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Abstract 
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The New Capital Accord (henceforth, Basel II), is expected to impose 
dramatic changes on banks and other providers of corporate financing, as 
well as companies. Literature indicates that small and medium sized 
enterprises (henceforth SMEs), in general, and in particular German SMEs 
seem to be affected: Germany has the highest SME density with SMEs 
comprising 99.6% of all corporations (IMF, 2008), these SMEs are highly 
dependent on banks for financing (see Jacobson et al, 2006). However, there 
is huge controversy in the literature concerning how these changes will look, 
right before Basel II came into effect in the years 2007 / 2008 in the 
European Union. In order to explore this effect from a Post-Basel II 
perspective, the objective of this research project is to establish what effect 
Basel II will have on corporate financing of SMEs in Germany. 
The high impact on SMEs (in Germany), combined with controversial 
evidence from extant Pre-Basel II research, indicates a high relevance to 
academics and practitioners for this thesis. This thesis is probably the first 
from a Post-Basel II perspective which covers both – the SMEs’ as well as 
the financiers’ perspective. 
Based on a structured literature review using the comparative method 
(Peters, 1998) ‘Most Different Systems’ evidence is provided that there is no 
consistent picture regarding the effect of Basel II. Therefore, further research 
is needed to determine whether the effect in Germany is consistent, from a 
Post-Basel II perspective, with regards to the conditions which trigger certain 
mechanisms, from a ‘scientific realism’ (Smith, 1998) perspective, because 
the literature indicates that ‘positivist generalising’ has limited validity. 
Building on Creswell (2003), an ‘exploratory sequential’ design was created 
to test three initial hypotheses (as confirmation or refutation of a theory, see 
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Gujarati, 2003:8): a multi-method design is best suited to the author’s 
philosophical stance of ‘scientific realism’ by means of triangulation (Robson, 
2002:174). The result of the initial quantitative phase is based on the analysis 
of questionnaire data from 125 SMEs and financiers (banks, private equity 
companies, family offices, providers of alternative means of financing) de-
rived from a probabilistic sample frame in the fourth quarter of 2008. Mathe-
matical models for SMEs and financiers regarding the three initial hypotheses 
were set-up and tested using the appropriate statistical tests. In order to limit 
bias by means of a spill-over effect from the financial crises, control 
questions were used. The subsequent qualitative phase by means of semi-
structured elite interviews (Saunders et al, 2007:312) between March and 
May 2009 enabled a valid triangulation and provided in-depth insights into 
how SMEs can cope best with Basel II. The purposive sample, of 17 ‘impor-
tant cases’, included company owners and top-level financier executives. 
In a conclusive quantitative and qualitative synopsis, the three initial 
hypotheses were acknowledged. However, the qualitative in-depth analysis 
by means of ‘causal networks’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) led to an 
amendment of the hypotheses as follows: 
1. Corporate finance has become different for SMEs because the ‘house 
bank principle’ has changed to a ‘core bank principle’ due to Basel II. 
Shopping around regarding credits will be more difficult which makes 
financing more difficult. This could be overcompensated by major SMEs, 
by using non-credit corporate financing which leads to a reduction of the 
‘house bank’ principle. 
2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: 
a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or 
b) they adjust their strategy as stated in hypothesis 3. 
3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME corporate 
finance when they have a sound financial basis / management and when 
they adjust their strategy in terms of growth with the aim of niche market 
leadership and when they open up for exit strategies. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research project is to establish what effect the recent 
New Capital Accord regulation by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (henceforth BCBS), will have on corporate financing of small and 
medium sized enterprises (henceforth SMEs) in Germany. The New Capital 
Accord directive (henceforth ‘Basel II’ or ‘New Accord’, in line with Hall, 2006) 
was initiated in 1996 (BCBS, 1996) by the G10 countries trying to unify the 
basis on which loans were granted. It gained momentum from 1997 
(Wahlström, 2009) and 2001 onwards (BCBS, 2001a), after the ‘Asian 
Financial Crisis’ and the stock market crash. The regulation is expected to 
impose dramatic changes on banks and other providers of corporate 
financing and companies alike.  
Years before Basel II became a European Union directive in 2006 (European 
Commission, 2006), Altman (2001:1) stated: ‘These guidelines could have an 
enormous impact on the safety, performance and competitive environment of 
both bank and non-bank financial institutions on a global basis.’ 
Finally, Basel II was signed by 13 countries of the EU, US, Japan and 
Switzerland and is a worldwide de-facto standard, yet not legally binding. In 
contrast the Capital Requirements Directive (henceforth CRD), which was 
derived from the New Basel II Accord, is legally binding in the 27 member 
states of the European Union. According to Mercieca et al (2007:1977) Basel 
II is ‘placing more competitive pressure upon banks’. 
 
In terms of corporations the effect on SMEs is decisive, particularly within 
Europe, and especially so in Germany. Several authors regard SMEs as the 
backbone of the European (Saurina and Trucharte, 2004, for example) and 
the German economy (see Bräunig and Lob, 2007, for example. Germany 
has the highest SME density with SMEs comprising 99.6% (IMF, 2008) of all 
corporations with a high dependence on bank credits (see Jacobson et al, 
2006, for example). In 2001, the early defining phase of Basel II, Germany 
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was the second largest banking economy after the United States (Grunert 
and Weber, 2009) and continues to be a ‘typical example of a bank-based 
economy’. As a consequence German SMEs seem to be most affected by 
the original drafts of the New Accord. It is therefore not surprising that the 
improvements made on Basel II regulations in favour of SMEs were due to 
successful lobby work from German authorities and the government, as well 
as the Deutsche Bank, the biggest German Bank, according to their CEO 
(Ackermann, 2003). 
 
However, there are diverging opinions regarding how these changes will 
look, even after the third Consultative Paper (BCBS, 2003), which brought 
some relief to SMEs.  
1.1 CLOSING THE RESEARCH GAP: 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES TESTED 
The high impact on SMEs (in Germany), combined with controversial 
evidence from extant Pre-Basel II research on what the impact of Basel II 
would be, indicates a high relevance to academics and practitioners (see 
sections 1.2 and 1.3) for this thesis, as it is one of the first from a Post-Basel 
II perspective. Based on the research objective stated above, the research 
question has to consider the effect of Basel II regulation on the financing of 
SMEs in Germany and how SMEs can cope with the effect. 
The author’s contribution to knowledge in closing this research gap will be 
threefold: it will add to this debate from a Post-Basel II rather than a Pre-
Basel II perspective; in contrast to the majority of research papers under 
review the SMEs’, as well as the financiers’, perspectives are taken into 
account; finally, evidence is provided regarding how SMEs can cope best 
with the situation. 
Based on Creswell (2003), an ‘exploratory sequential’ design, by means of a 
multi-method approach, is used as Basel II came into effect during the writing 
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of the thesis in Germany and such a design was suited best to the author’s 
philosophical stance of ‘scientific realism’ (Smith, 1998). Scientific realism is 
explained in detail in section 4.1.  
Based on intense background gathering and literature research (see section 
3) the following three initial hypotheses were formulated and tested by means 
of quantitative analysis (see section 4). The three initial hypotheses were: 
1. Corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because the 
‘house bank principle’ is deteriorating. 
2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: 
a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or 
b) they adjust their strategy as stated in hypothesis 3. 
3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME corporate 
finance when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth with the aim of 
niche market leadership and when they open up for exit strategies. 
 
By means of a consecutive qualitative phase (see section 6) the findings 
were triangulated which led to amended hypotheses in the final synopsis 
section (see section 7): this means, in terms of the first hypothesis, strong 
evidence that banking is moving from a ‘house bank principle’ towards a 
‘core bank principle’. Regarding hypothesis 3 a further focus on financial 
management / stability was added as an additional requirement. 
1.2 RELEVANCE TO ACADEMIA 
As indicated above, there are diverging opinions on how these changes will 
look. Authors like Altman and Sabato (2005) estimate that SMEs will have 
lower capital cost due the ‘pooling’ effects of Basel II. Dietsch and Petey 
(2004) argue that SMEs show a higher risk profile and will therefore 
experience higher capital cost.  
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Regarding the prediction of the Basel II effect as a continuum, in terms of 
‘ease of getting an SME loan’, these two authors are at the opposite sides of 
the continuum with others in between (see Figure 1): Golland and Gehlhaar 
(2002), for example, argue that financing will neither become cheaper / 
easier, nor more expensive / difficult – it will just move away from mere credit 
financing. 
 
Figure 1 Basel II predictions regarding Basel II impact 
 
These contrary findings are remarkable as the regulation of Basel II was set-
up to unify the application of loans and to ensure a better consistency in 
market behaviour, as the chairman of the Committee of European Banking 
Supervision (henceforth CEBS) points out (Roldán, 2006). This is even more 
staggering as nearly all authors generalise their findings in a positivistic way 
(Greasley, 2004). One of the explanations could be found in evaluating the 
underlying philosophical position of the authors in financial research: 
Saunders et al (2007) points out that research philosophy determines the 
research design. 
 
Whereas other social sciences moved towards realism in the 1970s (Bhaskar 
1975), authors like Ardalan (2003) state that the vast majority of finance 
research is based on positivism: the search for positivist truth still prevails in 
financial research and therefore this narrow scope has to be widened, for 
example, by applying a (scientific) realist approach. Wahlström (2009), for 
Golland and 
Gehlhaar (2002)
(indifferent) 
Altman and 
Sabato
(2005)
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
fo
r S
M
Es
 w
ill
 b
e
ea
si
er
 / 
ch
ea
pe
rd
ue
 to
 B
as
el
-II Financing for SM
Es w
ill be
m
ore difficult  / expensive
due to B
asel-II
Dietsch and
Petey
(2004)
Larsen and Bjerkeland 
(2005) 
Jacobson et al
(2005) 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 19 of 463 
example, criticises the mere statistical research approach on Basel II. This is 
in line with other corporate finance research, according to Aziz and Humayon 
(2006), who evaluated 180 surveys. As pointed out by Schmid (2007) several 
research studies, like the ones mentioned in VanHoose (2007), have a 
certain or even high internal validity (Girden, 2001:4-5). The problems arise 
when these authors, who use for example, a one-factor empirical approach, 
generalise their findings, beyond the given scope which can harm external 
validity (Robson, 2002:107). Therefore, the author will use a special 
sequential research design (see section 4.2) from a scientific realist stance 
(Sayer, 2000) in order to overcome these limitations by means of 
triangulation (Robson, 2002:174) as will be explained in section 4.1. 
1.3 RELEVANCE TO PRACTITIONERS 
According to Scholtens (2000), there are three determinants of the financial 
architecture: financial markets, financial institutions and financial regulation. 
Basel II has an effect on all three determinants: 7,000 European banks are 
affected (Barfield, 2004a) who have to spend up to 150 million euros each, 
especially in IT, in order to cope with the regulation. On the other hand it is 
predicted, in the research for the European Council of Ministers, that bank 
capital could be reduced by up to 100 billion euros with Basel II. This issue of 
reducing capital has to be seen in the light of regulator objectives. According 
to Koziol and Lawrenz (2009), assessing the risk of bank failures is the 
paramount concern of banking regulation. Viale et al (2009) argue that the 
recently adopted Basel II standards increasingly emphasize the use of 
market discipline as a major regulatory device. 
 
In a German context, the dominating financial institutes are banks 
(Scholtens, 200). Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (henceforth KfW), the 
German state-owned SME bank, regards Basel II as a ‘catalyst’ (Reize, 
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2007:86) for a risk-adjusted granting of credit. Josef Ackermann (2003:79), 
CEO of Deutsche Bank, the biggest German bank, states that the 
‘preparation for Basel II is one of the four key tasks for German banks to 
react to global development on the financial markets with its far reaching 
impacts’. 
 
Germany has a three pillars banking system consisting of commercial banks 
(357 in 2005), savings banks (‘Sparkassen’, 463 in 2005) and cooperative 
banks (1,293 in 2005, Engel and Middendorf, 2010). According to Engel and 
Middendorf (2009), both pillars (savings banks and state banks, so-called 
‘Landesbanken’) have an explicit mandate to promote SMEs. They have 
been the prime source of SME lending (Sachverständigenrat, 2005) as these 
banks belong to state or local authorities and act as a ‘virtual extension’ of 
regional politicians to foster regional development and labour. These state 
guarantees (so-called ‘Anstaltslast’ and ‘Gewährträgerhaftung’) ‘supported a 
good refinancing’ according to Schauerte (2006:13), the German State 
Secretary for Mittelstand affairs. 
 
This changed dramatically when the guarantees of the state-owned 
Landesbanken or Sparkassen were removed. This happened in 2005 after 
the German government adjusted the legislation in the year 2002, following 
an agreement from July 2002 (Monti, 2003) as a reaction to complaints from 
the European Commission concerning unfair competition. On the verge of 
this foreseeable decision, credits rates have risen by 12.5% since 2003, 
according to Kerle’s (2006) research. However, there are academic studies 
which do not come to this conclusion. Based on empirical research on a large 
data set of German banks, Engel and Middendorf (2010) did not see any 
significant difference in financing constraints, or a disproportionately high 
attraction of ‘more financially constrained’ firms to savings banks. 
Therefore, Basel II, with its more ‘mechanistic approach’ (see quote from an 
interviewed SME in the author’s empirical qualitative research), in relation to 
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‘politically influenced lending’ of the past (see above), will have a dramatic 
effect on German companies in general and German SMEs in particular, as 
bank loans are the prime sources of SME financing (see Jacobson et al, 
2006, Reize, 2007 or Russell-Walling, 2007, for example). 
 
SMEs are the backbone of the European and especially the German 
economy. In the time of the formulation of a unified SME definition (European 
Commission, 2003a), approximately 23 million SMEs represented 99% of the 
EU-25 corporations. The importance of SMEs in Germany can be assessed 
by the fact that a special noun exists for SMEs, the so-called ‘Mittelstand’. 
Using the most common definition (IfM, 2008) ‘Mittelstand’ comprise SMEs 
according to the EU definition (European Commission, 2003b), plus slightly 
bigger companies up to a total of 500 employees. 
Therefore, the majority of banks (and SMEs) are affected as Germany’s 
banking landscape is highly fragmented (Lahusen, 2004) and smaller 
institutes normally have SMEs as clients due to their privileged relationship 
lending situation (Berger, 2004). According to Kirschenmann and Norden 
(2007:31) ‘small business lending is an especially interesting case because 
… relationship lending is more common than in case of lending to large 
firms.’  
 
As a consequence CFOs (SFS, 2003) regard Basel II, with its increased 
disclosure requirements towards banks, to be the second biggest issue in 
Germany after changes in corporate taxation: according to De Jong et al 
(2008), Germany has one of the highest corporation taxes. On the verge of 
Basel II credit demand outpaced supply by SMEs by 142% (Reize, 2007).  
However, KfW-negotiator in the Basel II committee, Lob, states that the SME-
package will provide SMEs with ‘a not unsubstantial advantage’ (Bräunig and 
Lob, 2007). On the other hand, authors like Golland and Gehlhaar (2002) or 
Sandvoß (2007) argue – with reference to Basel II – that in Germany the 
famous ‘Hausbank-Prinzip’ (Kirschenmann and Norden, 2007) is eroding. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 22 of 463 
The house bank principle means that an SME will exclusively carry out nearly 
all financing activities with one institute, often for decades. In literature 
outside Germany this is often referred to as ‘relationship lending’ (see Altman 
and Sabato, 2005, for example). The high leverage of German SMEs is 
linked to the low equity ratio of SMEs which comprises 7.5% (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2003:41). This is significantly lower compared to other 
European countries (Irsch, 2003). Even worse, in times of the current crisis, 
Stoltz and Wedow (2005) provide evidence based on Pre-Basel II data that 
capital buffers fluctuate cyclically with business cycles – with a stronger 
fluctuation in terms of savings banks than for cooperative banks. Fedorenko 
et al (2007:16) point out that the length of credit is now nearly exclusively 
determined by rating rather than the duration of the business relation: ‘In the 
wake of Basel II it seems as if German house-banks reorient their business 
model towards the more arms-length lending policy of US-banks.’  
 
As a consequence, major SMEs in particular are seeking alternatives to bank 
credits, such as private equity, stock market and other forms of alternative 
funds, like mezzanine, leasing, factoring and Asset Based Securities 
(henceforth ABS), as Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006), Hofmann et al (2007), 
Lehmann et al (2004), Schäfer et al (2007), SFS (2003) or Schmit (2004), 
point out. However, banks try to adjust to the situation: on the one hand, they 
cut back the ‘Hausbank’ (house bank) principle. On the other hand they try to 
stay the dominant financing partner of the German SMEs. 
Research in the years 2008 and 2009 (including this thesis) indicate that the 
sustainable effect of Basel II is a major issue, even compared to the recent 
(and hopefully shorter-term) subprime crisis, although Hall (2008:19), for 
example, reflects on the Northern Rock case as ‘the first fully-blown nation-
wide deposit run on a UK bank for 140 years.’ The German Ifo Institut 
(Abberger, 2009) reported in August 2008, in their monthly economic activity 
report, that the business climate increased for the second time in a row and 
that the increase is ‘carried by many sectors’. 
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Based on a company survey in Germany amongst 25 associations and KfW, 
Plankensteiner and Zimmermann (2008) pointed out that the credit trend on 
the verge of Basel II is differentiated: whereas only 11.0% of major 
corporations stated that getting credit became more difficult, 13.8% to 37.4% 
of the SMEs actually found it so. Abberger and Kunkel (2008) confirm these 
findings. This is contrary to a survey amongst 113 banks by the European 
Central Bank (ECB, 2008) stating that net tightening of credit increased more 
for larger corporations rather than for SMEs. As no consistent picture 
emerges there is a need for more in-depth research. 
 
The relevance of the author’s research is underlined by the fact that several 
leading financial news services (VC-facts, 32/2009 and M&A News, 32/2009) 
and SME decision maker magazines (Going Public Media ‘Entrepreneur 
Magazine’ IV/2009 and Markt & Mittelstand 7/8 2009, see section 4) 
published articles from the author, published interviews with the author or 
wrote articles based on the author’s findings. 
The issues mentioned earlier are not only relevant to the audience stated 
above but to the author’s business as well. The author is founder and 
manager of a corporate finance consultancy dedicated to SME financing. 
Prior to that he was General Manager and Member of the Board of several 
national and international consulting and training companies, as well as 
Director of an Accenture Company, regarding Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland. In doing so he managed over 20 SME corporate finance 
transactions – as manager, consultant or entrepreneur. He is a member of 
the Bavarian Journalist Association and Member of the Jury of the biggest 
German Business Plan competition which fosters entrepreneurship. 
Therefore, this professional expertise and network contributes to the thesis, 
for example, by getting access to top-level interviewees, such as the fund 
manager of an industrial family with a fortune of several billion euros, which 
would have been otherwise hardly feasible as these kinds of managers do 
not normally participate in research. 
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1.4 CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE AND TO KNOWLEDGE 
Academics and practitioners came up with a variety of models and empirical 
studies at different stages of the Basel II discussion. 
 
However, some of the research studies seem at least partly outdated due to 
the on going changes in Basel II regulation, such as Acharya (2003), Buch 
(2003), Cowley (2002), Carey et al (1998), Garside and Bech (2003), Golland 
and Gehlhaar (2002), and Hudson (2003). Some research studies focus too 
narrowly, for example, on a special sector, like Hartl (2002), BWI (2002), 
Partsch and Wlaschitz (2002) or Schwaiger (2002). 
The majority of research focuses either primarily on the effect on financiers, 
like Altman and Sabato (2005), Berger (2004), Cumming and Johan (2007), 
Dietsch and Petey (2004), Jacobsen et al (2006) or Nitschke and Kuper 
(2007). Or, they address primarily the effect on corporations, such as Aziz 
and Humayon (2006), Diller et al (2005), Ehrhart and Zimmermann (2007), 
Heid (2007), Kopecky and VanHoose (2006), Larsen and Bjerkeland (2005) 
or Schäfer et al (2007). 
 
According to the author, there has been no comprehensive study so far, after 
Basel II came into effect during 2007 and 2008, which covers both the effect 
on financiers, as well as the effect on SMEs in Germany, regarding SME 
financing. Furthermore, there is huge controversy on how the effects of Basel 
II will develop – in general and especially with respect to SMEs. The thesis 
will, therefore, contribute to practice in order to close the research gap in two 
ways. First, by evaluating the effect of Basel II in line with the main focus of 
pre-Basel II research and second by providing guidelines on how SMEs can 
cope best with the changes imposed. 
 
Based on a comprehensive literature review the author’s empirical research 
aims to establish the effect on financiers and SMEs from an initial Post-Basel 
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II perspective, with further insights into how SMEs can cope best with the 
changes imposed by Basel II. Therefore, it is evaluated whether certain 
patterns in the research designs exist (especially Basel II factors under 
research) which lead to certain outcomes. Research designs and research 
outcomes are set into relation in order to decide which research design is 
best suited for closing the research gap from a scientific realism stance. 
 
Secondly, using the findings from this ‘clustering’, the author will come up 
with a model for a research design which tries to avoid the limitations of the 
predominant positivist approach. Based on the author’s scientific realism 
stance a ‘sequential mixed method’, aligned to Creswell’s (2003) approach, is 
used as a means of ‘triangulation’. The concept of triangulation and mixed-
method design is explained in depth in section 4.1 and 4.2.2 with regard to 
the related concept of ‘falsifiability’ (Popper, 2002:345). Applying theoretical 
and methodological rigour, as well as higher practical relevance, the author’s 
thesis approach aligns with ‘pragmatic science’ in the ‘typology of research’ 
by Hodgkinson et al (2001) (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2 ‘Typology of Research’ (Hodgkinson et al, 2001) 
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1.5 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
In terms of research unit SMEs, the classification of the European 
Commission (European Commission, 2003b) is used, as it builds the basis 
for the CRD. As in Germany an SME is established which comprises some 
major companies as well (2.5.1); for reasons of comparison a representative 
of this major ‘Mittelstand’ is included in the qualitative part of the research. 
 
As stated already, Sandvoß (2007) argues that the financing sector 
underwent a major change due to Basel II with banks becoming ‘facilitators’ 
of various financing options. The research unit regarding financiers is 
segmented in line with Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006), Hartl (2002), 
Lehmann et al (2004), Schäfer et al (2007), SFS (2003), and Schmit (2004), 
into banks and non-bank financiers, such as private equity, mezzanine, 
leasing, factoring and ABS. Banks and non-bank financiers are henceforth 
referred to as financiers. 
As the aim of a DBA (in contrast to a PhD) is to appeal to an academic 
audience as well as a practitioners’ audience, research from the academic 
side, as well as from the practitioners’ side is embraced in the literature 
review. Especially regarding practitioners’ research, special care has been 
taking how to cope with bias. In addition, the soundness regarding research 
standards in terms of internal and external validity (Saunders et al, 137) is 
evaluated in more depth in section 3. However, leaving out practitioners’ 
research in an empirical DBA context would harm the validity of the author’s 
DBA research as a means of triangulation from the author’s scientific realism 
perspective (Smith, 1998). 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In line with suggestions by Saunders et al (2007:526-531) the thesis is 
organized as follows: 
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Section 2 provides an overview of Basel II. Starting with a critique of the 
former Basel Accord from 1988 (BCBS, 1988) this section presents the so-
called three pillars of the New Basel Accord with a special focus on SME 
related issues. An overview of the worldwide application and a review of 
critique regarding the New Accord are provided. The section closes with a 
comprehensive overview of corporate financing in Germany with regards to 
supply and demand issues as well as information infrastructure. 
 
The literature review will be in line with suggestions by Saunders et al 
(2007:61), starting from a more general level to elements where new aspects 
are added by this thesis. Therefore, the general literature review, which was 
touched upon in the introduction, becomes more elaborated upon in section 2 
regarding a critical review of Basel II. In section 3 the (primarily) Pre-Basel II 
state of research on the (expected) Basel II effect on SMEs is reviewed, 
primarily using Pre-Basel II research, as Basel II was active partly since 2007 
and fully since 2008 in Europe, with certain transition periods. As the 
literature review builds a foundation for the research design, frequent 
references to the research objective / question as well as to the three 
research hypotheses are made, as these are evaluated and tested within the 
empirical quantitative and qualitative sections 5 and 6. 
A special comparative method (Most Different Systems) is used for 
structuring and describing the findings of the author’s literature research 
covering EU-25 countries as well as the US, Australia and parts of Asia, as 
these are drivers behind the New Accord. The literature research provides 
evidence that no consistent picture regarding the effect on Basel II exists 
from a holistic, positivist viewpoint: neither regarding the discriminating factor 
‘country’, nor regarding cross-country discriminating factors like ‘financial 
markets-based economies vs. banking-based economies’. 
 
Based on the literature review the research design is explained in the method 
chapter in section 4. A sequential mixed-method design is applied as this 
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triangulation approach is suited best to the philosophical position of scientific 
realism and helps to validate context-sensitive findings in relation to the 
diverging Basel II research. The central concepts of scientific realism, semi-
structured interviews in the qualitative phase and triangulation are explained 
and justified in depth within this chapter. The research approach, strategy, 
choices and data collection and analysis techniques derive from the research 
purpose and objective stated above are introduced in relation to the findings 
from the literature review. 
 
In section 5, the results of the quantitative analysis are provided; these relate 
to the self-administered questionnaires sent to SMEs and financiers. 
Mathematical models were set up regarding the three hypotheses from an 
SME’s, as well as from a financier’s, perspective. These models were tested 
using the appropriate statistical tests. 
 
Likewise, section 6 provides the findings of the subsequent qualitative 
analysis based on ‘causal networks’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) related to 
the semi-structured elite interviews. 
 
Section 7 concludes by means of a triangulation synopsis of the findings of 
the mixed-method design. 
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2 BASEL II 
The ‘New Capital Accord’ was established to overcome the limitations of 
Basel I which goes back to 1988 (BCBS, 1988): the New Capital Accord by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (henceforth Basel Committee’ 
or ‘BCBS’) tries to address a better and more risk sensitive allocation of 
capital as a central goal. Basel II (BCBS 2004) was initiated in 1996 (BCBS, 
1996) by the G10 countries trying to unify the basis on which loans are 
granted. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established in 1974 as a 
reaction to a crisis, namely the default of Bankhaus Herstatt, a relatively 
small German private Bank (BCBS, 2009a). The intention of the Basel 
Committee with the New Capital Accord was to limit the so called ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’ (BCBS, 1999) as a reaction to the Asian Financial Crises 
(Wahlström, 2009). Regulatory capital (henceforth RC, bank capital enforced 
by regulator, see BCBS, 2004) was to become close to economic capital 
(henceforth EC, bank capital allocated by a bank via internal management 
decision, Scott, 2002). Therefore the capital allocation became more risk 
sensitive compared to Basel I. For example, market risk was developed in 
more depth (BCBS, 2004). 
Credit risk and operational risk are quantified in a sophisticated manner. This 
is in contrast to the broad brush credit risk approach of Basel I which caused 
‘adverse selection’ to a much greater extent. According to Leary and Roberts 
(2005), adverse selection (a company has a better credit quality than 
assessed and vice versa, Jankowitsch et al, 2007) is an important 
determinant in financing decisions. This relates to the second part of the 
research objective: how can SMEs cope best with the effect of the new and 
much more sophisticated Basel II regime? 
Starting with a short recollection of Basel I, the Basel II history and the three 
pillars of Basel II are explained in general, as well as in relation to SMEs, the 
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international application and selected critics. The section closes with 
considerations of supply and demand issues and an overview of corporate 
financing in Germany on the verge of the Basel II inception in 2007 / 2008. 
2.1 BASEL I VINTAGE 
In order to understand the implications of Basel II, a brief outline of Basel I is 
presented, as criticism from practitioners led to the development of Basel II 
starting with the amendment of 1996 (Lamy, 2006). 
Basel I was initiated by the G10 bank supervisors (Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States), and Luxembourg and was agreed in July 1988 (Hall, 2006). 
Therefore under the 1988 Accord banks had to hold capital of at least 8% of 
their Risk Weighted Assets (henceforth RWA, see BCBS, 1988) as RC. 
Nordal (2009) states: ‘The aim of this RC is to provide a cushion that can 
absorb large and sudden deficits in the bank’s earnings and thereby avoid a 
bank failure’. The risk weights range from a factor of 0% for accounts 
receivables of OECD banks and 100% for bank loans. Basel I was 
implemented by banks internationally from 1993 onwards (Hall, 2006). 
This ‘one-fits-all’ approach was criticised, for example, by von Thadden 
(2004) because all risks are treated alike, despite more and more advanced 
risk management methods. 
2.2 BASEL II HISTORY 
In order to overcome the limitations of Basel I the first ideas on a ‘New 
Accord’ were published in June 1999 (BCBS, 1999) by means of a first 
Consultative Paper (‘A New Capital Adequacy Framework’). The aim of Basel 
II was to ‘develop a framework that would further strengthen the soundness 
and stability of the international banking system’ and to ensure ‘more risk 
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sensitive capital requirements’ (BCBS, 2004). Furthermore, it intended to 
foster a fair, competitive environment, to provide a framework applicable to 
non-international banks (see hypotheses 2.b and 3), and to ensure, in 
general, the Basel I regulatory capital basis, yet provide an incentive-
compatible regulatory capital regulation (Suyter, 2008). 
 
It contained the outline of the so-called ‘three pillars’ which are explained 
below. Based on further discussions by the affected parties a second 
Consultative Paper was published in January 2001 (BCBS, 2001a). Following 
studies within the banking industry (von Thadden, 2004) a third Consultative 
Paper (BCBS, 2003) was issued in April 2003 (Hall, 2006). This paper was 
further refined (Lamy, 2006) by including the results of the third Quantitative 
Impact Study (henceforth QIS, see BCBS, 2003) from May 2003, as well as 
comments from banks and the March 2004 modifications (Lamy, 2006). 
 
These studies led to the final version of Basel II published under the title 
“International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards” in 
June 2004 (BCBS, 2004). In total four quantitative impact studies (henceforth 
QIS) were conducted in 2001 (QIS1, see Quaglia, 2008), 2002 (QIS2, see 
BCBS, 2001c), 2004 (QIS3, see BCBS, 2002) and 2005 (QIS5) ‘concerning 
the implementation of the new rules and such assessments in aggregate 
terms … that is, they were not country or sector specific’ (Quaglia 2008). As 
countries, such as Germany, were not satisfied with the findings they 
conducted their own ‘national impact studies’ (QIS4, see BCBS, 2005a) – 
German authorities were especially concerned about the ‘Mittelstand’-impact. 
The fear was that SMEs might suffer due to the cyclical effect and lack of 
external rating (see hypothesis 2.a) as the German Banking Association 
(BdB, 2003) points out, and Germany regarded this to be a competitive 
disadvantage (Lütz, 2004). 
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Fostered by the CEBS (Bauer, 2004) the final version became a European 
Directive in June 2006 (CRD, European Commission, 2006). Yet, there are 
some differences between Basel II and CRD (Quaglia, 2008), for example, 
on intra-group exposure which became important regarding Germany’s 
connected savings and cooperative banks (which serve as the primary 
‘house banks’ according to Quaglia, 2008, see hypothesis 1): Basel II only 
applies to banks, whereas CRD applies to investment firms too (Quaglia, 
2008). This relates to the focus of Basel II on non-bank financiers, as stated 
in hypotheses 2.b and 3. 
 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the Basel II from the official documentation 
(BCBS, 2004:6) 
 
Figure 3 Overview Basel II (BCBS, 2004:6) 
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2.3 BASEL II - PILLAR 1 (MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS) 
Basel II can primarily be regarded as a reaction to criticism on ‘credit 
arbitrage’ (BCBS, 1999). Therefore the issues summarised under Pillar 1 are 
at the core focus of research conducted on Basel II. Whereas in Basel I the 
regulatory capital was flat at 8% (BCBS, 1988), banks can choose between 
various approaches (Lamy, 2006) to determine RC within Basel II. Besides 
credit risk, Pillar 1 deals with operational risk and market risk as well. These 
factors account for approximately 1% in Germany (see Figure 4), according 
to empirical calculations by Schwaiger (2008). 
 
 
 RC = SC x (RWA from credit risk + amount accounted to market 
   risk and operational risk x 12.5) 
 with 
 SC = 8% (= Solvability Coefficient) 
 RWA = Risk Weighted Asset (from credit risk as explained below) 
 
Figure 4 Basel II Regulatory Capital scheme 
2.3.1 Credit Risk 
The evaluation scheme regarding regulatory capital stays, in principle, 
unchanged (Suyter, 2008). Regulatory capital is calculated by multiplying the 
weighted total exposure (the exposure of default multiplied by the risk weight) 
with the solvency coefficient (unchanged at 8%) incorporating regulatory 
capital for operational and market risk as well.  
According to van Thadden (2004), one of the essential elements of the third 
Consultative Paper in April 2003 was that banks in two of the three credit risk 
approaches would have to conduct ratings on their own – this was a big 
change (see hypothesis 2.a). The bank internal rating imposes a much higher 
responsibility according to Agarwal and Taffler (2008:1541) ‘because a poor 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 34 of 463 
credit risk model could lead to sub-optimal capital allocation.’ They believe 
that accounting based models are superior to market based models based on 
an extensive set of UK data. Jankowitsch et al (2007:181) estimated that 
‘improving a rating system with low accuracy to medium accuracy can 
increase the annual rate of return on a portfolio by 30 to 40 bp’. According to 
the 2004 Basel Accord (Krink et al, 2008:2275), a rating system ‘comprises 
all of the methods, processes, controls, and data collection and IT systems 
that support the assessment of credit risk, the assignment of internal risk 
ratings, and the quantification of default and loss estimates’. 
From a practitioner’s point of view, Hromadka (2008) regards this as a great 
leap forward. However, Suyter doubted the ‘incentive part’, especially 
regarding SMEs (see below). Finally, the April 2004 modifications (Hall, 
2006) include the fact that expected losses are covered by special 
provisions, whereas the capital requirement addresses only unexpected 
losses (henceforth UL-only, see Lamy, 2006). 
Banks can chose amongst the so-called Standardised Approach (henceforth 
SA, see Saurina and Trucharte, 2004) and the two so-called Internal Rating 
Based approaches (henceforth IRB, see Repullo and Suarez, 2004), as will 
be explained below. In general, the simpler SA method contains a bit more 
security surcharge in relation to the more sophisticated IRB approaches 
(according to Wilkens et al, 2007). 
 
Standardised Approach (SA) 
In the SA banks stick to the 8% capital requirement of weighted total 
exposure in order to calculate the regulatory capital. Regarding secured 
loans, banks’ own Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques (henceforth CRMT, 
Suyter, 2008) apply. Concerning the acknowledgement of securities, a simple 
or a more comprehensive approach can be used. In short, the first is based 
on a substitution equivalence principle; within the latter, a broader range can 
be taken into account such as investment funds (Schumann and Daldrup, 
2005), using ‘haircuts’ (see below) in order to add a security buffer. In 
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addition, one of the interviewees (see section 6) points out that an important 
element of the SME package included SME affine securities. The CRMT 
regulation covers qualitative issues, for example, a non positive correlation of 
creditor and borrower, and quantitative issues like so-called ‘haircuts’ (‘safety 
reductions’, BCBS, 2004) or the introduction of floors which avoid the Loss 
Given Default (see below) falling below certain thresholds (e.g. 35% for 
accounts receivables, see Suyter, 2008). 
Creditors are ranked in seven classes via external ratings, to which specific 
risk weights are applied. For example, ‘other retail’ gets a risk weight of only 
75% whereas corporate loans have a risk weight of 100%, as in Basel I, if 
they are not rated under national discretion (BCBS, 2004:19). Otherwise the 
weight will be between 20% and 150% depending on the respective external 
rating (Schumann and Daldrup, 2005). According to the German regulation 
Solvabilitätsverordnung (henceforth SolvV), paragraph 52 and paragraph 53 
(Suyter, 2008), DBRS, Fitch Ratings, S&P (McGraw-Hill Companies) and 
Moody’s are accredited in Germany. This differentiation is especially 
important regarding SMEs (see hypothesis 2.a) which will be discussed in 
section 2.5.2, as SMEs can be included in the favourable ‘other retail’ group 
under certain conditions. Paul (2007a) attributes this to a natural risk 
diversification in retail portfolios. 
 
Internal Rating Based (IRB) Approaches 
Within the novel IRB approaches the capital requirements vary based on 
ratings which are carried out by the bank internally. The IRB approach means 
that regulatory capital is based on the ‘inherent risk that each obligor, or 
homogeneous group obligors, add to the credit portfolio of each bank’ 
(Saurina and Trucharte, 2004:123). The application of the IRB-approach is 
subject to approval by national supervisors (Jacobson et al, 2005). Credits 
are divided into five risk classes: sovereigns, banks, corporate (with five sub-
classes of specialised lending and purchased receivables), retail (with three 
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sub-classes and purchased receivables), and equity (BCBS, 2004:48). 
Therefore, banks have to assess the following risk components (based on 
Lamy, 2006 and Suyter, 2008):  
> ‘Probability of Default’ (henceforth PD), of a creditor or a group of creditors 
(‘PD bucket’, Krink et al, 2008) by means of internal rating: banks are 
required to have at least a one-year PD estimate per rating class. 
Therefore, enough data is to be collected for at least one economic cycle. 
Schwaiger (2008) suggests that PDs can directly be derived from score 
values of the rating system. 
> ‘Exposure at Default’ (henceforth EAD): EAD is, in simplified terms, the 
height of credit at the time of the default which may be a result of creditors’ 
decisions or external conditions in case of market-driven exposures. 
> ‘Loss Given Default’ (henceforth LGD), expressed as a percentage of 
exposures, is an estimate of the portion of any exposure that will be lost 
when a creditor defaults (in the SA the LGD is fixed for unsecured credits). 
> Maturity of Exposures (henceforth M), the effective remaining time until the 
credit has to be repaid (in the SA 2.5 years are used for M). 
 
These variables build the basis for the so-called ‘risk loss function’ to 
calculate the regulatory capital for unexpected losses (see below). If banks 
run one of the two IRB approaches they are required to apply the SA as a 
means of comparison and consistency checking (Rowe, 2004). Within the 
IRB approach banks can choose between the so-called Foundation 
Approach (henceforth F-IRB) and the Advanced Approach (henceforth A-
IRB). Using the F-IRB approach, banks primarily estimate the PD values and 
carry over estimates from supervisors for other variables (BCBS, 2004): 
> The PD values are calculated as the average default probabilities over at 
least a five year period. Krink et al (2008:2275) point out: ‘Within such a 
system [rating], a key role is played by the PD.’  
> EAD is defined as outstanding or used credits, plus granted but not yet 
used credit approvals, the Credit Conversion Factor (henceforth CCF, 
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Suyter, 2008). The latter is ‘0’ if the approval can be withdrawn at any 
time. Within the A-IRB approach a bank can make its own CCF estimates. 
> Within the F-IRB approach the Loss Given Default (LGD) (see below) ran-
ges between 45% and 75% for unsecured loans. Regarding secured loans 
a bank can use the comprehensive CRM approach. A-IRB banks instead 
can use their own LGD judgements (Suyter, 2008) based on ‘best-practi-
ces’. Furthermore (nearly) all kinds of securities can be taken into account. 
> M is fixed to 2.5 years in the F-IRB approach; a middle value is used in the 
A-IRB approach with certain floors and caps. 
 
The internal or external rating consequently has a strong influence on the 
capital requirement (see hypothesis 2.a) as rating determines the PD and 
LGD (Lamy, 2006). Therefore, the A-IRB approach requires much more 
sophisticated systems and methods in order to derive this granular risk 
adjusted regulatory capital. Furthermore, all credit securities can fully be 
taken into account, which is not the case under F-IRB (Suyter, 2008). 
Regulatory capital regarding credit risk (see Figure 5) is therefore calculated 
in the IRB approaches as follows (BCBS, 2004:57-60): 
 
 
 RC (regarding credit risk) = 
 RCCR = RWA x SC 
 RWA = EAD x K 
 with K = f(PD*, LGD, M*) * UL-only 
 RCCR = Regulatory Capital (Credit Risk) 
 RWA = Risk Weighted Asset 
 SC = 8% (= Solvability Coefficient) 
 EAD = Exposure at Default 
 K = capital requirement function 
 PD* = ‘modified PD’ (Lamy, 2006), the PD modification contains a further coefficient and 
     an SME deduction (Size Adjustment Factor) of up to 4% (Schwaiger, 2008) 
 LGD = Loss Given Default 
 M* = MAF, the Maturity Adjustment Factor (Schwaiger, 2008), 
 UL-only = 1.06 (see below, adjustment factor from EU regulators due to ‘UL-only’ calculation) 
 
Figure 5 Basel II IRB Regulatory Capital scheme Credit Risk 
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Originally it was planned (see third Consultative Paper, BCBS, 2003) to take 
expected losses and unexpected losses into account. This was changed due 
to criticisms from banks: they argued that in the case of expected losses, a 
double provision would take place as banks already make specific provisions 
for expected losses (Schumann and Daldrup, 2005). Therefore, with the April 
2004 consultations (BCBS, 2004), only unexpected losses were taken into 
account in the credit risk related regulatory capital. Therefore, a UL-only 
surcharge of 6% was added which brings the regulatory capital close to the 
Basel I level. According to Schwaiger (2008), this was intended by politics: 
based on Creditreform data the average in Germany would be 7.22% 
including operational risk charges (Schwaiger, 2008). 
As a result, the capital charge curves (that means Risk Weight Assets x 8% 
in relation to PD) became more flat (Suyter, 2008). Furthermore, there is a 
distinction related to the size of the company – SMEs get a special linear 
deduction (between 50 and 5 million euros, BCBS, 2004, 60) in the corporate 
curve of up to 4% (Schwaiger, 2008). 
In order to comply with Basel II, especially with the (A-)IRB approach(es), a 
bank has to fulfil certain criteria, such as a substantial risk differentiation in ‘7 
+ 1’ classes (the last one is the default class), an adequate rating system, a 
valid data track record via effective IT-systems, valid one-year PD estimates 
(and the other variables in the F-IRB approach), stress tests and disclosure 
requirements (Suyter, 2008). However, according to Suyter (2008), stress 
tests incorporate deviations of around 30% which are minor compared to a 
PD change of 0.37 to 1.38 from BB+ to BB-. Regarding the internal rating 
systems, the controlling feedback-loop should entail calibrating, planning and 
validating the system on an on going basis (Schwaiger, 2008). 
As the IRB requires a data history between three years (PD) and seven years 
(EAD and LGD), there are transition periods, for example, regarding the PD 
of two years (BCBS, 2004). However, cherry picking (Suyter, 2008) should 
be avoided as in general all elements have to be applied regarding the 
approach chosen within a certain period of time. 
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2.3.2 Market Risk 
Market risk (BCBS, 2004:188) comprises the risk of losses derived from 
changes in market factors. In the Standardised Approach (SA) this contains: 
equity risk (risk of changing stock prices), interest rate risk (changes in 
interest rates), currency risk (changes in foreign exchange rates), and 
commodity risk (changes in commodity prices like raw materials). 
Within the Internal Models Approach (henceforth IMA) the most common 
methodology for measuring operational risk is Value at Risk (henceforth VaR) 
as a financier’s equity holders can benefit from risk-based capital 
requirements according to Dangl and Lehar (2004). VaR is the maximum loss 
not exceeded – with a given probability defined as the confidence level over 
a given period of time. Regarding Basel II, a period of ten days is taken into 
account (BCBS, 2004:39). VaR has several limitations (see section 2.10) 
which are derived from the underlying assumptions. One is that the portfolio 
composition has to be stable over the period under review. Furthermore, 
other changes, like changes in interest rates or embedded options, are not 
taken into account. 
However, specific risk measures can be used to address changes in special 
investors, for example, if certain sectors experience unrelated changes to the 
rest of the market. 
For estimating the VaR value (that is the maximum value at risk) various 
methods could be used (BCBS, 2004:108), such as variance-covariance 
(VCV, based on a normal distribution assumption), historical simulation (the 
distribution in the future is assumed to be the same as in the past) or Monte 
Carlo simulation (using a random simulation of future returns, see Train, 
2009:267). By using an empirical model, Pérignon et al (2008) point out that 
banks overestimate the risk by introducing an empirically not justified 
conservative security buffer, despite sophisticated models. However, the 
results are based on a period between 1999 and 2005 – well before the 
subprime crisis. 
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2.3.3 Operational Risk 
Schmidt (2007) argues that the expected reduction in credit risk by 12% will 
be compensated by the operational risk charges. Operational risk is defined 
as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events’ (BCBS, 2004:137-157). 
According to Kaiser (2007), operational risk is included due to high levels of 
realised losses from Barings or Orange County, for example. 
It is allowed for a bank under the regime of the New Accord to use and apply 
its own definition if certain minimum criteria are fulfilled. The required event 
types are (BCBS, 2004, Annex 7): internal fraud (misappropriation of assets, 
tax evasion, intentional mismarking of positions, bribery), external fraud (theft 
of information, hacking damage, third-party theft and forgery), employment 
practices and workplace safety (discrimination, workers’ compensation, 
employee health and safety), clients, products, and business practice (market 
manipulation, antitrust, improper trade, product defects, fiduciary breaches, 
account churning), damage to physical assets (natural disasters, terrorism, 
vandalism), business disruption and system failures (utility disruptions, 
software failures, hardware failures), execution, delivery, and process 
management (data entry errors, accounting errors, failed mandatory 
reporting, negligent loss of client assets). 
Grody et al (2008) point out that the Basel Committee overturned itself with 
its Consultative Paper of 2003 by redefining operational risk to the 
assessment of risk rather than the measurement. This led to a ‘dashboard-
like’ categorisation. 
In order to deploy this standard the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2004:137-141) 
prescribes one of the following three methods in order to quantify operational 
risk (see Dutta and Perry, 2007): 
 
> The Basic Indicator Approach (henceforth BIA) is recommended primarily 
for nationwide operating banks. It is based on the annual revenue of the 
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financial institution: the operational risk capital required is related to the 
last three years average gross income (years with positive income only). 
The percentage is set by the Basel Committee. 
> The Standardised Approach (SA) uses a likewise average method but on 
an aggregated business line basis. Within Basel II eight business lines are 
distinguished (BCBS, 2004, Annex 6): corporate finance, trading and 
sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment and settlement, 
agency services, asset management, and retail brokerage. The gross 
income figures for the business lines are ‘weighted’ with a beta factor 
setting the industry average of operational risk in relation to the average 
gross income for the respective business line. As this approach needs a 
higher sophistication regarding each business line, banks have to 
demonstrate that they have the management capacity to assess the 
operational risk framework for all business lines (BCBS, 2004:141-142). 
> Within the Advanced Measurement Approaches (henceforth AMA) banks 
are –subject to prior approval of the respective national regulator – 
allowed to use their own risk measurement framework if this complies with 
the standards prescribed, such as scenario analysis. As this approach is 
much more difficult to assess, a special focus is laid on the involvement of 
the top-management, the soundness of the system, and the resources 
spent to implement this system. Internal operational risk management 
must be ‘closely integrated into the day-to-day risk management process 
of the bank’ (BCBS, 2006:143). 
 
Whereas BIA and SA were permitted from 2007 in Europe, AMA could be 
used from 2008 onwards (Suyter, 2008). Chapelle et al (2008) developed a 
procedure to implement the AMA approach regarding operational risk. In 
doing so they point out that active management results in substantial 
savings. According to Grody et al (2008), the capital allocation for operational 
risk can be limited by up to 20% by mitigating strategies such as insurance. 
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Regardless which approach is used, the bank has to establish an Operational 
Risk Management framework. This has to include the identification, 
measurement, monitoring, reporting as well as a control and mitigation 
framework for operational risk. However, Chavez-Demoulin et al (2006:2635) 
point out ‘that a full quantitative approach may never be achieved’. Therefore 
a bank internal ‘risk culture’, which is the goal of the risk-adjustment 
performance measurement (RAPM), is needed. And it is needed externally in 
an interconnected world (Grody, 2008). This seems especially true taking the 
effects of the subprime crisis into account. 
2.4 BASEL II - PILLARS 2 AND 3 
(SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS, MARKET DISCIPLINE) 
Researchers reflect the effect of Basel II on corporate financing mainly by 
analysing Pillar 1 (see, for example, the literature under review in section 3). 
This is not surprising, as authors like Decamps et al (2004) point out: they 
state that the Basel Committee is far less precise on Pillar 2 and especially 
Pillar 3. The amount of pages dedicated to Pillar 1 in the third Consultative 
Paper (BCBS, 2003) is nearly 10 times greater than the Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 
sections. Whereas the Basel Committee is precise on quantifying regulations 
on Pillar 1 it remained vague regarding the latter ones. 
 
However, the so-called Pillar 2 (supervisory review process) and Pillar 3 
(market discipline) also have significant effects. For example, disclosure 
requirements will have an influence on risk taking in relation to lending in 
general, and lending to SMEs in particular, as the latter are regarded as 
being more risky (see, for example, Dietsch and Petey, 2004). 
Based on a large set of statistical data from 76 countries Pasiouras (2009:2) 
provides evidence‚ in relation to Pillars 2 and 3 ‘that banking regulations that 
enhance market discipline and empower the supervisory power of the 
authorities increase both cost and profit efficiency of banks’. According to this 
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finding, the regulation has an intrinsic value, even for the ‘supervised’ and 
‘disciplined’ banks, which may not be obvious to them at first glance. 
The key principles of the Supervisory Review Process (henceforth SRP) of 
Pillar 2 includes ‘guidance relating to … the treatment of interest rate risk in 
the banking book, credit risk (stress testing, definition of default, residual risk, 
and credit concentration risk), operational risk, enhanced cross-border 
communication and cooperation, and securitisation’ (BCBS, 2004:158). 
Therefore, integrated risk management is separated into two areas (Suyter, 
2008): the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP, including the 
Risk Assessment Process, henceforth RAS), and the Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP).  
According to Suyter (2008) there are four basic SRP principles: bank internal 
procedures to assess capital adequacy, review of the bank internal 
procedures by the supervisory organisation, economic capital should be 
above regulatory capital, and an early intervention of banking supervision if 
complying with the minimum capital requirement is at risk. Loeper (2007) 
believes that the supervisory process does not only ensure that banks have 
enough capital, but enables a dialogue between supervisors and bank 
executives regarding risk management policies. 
 
The Basel Committee (BCBS, 2004:175) regards Pillar 3 (market discipline) 
as complementary to the first two pillars: ‘The Committee aims to encourage 
market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will 
allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of 
application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence 
the capital adequacy of the institution.’ 
Therefore, Pillar 3 (Rowe et al, 2004) sets the framework of information 
disclosure requirements regarding capital and risk numbers and the risk 
management practice. The aim is to enable stakeholders to get a deeper 
insight into the general risk position a bank has in order to assess the bank 
properly. 
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The effect on banking supervision, like Pillar 2 and Pillar 3, seems not to be 
consistent in the assessment by researchers, although the following authors 
do not explicitly reflect on Basel II: authors like Beck et al (2006) argue that 
an extended disclosure policy ‘forces’ banks to limit risk taking as their 
behaviour can be assessed and monitored. On the other hand, authors such 
as Barth et al (2004) or Angkinand and Wihlborg (2005) expect no significant 
effect on banking in relation to risk-taking and the chance to prevent a 
banking crisis. 
2.5 SMES AND BASEL II  
One of the most controversial elements of the New Accord has been the 
treatment of SMEs as SMEs comprise, in several economies, up to 99% of 
all corporations (European Commission, 2003a). Therefore the SME 
definition and classification is presented upfront. This is important as SMEs 
get, for example, a special size-dependent adjustment regarding the 
correlation coefficient in the corporate asset class, or could even be in the 
favourable retail asset class under certain criteria. 
2.5.1 SME Definition 
At the time of the formulation of a unified SME definition (European 
Commission, 2003b), approximately 23 million SMEs represented 99% of the 
EU-25 corporations with a workforce of approximately 75 million employees 
(European Commission, 2003a). According to Faccio and Lang (2002) these 
companies are primarily entrepreneur-owned. They state that 63% of their 
sample from 13 Western European countries had a single large shareholder 
who controlled at least 20%. In Germany, both quotas are even higher. The 
institute for Mittelstands-research (IfM, 2008) analysed the company register 
of the Ministry of Justice at the end of 2007 according to the EU definition: 
SMEs comprise 99.6% of all corporations (3.5 million in total), 39.2% of 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 45 of 463 
revenues (4.494 billion euros in total) and 55.1% of all employees (23.8 
million in total). 
According to Wallau et al (2007) 95.1% of all German corporations are 
privately held businesses (henceforth PHB, see IBR, 2008), comprising 
57.3% (13.4 million) of the employees and 41.5% (1.9 billion euros) of all 
revenues. Only 1,200 of these family owned businesses can be regarded as 
large enterprises with revenues beyond 50 million euros (out of 3,500 
concerns in total from Germany). However, the term SME was, and is still, 
differently defined amongst the economic regions of the G10 initiating 
member states from Europe, the United States and Japan. In Germany the 
term ‘Mittelstand’, as a near synonym for SME, is quite common. However, in 
Germany the broader Mittelstand definition includes companies with up to 
500 employees according to a widely accepted definition of the Institut for 
Mittelstandsforschung (IfM, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, the SME definition, in economic areas like the EU-25, 
underwent significant changes on the verge of Basel II: ‘Following the logic of 
a single market with no internal frontiers’ (European Commission, 2003b:36), 
the European Commission released a recommendation to unify the SME 
definition. This recommendation replaces an older one from 1996 
(Recommendation 96/280/EC) and became effective on January 1st 2005 
(European Commission, 2003b). 
 
The headcount-figure still lies at the heart of the SME definition: ‘The criterion 
of staff numbers (the ‘staff headcount criterion’) remains undoubtedly one of 
the most important, and must be observed as the main criterion’ (European 
Commission, 2003b:36). Whereas the headcount differentiations stayed 
stable, the total balance sheet amounts and the turnover figures were 
adjusted in order to take economic development and inflation rates into 
account. As a result SMEs are defined as companies which have up to 250 
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employees, a maximum turnover of 50 million euros and a maximum balance 
sheet total of 43 million euros. 
 
SMEs are denominated as ‘micro enterprises’ / ‘small enterprises’ when the 
headcount is below ten / fifty, the turnover is at most two / ten million euros 
and the balance sheet total is a maximum of two / ten million euros, 
respectively. SMEs above the small enterprise category are called ‘medium-
sized enterprises’ (European commission, 2003a). This classification is used 
throughout the thesis, for example, by segmenting SMEs into classes which 
are used in histograms (see section 5.1). Therefore revenue and number of 
employees both serve as a proxy for SME size. 
Besides the resizing of the ceilings a focus was laid on two issues: in order to 
foster qualification, students and apprentices are not taken into account 
regarding headcount. The second issue focuses on the ‘autonomy’ of the 
SME which relates to subsidies to foster entrepreneurship as the backbone 
of the European economy (Saurina and Trucharte, 2004). Therefore cross-
ownership of concerns is taken care of with reliefs for smaller investors, such 
as Venture Capital (see hypotheses 2.b and 3). 
 
In other economic regions there are similar classification systems with certain 
deviations (SBA, 2008). For example, in the United States the ‘size’ 
classification is derived from the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) by a special organization (Small Business Administration, 
henceforth SBA) based on specific industries’ size criteria (in many cases 
less than 500 employees and less than 28.5 million US-$ revenue). 
However, it has to be noted that a classification in terms of size might not be 
the only valid criteria to classify SMEs: evaluation of a major set of Finnish 
SMEs by Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008) concluded that ‘information 
opaqueness’ for SMEs is strongly related to the age of the SME, rather than 
to size.  
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2.5.2 Basel II Regulation Regarding SMEs 
One of the central debates of Basel II has been about default probabilities in 
relation to company size – which affects the pricing of credit to SMEs. Based 
on empirical research by Benito et al (2004) and Bonfim (2009), related to 
similar good financial ratios, evidence is provided that smaller firms are at 
least not more prone to default than larger ones. Contrary authors like 
Bhattacharjee et al (2002), Bunn (2003), Eklund et al (2001) and Jiménez 
and Saurina (2004) state the opposite. As a kind of middle position 
Bernhardsen (2001) points out that the effect of size on default probability is 
not significantly pronounced. 
 
Originally it was intended to place most of the SME credits into the corporate 
asset class. With its second Consultative Paper (BCBS, 2001a) a major 
debate was initiated: politics and industry, led by Germany and Italy (Quaglia 
2008), have argued that SME corporate credits are exposed to a too high 
regulatory capital requirement. The lack of external rating (see hypothesis 
2.a) and the high dependency of (German) SMEs on bank loans (Lütz, 2004, 
see hypothesis 1) confers on them a competitive disadvantage with the 
installation of Basel II. This might lead to a substantial reduction in credit 
supply to SMEs which could harm the economy to a major extent, as 
discussed. 
Based on such criticism from practitioners, the Basel Committee announced 
the bringing forward of some changes, especially regarding the SME case 
(BCBS, 2001b). As Saurina and Trucharte (2004) point out, this distinction is 
derived from the view that SMEs depend much more on idiosyncratic risks 
than systematic ones (Bonfim, 2009), like economic downturn, which is the 
case regarding larger corporations and creditors. Therefore, the regulation 
was refined further and the recommendations were announced in October 
2002 with the start of the third Quantitative Impact Study (QIS3, see BCBS, 
2002) in a twofold way: firstly, the (corporate) risk weight curves were further 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 48 of 463 
differentiated depending on the type of credit and size of a company. This 
comprises the special treatment of SMEs in the corporate class. The 
corporate curve for SMEs became more flat than the curve for major 
corporations due to a size adjustment factor which was introduced in the 
continuation of the Basel II definition process (BCBS, 2004:60). 
Secondly, under certain conditions a bank can handle SME credit in the 
‘other retail’ class, with an even more favourable credit risk curve. 
Prerequisites are: that the total amount of credit granted to an individual firm 
is below 1 million euros, that the process has to be handled as a mass pro-
cess (rather than corporate credit), and that the SME portfolio must be signi-
ficantly diversified in order to reduce risk (Allen et al, 2004). The rationale 
behind this is that SMEs are more diversified and therefore a preferred treat-
ment under the beneficial retail curve is justified. As discussed, the SME risk 
weight in the ‘other retail’ classification is only 75% (BCBS, 2004:230). 
The final presentation of the new curves took place in April 2003 (BCBS, 
2003), together with the presentation of the third Consultative Paper. Figure 6 
(taken from Saurina and Trucharte, 2004:132) shows the effect of the size 
adjustment factors for SMEs under the corporate curve regime. Figure 7 
(taken from Saurina and Trucharte, 2004:133) shows that the ‘other retail 
curve’ is even flatter than the ‘normal retail’ curve. Such discounts are hardly 
feasible, as authors Aziz and Humayon (2006) argue, if an SME is rated and 
treated under the normal corporate curve. 
 
Figure 6 Development of corporate 
curves 
Figure 7 Development of retail curves 
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Therefore, knowledge of a bank’s credit risk approach can serve as a 
decision criterion (see hypothesis 2.a), if and only if, the IRB approach in 
general has a negative impact on SMEs. Using a loan pricing equation 
model, which is based on the same risk factor model applied to calculate the 
capital charge, Repullo and Suarez (2004) show that a bank’s risk model 
approach should be a driver for selecting a bank. If a low risk company 
switches to a bank which applies an IRB approach it will experience a cost 
reduction compared to Basel I. High risk companies can avoid rate increases 
by choosing a ‘SA bank’. This is in line with Ruthenberg and Landskroner 
(2008) who believe that high-risk (SME) customers benefit from Basel II. 
They will approach smaller banks which use the SA. 
Much attention has been paid to the effect Basel II imposes on SMEs. 
However, it should not be forgotten that the ‘house bank relationship 
principle’ (see hypothesis 1) is bidirectional. Saurina and Trucharte (2004) 
draw attention to the fact that the dependency is the other way around too. 
Derived from data of the Bank of Spain credit register they found that 70% of 
total credit exposure comprises SME credits. Berger (2004) highlights that 
small banks primarily serve SMEs, therefore, Hall (2006) regards small banks 
to be winners of Basel II due to moderate increases in the standardised 
approach. 
2.6 BASEL II IN GERMANY 
The major disruption in Germany has been the widespread introduction of 
ratings, as the German Mittelstand, in particular, had hardly any experience 
in the past. Therefore the transferral of Basel II into national law is explained, 
as well as the acceptance of ratings. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 50 of 463 
2.6.1 Basel II Regulation in Germany 
The CRD was transferred to German law by means of changing the KWG. 
KWG is the German law for banking supervision (KWG, 2008), e.g. 
paragraph 10 concerned with ‘risk classes’ or paragraph 26a related to 
‘disclosure requirements’. 
In Germany, Basel II became law as an amendment of the KWG (German 
law on credit sector regulation) and the SolvV. Within SolvV, the next 
regulatory layer (Steinbrück, 2006), Pillars 1 to 3 are covered in more detail, 
e.g. in terms of risk calculation methods. Finally, MaRisk (2007) provides the 
regulatory basis for an integrated risk management system regarding Pillar 2 
(Gonsior and Hartschuh, 2007). MaRisk was defined in 2005 and came into 
effect in November 2007. It replaces the prior regulations MaH (trade book) 
and MaK (credit business) according to Schwirten and Zattler (2007). Wohlert 
(2007) makes an interesting statement by pointing out that MaRisk goes 
beyond banks – it should be extended to non-banks as it ‘seems necessary’ 
(see hypotheses 2.b and 3). 
 
The last regulatory element so far comprises GroMiKV (2006), which has 
substituted Pre-Basel II regulation on ‘major and million credits’ since 
January 1st 2008. Regarding the acceptance of the IRB approach, Paul 
(2007a) points out that only 30 banks applied for bank internal ratings before 
June 2006. The federal banks tend towards rating scorecards (Merkl and 
Stäblein, 2007). The mutual savings banks have already bundled their 
resources (Hromadka and Döhring, 2007). These already have a valid risk 
system and therefore Basel II should not have a major change effect (which 
would indicate an alternative to hypothesis 1, and be in line with the 
statement of one top-level savings bank executive, as stated in the qualitative 
empirical section 6). Regardless of the various implementation modes, Paul 
et al (2007) state that Basel II initiated an ‘SME hype in Germany’ regarding 
the expected negative effects of Basel II. 
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2.6.2 Ratings in Germany – the Big Unknown 
External ratings have been common in the US and the UK for years. The 
issue gained more public awareness elsewhere with the Basel II discussion, 
as Basel II banks can apply their own ratings. Even in academia there has 
been little research about internal ratings prior to Basel II, in Germany, as 
Krahnen and Weber (2001) point out. According to Mester (1997) 97% of 
banks use scoring which originated from pioneer work of Altman (1968, 
multiple discriminant credit scoring analysis). According to a survey by 
Altman and Narayanan (1997) profitability, leverage, and liquidity ‘had the 
most statistical power in differentiating defaulted from non-defaulted firms’ 
(Allen et al, 2004:736). Scoring means that a bank abstains from lavish 
‘individual’ rating measures regarding existing SME clients and uses 
substitutes, such as credit patterns or overdraft ratios, for evaluating smaller 
risks in Germany, instead (Krahnen and Weber, 2001). 
Regarding SMEs (see hypothesis 2.a), a synopsis of several German studies 
provides a similar picture: only 8.1% to 14.6% of the SMEs (related to SME 
size) stated to be rated compared to 21.3% of companies with revenues 
beyond 50 million euros, according to an empirical survey by Plankensteiner 
and Zimmermann (2007:45). In reality, the ratio is significantly higher 
according to an empirical study by Zimmermann (2007): only 77.2% of 
companies which got a rating stated to be rated. In terms of small companies 
with revenues lower than 1 million euros the value is even lower (54.6%). 
The ignorance of ratings is conveyed by the fact that 74.5% of participants 
who did not know their rating, they just did not ask. 
 
It shows that the bigger a company is the more it is educated about rating 
criteria: 79.1% of major companies with more than 50 million in revenues 
were knowledgeable about the criteria, compared to 41.1% to 77.6% 
regarding SMEs, ascending with revenue size (Zimmermann, 2007). 
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Brunner et al (200) stresses the advantage of internal ratings over external 
ones as they combine hard balance sheet data with soft factors, based on a 
deep knowledge of the lenders. Grunert et al (2005:528) argue that small 
banks in particular, which focus on SMEs, are good at rating soft factors. 
Based on an empirical study using data from four German banks there is 
evidence that the combination of financial and non-financial information 
‘leads to a significantly more accurate default prediction’ (see hypothesis 
2.a). The importance of rating is illustrated in a survey by Zimmermann 
(2007): 38.7% of the participants with an improved rating experienced easier 
access to credits in contrast to only 12.4% and 8.2% with stable and 
deteriorated rating. 
2.7 INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF BASEL II 
In the EU, Basel II became a European Directive in 2006 (CRD, European 
Commission, 2006) which is applied to all banks and investment firms in the 
EU by means of national laws (Roldán, 2006). That means that the non-
advanced approaches of Basel II came into effect in the EU on January 
2007, and the advanced approaches from January 2008 onwards. Non EU-
countries have either a different timeline or set-up a regulation partly similar 
to Basel II in recent years or will do so in the future.  
Gentle (2008:207) sets Basel II in the context of various additional 
regulations imposed or planned during the last decade (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8 Financial regulation 2000 to 2012 (e) according to Gentle (2008:207) 
 
In contrast, the US bank regulatory agencies ratified the New Capital Accord 
in November 2007 (Kroszner, 2007), after another delay in July 2007 (Martin, 
2007): The application is, as yet, limited to the so-called ‘core’ banking 
organizations with total assets over $250 billion or more than $10 billion of 
on-balance-sheet foreign exchange exposure, with an effective date of April 
1, 2008 (Agarwala et al, 2008). Furthermore, US banks have a three-year 
transition period; in 2008 only 10 banks fulfilled the requirements (Chernobai 
and Yildirim, 2008). Currently there are three Basel regimes in the US (Rubin 
and Nayda, 2008b): General (Basel I), established 20 years ago, 
Standardized Basel II, and Advanced Basel II. 
 
According to Suyter (2008) A-IRB and AMA will be permitted from 2009 
onwards so he expects that most banks will stick to Basel I. In addition, there 
is a three year introduction period for ‘mandatory banks’ (1st Tier banks with 
more than 250 billion US-$ in assets, Sharma, 2006) starting in April 2008 
(Dugan, 2008). Standardized Basel II will come into effect in 2009 and US 
institutions expect 10% of banks to follow that route. For all other banks a 
‘Basel Ia’, comprising a limited set of Basel requirements (with a kind of 
‘standardised approach’) will apply for all other banks (Sharma, 2006). 
However, Webb Cooper (2009) points out that although small banks are 
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currently freed from Basel II regulation, there is already pressure on 
corporate governance of private banks to become more effective. 
 
Oonagh (2005) provides some explanations for this hesitant behaviour: the 
fourth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS4, see BCBS, 2005a) amongst 26 
American banks showed that the minimum capital would likely be reduced by 
17%. This is not in the interest of US banking supervision as they intervene 
much more than their European counterparts (Oonagh, 2005). This is in line 
with Sharma (2006) who states that US regulators watch closely any attempt 
to lower capital requirements. The Comptroller of the Currency (OCC, 
2007:1) state in their Basel II press releases that they ‘retained several 
safeguards unique to the U.S. supervisory process’. According to Berger et al 
(2008), large banks in particular showed an excess of capital between 1992 
and 2006 above the regulatory capital. Rubin and Nayda (2008a) evaluate 
that capital savings from Basel II, amounting to US-$ 31 billion ‘are not 
allowed to leave the system’ by regulators. Oonagh (2005) argues that 
European and Australian banks are already more advanced on the road of 
Basel II implementation.  
 
In order to expand the reach of Basel II the International Liaison Group (ILG, 
BCBS, 2007) was founded. The ILG includes – besides eight Committee 
member countries – 16 countries and further institutions from non-member 
states in five continents.  In India, for example, Basel II principles will also be 
adopted, as Sensarma and Jayadev (2009:8) point out. The Reserve Bank of 
India issued ‘a comprehensive framework for implementation of integrative 
risk management systems and lately Indian banks have been preparing for 
the implementation of Basel II norms’. On the other hand, there is still a long 
way to go, as an empirical survey in the UAE (Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 
2007) shows: Basel II ranks low on agendas – only a few respondents of a 
primary study argued that the application of Basel II would improve the 
efficiency of risk management. It ranked eighth place out of ten places. 
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2.8 CRITICISM OF BASEL II 
In general, it is not questioned by the researchers under review that Basel II 
is an advancement compared to Basel I. Yet, Basel II is criticised regarding 
general as well as several specific issues. First of all, there is the argument 
that imposing more and more refined regulation is counterproductive. 
Second, leaving alone the debate on the pros and cons of regulation, the 
following issues are raised most often in the literature under review: 
 
The sophisticated approaches lead to a preferential treatment of large 
corporations, large banks and to a discrimination of emerging countries as 
they do not have such large banks. Basel II regulation enforces a pro-cyclical 
effect. Furthermore, academics raise methodical issues like the validity of 
ratings (see Schwaiger, 2008) and potential inconsistencies in the 
assumptions underlying, especially the risk model, of Pillar 1, as well as still 
existing discrepancies in relation to capital cushion. 
2.8.1 General Issues of Imposing More Regulation 
Whereas in other sectors, such as energy or telecommunication, 
deregulation took place to a major extent, the banking sector is still highly 
regulated and Basel II adds to that. Authors like Lindquist (2004) and Paul 
(2007b) derive this from the high importance of the banking sector regarding 
economic stability, which is based on financial stability. Using data from the 
1893 financial crises in the US, Ramírez (2009) calculated that 1% increase 
in bank instability reduces output growth by 2-5%. 
 
Brissimis et al (2008) highlight the positive effect of banking regulation. 
Based on empirical evidence from 10 new EU members they argue that bank 
regulation and bank competition both have a positive effect on bank 
efficiency. However, Kopecky and VanHoose (2006) refer to several 
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empirical studies which show that only a fraction of banks will be subjected to 
regulation. Kishan and Opiela (2006:282), for example, argue ‘that merely 
having de jure capital regulations is not sufficient to obtain the results argued 
… Rather, they show that the constraint must be of a certain level or 
stringency, and enforced effectively for these results to hold.’ Based on an 
empirical explanatory model, Barth et al (2004) postulate that private-sector 
corporate control of banks and incentives for private agents to exert control 
should be fostered, rather than strengthening governmental or organisational 
control. By addressing the same issue, Decamps et al (2004:151) suggested, 
several years before the subprime crisis, that ‘important reforms of the 
supervisory system have to be implemented as well, in order to guarantee 
independence of banking supervisors from political powers and also proper 
behaviour during future crisis.’ 
 
Finally, by referring to the 86 opt-out clauses, Hall (2006) doubts that 
consistent application of Basel II throughout the economies will take place, 
although a special group in the Basel Committee should ensure consistency 
(Accord Implementation Group, henceforth AIG, BCBS, 2004:2). This is in 
line with apprehensions of German banks that a differentiated application of 
the CRD will lead to a distortion of competition (BdB, 2007). 
 
Similar to the assessment on the effect of Basel II on SMEs (VanHoose, 
2007), there are diverging views: authors like Kopecky and VanHoose (2006) 
argue that higher regulation, in principle, makes lending more expensive, 
especially to SMEs (Dietsch and Petey, 2004). Therefore the second part of 
the author’s research objective / question regarding how SMEs can cope with 
Basel II becomes of high importance. As a successor of Basel I the New 
Capital Accord was set-up to refine the specific capital requirements. 
According to Angkinand (2009), the effect of bank capital regulation and 
supervision is related to risk taking. Author’s like Barth et al (2004) and 
González (2005) conclude that regulatory capital limits risk taking. On the 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 57 of 463 
other hand, researchers such as Calem and Rob (1999) estimate, in the 
dawn of Basel II that banks with a high capital cushion are more likely to take 
risks as they have a low PD for themselves. And finally, Blum (2008) adds to 
the human rather than the statistics side of regulation: even if Basel II was 
perfect there is the issue of fraud. In order to limit the damage imposed by 
‘dishonest banks’ he proposes to set-up a leverage ratio as a restriction to 
enforce ‘truthful risk reporting’ as proposed in the Federal Insurance Deposit 
Corporation (FIDC) for the US. However, the deterrent effect depends on the 
height of sanctions ex post. 
2.8.2 (Pro-)Cyclical Effect of Basel II 
As the pro-cyclical effect under consideration of the current severe financial 
crisis is discussed in section 2.11, in this section the pro-cyclical effect in 
‘normal’ up- and downturns is reflected: 
 
One central criticism of Basel II is that the risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements might have a negative cyclical effect on lending (Kashyap and 
Stein, 2004, Blejer, 2006, Frese and Glüder, 2006, Hall, 2006 or Weber and 
Darbellay, 2008 on a pre-crisis basis or Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2009, 
after the start of the financial crisis). It is argued that in times of an economic 
downturn the PD predictions will increase which lead to a restricted lending 
policy. Goodhart et al (2004:613), for example, state that ‘the new Basel II 
Accord may considerably accentuate the pro-cyclicality of the regulatory 
system’. Using balance sheet data of EU banks between 1997 and 2004 
Jokipii and Milne (2008) found evidence for the pro-cyclical effect of Basel II. 
In addition, Zicchino (2006:68) points out that in times of high economic 
activity the capital kept will be lower under the new Basel regime than with 
Basel I. This makes banks ‘more vulnerable to negative shocks’. Jiménez 
and Saurina (2006) reflect on the cyclical effect of banks: high default rate in 
economic downturns is an outflow of excessive risk taking (which means 
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financial gearing) in times of economic prosperity. Based on a complex 
dynamic equilibrium model, Repullo and Suarez (2007) show that the high 
capital buffers built up during a boom phase under the Basel II regime will not 
be sufficient in the forefront of a recession. 
However, authors like Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) came up with a model 
to show how these contrasting effects could be reconciled based on an 
empirical study using US data. Pennacchi (2005:432) too regards an 
‘integrated risk-based deposit insurance’ as a remedy against the pro-cyclical 
effect. He bases his empirical findings on data from 42 banks. Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008) made an extensive Pre-Basel II pan-European survey in order 
to determine the influence of a provisioning system on credit fluctuations. 
Their findings provide evidence that a more dynamic provisioning system 
could lower the pro-cyclical effect. 
2.8.3 Methodological Issues 
Methodology issues cover a broad spectrum of the complex Basel II 
regulation – a number of major points of discussion in the literature are 
presented in this section: 
Koziol and Lawrenz (2009) argue that the prime goal of banking regulation is 
better prevention of bank bankruptcy: therefore they promote a more 
dynamic approach as the static view of setting risks from bank’s assets into 
relation to the current asset-liability ratio does not take future action of the 
bank into account. This is, however, needed to improve these factors (for 
example, by incorporating more deposits) which serve as a kind of incentive 
for future adjustments. 
Whereas the stronger risk management approach is, in general, widely 
accepted, Blum (2008) points out that banks might underestimate their risks 
in terms of PD values as this lowers the regulatory capital. Therefore, he 
suggests a risk independent leverage ratio to distract banks from that and / or 
sanction otherwise afterwards. Krink et al (2008) adds that the focus on PD 
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related research lies in assigning credit exposure to a rating bucket and to 
assigning a PD value to the various rating classes; less effort has been made 
to defining the optimal bucket structure. Another critique on default 
probabilities relates to the issue of data validity – for example, BCBS 
(2005b), refers to the lack of sufficient (reliable) data regarding ‘assumed’ low 
default portfolios like it had been for banks in 2005. Kiefer (2009) opts for a 
mixture of a probability approach and expert opinion to solve that issue. 
 
Another issue is that Basel II introduced a variety of somewhat arbitrary 
limitations, even in the F-IRB approach, which limits the accuracy of the 
bank’s calculation. For example, regarding the maturity variable M, a floor 
and cap duration of 1 to 5 years is introduced, regardless of the actual M 
estimate of the bank (BCBS, 2004:68). 
Suyter (2008) addresses other intrinsic issues, such as home-host-country 
problems regarding banking supervision with internationally operating banks, 
the issue of partial usage under certain circumstances, high risk weights for 
equity holdings, and the ‘maturity premium’ for credits with higher duration. 
 
Johnston (2009) points out that the capital risk requirements for equity 
investments are ‘quite different’ from the ones for credit risk because the 
value of equity can be substantially reduced even before a default. He came 
up with a formula to quantify such risks by extending the Asymptotic Single 
Risk Factor (ASRF) approach. 
Referring to the long-time undetected loss of 7.2 US-$ billion of Société 
Générale by a trader, Chernobai and Yildirim (2008) point out that the 
management of operational risk becomes more and more important. They 
developed a model for managing complex situations which covers multiple, 
longer ranging consequences of one occurrence. This is an extension of the 
predominant mono-causal statistical models. 
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Furthermore, criticism regarding operational risk addresses the fact that legal 
risk was entered in the definition late but was not described in sufficient 
detail. On the other hand, strategic risk (risk of making wrong strategic 
decisions) as well as reputational risk (risk that a company suffers due to a 
poor reputation) is not included (BCBS, 2004:137). In addition, Jarrow 
(2008), for example, developed a model to calculate losses related to 
operating technology and losses relating to agency cost, because the current 
approach is ‘biased high’ as it omits the NPV generation process. 
2.8.4 Potential Inconsistencies in the Underlying Assumptions 
An issue which is controversially discussed in several research studies under 
review, is the negative relationship between PD and Asset Correlation. Lopez 
(2004:265) points out that ‘a key variable in the asymptotic single risk factor 
approach which is a central element in determining the Basel II regulatory 
capital is the correlation of a given firm’s assets with the risk factor that 
summarizes general economic conditions.’ 
This relationship underwent several changes in order to come up with a 
proxy, as otherwise the correlation had to be calculated for every borrower. 
Originally, the Basel Committee proposed a relationship value of 0.2 in 
January 2001 (BCBS, 2001a) for the common risk factor. Based on feedback 
from practitioners and their own quantitative studies, this was changed in 
November 2001 (BCBS, 2001b): asset correlations became a decreasing 
function of PD. Some researchers either do not question this assumption, like 
Altman and Sabato (2005), or provide evidence that this negative correlation 
is valid, such as Jacobson et al (2005). This is in line with Lopez (2004). His 
empirical research indicates further that firms are more correlated with the 
general state of the economy the bigger they are; a higher PD is related to 
idiosyncratic risks rather than the state of economy. Other authors, such as 
Dietsch and Petey (2004), however, question the committee’s assumption of 
a negative relationship between PD and Asset Correlation. Medema et al 
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(2009:701) add to the discussion by pointing out that the historic data basis 
of banks is too weak to provide an adequate basis to validate the PD ratios. 
Therefore, bank regulators have to enhance the effort of ‘testing model 
validation processes’.  
Besides the PD ratio there are other areas: to name just one, Kaplanski and 
Levy (2007) evaluated the various VaR approaches and came to the 
conclusion that requirements above the optimal level (and the Basel Range is 
within this area) lead to inefficient regulation in terms of reporting and 
disclosure policies. Jarrow (2007:15) goes even further claiming that the IRB 
approximation is only a very rough approximation of an ideal capital rule as 
the risk measure (VaR) is ‘not conceptually appropriate’. This seems 
especially true in the current financial crisis (see section 2.11). 
2.8.5 Validity of Internal or External Rating 
According to the New Basel Accord, banks can use their own estimates, 
which build the basis for capital requirements regarding their own ratings, or 
rely on external ones in the SA. The importance of the rating issue is 
reflected in hypothesis 2.a and the second part of the research objective / 
question relating to how SMEs can cope best with the effect of Basel II. 
 
In the context of internal vs. external ratings, Löffler (2004) points out – 
especially in relation to the current economic crisis – that external rating 
agencies use a through-the-cycle-method (with a high stability but a low 
‘default prediction power’) rather than a point-in-time approach as with banks 
and their internal ratings which reflect ‘current conditions’. This is in line with 
Russell-Walling (2007). In addition, Hall (2006) highlights that Basel II pundits 
question the credit assessment rating validity produced by credit agencies, 
with respect to highly rated corporate failures in the past. Stolper (2009) 
argues that there is great danger of making ‘courtesy expertise’ as the rating 
organisations are paid by the issuer rather than the investors. He came up 
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with a model which should provide ‘inflated ratings’ and could build the basis 
for national regulators to punish or reward rating agencies based on past 
prediction performance. 
Furthermore, there is the issue of information opaqueness and correlation 
regarding external ratings: rating agencies publish all public ratings whereas 
a firm can decide whether a private rating is disclosed or not (Mählmann, 
2008). As SME ratings are therefore not published automatically, an investor 
cannot be sure if a company has not been rated or if it just does not want to 
publish its (poor) rating. 
 
Güttler and Wahrenburg (2007) analysed the behaviour of the leading rating 
agencies Moody’s and S&P. There seems to be a high correlation in the 
short term, especially regarding downgrades. If one rating agency 
‘downgrades’ a company this will ‘trigger’ a downgrade by another rating 
agency. In addition Liao et al (2009) illustrate that external rating does not 
provide information about a bank’s default probability or LGD. On the other 
hand, regarding bank internal ratings, Cifuentes (2007) asks how valid the 
internal ratings will be in relation to specialised rating agencies. Schwaiger 
(2002), for example, points out that one of the main obstacles will be to come 
up with up-to-date information regarding a variety of parameters such as 
‘quality of cash-flow (predictions)’ or ‘current position in industry’. Whichever 
approach is used, the rating issue will have implications on the regulatory 
capital, regarding SMEs in particular, as rating has been so far an issue 
primarily for the major companies (Plankensteiner and Zimmermann, 2007). 
Bartels (2002:49) even regards Basel II as a ‘new credit risk factor’. He 
argues that the German Mittelstand will have problems in getting valid ratings 
as they are not used to the process and are ill prepared in terms of the 
documentation of soft factors, like strategy (in line with findings from the 
qualitative analysis, see hypothesis 2.a). This view is supported by 
Plankensteiner and Zimmermann (2007): in the year 2007 13% of companies 
in their survey were rated compared to 9% one year ago. 
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According to Tschemernjak (2004) getting adjusted to ratings is, in a way, a 
means in itself: he argues that internal ratings enforce better risk 
management and therefore better stability and control of a bank’s activities. 
Besides external or internal ratings from rating agencies, Carling et al (2007) 
refers to the possibility of using values from credit bureaus as a more direct 
way. However, there are authors like Weber and Darbellay (2008:1-2) who 
believe ‘that the ratings-based regulation has negative effects on the financial 
markets’. The use of ratings ‘may have changed the structure of the (private) 
rating industry’ and therefore fosters the pro-cyclic effect. 
2.8.6 Arbitrage Issues 
Despite intense discussion about the new regulatory capital, one issue must 
not be overlooked. Whereas a bank is free to choose a method most suitable 
to calculate EC which covers all kinds of risk from a bank’s perspective, the 
calculation of RC is much more restricted by regulators (Rowe et al, 2004). 
Authors like Peura and Jokivuolle (2004) point out that the Basel II dynamic, 
which is based on ratings, is only one parameter which determines the 
capital cushion. Considerations such as bank income and default losses are 
other important parameters as well. Therefore, for example, banks hold 
capital above the required minimum in order that they do not run under 
supervisory intervention, facing the respective consequences like losing 
market confidence and reputation (Furfine, 2001). In this context, Zicchino 
(2006) believes that the potential cyclical effect of Basel II might bring 
regulators to request banks to hold economic capital above regulatory 
mandatory levels in order to ensure that banks will not get in trouble in times 
of economic downturn. 
 
In order to provide a better consistency in the future an internal portfolio 
based model will be introduced with a Basel II + X (Suyter, 2008). 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 64 of 463 
Furthermore, there is the issue of cross-border control which is of particular 
concern in the twelve new EU member states where 69% of banks showed 
foreign ownership in the year 2005, compared to 33% in the older EU 
member states (Eisenbeis and Kaufman, 2008): Agarwala et al (2008) note 
the ‘home-host-country’ problem, as regulatory requirements will differ 
between countries in the given framework – for example, different 
interpretations between the US and Europe as discussed already in section 
2.6. In a pointed article, Mainelli (2008:410) states that regulation, especially 
Basel Accords I and II created incentives for off-balance sheet finance which 
leads to the ‘traditional approach’ of ‘great short-term financial returns and 
increased bonuses, high gearing and high leverage’. 
2.8.7 Discrimination of Emerging Countries (and Small Banks) 
One would believe that the A-IRB approach would be adopted quickly as, for 
example, Tschemernjak (2004) estimates that applying the A-IRB approach 
could reduce regulatory capital by approximately 20%. This correlates with 
the Altman and Sabato (2005:33): within their model they calculated a 25% 
discount in capital requirements using the A-IRB approach. 
However, the answer is not that simple as huge implementation costs are 
required to install systems and procedures to comply with Basel II: Kolbeck et 
al. (2002) estimate that small and medium-sized institutes (which had a 
typical SME ‘house bank function’ according to Berger, 2004, see hypothesis 
1), with up to 100 billion euros in total assets, will initially have to spend up to 
10 million euros. This is a major investment taking the low, or even negative, 
profitability within European banking into account (Barfield, 2004a, see 
Figure 9: comparison of Return on Equity (RoE) and Cost of Equity (CoE)). 
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Figure 9 EU banking market (Barfield, 2004a:87) 
 
Cornford (2004:26) considers this with reference to the third Consultative 
Paper (BCBS, 2003). He estimates that less developed countries will use the 
SA for reasons of compliance and costs. Therefore, these economies might 
be excluded from accessing cheaper capital as the less refined SA induces, 
in general, a more conservative capital allocation, as discussed. In addition, 
Blejer (2006) points out that the pro-cyclical effect might especially be 
harmful to emerging countries if they do not apply other means of counter-
actions. 
2.8.8 Discrimination of SMEs 
The issue of the effect on SMEs is only touched upon from a practitioner’s 
point of view, as this is the main objective of this thesis. According to Beyer 
(2009), the following relates to Basel II: the traditionally low equity capital of 
German SMEs, in general, lowers their rating (see hypothesis 2.a) although 
the equity ratio allows, in general, a statement about business perspective 
and market position. Basel II therefore fixates market positions as companies 
who do not need credit to enhance their position are rated best. 
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2.9 CORPORATE FINANCE SUPPLY AND DEMAND ISSUES IN 
GERMANY 
The research objective is to evaluate the effect of Basel II on SMEs from both 
sides – the SMEs’ as well as the financiers’ perspective. Therefore, supply 
and demand issues are introduced in sections 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 as the 
‘forecasting of market outcomes under changed conditions requires an 
understanding of supply, as well as of demand’ (Train, 2009:328). After 
which, the information infrastructure regarding bank credits is explained in 
section 2.9.3. 
2.9.1 Supply Issues of Corporate Finance in Germany 
As discussed in section 2.10 the supply of credits to SMEs in Germany can 
be clustered into bank credits and non-bank credit means of supply, such as 
private equity / venture capital, alternative forms of finance, including 
mezzanine, factoring, leasing and stock markets by means of IPOs. 
 
Credit Financing 
Regarding the supply side, banks were in a dominant position in the Pre-
Basel II era. According to Sandvoß (2007), only one out of 10 long-term 
credits between 1970 and the year 2000 were facilitated by a non-bank 
intermediary. It is, therefore, no wonder that interest rates are regarded as 
being by far the most important factor regarding financing, according to 
several practitioners’ research studies (see Hollasch and Berg, 2007, or Frey 
and Kuhn, 2007, for example). 
According to Quaglia (2008), the universal banks in Germany can be 
grouped in three sectors: private commercial banks (including subsidiaries 
like special banks for mortgage loans), savings banks and co-operatives. In 
2002 the ‘big four’ private commercial banks comprised 16% market share 
(all: 28%), the savings banks 36% and cooperatives 20%. The rest 
accounted for special banks. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 67 of 463 
The trend seems unequivocal (BdB, 2008); whereas the credit volume issued 
by commercial private banks to corporations and freelancers declined from 
39.0% (corporate credit volume to balance sheet equity) in 1990 to 14.8% in 
2007, in relation to the balance sheet total, it rose in the same period from 
26.2% to 27.1% for the savings banks. A further detailed evaluation of credit 
financing in Germany is provided in section 2.10.1 and 2.10.2. 
 
Non-Credit Financing 
As will be explained in sections 2.10.3 to 2.10.5, private equity, stock markets 
and other alternative forms of corporate finance gained momentum in the 
past few years with reference to SMEs – with Basel II being an important 
factor. 
 
Private Equity 
Although the effect of Basel II is mainly discussed in the context of credit, it 
should not be neglected that the regulation affects private equity as an 
‘alternative’ to bank financing (see hypotheses 2.b and 3). Experts from the 
German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (henceforth BVK) 
argue that the capital requirements might rise for banks which ‘own’ a 
venture capital fund. This makes it much more difficult for banks to invest in 
venture capital funds (Cowley, 2002). Based on a theoretical model, 
Bongaerts and Charlier (2009) show that under the Basel II regime simple 
risk weight approach (standardised approach), capital requirements for 
private equity investments are higher (12%) than the average capital 
requirement in public equity (8%), which will lead to a ‘competitive 
disadvantage’ with banks being the second largest investor in private equity 
in Europe. However, if banks use the CRD IRB-approach derived from the 
Basel II framework, the opposite is true, giving banks with sophisticated 
measures an ‘adverse incentive’. However, care has to be taken as the 
portfolio used in the model is well diversified and the focus is on leveraged 
buy-outs (henceforth LBO) which will become increasingly difficult. 
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The former German Minister of the Economy, Clement (2004), therefore 
expects a reduction in private equity investments in line with Suyter (2008). 
On the other hand he claims that the German Government was successful in 
alleviating the effects. According to probabilistic BVK statistics (Höppner and 
Ostmeier, 2009), companies with less than 50 million euros comprise 72.6% 
of all funds invested in 2008. In terms of employee size, companies with less 
than 500 (100) employees account for 87.2% (67.3%) of all investments. 
Therefore, the development and current status of private equity in Germany, 
in the light of Basel II and the subprime crisis, is explained in section 2.10.3 
with a special focus on German SMEs.  
 
Stock Markets 
Despite being the biggest economy in the European Union, Germany ranks 
only in third position with a 7% share of IPOs and a 7% share in issuing 
volume (Frommann, 2007a), after the London Stock Exchange (with 58% 
and 37%) and Euronext (with 11% and 32%). The German Share Institute 
(Frey and Kuhn, 2007) undertook a study regarding Mittelstand and the stock 
market: 24.1% of the major SMEs (more than 5 million euros of revenue and 
even beyond 500 million euros) were thinking about an IPO, while 80% 
considered alternative forms of finance. However, regarding smaller SMEs 
an IPO is more of a theoretical option which will be evaluated in section 
2.10.4. 
 
Alternative Forms of Finance 
On the verge of Basel II other ‘alternative forms’ of financing became more 
prominent in Germany too, which led the author, amongst others, to postulate 
hypotheses 2.b and 3. The focus is on mezzanine, leasing, factoring and 
ABS, as explained in section 2.10.5. Hollasch and Berg (2004) regard 
mezzanine on the verge of Basel II as an important instrument for small and 
medium-sized companies to escape the ‘credit crunch’. In terms of the future, 
CFOs of major Mittelstands-companies (SFS, 2003) rank leasing and 
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factoring with its ‘off-the-balance-sheet liquidity effect’ as the financial 
instruments of highest importance.  
According to Hofmann et al (2007), another form, Asset Backed Securities 
(henceforth ABS), showed growing importance in recent years in corporate 
financing. 
2.9.2 Demand Issues of Corporate Finance in Germany 
As discussed in section 2.9.1, on a Pre-Basel II basis credits were almost 
exclusively the only source of finance. The credit volume for corporations 
rose from 759.9 billion euros in 1999 to 873.1 billion euros in 2007 (BdB, 
2009). In the year 2006, 900,000 out of approximately 3.5 million German 
SMEs (IfM, 2008) which wanted to invest carried out credit negotiations due 
to a positive economic climate. On the verge of Basel II the overall bank 
credit volume in Germany grew to 60 billion euros in 2006 (Reize, 2007). 
However, credit demand outpaced supply between the years 2004 and 2006 
by far. It rose from 100 billion euros to 145 billion euros (Reize, 2007). As 
discussed in sections 2.10.3 to 2.10.5, the demand for non-credit sources of 
finance grew as credit demand outpaced supply, as stated above. 
2.9.3 Information Infrastructure regarding Credits in Germany 
There has been insufficient attention shown to the information infrastructure 
(in relation to SMEs) that is available to lenders for making credit decisions in 
Germany. 
The information infrastructure used by SMEs to make credit decisions in 
Germany consists primarily of banks and chartered accounts as the prime 
source of information. This is acknowledged by the findings from the 
quantitative survey (see section 5). According to Deloitte & Touche (2007), 
80% of SMEs participated in a survey stating that they get information about 
financing options from banks which operate in a fragmented sector. Lahusen 
(2004) states that the number of banks fell by 40% between 1993 and 2002. 
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However, the number of banks and branch density is still approximately twice 
as high as the EU average. In 2007, Germany accounted, with 2,026, for one 
third of all European credit institutes and 21.6% of all 183,981 bank sites, 
according to the German Banking Association BdB (2009). The top five 
institutes account for only 22.0% of market share compared to the 54.7% EU 
average. Banks are followed by chartered accountants with less than 60% 
(Deloitte & Touche, 2007). The ranking supports the empirical findings of the 
author, as described in the quantitative section 5. 
 
Regarding banks, the information infrastructure can be classified into banks 
for ‘normal bank credits’ and ‘state-owned’ banks who provide subsidised 
credits. The latter consists of the national bank KfW (the provider / 
aggregator of EU funds and national German funds) and the ‘Landesbanken’ 
of the 16 federal state banks with their own subsidised credits. However, 
‘subsidised credits’ for SMEs were handed out via the house bank (BdB, 
2005) which comprises, according to the German Savings Bank Association 
(henceforth DSGV), to a large extent, the savings banks (DSGV, 2005). 
Therefore they should play an important role in information about subsidised 
bank credits. However, as the margin regarding ‘subsidised credits’ is 1%, 
i.e. very small, the ‘classic house banks’ do not provide information 
proactively. This is in line with the information collated during the interviews 
in the background gathering and qualitative phase. Therefore KfW or the 
‘Landesbanken’ spread information by means of their internet homepages, as 
well as publications. 
 
With regard to chartered accountants, the market is also very fragmented. 
According to the Chartered Accountant Association IDW (2010), 85.62% of 
the 13,002 members comprise individual chartered accountants and only 
14.38% associations like BDO, O & R Oppenhoff & Rädler, Rödl & Partner, 
or Rolfs WP Partner which focus on SMEs. 
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The many small chartered accountants act more like ‘bookkeepers’ rather 
than advisors on corporate financing too (see interview with the Managing 
Partner of a major chartered accountant with an SME focus, in section 6). In 
addition, associations like Bundesverband Mittelständischer Wirtschaft 
(BVMW, German SME Association) or the Chambers of Commerce (umbrella 
organisation DIHK as well as the regional chapters, the local IHKs) are part 
of the information infrastructure. However, the findings from both the 
quantitative analysis (see section 5), as well as the qualitative analysis (see 
section 6), provide evidence that this function is not fulfilled. Furthermore, 
dedicated finance and SME journals exist, such as ‘Finance’, which regularly 
publish information about ‘SME credits’ like Arons (2008), for example. 
2.10 CORPORATE FINANCING IN GERMANY ON THE VERGE OF 
BASEL II 
As already discussed in the introductory section, Basel II imposes a major 
effect on corporate financing – regarding credit and other options like private 
equity, IPOs and so-called alternative forms of financing as well. Based on 
the supply and demand overview of section 2.9, the status and development 
of corporate financing in Germany will be explained in detail in the light of 
Basel II. In addition, the interlinkage between rating and corporate financing 
is explored as rating induces a prime paradigm shift within the New Accord, 
especially in Germany, which is reflected in hypotheses 2.b and 3. 
 
Credits are still of the highest importance, according to a Pre-Basel II study 
by Deloitte & Touche (2007), amongst 266 German SMEs. This can be 
related to a strong quest for autonomy: according to Mach (2008), the top 
financial priorities of Mittelstands PHB’s are flexibility and liquidity, closely 
followed by preventing the influence of external capital providers. 
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However, alternatives to credit gained momentum in Germany, as discussed 
in sections 2.10.3 to 2.10.5. Furthermore, both topics seem to be interlinked 
with each other. Whereas on an international basis increased competition 
and unreasonable expectations of sellers seem to be the major private equity 
obstacles, according to a survey from Charnaud et al (2006:5). Contrary, in 
Germany the availability of credit is the number one obstacle due the ‘low 
equity coverage of the typical Mittelstand company’. 
2.10.1 Credit Financing in Germany Pre-Crisis 
The sole focus on one ‘house bank’ changed gradually due to the 
psychological effect of Basel II right after the start of the discussion (see 
hypothesis 1). According to a Pre-Basel II study (Deloitte & Touche, 2007), 
26% of participants of the questionnaire-based survey answered that Basel II 
had a negative influence on the financing situation in general; 30% answered 
that the situation only marginally changed and 44% said it has not changed 
at all. 
 
Reize (2007) found out that only 56% of the credit negotiations from SMEs to 
banks and state-owned savings banks were successful, with 37% of credit 
denials declined by the bank. In 2006 the ratio was only 31%. Due to 
enhanced demand this means that the credit backlog more than doubled 
from 2005 to 2006 from 170,000 to 360,000. In particular, (small) SMEs are 
affected, according to Plankensteiner and Zimmerman (2007): credit 
prolongations were reduced by four to six times as much for small companies 
with less than 10 million euros in revenues (6.0% to 9.0%) compared to 
companies with more than 50 million euros (1.6%). 
Part of the explanation could lie in the fact that SMEs utilise their credit lines 
at banks and have to shop around (Reize, 2007) as the total quota of overall 
denials stayed stable at 27%. Therefore, bank guarantees play a major role: 
according to Schmidt and von Elkan (2006) Savings Banks and Cooperative 
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Banks account for 46% and 33% of the facilitating banks, with regard to debt 
guarantees. Only 10% of the corporations included in the study stated that 
the decline of state guarantee would not have an influence on the volume 
and timing of the respective investment. Based on a holistic economic model 
they estimated that the gross domestic product rose by 3.2 billion euros due 
to state guarantees. 
 
However, there are other views on a pre-crisis basis. Based on empirical 
research in the UK, Vos et al (2007) tell the ‘The happy story of small 
business financing’: they question the widespread belief that companies are 
striving for growth (Gregory et al, 2005, for example). Instead they found that 
less than 10% of the UK SMEs were focusing on strong growth. On the 
contrary they were looking for sustainability and interconnection, therefore 
they question the ‘classic rationale’ to experience leverage in terms of profits 
or market share by use of ‘external financing’. By ‘not participating in the 
growth rat race’ they experienced ‘financial contentment’. Therefore, on the 
verge of Basel II in the US only 1.2% of the SMEs under review stated that 
financing was an issue beyond working capital financing. 
2.10.2 Credit Financing in Germany on the verge of the Crisis 
Based on the evaluation of large statistical data sets, consultant McMahon et 
al (2009) state that after the Lehmann default ‘credit markets stopped 
functioning’ and ‘As a result, liquidity dried up in 2008, making it increasingly 
difficult for companies to finance their operations, …’. The effect on SMEs 
can be evaluated on a high-level basis using the following analogy. Well in 
advance of the current financial crisis, Kroszner et al (2007, the article was 
accepted by the journal in 2005) provided the following evidence based on 
the evaluation of financial shocks of the last quarter in 38 countries: sectors 
with a high dependence on external finance show greater downsizing in 
times of a financial crisis in well developed financial systems than in more 
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‘shallow’ ones. Translated to Basel II and the current financial crisis this could 
lead to the following conclusion: Basel II can be regarded as a ‘well 
developed financial system’ and SMEs as ‘a sector with high dependence on 
external finance’, it can be concluded that the current financial crisis adds to 
the downturn of SMEs. This is in line with a survey from Stübiger and Steinert 
(2009) amongst private equity managers: 42% of the respondents believed 
that banks handle credits restrictively and even 49% as very restrictively, due 
to the financial crisis. For sure, the subprime crisis has a spillover effect on 
credit. However, there is controversy regarding what this effect on SMEs will 
look like. A recent survey (Abberger and Kunkel, 2008) amongst 2,700 
German companies in spring 2008 showed that 92% stated that credit 
conditions remained unchanged for them despite the credit crisis. This is in 
line with empiric research amongst bank lending managers (Arons, 2008). In 
general, the credit volume to German companies increased from 1,204 billion 
euros in 2006 to 1,260 billion euros in 2007 and 1,333 billion euros in 2008 
according to statistics of the German Federal Reserve (Handelsblatt, 2009).  
The yearly empirical survey of the German Ifo Institut (2009) provided 
evidence that German SMEs companies are less affected than larger ones 
(see Figure 10: manufacturing companies, which are the stronghold of the 
German economy) regarding the credit crunch.  
 
 
Figure 10 Credit constraints in manufacturing (IFO Institut, 2009:2) 
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On a model-based calculation, Bruche and González-Aguado (2010) provide 
further evidence in relation to the good pre-crisis situation. They argue that 
credit downturns start before recessions and last longer. Therefore the credit 
crunch must have been observable well before the crisis according to their 
model, which seems not to be the case. On the other hand, bank deposits at 
the European Central Bank (ECB, 2009) rose from 0.1 billion euros in 
September 2008 to 280.2 billion euros in November 2008 which is a clear 
indication of mistrust amongst banks which leads to a reduced credit supply. 
Therefore, credit financing has top priority according to a BVK survey 
amongst 46 funds (BVK, 2009a): the credit crunch and the ability to reduce 
credit are two of the top-five priorities of the portfolio companies in the current 
financial crisis. 
In contrast to the studies mentioned already, Russell-Walling (2007) points 
out that SMEs will be most affected by the subprime crisis and the following 
credit crunch because they depend greatly on loans and their contracts 
normally allow for a quicker withdrawal of credit compared to larger 
corporations due to the lower bargaining power of an SME. As a remedy to 
these issues the federal government set-up an ‘economic stimulus package’. 
However, Fahrion (2009) believes – based on qualitative assessments from 
business associations – from a practitioners’ point of view, that, especially, 
SMEs with low creditworthiness will be excluded from the indemnification 
clause of 50% to 90%. 
Even worse, on the verge of the financial crisis, even prior to the Lehman 
Brothers default on September 15th 2008 (Greenspan, 2008) the German, 
partly state-owned and dedicated ‘Mittelstands’-bank, IKB, would have gone 
bankrupt without support. Germany’s state bank KfW, which owns 37.8% of 
IKB had to support IKB with a rescue fund of 3.5 billion euros together with 
other banks (Hall, 2008).  
However, based on US data, Carey (2002) believes that only 50% of the 
banks would recover, despite ‘equity infusions’, within one year of severe 
losses. And from a holistic perspective, Hasan et al (2009) point out, based 
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on cross-regional research, that economic growth is spurred more by the 
quality of services provided by the banks than the mere quantity of credit 
supply. 
2.10.3 Private Equity Financing 
As Germany is a laggard regarding private equity, the private equity 
development is explained followed by an overview about private equity 
options regarding (German) SMEs. 
Private Equity Development 
According to the BVK yearbook (BVK, 2009b), in 2008, investments in par-
ticular declined, and fundraising even dropped by two-third (see Figure 11). 
 
 2008 2007 
Capital under management 35.1 billion euros 31.9 billion euros 
Fundraising 1.9 billion euros 5.7 billion euros 
Investments in Germany 8.4 billion euros 10.6 billion euros 
Portfolio 31.9 billion euros 27.1 billion euros 
Portfolio companies 6.409 6.279 
Figure 11 Private equity in Germany (derived from BVK, 2009b) 
 
Before the subprime crisis private equity reached another record high on a 
worldwide basis, according to BVK statistics (Gürtler, 2007). In 2006 US-$ 
400 billion were raised, approximately US-$ 700 billion were spent, and in 
total US-$ 1,600 billion were allocated to private equity funds for further 
investments off-market.  
In Germany (Frommann, 2007a) the funds volume of German investment 
companies has nearly doubled since the year 2000 (15.6 billion euros). 
Frommann (2006a) ascribed this favourable trend in the pre-subprime years 
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to two reasons. Firstly, the capital and stock market climate recovered after 
the burst of the New Economy bubble (see above). Secondly, since 2003 the 
German government has made laws in favour of private equity, such as the 
‘Law to foster venture capital’ (GFW, 2004) which has lowered the tax on 
‘carried interest’. Furthermore, von Berger et al (2007), for example, that 
recent contradictory negative effects of the Corporate Tax Reform 2008 
(UStRG, 2007) are not compensated as the German government does not 
see a need to correct the taxation further in favour of private equity 
companies. It is only planned to make special regulations for venture capital 
and part of the earlier tax advantages have been withdrawn by the current 
government (Haarmann, 2007) with the law to modernise the framework of 
private equity (MoRaKG, 2008). According to the European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA, 2008), Germany still ‘remains ranked in the lower half of 
the European classification’ in terms of tax and legal environment with 
regards to private equity. This is in line with other empirical studies: Ehrhart 
and Zimmermann (2007) introduced the so-called German Private Equity 
Barometer (GPEB) based on a probabilistic sample frame in terms of private 
equity and SMEs. The GPEB reached a record high with nearly 80% in 2006 
(on a scale from -100% to 100% for ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’) amongst BVK 
members. 
The Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR) tracked the 
European buy-out market between 1986 and 2006 (Wright et al, 2006): in 
relation to GDP, private equity in Germany gained momentum and ranked 
third in Europe with a portion of approximately three-quarters of a percent of 
buy-out volume in relation to GDP. According to Schäfer and Fisher (2008:2), 
the buy-out sector has a complementary function in order to ‘activate credits 
and reduce financing limitations’ (see findings from the qualitative analysis in 
section 6 in relation to hypotheses 2.b and 3). 
While private equity was on the rise on a global basis the subprime crisis 
(Russel-Walling, 2007) brought a sudden backdrop regarding larger scale 
transactions. In the first quarter of 2009 the effect of the Lehman default took 
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momentum: ‘Q1 2009 numbers are down by a remarkable 39% and 86% in 
terms of volume and value on the corresponding period of last year’ as the 
leading, recurring transaction trend monitor Unquote (2009b:2) states – 
mainly due to the strong reduction in (large) buy-outs. In late 2006 managers 
of 59 private equity companies still expected a continuous positive effect in 
their outlook for 2007 (Lauszus et al, 2007). 
Due to the subprime crisis the climate for LBOs became dramatically adverse 
after the end of 2007. The value of buy-outs in the last quarter of 2007 
amounted to 21 billion euros which was the lowest recorded value for seven 
years (Unquote, 2008). Several research studies, such as BVK (2009c) or 
Capon (2008), Finance-Dealbank (2009) or Unquote (2009a) expect that 
financing of LBOs will become extremely difficult. Data from the German 
M&A association (BMA, 2009) show the effect: the number of transactions 
grew from 424 transactions in the first quarter of 2007 to 557 in the third 
quarter of 2008 (BMA, 2009) and plunged to 380 in the last quarter 2008: 
normally the last quarter is the highest throughout a year. 
The German Private Equity Barometer (GPEB, 2009) by KfW and BVK 
reflects this trend as illustrated in Figure 12 (orange: whole market, blue: 
early stage, yellow: later stage / buy-out). 
 
 
Figure 12 German Private Equity Barometer (2009), GPEB, 2009:1  
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According to EVCA (2009), fund raising has been mainly stable in 2008 but 
investments were reduced by 27%, especially in the large buy-out area (see 
Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13 Private equity activity – quarterly evolution (EVCA, 2009:1) 
 
This is in line with findings from BVK (2009c): 303 investments were made in 
Germany compared to 315 one year ago. Yet, large buy-outs plunged by 
nearly 75%. Transactions dropped sharply in Germany according to Ernst & 
Young (2009): the number of transactions declined from 98 (9.5 billion euros) 
in the first half year 2008 to 54 (2.8 billion) in the same period in 2009. 
As a consequence, Meerkatt and Liechtenstein (2008) expect a major 
consolidation of the private equity market due to the financial crisis: up to 
40% of all private equity companies could diminish before 2010 / 2011. In 
contrast, private equity related to SMEs seemed less affected (Unquote 
2008, based on data of 16 European countries): the Small-cap Market (below 
160 million euros) in 2007, comprised 87% of all deals recorded in the fourth 
quarter and grew by approximately 17% in terms of deals closed and volume. 
According to Barker (2009), only one third of the smaller Venture Capital 
firms (focusing on smaller companies) expect a reduction in investment 
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levels compared to more than 50% of major VCs (beyond 500 US-$ million in 
funds). Contrary to other European countries, ‘Evergreen funds’ (which 
continuously reinvest) and captives (funds which are financed by a mother 
company like an insurance concern) are predominant in Germany and 
comprise 51% of all funds (Frommann, 2006a). Only 49% of private equity 
funds are solely dependent on fund raising. 
In an international context Germany played a minor role in the private equity 
arena in the past. According to the European Commission (2006), the UK 
takes the lead with 23.8 billion euros managed from the UK and 11.9 billion 
euros invested in the UK, followed by France with 7.3 (7.7) billion euros and 
Germany with 2.7 (5.5.) billion. 
SME Financing in Germany via Private Equity  
Whereas private equity was barely known in Germany in general in the 
1990s it has been discussed as highly controversial in Germany since the 
famous quote of former State Minister Franz Müntefering in 2004 (SPD, 
2005:29). He compared private equity corporate raiders with the biblical 
scenery of flocks of grasshoppers which destroyed whole harvests: ‘We must 
help these companies, which focus on the sustainability of their companies 
and the interests of their employees, against irresponsible flocks of 
grasshoppers, which measure success on a quarterly basis, draw off a 
company’s substance and let the company go bankrupt, when they have 
eaten them up’. Several interviewees from the private equity sector (see 
qualitative analysis in sector 6) stated that this political statement had an 
effect other than that intended by the State Minister. Wealthy private persons 
became more aware of the high return chances of private equity and there 
was a ‘leap’ in fund inflow in the months after the famous quote in Germany. 
In addition, on a day-to-day business, private equity seems to become more 
and more accepted in the German Mittelstand and Basel II is one of the 
drivers behind this. According to an empirical survey by Nitschke and Kuper 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 81 of 463 
(2007), approximately one quarter of participants (especially Mittelstand 
companies) already regard private equity as a financing option. A study by 
the Centre for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) provides further 
evidence (Achleitner and Geidner, 2007): based on interviews with 
managers, about one third of ‘carved-out’ business units between 1998 and 
2005 claim that the cooperation with private equity firms is more positive than 
with the former stakeholder. The biggest change was experienced by SMEs 
due to new investors in the area of controlling and corporate governance. 
30.2% of the investment volume of 23.1 billion euros (Frommann, 2007b) 
was placed in 664 German SMEs. The SMEs therefore account for 97.7 % of 
all funded companies. 
 
Regarding buy-outs the situation is similar: companies with less than 100 
(15) million euro revenues comprise 27.7 % (13.1%) of the funds invested but 
95.2% (80.4%) of the companies. The bulk of the buy-out volume 
(Frommann, 2007b) are still Management Buy-outs (henceforth MBOs, 72), 
followed by LBOs (12) and Managements Buy-Ins (henceforth MBIs, 8); 
MBOs and MBIs are per-definition SME-centric. A major role in the SME-
related private equity sector in Germany is played by (federal) state owned 
investors, for example, the MGB (Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesell-
schaften) in terms of mezzanine (Selbherr, 2007). According to BVK (2008), 
they invest up to 98.8% in companies with less than 50 million euros in 
revenues. 
This trend correlates with the establishment of a new stock market segment 
called Entry Standard in 2005 (Deutsche Börse, 2007) which was designed 
for SMEs having lower requirements. Bormann (2007) therefore calls this 
segment ‘capital market light’. According to a BVK survey (Frommann, 
2006b) the majority of private equity companies regard this new segment as 
one of the prime reasons for increased IPO activity as a new exit channel for 
private equity companies. 
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However, other authors, such as Ehrhart and Zimmermann (2007) believe 
that this positive climate might not substitute bank credits. Buy-out capital is 
about three times as high as growth capital, which is more than three times 
as high as seed capital. That means that ‘classic investment / growth 
financing’, a prime focus of SMEs, is still below Pre-Basel II and Pre-New-
Economy levels. The gap in seed financing is partially closed by Business 
Angels. In their 24th survey amongst business angels (BAND, 2008) the 
participating 21 respondents answered that 70% of their investments are 
seed- or first round investments. 
2.10.4 SME Financing via Capital Markets 
In its yearly IPO Watch, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Troubridge, 2008) states 
that IPO activity stayed strong in 2007 on a pre-crisis basis: 838 IPOs (2006: 
813) on a European basis and 279 in the US (2006: 242). In Germany, IPOs 
recovered on a smaller scale. After the IPO record during the prime of the 
New Economy bubble, with 175 on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in the year 
2000, the number of IPOs declined sharply to 1 in 2003 (Frommann, 2007a). 
During 2008 IPO activities reduced to 12 IPOs on the regulated market after 
33 in 2007 (Deutsche Börse, 2008). 
 
According to Frey and Kuhn (2007) the primary aim of an IPO is growth and 
innovation financing (70.3%). However, this might be primarily wishful 
thinking for (smaller) SMEs: several interviewees (see qualitative analysis in 
section 6) pointed out, in relation to hypotheses 2.b and 3, that an IPO is only 
an option for major SMEs. 
 
The IPO recovery after the burst of the New Economy bubble is strongly 
linked to Private Equity (Frommann, 2007a): 52% of the IPOs between 2002 
and mid 2007 were private equity-financed comprising primarily major 
corporations. This combination seems beneficial for all parties: private equity-
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backed IPOs (33 buy-out samples) and especially venture capital-backed 
IPOs (105 venture capital samples) outperformed the stock market between 
1990 and 2007 (Drathen, 2007) over a five year period. The same applies to 
LBOs in the UK. Based on 128 leveraged buy-out fund-backed IPOs, von 
Drathen and Flaviano (2007) revealed that these IPOs outperformed the 
market in relation to various return measures. 
2.10.5 Alternative Forms of Financing 
In line with the literature review, the means of alternative finance under 
review are: mezzanine, leasing, factoring and ABS (see hypotheses 2.b and 
3): Brokamp et al (2004) argue, that acquisition of credits became too costly, 
and new shareholders are not yet welcomed on a broad basis in the German 
Mittelstand. Therefore, mezzanine, with its equity equivalent design options, 
is of growing importance. This is in line with other empirical research from 
Hollasch and Berg (2007), for example. According to an exemplary 
calculation by Hartl (2002), companies with a low equity ratio can reduce 
their credit rates by approximately 1% under the Basel II paradigm. However, 
others, like Bruch (2007), argue that smaller SMEs might be excluded from 
‘traditional mezzanine’ due to their poorer ratings in relation to major 
corporations. 
 
Other forms of alternative finance are leasing and factoring (Hartl, 2002): 
SFS (2006) evaluated in an empirical study that already one quarter of 
investment in plant and machinery is facilitated by leasing and reaches, 
therefore, nearly the level of the UK (28.7%) with its strong leasing tradition. 
The prime purpose of using leasing is it’s ‘liquidity generating facility’ as 
rating agencies will be ‘factored it back to the balance sheet’ (SFS, 2003:32). 
However, the authors of the survey argue that the new rating systems of 
banks under Basel II ‘will not sufficiently differentiate to extrapolate the 
leasing effect’. However, Schmit (2004) points out that physical securities are 
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only partly recognised under the New Accord which leads to higher 
regulatory capital for leasing portfolios. 
 
Factoring has a similar off-the-balance-sheet liquidity effect. This is in line 
with Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) who pronounce the importance of 
factoring in their cross-country comparison of financial-factors which foster 
growth. However, factoring still has a poor image in Germany as corporations 
who use factoring are still regarded to be short on liquidity (SFS, 2003). 
According to Hofmann et al (2007) banks will play a major role in facilitating 
ABS as it is a means of spreading risk regarding credits to the German 
Mittelstand. ABS means that a company can sell its receivables to a special 
purpose entity which offers instant liquidity. The bundle of receivables is 
refinanced via the capital market (Rosenfeld and Ziese, 2006). 
 
Whereas Asset Backed Securities (ABS) have been an instrument for major 
corporations in the 1990s due to the huge structuring effort (BdB, 2005), 
private banks offer standardised solutions which are available from 5 million 
euros in credits onwards. Based on data from Moody’s, the securitisation 
market in Germany (Sandvoß, 2007) grew between 2001 and 2006 from 14.2 
billion euros to 66.7 billion euros (+370%). On a European basis, the German 
Mittelstand takes the lead with a market share of 30% of the European SME 
securitisation market; Germany accounted for 13% of the European ABS 
market in 2006 (Sandvoß, 2007). Schauerte (2006) regards the cheaper 
refinancing of banks in terms of bundled SME credits to be one of the main 
drivers behind ABS. 
However, with Basel II ‘securitisation exposures’ (Rosenfeld and Ziese, 2006) 
a major spread concerning SA has been experienced regarding risk weights: 
they range from 20% to 1,250% (Suyter, 2008) depending on the external 
rating. Frese and Glüder (2006) point out that this is a major problem 
especially within Germany. They argue that syndicated credits, which were 
not developed as a kind of securitised product, can fall under this category. 
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2.11 QUO VADIS BASEL II IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
Federici and Caprioli (2009) point out that financial liberalisation is associated 
with a ‘greater incident of crisis’ in a more and more integrated world. Basel II 
can be regarded as a means of integration with a pro-cyclical effect. 
According to authors like Wahlström (2009) financial crises lead to changes 
in regulation. In terms of Basel II it was the outflow of the Asian Financial 
Crisis in the year 1997, to which Basel I did not have the right tools to prevent 
it. Will the current financial and economic crisis serve as a trigger for 
substantial changes within a ‘Basel III’? 
 
Weber and Darbellay (2008) point out that the current subprime crisis shows 
the weaknesses of the system. Prior to Basel II banks were used to keeping 
their loans on their own balance sheet, however, under the Basel II regime 
banks have incentives for offloading credit risk from their balance sheet and 
transferring it to other investors, as has occurred in the last decade of 
deregulation (Clerc, 2008). The result is known as ‘subprime / financial crisis’. 
By using a real options approach Daglish (2009) points out that the rising 
default rate which leads to subprime defaults is a combination of rising 
interest rates and declining house prices. 
It should not be forgotten, when talking about financial crises, to point out the 
relationship to the economic environment. According to the German Industry 
Association (BDI, 2009), recessions, which are accompanied by real estate 
and banking crises are more severe than ‘normal’ anti-cyclical crises: the 
estimation of the economic framework plunged from 0.1 in Q4 2008 to minus 
43.7 in Q1 2009. 
An in-depth discussion as to whether the extent of the financial crisis was 
foreseeable and whether a ‘revised’ Basel Accord could have prevented this 
is beyond the scope of this thesis – yet, some exemplary viewpoints are 
provided: 
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Stefanescu et al (2009:216) argue in an article (which was submitted in early 
2008) that it is difficult for Basel II to calculate default rates for low default 
portfolios: ‘Such low default portfolios typically include exposures to 
sovereigns, large corporations, or financial institutions such as banks (in 
developed nations) and insurance companies …’ Therefore they set up a 
model including systematic macroeconomic shocks and came to the 
conclusion that – based on data from Standard and Poor’s between 1981 
and 2007 – default probabilities for AAA and AA portfolios should be 0.4 and 
1.0 which is far below the Basel II threshold of 3.0. Current history proves 
otherwise in the banking crisis. Yet, there had been in-time warnings: Lang et 
al (2008), for example, examined the effect of Basel II from a competitive 
point of view. Their article – which was accepted by the journal nearly two 
years prior to the default of Lehman Brothers – is concerned with the effect of 
Basel II on credit card lending in the US. While in normal economic times the 
effect will be marginal, they argue that Basel II banks will face, in times of a 
financial crisis, a significant competitive disadvantage. As a result US banks 
might not adopt the A-IRB approach or non-bank issuers might defer credit 
card business to a parent company. 
 
Authors such as Alexander and Sheed (2008:2220) go even further: they 
believe that Basel II did not provide the right tools for this ‘historic crisis’ 
through a lack of imagination regarding banking stability, although Basel II 
requires that ‘a bank must ensure that it has sufficient capital to ... cover the 
results of its stress testing’. 
They point out that traditional stress tests are often conducted outside the 
risk model like VaR, or they do not pay attention to the ‘characteristics’ of the 
market in terms of crises periods, ‘namely, increased probability of further 
large movements, increased co-movement between markets, greater implied 
volatility and reduced liquidity.’ 
Based on US panel data over a 10-year period, Pérignon and Smith (2010) 
add to this: they found out that most VaR calculations were based on 
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historical data with, according to their model, no suitable information 
regarding future volatility. Furthermore, default risk, which is based on a 
bank’s trading book, had not yet been covered by value-at-risk models 
although the idea of on ‘incremental risk charge’ (henceforth IRC) has been 
around since 2005 (Pengelly, 2009). 
Therefore several authors focus on lessons learned in terms of Basel II out of 
the financial crisis. According to McIllroy (2008), for example, securitisation 
should be limited to keep a certain amount of risk within a bank’s own 
balance sheet, make inherent risk of bank products more transparent and 
reduce the pro-cyclical effect of Basel II. 
 
Hall (2008) analysed capital arbitrage by off-the-balance-sheet balancing 
(conduits etc.) in light of the Northern Rock issue in the UK. As a remedy he 
suggests to reassess the model for setting regulatory capital charges. 
As a consequence, several practitioners and academics even demand an 
interruption of Basel II, according to Beyer (2009:7), as SMEs in particular 
suffer most from the pro-cyclical effect of Basel II: he claims that Basel II 
manifests the current economic situation as the ‘companies have the best 
rating who do not need a credit at all’. 
In light of the financial crisis the Basel Committee and European Commission 
thought about changing Basel II (Dallara, 2008) in late 2008 in order to 
overcome the weaknesses which emerged during the crisis. Nouy (2008) 
names for example: the improvement of stress testing especially in the area 
of chain reactions, the upgrading of risk management practices as liquidity 
plays a crucial role, and the improvements needed regarding Credit Rating 
Agencies (henceforth CRA) to assess the risk in structured products. 
 
Several author’s stress this issue of the inadequacy of current market risk 
prediction in times of crisis. Clark (2009) points out that historic data of 2007 
were unable to predict the ‘losses that would occur in stressed markets’. 
Based on empirical data Campbell (2009) showed that value-at-risk is ‘risky’ 
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in times of crisis: almost every category experienced strong increases in 
many banks. 
The Basel Committee reacted by issuing consultative papers in January 2009 
(Campbell, 2009) introducing the IRC ‘designed to tighten up the 
management of risk in bank trading books’ (Davidson, 2009) and it added a 
‘stressed VAR’ (SVAR, Pengelly, 2009). In March 2009 the Basel Committee 
confirmed introduction of rules to build-up capital buffers to be used in 
downturns (Tattersall, 2009), another consultative document was published 
in April 2009 (BCBS, 2009b). In the past, there had been no differentiation 
between ‘standard ABS’ and the so-called ‘collateralised debt obligations 
(henceforth CDO) which were part of the issues initiating the crisis.  
The enhancements should come into effect at the end of 2009 (BCBS, 
2009c) in the US the start should be in 2010. As discussed, the 
enhancements circle a better and more comprehensive risk management, 
especially in terms of securitisation risk. Other enhancements included: in 
Pillar 1, higher risk weights were introduced, in Pillar II a special focus was 
laid on off-balance-sheet exposures and securitisation, and in Pillar III 
securitisation in the trading book was one of the key features.  
This is in line with authors such as Himino (2009) who calls for a ‘counter-
cyclical Basel II’ so that in good times capital buffers are built up which melt 
off in bad times. However, he proposes a ‘regulator independent deno-
minator’ based on macro indicators. Furthermore, there are already voices 
from the US, like the FDIC chairman, who believe that a ‘more granular Basel 
I’ would be favourable in comparison to Basel II (Madigan, 2009). 
 
From a holistic point of view and under the impression of the financial crises 
authors like Breuer et al (2010) opt for an integrated ‘compound’ risk 
calculation approach in terms of credit and market risk, rather than three 
separate ones (for credit, market and operational risk). Based on a simulation 
model they argue that this could lead to an underestimation as well as to an 
overestimation of risk. 
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Besides the current crisis, it should not be forgotten that there is still a road to 
go – and not only for SMEs to adept to a risk based Basel regime: Wahlström 
(2009) carried out 25 in-depth interviews with managers from Swedish banks. 
He found that there is a mismatch in perception between managers who 
operate in the risk management department and operational staff. Whereas 
the first group points out the positive effects, like the confirmation of current 
banking practice and the refinement of internal systems and risk control 
mechanisms, the second group criticises Basel II for the lack of applicability 
of the models in practice despite an ‘overly’ high usage of resources. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As discussed in the introductory section, there is a research gap regarding 
what the impact of Basel II on SMEs looks like. Therefore the author uses the 
comparative method (Peters, 1998) ‘Most Different Systems’ to structure the 
literature review in line with certain generic ‘discriminating factors’, with 
regards to Basel II in an international context, like for example ‘banking 
economy structure’ (bank-based economies vs. financial market-based 
economies). 
 
Within the respective paragraphs, the findings of the literature review were 
linked to the research question and hypotheses tested, as stated in the 
introductory section 1.1. Based on this methodology the findings provide the 
following evidence: from a Pre-Basel II perspective, no consistent effect of 
Basel II on SMEs with regard to the various types of companies within a 
country exists. On the other hand, there is little evidence either that the 
effects of Basel II, regarding the generic ‘discriminating factors’ under review, 
are consistent across countries. Therefore, further research is needed to see 
whether the effect in Germany is consistent, from a Post-Basel II perspective, 
regarding conditions which trigger certain mechanisms – from a scientific 
realism perspective, as described in 4.2.3. In combination with the back-
ground-gathering phase, the findings from the literature review in this section 
provide the basis for defining the research design (see section 4, based on 
the author’s philosophical stance) and the three initial hypotheses which were 
tested in the empirical quantitative and qualitative sections 5 and 6. 
 
As discussed in the introductory section there is no homogeneous generic 
pattern regarding the effect of Basel II on SME financing. Based on different 
country specific sample frames on the one hand, and different ‘discriminating 
factors’, like ‘financing focus’, on the other hand, researchers come to 
different conclusions about whether SME financing will become ‘easier / 
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cheaper’ or ‘more difficult / dearer’ due to Basel II. De Jong et al (2008), for 
example, point out that the leverage of corporations depends directly and 
also indirectly on country specific factors, like the maturity of bond markets or 
stock markets. 
 
Therefore, it is of interest to research these two categories mentioned above 
in more depth to evaluate whether there are consistent patterns within each 
of the following two determinants: 
1. It is of interest whether the effect of Basel II on SMEs (which is in general 
not consistent) might be consistent within a country as a kind of ‘universal 
principle’ (regardless of the specific factor approach used). 
2. Likewise it is of interest whether the characteristic is consistent regarding a 
specific ‘discriminating factor cluster’ (regardless of the differences in the 
economies in other factors). For example, if ‘financing focus’ is used as 
‘discriminating factor’ a country could be either a (more) ‘financial market-
based economy’ or a (more) ‘bank-based economy’ regardless of other 
factors. ‘Financial market-based economy’ and ‘bank-based economy’ will 
build clusters regarding the discriminating factor ‘financing focus’. 
 
A comparative method called ‘Universalising Comparison’ is used in order to 
establish that every instance of a phenomenon follows the same rule 
(Espíndola, 2007). This is undertaken by using a Most Different Systems 
(MDS) approach which is based on Mill’s ‘Method of Difference’ of the 
English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Within the MDS approach 
SMEs which belong to a particular country or to a specific cross-nation 
‘discriminating factor’ are taken into account. The aim is to seek explaining 
phenomena (here: effect on Basel II) which they have in common (Espíndola, 
2007). The principle is: most different, similar outcomes (Peters, 1998). 
 
In the case of the first determinant of a coherent country specific behaviour 
the difference lies in the different ‘methodologies used / factors under review’ 
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in the respective research studies. In case of the second determinant of a 
coherent ‘discriminating factor cluster’ the difference lies in the fact that 
SMEs belong to various countries which are different in many other factors, 
like size of economy or industry structure. 
 
Based on these clusters, the effects on SMEs, derived from the literature 
review, were assigned to the country on which the respective research is 
based. The effect on SME financing will be clustered accordingly in a two-fold 
way: the effect of Basel II is (a bit / rather) negative for SMEs (i.e. ‘credits will 
become dearer / more difficult for SMEs’ or the effect is (a bit / rather) 
positive, that means ‘credits will become cheaper / easier for SMEs’. This 
clustering of the Basel II effect from primarily a Pre-Basel II perspective (as 
the literature research was carried out prior to Basel II), ensures a structure 
of the literature review section in line with the research question which is: ‘to 
explore the effect of Basel II on SMEs’. In addition, the respective research 
papers were linked to the research hypotheses. 
The results of the comparative research will be displayed as a four square 
matrix for every factor under review with the instances of each factor on one 
axis and the effect on SMEs on the other axis. Patterns like the one 
displayed in Figure 14 will provide evidence that there is a consistent pattern 
regarding a discriminating factor. If patterns like the one in Figure 15 emerge, 
this will ‘falsify’ (Smith, 1998:105-106) in the positivist view, the existence of a 
consistent pattern regarding the respective discriminating factor. As 
discussed in the introduction a positivist view is prevalent in financial 
research according to Ardalan (2003). 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 93 of 463 
  
Figure 14 Supporting evidence regarding the existence of a consistent pattern 
regarding a ‘discriminating factor’ (sample figures) 
  
Figure 15 Falsifying the existence of a consistent pattern regarding a 
‘discriminating factor’ (sample figures) 
 
Regarding the discriminating factor ‘financing focus’, for example, research 
papers estimate that for the financial market-based economy, e.g. The 
Netherlands, credit for SMEs will become cheaper, whereas for other finan-
cial market-based economies like the US or UK credit will become dearer. 
Therefore, the behaviour regarding the discriminating factor ‘financing focus’ 
is not unequivocal and there is no consistent pattern regarding the 
discriminating factor ‘financing focus’. Empirical research from the US, 
Australia and especially European countries is taken into account. In 
addition, the research designs are explained which provides further insights 
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regarding the choice of a valid research design for the author’s own primary 
research (see section 4). 
3.1 SEGMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING MDS ANALYSIS 
ON BASEL II 
The MDS analysis is clustered in line with the ‘discriminating factors’ 
selected, as described below. In total 42 main research papers and several 
tens of supporting research studies have been critically reviewed. In each 
sub section, one factor will be analysed based on several studies under 
review, knowing that this can give only a preliminary picture, as Hudson 
(2003) points out: he believes that banks will be consumed for a few more 
years in order to interpret the regulation. In addition, more than 40 opt-out 
clauses will make a unified comparison difficult and inconsistencies will arise 
regarding the nation-specific application when a multinational bank operates 
loans abroad. 
 
Within the respective sections the literature review findings were linked to the 
research hypotheses. These were derived from the research objectives / 
question. Another prerequisite is that the factor specific researches under 
review have respective internal validity (Robson, 2002:100-107) which is the 
case to a major extent. Yet, a detailed management critique of each article is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and can be found partly, for example, in 
VanHoose (2007) or Schmid (2007). Furthermore, some findings may be 
time dependent as Basel II underwent several changes until its final 
application. As most research is focusing on Europe, the US and Australia 
these regions build the foundation for this literature research. 
 
Based on the literature research the following discriminating factors emerged 
as being suitable for the chosen MDS approach: 
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> Financing focus: bank-based economies vs. financial-based economies 
> Good protection of creditor rights / forbearance 
> Effect on economy structure 
> Effect on banking structure / sophistication 
> Basel II intrinsic approaches 
 
The section starts with a summary of the literature review findings in order to 
provide a comprehensive picture. Each discriminating factor is then 
evaluated in detail in the consecutive sub-sections. 
3.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aim of the literature review was to put Basel II research in perspective 
with the research objective / question: ‘to establish what effect Basel II has 
had on corporate financing of SMEs in Germany from an initial Post-Basel II 
perspective and consider how SMEs can cope best with the changes 
imposed’. The findings of the MDS-based literature review (see sections 3.3 
to 3.7) provide evidence that the Basel II effect is not generally consistent 
over all countries and all ‘discriminating factors’ from a Pre-Basel II point of 
view. Therefore, more detailed research is needed which is provided in the 
empirical sections 5 and 6. 
3.2.1 Inconsistent Country-specific Effect 
The various researches on a country level show a certain pattern regarding 
what the effect of Basel II looks like (see research question / objective). 
However, the picture is ambiguous. Figure 16 provides a comprehensive 
overview of the findings from the various studies under review on an 
aggregated country level.  
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Figure 16 Basel II effect country synthesis chart 
 
However, there seems to be certain patterns showing that credit will become 
dearer in Austria, Finland and Greece. They will become cheaper in Belgium, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, the UK and the US. With 
regard to Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Portugal the 
opinions of the effect are even more diverging. 
3.2.2 Inconsistent ‘Discriminating Factor’-specific Effect of Basel II Regarding 
SMEs 
With the inconsistency in mind, a second research focus was established, to 
see whether there are overriding ‘discriminating factors’ under which SMEs 
show a consistent behaviour, regardless of other factors in the economy. 
However, no consistent pattern regarding the effect of Basel II (see research 
question / objective) emerged for any of the ‘discriminating factors’ under 
review in the last section, as follows. 
1) Garside & Bech, 2) Giannetti, 3) Heid, 4) Cowley, 5) Buch, 6) Rubin & Nayda 7) Bartels, 8) Barfield-b,
9) Cartwright & Sarraf 10) Dietsch & Petey, 11) Altman & Sabato, 12) Larsen & Bjerkeland, 13) Jacobson
et al, 14) Kopecky & VanHoose, 15) Saurina & Trucharte, 16) Hedtstück, 17) Hollasch & Berg, 18) Schäfer-a et al, 
19) Schäfer-b et al, 20) Schalast & Barten, 21) Ehrhardt & Zimmermann, 22) Bruch, 23) Hartl, 24) Ackermann,
25) BWI, 26) Suyter, 27) Carey et al, 28) Berger, 29) SFS, 30) Plankensteiner & Zimmermann, 31) Cole,
32) Degryse & Ongena, 33) Sandvoß, 34) BDB, 35) Cumming & Johan, 36) Barfield-a, 37) Golland & Gehlhaar, 
38) Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 39) Bräunig & Lob, 40) Nitschke & Kuper, 41) Ahrweiler et al, 42) Nordal
Austria36
Belgium2+38, 8,11+32
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Portugal2+38, 8
Norway12
Sweden13
Spain2+38, 8
The Netherlands2,2+38,5,27, 35
UK2, 5, 8, 27, 36
US2, 5, 11, 27, 11+31+32, 6
Austria8
Belgium2+14
France9, 10, 2+14
Finland36
Germany1,3,7,9,10,20,22,23,24,25,26,27,29,30,33, 41
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Summary: Financing Focus 
Based on findings from Bruch (2007), Carey et al (2003), Cowley (2002), 
Cumming and Johan (2007), Ehrhardt and Zimmermann (2007), Garside and 
Bech (2003), Giannetti (2003), Golland and Gehlhaar (2002), Heid (2007), 
Hedtstück (2007), Hollasch and Berg (2007), Nitschke and Kuper (2007), 
Schäfer et al (2007), and SFS (2003), SMEs in banking-based economies 
like Italy experience higher credit costs. In finance market-based economies 
such as the Netherlands credit will become cheaper, as will be the case in 
the UK. However, other influences might dilute this effect and lead to 
opposite conclusions. 
 
Summary: Protection of Creditor Rights 
The author derives from the findings of Giannetti (2003), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002) and Buch (2003) that credits will become cheaper as 
Basel II can be regarded as a means for stronger regulation, whether the 
respective country had a high protection of creditor rights like Germany, the 
UK or the United States or a low protection e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, 
Portugal, the Netherlands or Spain. On the other hand, Kopecky (2006) and 
VanHoose (2006) argue that credit will become cheaper for corporations 
which rank low with regard to regulation (see Giannetti’s, 2003). 
 
Summary: Effect of Economic Structure 
Based on findings related to the economic structure from Hartl (2002), 
Bartels (2002) and Ackermann (2003), German SMEs will experience a more 
difficult financing situation. Yet, with regard to findings from Barfield (2004b) 
and BdB (2005) the effect will be nullified. Regarding other countries, the 
findings from the European Commission survey (Barfield, 2004b) are mixed: 
SMEs in countries like Austria will face higher credit costs. Other countries 
like France will face lower rates (Barfield, 2004b). 
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Summary: Effect of Banking Structure / Sophistication 
On a macro-economic level, Barfield (2004b) points out that operational risk 
will offset the other risk factors, like credit risk, and will lower the capital 
requirements for SMEs in most European countries to a greater extent 
(Belgium, France, Portugal and UK). RC will nearly stay the same in 
Germany and France and will actually become higher in Austria and Greece. 
Barfield (2004a and 2004b) as well as Cartwright and Sarraf (2005) studied 
the effect of banking structure on credit prices in relation to Basel II. Whereas 
contradictive findings are derived for the major economies France, Germany 
and Italy, higher credit rates are expected for Finland, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. A reduction is predicted for Austria and the UK, whereas the effect is 
indifferent for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden. Combining research of Altman and Sabato (2005), 
Degryse and Ongena (2005) with Cole (1998) and Rubin and Nayda (2008a) 
for the US, and Ackermann (2003) for Germany induces that a reduction of 
regulatory capital will be the result. On the contrary, Berger (2004) does not 
expect a major change for US SMEs and Sandvoß (2007) expects an 
increase for Germany. 
 
Summary: Basel II Intrinsic Approaches 
BWI (2002), Dietsch and Petey (2004), Altman and Sabato (2005), Larsen 
and Bjerkeland (2005), Jacobson et al (2005), Plankensteiner and 
Zimmermann (2008), and Saurina and Trucharte (2004) examined the effect 
based on the determinants of Basel II – partly using the Basel II assumption, 
partly questioning them. Regarding Germany and France they expect an 
increase in capital requirement, whereas in Italy, Norway, Sweden and the 
UK the opposite should be the case. 
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From a German perspective, several authors reflect on the Mittelstands-
package built into Basel II in 2003 and 2004: Bräunig and Lob (2007) and 
Suyter (2008) believe in a relief for SMEs, while Ahrweiler et al (2007) come 
to a different conclusion. 
3.2.3 Inconsistent German View on the Effect of Basel II regarding SMEs 
In order to set the findings of the author’s research in Germany into 
perspective, the research papers – which are either based solely on 
Germany or provide valuable insights as Germany is indirectly referred to – 
are grouped in line with Creswell’s (2003:3-24) classification of research 
approaches: quantitative and qualitative as well as mixed-method 
approaches. As the mainstream of financial research follows the positivists’ 
view (Ardalan, 2003), the nomothetic quantitative approach prevails. 
Setting the various research papers under review into perspective provides 
further evidence that there is no consistent picture regarding the author’s 
research question / objective (effect of Basel II on SMEs in general in 
Germany) from a Pre-Basel II perspective. 
However, there are two tendencies from a Pre-Basel II perspective 
originating in a deterioration of the ‘Hausbank’ principle due to Basel II: 
credits will become dearer, furthermore, there is a certain indication that 
SMEs will try to gain more financial flexibility by adapting to alternative forms 
of finance. Yet, there is evidence that the house bank principle will not 
completely diminish within a short period of time (see quantitative and 
qualitative analysis in sections 5 and 6). The first hypothesis (‘deterioration of 
the house bank principle’) is therefore directly derived from literature 
research. The same applies for the other two hypotheses which were 
established to answer the research question, as will be explained in detail in 
the following sections 3.3 to 3.7. 
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The comprehensive findings of German related Basel II research are 
displayed in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17 Summarized effect of Basel II research related to Germany 
 
3.2.4 Research Design Evaluation 
The evaluation of research design elements is based on Creswell (2003), 
Robson, (2002) and Saunders et al (2007). It contains the following elements 
(see Figure 18): research question, research philosophy, research type, 
research approach, research strategy, unit of analysis, data collection 
methods, research question (purpose / objective), sampling strategy and data 
analysis methods (statistics used). 
The following paragraphs provide a summary of the research designs used in 
the 42 main studies under review. 
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Figure 18 Research design elements based on 
Creswell (2003), Robson, (2002) and Saunders et al (2007) 
 
> Research Philosophy 
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in any case, nearly all authors took a 
positivist stance (88%), only 12% of the research papers followed a 
different philosophy, especially a realist stance. 
> Research Type 
Nearly all papers under review were written before Basel II was set in 
national law: 76% of these research papers were based on an explanatory 
research type; 19% were partly exploratory in nature, while 5% were 
primarily descriptive. 
> Research Approach (Methodology) 
The usage of quantitative, deductive methodologies predominated (83%) – 
only 17% of the research papers were largely qualitative in nature. A few 
contained certain qualitative elements in a kind of sequential design. 
> Research Strategy 
The predominant method was a quasi-experimental design in order to 
come up with new models. Model building dominated (38%), this was 
followed by surveys (21%), then hypothesis testing (partly linked to upfront 
modelling, 21%), case studies (14%), and then research with alignments 
to grounded research (5%). 
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> Research Choice 
88% of the studies under review were mono-method, 10% and 2% 
comprised mixed-method and multi-method. 
> Data Collection Methods 
Modelling and related hypotheses testing was based on secondary data. 
76% of the research studies relied almost completely on secondary data. 
Primary data collection was primarily carried out by means of non-
participating observations (postal or online questionnaires, 19%). Semi-
structured interviews were used by 5%. 
> Sampling 
The research papers under review focused on public databases. In 
Germany Creditreform, KfW and the BVK dominated. The advantage is 
that due to the large extent of data a statistical significance can be 
assumed (see discussion in section 4.1). In general, 61% of the research 
studies which made statements about their sampling approach can be 
regarded as (nearly) probabilistic, 39% used a purposive sample. 
> Display of Results 
The results were, in nearly all instances of the quantitative ‘statistical’ 
studies, presented primarily by the use of descriptive statistics, such as pie 
charts or bar charts (58%). 42% of the researchers under review extended 
the statistics with more advanced statistics, like regression analysis. 
 
This evaluation provides valuable insights in terms of defining a research 
design which is suitable in terms of answering the research question, as will 
be explained in section 4. Based on Creswell (2003), Robson (2003) and 
Saunders et al (2007), Table 1 provides a detailed description of region, 
research question (purpose / objective), research philosophy, research 
purpose of inquiry, research approach (methodology), research strategy, 
research choice, unit of analysis, techniques and procedures regarding data 
collection and analysis, sampling strategy, results, as well as expected 
reactions of the 42 main studies under review in this literature section. 
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Table 1 Research design evaluation regarding research studies under review 
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3.3 FINANCING FOCUS: BANK-BASED ECONOMIES VS. FINANCIAL 
MARKET-BASED ECONOMIES 
Bank-based economies (Heid, 2007) like Germany (Norden and Weber, 
2005) are those where bank credits are the prime source of external 
corporate financing, contrary to market based-economies (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2002). In Germany, for example, on a scale from 1 to 6 
‘bank credits’ gets the highest importance ranking (5) as a means of SME 
finance (Deloitte & Touche, 2007). This is a strong Pre-Basel II indication 
that, from a Pre-Basel II perspective, the house bank principle was intact in 
Germany (see hypothesis 1). More than 80% of SMEs stated that they obtain 
information about financing options from banks, the chartered accountants 
come second with less than 60%. This is acknowledged by the author’s 
empirical quantitative and qualitative research (see sections 4 and 5). On the 
other hand, in financial market economies, other forms, like stock markets or 
private equity, play a major role. 
 
In Germany and Italy, state backed credits, handed out by the ‘savings 
banks’, are the main source of SME credit supplies, according to the savings 
bank association DSGV (2005). DSGV states that 40% of the SMEs rely on 
the savings bank ‘Sparkassen group’. Zecchini (2006) points out that Italy 
accounts for 37.3% of the whole European mutual guarantee sector. Another 
reason for this dependency could lie in the low ratio of stock market 
capitalisation to GDP: Italy ranks lowest according to Giannetti (2003:210), 
similar to Germany. A survey by the German Share Institute (DAI, 2007) 
indicates that only 9% of the German population are shareholders – in rela-
tion, for example, to a ratio of 26% in Finland. This correlates with Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) who found out that Germany ranks low on the 
TOR index (shares traded in the stock exchange divided by market 
capitalization) in a range of industrialised 40 countries under review. This 
means that stock market activity is low. 
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Drahten (2007:7) traces this back to a ‘risk averse culture’ in Germany and 
strong regulation. Reluctance to open finance communication in terms of 
investor relation could be another explanation: Diller et al (2005) undertook a 
study regarding finance communications of German SMEs. They used a 
sequential mixed-method design: the qualitative phase included elite 
interviews followed by a subsequent quantitative phase. The reluctance to 
communicate efficiently was illustrated by the following two statistics: 40% of 
German SMEs regard communications with investors as cumbersome. Only 
43% of SMEs know how the shareholders use their financial information. This 
is in line with another empirical research amongst CFOs (SFS, 2003), where 
only 10% expect that transparent reporting structures will become of ‘very 
high’ or ‘high’ importance. These research studies provide evidence, from a 
Pre-Basel II perspective, that limited openness is predominant. This has to 
change in order to obtain alternatives to bank credits (see hypotheses 2.b 
and 3). This is some of the advice for SMEs given by the interviewees in the 
qualitative section 6 (see second part of the research question). 
 
Evaluating the relationship between financial development and corporate 
growth, Braun and Raddatz (2007) state that domestic financial development 
is most important – despite financial integration – regarding sectors with little 
access to an integrated market. SMEs can be regarded as such a kind of 
sector according to the author. 
Based on an evaluation of one hundred institutional Dutch investors, 
Cumming and Johan (2007) evaluated the impact of regulation regarding the 
affinity of these investors to invest in private equity. They apply an empirical, 
deductive approach: they concluded that ‘Basel II significantly increases the 
probability of institutional investment in private equity’ (Cumming and Johan, 
2007:3244) for the following reasons: the regulation will harmonise the way 
that several institutional investors can act in a joint way for the same private 
equity fund, for example, as limited partners. Private equity is so far not 
transparent because in general, only professional, and therefore 
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experienced, investors place money in such funds. Basel II regulations will 
exert indirect pressure as the portfolio company, as well as other investors, 
have to comply with the New Capital Accord. According to the author, this 
influx of money will have a positive momentum on SME financing, as private 
equity corporations will downsize in order to allocate their money accordingly 
(BVK, 2006); thus, providing evidence regarding hypotheses 2.b and 3. 
After the third Consultative Paper (BCBS, 2003) was released, Garside and 
Bech (2003) used a statistical methodology by applying the effective RWA 
approach to different product classes. According to the author, they made an 
implicit hint that some bank-based economies, like Italy and Germany, will 
experience higher credit costs for their SMEs as sovereigns will experience 
the highest cost increase. 
This is in line with cross-country mixed-method research by Siemens 
Financial Services (SFS, 2003). An exploratory, background gathering phase 
was followed by a quantitative survey based phase. They concluded that 
finding alternatives to bank credit is amongst the top-three priorities of the 
CFOs of major German Mittelstand-companies. The survey acknowledged 
that even major SMEs are still focused on bank loans and use only a limited 
range of financial instruments. Therefore 63% of German CFOs who took 
part in the survey believe that the financing situation will become more 
difficult – compared to 12% and up to 23% in France, UK and the US. 
Consequently, 64% are thinking about expanding their existing range of 
instruments in Germany compared to between 22% and 29% in France, the 
UK and the US. 
This is in line with Schalast and Barten (2008:11); based on their empirical 
research, amongst German industry companies, they point out that the ‘risk-
adjusted pricing means for companies who are searching for credits in many 
cases an increase in credit rates, which can hardly be covered cash flows’. 
This provides evidence for hypotheses 1, 2.b and 3. 
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Giannetti (2003:206) argues that in countries with a high capitalised bond 
market, like the UK or The Netherlands, companies substitute bank loans 
with bonds. He bases his findings of his explanatory research on an 
extensive data set of 150,000 companies. 
Heid (2007) compared the pro-cyclical effect of Basel II in terms of economic 
situation and ease of getting a loan within a quantitative explanatory research 
design. He based his findings on a multi-factor simulation model which he 
calibrated with real world information using OECD data from 945 commercial 
banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives. He argues that bank-based 
economies will be more affected by the cyclic effect of Basel II (lending in 
terms of economic position) than financial market-based economies. 
 
Cowley (2002) applied a deductive approach based on secondary data. In 
the dawn of the amendment of the third Quantitative Impact Study, he puts 
focus on the private equity market arguing that capital requirements make it 
much more difficult for banks to invest in venture capital (VC) funds. This will 
be harmful to VC funds as banks are – especially in Europe – the largest 
investors in venture capital with 24% (9.2 billion euros in Europe in 2001). 
81% of venture capital investment goes to companies with less than 100 
employees. However, there is evidence that this issue would not harm firms 
in Germany (‘Mittelstand’) so much (see section 2.10.3). On the other hand, 
Cowley (2002) argues that the state owned public funds move towards larger 
companies, as do private equity companies. Therefore, there will be fewer 
alternatives to bank credits for German SMEs. According to Cowley (2002), 
UK based SMEs will be most affected. Based on these combined findings it 
can be derived regarding SMEs, that bank-based economies like Italy will 
experience a reduction in lending (especially in terms of economic 
downturns). 
 
Furthermore, other alternative forms of finance are on the rise too, as 
Golland and Gehlhaar (2002) point out in their explanatory paper. They argue 
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that the house bank principle will deteriorate in Germany (see hypothesis 1) 
and that credits will become dearer due to Basel II. The German Mittelstand 
has a very low equity basis which is below 18%. They applied a quantitative 
survey using a purposive sample of 25 major European credit suppliers 
engaged in corporate financing of 1,500 German SMEs. They argue that 
there will be a shift in financing away from bank loans towards alternative 
forms of financing like mezzanine. In general, they believe that financing will 
be neither significantly dearer, nor cheaper: just different. 
 
This is in line with an empirical questionnaire-based research by Deloitte & 
Touche (2007): already 43% of the participants think about using private 
equity or mezzanine to strengthen the equity basis. This is an indicator that 
SMEs are opening up to alternatives to bank credits (see hypotheses 2.b and 
3). 
Schäfer et al (2007) investigated the effect of financing of innovative SMEs in 
the Pre-Basel II area using a purposive sample based on 1,000 KfW projects 
between 1999 and 2004. They developed an explanatory model based on 
game theory using quantitative methods in order to test certain hypothesis. 
Their findings provide evidence that private equity firms are more willing to 
take risk which is no surprise. However, the researchers argue that banks are 
especially looking for companies with higher revenues, rather than SMEs, 
even if these show a higher risk profile in a comparative case. Furthermore, 
the availability of cheap public funds has positively impacted on equity 
financing (which again refers to hypotheses 2.b and 3). 
This supports an earlier study from 2004 (Schäfer et al, 2004:1) between 
1999 and 2003. Based on a similar hypothesis testing methodology, 
evidence is provided (see Basel II ‘risk rating’) that ‘the probability that a 
young high-tech firm receives equity financing is an increasing function of the 
financial risk.’ 
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Nitschke and Kuper (2007) undertook a survey regarding private equity in 
relation to Basel II. Already, 12% of the 1,100 respondents, from the 
corporations of this explanatory, quantitative research, believe that 
incorporating private equity will improve their Basel II rating (which is in line 
with hypothesis 2.a and the advice to the SME part of the research 
objective). Approximately one quarter of the companies under review already 
regard private equity as a financing option: the smaller the company, the 
more it is open for private equity. They ascribe this to the low equity ratio of 
German companies and the respective poor rating. As such, 30% of the 
companies who regard Basel II as a risk are in favour of private equity. Only 
25% of the Basel II critics state being sufficiently financed, in relation to 46% 
of the whole sample. Interestingly enough, the financial services industry is a 
major investor in private equity funds (Frommann, 2006a). 
Based on the findings from Schäfer et al (2004 and 2007), as well as 
Nitschke and Kuper (2007), it can be argued that: in a sense SMEs 
‘discovered’ private equity because of Basel II and therefore became more 
open to the financing options which enforce their bargaining power (see 
hypotheses 2.b and 3). This is in line with a recurring study of the renowned 
German financial magazine finance (Hedtstück, 2007). The entrepreneurs 
who were questioned state that changes via buy-outs and growth strategies 
could be accomplished (under the Basel II regime) with private equity as 
banks become more restrictive. They base their findings on selected (paired 
interviews) with 13 private equity backed entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, authors like Gregory et al (2005) or Frey and Kuhn (2007) 
for example regard this ‘freedom of choice’ as a more hypothetical option – 
especially for smaller SMEs. This is in line with Ehrhart and Zimmermann 
(2007) who argue, in their explanatory research, that this positive climate 
might not so much go into substituting bank credits (this is one of the few 
examples of evidence regarding the alternative hypothesis 1, that the house 
bank principle will not deteriorate). In total the conclusion is that the effect will 
be levelled out. 
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Using a quantitative, questionnaire based survey the authors Hollasch and 
Berg (2007) argue in their explanatory research that SMEs in particular have 
become increasingly interested in alternative forms of financing. About one-
third already had experience with alternative financing, such as private equity 
or mezzanine. 67% of those stated that they had reached the intended goals. 
As discussed above, Brokamp et al (2004) regard mezzanine – with its ‘in-
between function’ regarding credit and equity – to be a viable option for 
SMEs to escape the ‘credit crunch’ (as stated in hypotheses 2.b and 3). 
However, Bruch (2007) believes that the majority of SMEs will be excluded 
from traditional mezzanine for two reasons: less than 75% of the big SMEs 
(with revenues above 10 million euros) comply with the required equity quota, 
which is normally between 10% and 20%. Furthermore, traditional mezzanine 
finance providers, like the big German banks, require companies to have a 
high rating. Commerzbank, for example, requires at least Moody’s Baa3, 
which is hard to achieve for a small SME. This is in line with the assessment 
from the interviewees, in the qualitative section 6, especially from the side of 
the banks and the providers of alternative means of financing. 
In the dawn of Basel II Carey et al (1998) made a comprehensive study 
regarding the risk affinity of banks vs. other finance companies in the late 
1990s. They provided evidence – related to US companies – that there is a 
difference in how financial players cope with observable risk. Finance 
companies tend to finance lenders with higher observable risk and leverage. 
Basel II can be regarded as a means of making risk more transparent. The 
author regards this as an indication that financing of SMEs should become 
more difficult in banking economies as they are concerned as being more 
risky, according to authors like Larsen and Bjerkeland (2005). The opposite 
can be regarded in relation to ‘financial market-based economies’. 
The comprehensive findings are displayed in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Basel II effect: bank-based economies vs. financial market-based 
economies 
 
It shows that there is no unique pattern regarding the discriminating factor 
‘financing focus’ with regard to the research objective / question which 
considers what the effect of Basel II will look like. There are researches who 
postulate that for financial market-based economies like the UK and the US 
that SMEs credits will become dearer. Others argue they will become 
cheaper.  
3.4 GOOD PROTECTION OF CREDITOR RIGHTS / FORBEARANCE 
According to De Jong et al (2008) the protection of creditor rights is an 
important determinant. Although Giannetti (2003) does not directly reflect on 
Basel II he provides valuable insights regarding regulatory issues. Setting his 
findings into relation with Basel II allows for some interesting conclusions: 
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Giannetti (2003:201-202) claims that ‘Good protection of creditor rights helps 
to lengthen debt maturity of firms with volatile return’ and ‘Listed companies 
have … longer debt maturity than unlisted companies …’ Based on an 
empirical study of 40 economies Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) too 
stress the importance of the legal system. A direct implication of these 
studies is that, in countries with weak legal systems, and consequently, weak 
financial systems, firms obtain less external financing which results in lower 
growth. Basel II can be regarded as a means to enforce creditor rights – 
especially considering Pillars 2 and 3 (Decamps et al, 2004).  
 
This could imply that SMEs in countries which rank low on the credit 
protection index (Giannetti, 2003), such as France, Ireland and Portugal as 
well as Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, can benefit from Basel II. 
There is evidence in literature regarding a trend towards convergence on 
central banking governance, even in the Pre-Basel II era. Acharya (2003), for 
example, argues that there is a spill-over effect from more forbearing to less 
forbearing countries in terms of regulations (here: disclosure policy). In a 
quantitative explanatory study Buch (2003) sets information cost and 
regulatory issues regarding the international lending business into 
perspective based on secondary data from the Bank for International 
Settlements. Using a regression model Buch (2003:865) states that 
regulation seems to be relatively more important than information cost in 
economies like Germany, the Netherlands, the United States and the UK. On 
the other hand, in countries like France, Italy, Japan or Spain it is the other 
way round. Therefore, banks in the first group of countries will try to enter 
countries which have low regulatory barriers. The European Commission set 
Basel II as a directive (Roldán, 2006). This implies that small and medium 
sized banks in the first group might focus on the respective home countries 
as non-regulative countries are more distant than the EU-25 region. On the 
other hand, Buch (2003:866) estimates that Basel II will have a positive effect 
on intra-EU lending. Therefore banks in the second group might invest in 
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(small and medium sized) corporations as they focus on information cost 
rather than regulation. Regulation would be stricter, but due to the unified 
basis, information cost on a relative basis would be reduced. This will – as 
the author concludes – give SMEs in Germany, the Netherlands, the US and 
the UK an even better advantage for shopping around, this is in line with 
hypotheses 2.b and 3. 
On the other hand, an opposite conclusion could be valid as well by 
combining the findings of Giannetti (2003) with an empirical study conducted 
by Kopecky and VanHoose (2006). They developed a simulation model using 
loan data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reports. By 
using analysis of regression they provide evidence that imposing capital 
requirements on a banking system which was not (strongly) regulated before, 
will impose higher credit interest rates and will reduce lending in general. 
That would imply that SMEs in countries like France, Ireland and Portugal as 
well as Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, which rank low on 
Giannetti’s (2003) regulation index, will face higher credit rates. The 
combined findings are displayed in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20 Basel II effect in relation protection of creditor rights / forbearance 
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Regarding the discriminating factor ‘Protection of Creditor Rights’, no 
consistent pattern, regarding the research objective / question emerges: 
there are opposing research findings for SMEs, which rank low on the 
‘creditor rights protection index’.  
3.5 EFFECT ON ECONOMY STRUCTURE 
Based on a probabilistic sample from the US Small Business Administration 
(SBA) lending program, Glennon and Nigro (2006) derive that SME defaults 
are closely related to the region and the economic strength in which the SME 
operates. 
 
According to a study for the European Commission (Barfield, 2004b), total 
capital requirement will be reduced in many European countries (in declining 
order: France, UK, Belgium, Spain and Portugal). However, in the 
Netherlands and especially in Germany the reduction will be close to zero. In 
Austria and especially in Greece the capital requirement will rise (see above, 
Figure 9). A special focus of this study was laid on SMEs and on small 
banks. In all cases the capital requirement regarding operational risk will 
increase to 7% and 10% (Barfield, 2004a), the segmentation regarding ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ operational risk is based on this data set (see Figure 21). 
Operational risk could be overcompensated in nearly all countries by the 
reduction of credit risk requirements which would lead to the effects 
mentioned already. 
 
Almost nullification of the effect is expected by the German Banking 
Association, BdB (2005). Based on economic SME statistics, they argue that 
credit rates will stay stable or increase only slightly due to Basel II. Because 
credit costs comprise only 2% of all costs according to German Federal Bank 
statistics (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003:48-49) the increase will be marginal. 
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However, critics might argue that the issue is more the question of getting 
credit at all (see Reize, 2007:91, for example), this is linked to hypotheses 1, 
2.b and 3. 
Hartl (2002) examined the effect of Basel II using a purposive sample based 
on secondary data from a tourist bank database in a German speaking 
market. As 90% of the industry relies on bank loans and the SME-shaped 
industry has a negative equity capital (because of non-exposed hidden 
reserves) he expects a selection process. Credits will become dearer for the 
bulk of the industry players. Derived from this secondary data set he estab-
lished a model combining equity capital and hidden reserves. Using a deduc-
tive approach, he concludes that a remedy against adverse effects of Basel II 
will be to strengthen the capital base by incorporating new investors, expo-
sing hidden reserves or by using alternative forms of financing, such as 
mezzanine or factoring; this is an indication for hypotheses 2.b and 3.  
 
Bartels (2002) bases his SME focus not primarily on size but on the 
entrepreneurial leadership function. This is in line with the ‘niche market 
leadership strategy’ that was postulated in hypotheses 2.b and 3: due to high 
taxes the German Mittelstand have tried to lower earnings which resulted in a 
low equity ratio of less than 20%. As a consequence the German ‘Mittelstand’ 
is highly dependent on bank credit as they could ‘not build adequate capital 
cushions’ (Bartels, 2002:49). 
This is in line with Ackermann (2003) who argues that it will be more difficult 
for SMEs to acquire credit for two reasons: poor debtors will not be 
subsidized with good ones. Second, the weak equity situation of German 
SMEs will be brought to light due to Basel II. This is an interesting point going 
to the ‘causes of causes’ (Olsen, 2003) rather than explaining the symptoms 
in an ‘effect-of-cause’ causality (Robson, 2002:17-22, see section 4.1). The 
‘true cause’ according to Ackermann is therefore not Basel II but the weak 
equity situation of the German Mittelstand. 
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A summary of the comprehensive findings is shown in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21 Basel II effect in relation to country economy specific risk factors 
 
It shows, again, that there is no consistent pattern concerning the 
discriminating factor ‘operational risk’ with regards to the research objective / 
question of the effect of Basel II on SMEs. There are countries with high 
operational risk, such as Greece, whose SMEs will benefit from Basel II, 
whereas SMEs in Spain, for example, with a high operational risk too, will 
experience negative effects.  
3.6 EFFECT ON BANKING STRUCTURE / SOPHISTICATION 
Many authors refer to the strong link between banking structure and banking 
stability, one of the prime objectives of the New Accord. However, Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) argue based on their literature review that there are 
diverging assessments of the relationship between banking fragmentation 
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and financial stability. The advocates of the ‘concentration-stability view’, e.g. 
Boyd et al (2003), argue that larger banks are more stable due to the 
increased capital buffers. On the contrary, Cetorelli et al (2007) point out, 
from the perspective of the ‘concentration-fragility view’, that a more 
fragmented banking environment is positive in terms of spreading out risk, for 
example. Furthermore, the balance in economy-of-scale has an effect on 
SME credit according to empirical research based on US data: Francis et al 
(2008) researched the impact of banking mergers in terms of SME credits. In 
the short-term there was a negative effect for new businesses, especially in 
terms of a large acquirer. However, if smaller banks merge the effect is 
positive – even in the short term. Craig and Hardee (2007) came to the 
opposite conclusion based on a large set of US data. In areas dominated by 
large banks the level of debt is lower than in areas with smaller banks. 
According to Barfield (2004a) the impact on Basel II will be determined by the 
banking structure in the respective country. They examined the competitive 
structure in the banking sector: in Germany, Austria and Italy, investors 
experience negative returns (see above, Figure 9) as the Return on Equity 
(RoE) is lower than the Cost of Equity (CoE). Barfield argues that this can be 
explained by the high market fragmentation and the existence of cooperative 
banking institutes (for example German Volks- & Raiffeisenbanken) whose 
key objective is not profit optimization (see above, Figure 9). This might be 
related to efficiency: Bos and Schmiedel (2007) evaluated the effect on the 
single European Market of 1993 based on bank data from 1994 to 2004 in 
terms of the economy-of-scale effect: they reflect on earlier works from 
Pastor et al (1997) who state that the banking industry in France, Spain, and 
Belgium is more efficient compared with the banking experiences of 
Germany, the UK, and Austria. 
Due to the competitive structure, Barfield (2004b) expects the following 
banking behaviour regarding how cost savings will be passed on: benefits will 
be kept by banks in Finland, Greece and Portugal. Benefits will be spread to 
customers in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
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whereas it will be a split in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. However, using the same argument of record 
low ROCE from the year 2000 onwards in Germany, Sandvoß (2007) comes 
to the opposite conclusion, that Basel II will become a driver to improve 
margins in Germany. Whereas Sandvoß’s findings provide evidence 
regarding hypothesis 1, Barfield’s findings progress in a different direction – a 
greater margin spread will strengthen the ‘house bank principle’. 
 
Barfield (2004a) predicts that smaller banks (in Europe) will benefit more. He 
explains that there are spill-over effects from other exposures within larger 
banks. As smaller banks have no such offsets they can focus on retail and 
SME credits. This focus of smaller banks could lead to an estimated 
reduction in cost of 15% or 34% if these small banks use an F-IRB or A-IRB 
approach (Barfield, 2004a). Only by sticking to the Standardised Approach 
will they face a capital increase of 2%. These findings indicate that rating will 
become of a high importance, as stated in hypothesis 2.a and in the advice 
given to SMEs (see second part of the research objective / question). 
 
Berger (2004) adds that smaller banks benefit from their ‘privileged 
relationship lending situation’. Based on an empirical research amongst 
Swedish SMEs, Lundahl et al (2009) point out that for SME it is important 
that a banker cares about the SME and not only provided valid credit rates 
and effectiveness. Berger’s (2004) explanatory research is based on data 
from other surveys. Using an innovative model and applying various forms of 
descriptive analysis, regression analysis and analysis of difference, he 
showed that the competitive situation in the US might only be slightly affected 
as the A-IRB advantages of large institutes might not outweigh the 
‘relationship lending’ advantages of smaller banks in the short run, but maybe 
in the longer run. 
On the other hand, authors like Altman and Sabato (2005) anticipate a revival 
of larger banks. Based primarily on US research in the SME lending sector 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 125 of 463 
they argue that these banks can lower capital cost using a blended ‘pooling’ 
approach due to their refined systems. Therefore, they envision a further 
consolidation of the banking sector, as larger banks might acquire smaller 
banks. In fragmented banking structures like Germany (Ackermann, 2003) 
such takeovers are more likely as smaller banks are still dominant in the 
German economy. Ackerman (2003) points out that Germany has the highest 
branch density with one bank per 1,450 persons in Europe (2,696 different 
banks in 2003); if this merger and acquisition trend becomes sustainable the 
situation might change accordingly. As the house bank principle is associated 
with smaller banks (Berger, 2004), this provides further evidence regarding 
hypothesis 1. This regional approach makes sense as Degryse and Ongena 
(2005) found out: by testing data from 15,000 bank loans to SMEs in Belgium 
between 1975 and 1997 against their hypothesis, they found evidence that 
loan rates decrease with distance between bank and SME. 
 
This relates to earlier research by Cole (1998) too: he tested hypotheses 
based on an empirical data set from US SMEs. His findings provide evidence 
that an existing relationship helps to extend credit due to the enhanced 
‘private information’. As this information is of less value when the creditor 
uses multiple sources of finance the probability of extending credit is reduced 
in such a case. With Basel II this ‘private information’ will become more 
institutionalised and the need or possibility for shopping around on a more 
homogeneously-rated basis will increase. The author concludes that this 
trend might enable SMEs to shop around as the new regulation will enhance 
competition among bank clusters; thus, providing further evidence regarding 
hypotheses 1, 2.b and 3. Therefore, it can be argued that the combination of 
refined tools of the large banks, in terms of Basel II, with the regional aspect 
means of mergers and acquisitions will lead to a beneficial environment for 
SMEs in the countries under review. 
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Rubin and Nayda (2008a) come to a similar conclusion: based on an 
evaluation of public bank data they argue that even for smaller banks which 
focus on SMEs, capital requirements will be lower in the US. 
Cartwright and Sarraf (2005) used an explorative approach based on a 
purposive sample of secondary data in case-study-like research. They argue 
that in the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Italy revenue growth of banks 
will go down – amongst other reasons – due to maturing markets and intense 
competition with little room for interesting margins and for lowering credit 
rates. Therefore, especially in Germany, Austria and Spain, banks have 
made joint investments in systems. This will have the effect that even smaller 
institutes can benefit from the changes which other authors, like Dietsch and 
Petey (2004), expected for only major institutes. This might strengthen the 
house bank principle (see alternative to hypothesis 1). 
 
Setting the findings in relation to the supportive studies mentioned above the 
following picture emerges, as shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22 Basel II effect in relation to banking structure 
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Taking the combined findings into account there is evidence, regarding the 
research objective / question of the effect of Basel II, that SMEs in some 
countries with an already consolidated banking sector, such as Finland, 
experience an increase, whereas in the UK a decrease in credit rates is 
predicted. Therefore again, no unified pattern emerges regarding the 
discriminating factor (here: ‘Banking Structure’). 
3.7 BASEL II INTRINSIC APPROACHES 
The Basel II intrinsic approaches cover selected controversial issues 
mentioned in the Basel II section as well as special topics related to the 
special status of SMEs. 
 
One of the main elements of the Basel II debate relates to the PD and Asset 
Correlation relationship. Asset Correlation means the correlation of the chan-
ges in enterprise value of two companies (assets, and therefore, according to 
Merton’s model (1974), default probabilities). In relation to risk measurement 
indexes, these are generated to illustrate how a company’s performance (for 
example default) is dependent on the belonging to a certain sector. 
Within an explanatory research approach Dietsch and Petey (2004) 
questioned the negative relationship between PD and Asset Correlation, 
which is one of the fundamental assumptions of the Basel II Accord. Building 
on secondary data from 280,000 companies in France and Germany, the 
German sample frame is based on Creditreform data, which can be regarded 
as probabilistic. Dietsch and Petey (2004) use a special ‘one-factor risk 
model’ and descriptive statistics to underpin their findings. The authors derive 
that SMEs show a higher risk profile for default than larger enterprises in 
relation to the Basel risk curves. However, by dividing SMEs in specific 
classes and by applying a new theory they try to ‘falsify’ one of the 
fundamental Basel II assumptions on the basis of their empirical research. 
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They conclude that ‘the less risky SMEs will pay for the more risky firms’ 
(Dietsch and Petey, 2004:774) imposing strong financial disadvantages in 
terms of high capital cost. This will foil the rating focus as stated in 
hypothesis 2.a. On the other hand, Altman and Sabato (2005) developed a 
new innovative model in order to evaluate the effect of Basel II on SMEs 
based on the Basel II assumption. Within their explanatory, quantitative 
analysis they used purposive samples from banks and public databases of 
selected G10 countries (US, Italy, Australia). By applying a one-factor 
method related to the A-IRB approach, Altman and Sabato (2005:29) 
calculated that, capital requirements can be lowered from 8% to 6%; thus, 
giving large banks a competitive edge as they run sophisticated systems 
which can already cope with A-IRB. This supports hypothesis 1. 
 
As discussed in section 2.5.2 the ‘other retail’ discount was given as SMEs 
were regarded as being less risky, with regard to systematic risk like 
economic downturn, which is the case regarding larger corporations and 
creditors (see Saurina and Trucharte, 2004, and Bonfim, 2009, for example). 
However, in an explanatory research project, Jacobson et al (2005) question 
the fact that SME loan portfolios are consistently less risky (in terms of 
unexpected loss rates) and therefore require less economic capital than the 
larger corporate loan portfolios. Investigating data from two Swedish banks in 
a one-factor approach they failed falsify this assumption. It is argued that this 
assumption is very specific, related to the SME definition and segmentation. 
That means that SMEs will experience a risk deduction which is not justified 
under the new Basel paradigm. 
Based on an empirical model, Altman and Sabato (2005) came to the 
conclusion that banks in the US and Italy (as well as Australia) will use a 
‘blended approach’ for segmenting SMEs in the retail and the corporate class 
in order not to pass the Basel I level, which could be achieved by ‘classifying’ 
at least 20% of the SMEs as retail. 
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Rather than applying a one-factor approach like Dietsch and Petey (2004), 
for example, Larsen and Bjerkeland (2005) use a multi-factor approach. Their 
quantitative, deductive research is based on a purposive sample of 
Norwegian data on which loss distribution models are applied. This research 
brings a new aspect into the discussion as it focuses not only on the 
distinction between the sizes of corporations (e.g. Claessens et al, 2005), but 
on expected versus unexpected losses on a time series basis. 
Nordal (2009) came up with a numerical example in order to implement the 
IRB approach in relation to SMEs based on a real options framework 
providing evidence that the reduction will be only from certain thresholds 
onwards. 
On the other hand, taking the adoptions of the various consultative papers 
into account – such as adjusted risk curves for corporate and retail risk 
portfolios – Saurina and Trucharte (2004) estimate that the effect of Basel II 
will level out in Spain. The regulatory capital will decrease only slightly 
regarding the different Basel II approaches simulated. 
 
As discussed in section 2, regulation regarding SME financing underwent 
several changes. Regarding the expected positive effects for SMEs due to 
the ‘Mittelstands-package’ in 2004 – primarily on behalf of German 
negotiators – authors with a focus on Germany, e.g. Bräunig and Lob (2007), 
argue SMEs will be better off due to the retail classification and the 
introduction of SME suitable securities, such as life insurances. However, 
they acknowledge in their initial explorative assessment, based on the Basel 
II documents, that German SMEs are yet not fully aware of the changes 
initiated by German lobbyist work, especially regarding German SMEs. 
On the other hand, despite the ‘Mittelstand package’ Ahrweiler et al (2007) 
came to a different assessment based on a meta-study approach. Combining 
the various expected reactions regarding SMEs they believe that German 
SMEs will be negatively affected due to the ‘traditional’ low equity ratio of 
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German SMEs (pro-cyclical effect), an enhanced demand of securitisation, 
and increased transparency demands by German banks. Similarly, Suyter 
(2008) doubts the ‘incentive’ aspect in terms of SMEs. The German based 
research, in particular, indicates a reduction in the house bank principle 
(hypothesis 1). Applying an extensive, empirical survey amongst 5,000 
corporations, Plankensteiner and Zimmermann (2008) conclude that another 
issue for SMEs is that credit will become dearer because the maturity – in 
case of investment credits – is not correlated to the investment period.  
From a German Pre-Basel II perspective BWI (2002) made a first rough-cut 
estimation of the Basel II impact in the year 2002. Based on an explanatory 
literature review and quantitative studies from Creditrefom on bankruptcy 
statistics or bank internal secondary data, they estimated that getting a loan 
would be more difficult for SMEs in general and the steel industry in 
particular. 
An overview of Basel II research studies related to intrinsic approaches can 
be found in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23 Basel II effect in relation to Basel II intrinsic issues 
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Again, no consistent pattern emerges in terms of the author’s research 
objective / question regarding the effects of Basel II on SMEs. In relation to 
the discriminating factor, ‘Basel II Intrinsic Approaches’, some researches 
show that researchers who question the Basel II assumption come to the 
conclusion that SME credit will become dearer (e.g. for French SMEs), 
whereas others predict the opposite (for Swedish SMEs, for example). 
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4 RATIONALE FOR CHOICE OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
As described in section 3 the various (Pre-) Basel II research papers do not 
provide a homogeneous picture of how the effects of Basel II in terms of SME 
financing will look. The purpose of the DBA research is to close this research 
gap by establishing how the effect of Basel II regulation on financing of SMEs 
in Germany will look from the SMEs’ and financiers’ perspective. 
Furthermore, the literature research provides evidence that there is a 
research gap in how SMEs can cope with the effect. This chapter explains 
and justifies the research design which was proposed to close the research 
gaps mentioned in the introductory section 1.1. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. As the research design is dependent on 
the research philosophy (Kavous, 2003), section 4.1 provides a description of 
scientific realism, which is the philosophical stance of the author, and sets 
this in relation to positivism and the Popperian stance (see Popper, 2002). In 
this section the main concept of triangulation is introduced as it builds the 
basis for the chosen ‘sequential-exploratory’ research design which is 
described in section 4.2 including an in-depth introduction and justification of 
triangulation. 
In Section 4.3 the design of the quantitative data collection and quantitative 
data analysis is illustrated as it builds the basis for the quantitative empiric 
section. Alike section 4.4 provides a description of the qualitative data 
collection and qualitative data analysis which builds the basis for the 
qualitative empiric section. 
4.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
As discussed in the introductory section there is major controversy regarding 
the effects of Basel II. However, nearly all of the researchers under review 
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(see section 3) came from a positivist view claiming generalisation of their 
(Pre-Basel II) findings based on a quantitative, primarily explanatory research 
designs on Pre-Basel II data sets. In relation to such controversies, Ardalan 
(2003) points out that there is a strong demand for augmenting the positivist 
paradigm with its quantitative based metaphor. Thus, this study aims to 
provide a richer understanding through a sequential research design 
(quantitative and qualitative methods) as a means of ‘triangulation’, which is 
typical for a scientific realist philosophical approach (Couvalis, 1997). Miles 
and Huberman (1994:267) go even further by pointing out that ‘triangulation 
is … a way of life’: the aim is to establish ‘causes of causes’ relationships 
(‘realism retroduction’, Olsen, 2003) rather than the mere ‘effect-of-cause’ 
causalities (‘positivist’s reproduction’) as described below. The concept of 
triangulation is explained in depth in the methodology section 4.2.2 and is set 
in relation to Popperian methods. 
 
Kavous (2003) points out that the ‘school of thinking’ determines the possible 
solution set and methodological approach. Therefore, it is important to define 
scientific realism and set the philosophical approach, in relation to the 
prevalent positivistic approach. 
Whereas other social sciences moved towards realism in the 1970s 
(Bhaskar, 1975) already, the mainstream of finance research is based on 
positivism (Ardalan, 2003). From a historical perspective, the theory of 
finance is strongly influenced by mathematical theory which is, as per 
definition, tautological. The literature review in section 3 acknowledged this. 
Butler and Olsen (2003) go a step further and claim that research papers 
which do not comply with a positivist’s structure should be rejected. However, 
in recent years authors like Kavous (2003) question what he calls the 
‘functional paradigm’, a positivists approach. This is in line with the 
philosophy module taught at the University of Bradford, DBA course 
(Seabrook, 2006), where a realism approach (Sayer, 2000) is regarded as a 
scientific approach with high internal and external validity. 
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Within recent years, there are several examples of the realism approach 
using sequential mixed-method designs from academic environments and 
practitioners’ of Basel II research, like: Turnbull and Moustakatos (1996), 
Almeida (2003) and Schrör and Kayser (2006). 
 
Based on the definition of ‘scientific realism’ the remainder of this section 
provides a definition and critical analysis of realism by explaining why this 
approach, with alignments from Popperian methods, fits better than 
positivism in this particular area and context of the author’s research. This 
scientific realism stance builds the basis for the specific research design 
which uses a sequential exploratory research design with triangulation as a 
central theme, as discussed in detail in sections 4.2 to 4.4. 
 
Smith (1998) points out that from positivism ‘all the existing social sciences 
are somewhat derived’, it is therefore necessary to introduce the concept of 
positivism upfront. In the knowledge continuum proposed by Hodgson 
(2003b, see Figure 24), realism follows positivism in its variations. 
 
 
Figure 24 The knowledge continuum based on Hodgson (2003) 
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4.1.1 Excursus: Positivism 
The idea of positivism originated with the founder of the social sciences, 
Auguste Comte 1798 – 1857 (Greasley, 2004). Positivism arose as a 
countermovement to religious dogmatism or naïve metaphysical worldviews 
(Butler and Olsen, 2003).  This was replaced by a deductive approach 
(Smith, 1998:102), based on a belief in universal laws (Popper, 2002:379). 
This scientific approach combines measurable observations into empirical 
regularities, according to Durkheim (Smith, 1998:84). Positivism is looking for 
testable facts in analogy to natural sciences, and for causal links between 
them (Robson, 2002:17-22). 
Thus meaning that there is ‘an objective and true account of nature and 
science’ (Smith, 2000:53). Gaining knowledge is independent from the 
person, the researcher, or the culture and will result in objective findings. 
Positivism is rooted in empiricism: reproducible knowledge, as universal 
generalisations, can be deducted by an empirical way; science is a process 
of gaining knowledge in a cumulative way (Sayer, 2000:23). In addition, 
Smith (1998:49) states positivism to be mechanistic and atomistic. 
In this sense positivism goes beyond John Locke (Smith, 1998:59-62), who 
regards sense experiments as the only source of acquiring knowledge – 
contrary to Descartes (Seabrook, 2006).  
The idea of applying scientific approaches to social sciences was developed 
further by Herbert Spencer (1820-95) who took an evolutionary stance (Butler 
and Olsen, 2003), like Darwin (Brody, 2005). 
4.1.2 Excursus: Popperian Conjectures and Refutations 
An excursus on Popperian methods is provided as the concept of refutability 
and falsifiability, as well as neglecting an absolute truth, is aligned to the 
concept of triangulation within the realism philosophy. According to Smith 
(1998:105), ‘In the middle of the twentieth century many philosophers of 
natural and social sciences were beginning to criticize the assumptions and 
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aims of Positivism’; especially by Karl Popper who developed the idea of 
refutability or falsifiability (Popper, 2002:345) based on David Hume’s 
sceptical attitude to truth. As an empiricist he accepts facts and values, but 
not nominalism (Smith, 1998:76). In neglecting a singular objective – truth 
(‘Truth is above human authority’, Popper, 2002:39) – derived from induction, 
Popper (2002:55) proposed trying to ‘falsify’ a hypothesis (refutation). The 
falsificationist (Popper, 2002:309) ‘say roughly speaking, that what cannot (at 
present) in principle be overthrown by criticism is (at present) unworthy of 
being seriously considered; while what can in principle be so overthrown and 
yet resists all our critical efforts to do so may quite possibly be false, but is at 
any rate not unworthy of being seriously considered and perhaps even of 
being believed – though only tentatively’. Therefore refutation should not be 
regarded as a failure but as a success (Popper 2002:329) as it fosters 
continued growth of science (Popper, 2002:291). On the other hand, 
‘confirmability ... must increase with testability’ (Popper, 2002:347). 
 
As the concept of ‘falsification’ (Popper, 2002) is central and financial 
research is rooted in positivism to a major extent (see above), the concept of 
falsification is incorporated within the author’s research as it is in line with the 
context sensitive approach of scientific realism, as discussed in section 4.1.3. 
Within the quantitative section 5, the initial hypotheses are tested in line with 
Popper (2002:48) who states that ‘every genuine test of a theory is an 
attempt to falsify it’. 
 
In addition, by looking for negative evidence, in terms of alternative 
hypotheses within the deductively-based analytical procedures (see section 
4.4.4), the ‘causal networks’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) display evidence 
regarding alternative hypotheses. From a scientific realism point of view (see 
section 4.1.3), this leads to amended hypotheses as shown in section 7. 
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4.1.3 Excursus: (Scientific) Realism 
As realism derives from a critique of positivism (Smith, 1998:297), a critical 
assessment of realism in relation to positivism is provided. Contrary to 
positivism, realism believes that human beings are not purely deterministic 
objects, they interact in a complex social environment and behaviour can 
therefore not be measured by deterministic causal laws (Olsen 2003). 
From an ontological standpoint, realism states that a real world external to us 
exists contrary to nominalism. The researcher – as part of this social context 
– is subjective to a certain extent as well (Robson, 2002:35). This means that 
observations are ‘theory laden’ (Couvalis, 1997). There is no absolute truth 
like with positivism; facts are questionable. Retroduction (Olsen 2003), 
examining the ‘causes of causes’, is a key element not reproduction as it is in 
positivism. Yet, contrary to relativism (Sayer, 1998:47), realism assumes that 
there exists an underlying reality which cannot always be observed, by 
means of data rather than constructed primarily by language, which is the 
case with constructivism (Sayer, 2000:90). In social constructivism, language 
is the determinant of the constructed worldview. Reflecting a stratified world 
there are three layers which are interlinked in realism. As Olsen (2003) puts 
it, the ‘empirical layer’ describes what can be sensed; the actual domain is 
observable and is represented by actions, derived from and changed by 
mechanisms; finally, the real layer is based on real effects of causal links. 
The aim of the researcher is therefore to evaluate, uncover and construct 
structures and mechanisms rather than deterministic causalities (Smith, 
1998:303). In relation to the author’s research objective this means: the link 
(see Robson, 2002:30) between actions (for example, companies which 
apply a niche market leadership strategy) and outcomes (these companies 
get easier access to non-bank financing) exists by means of mechanisms 
(Basel II regulation), but only in a context sensitive manner (other parameters 
like strategic focus of a company), rather than in a successionist way (Sayer, 
2000:14), as illustrated in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25 Basis of realism (Robson, 2002:31) 
 
However similar to positivism, realism ‘assumes a scientific approach to the 
development of knowledge’ (Saunders et al, 2007:104). The role of the 
researcher is to find optimal conditions which trigger the mechanism best 
(Robson, 2002:31). Similar to positivism, these explanations can be tested by 
a systematic scientific approach. However, contrary to Popper (Smith, 
1998:108-111), a theory might not be falsified by just one counterexample; 
gaining knowledge is a ‘continuous improvement process’ (Deming, 1986). 
Context sensitive ‘laws’ may, therefore, not be reproducible. According to 
realism, social structures are transformed by actions as well. Entities, which 
might again be unobservable, have the power to generate these outcomes 
(Keat and Urry, 1982) depending on the context which serves as a trigger. 
 
By means of so-called triangulation (Robson, 2002:174, see section 4.2.2), a 
multiple research design is often used in order to set findings into various 
perspectives. Contrary to positivism, realism acknowledges operating in open 
rather than closed system environments (Smith, 1998:45). As with positivism 
there are derivatives to realism (see Figure 26). 
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Figure 26 Scientific realism based on Olsen (2003) and Robson (2002) 
 
The so-called scientific realism is, as already described, non-atomistic and 
does not acknowledge a fact / value separation as positivists do. Due to 
mechanisms triggered by context there are – unlike idealism (Smith, 
1998:129-132) – phenomena at an actual level which are not identical with 
phenomena on the real level. 
From the author’s philosophical stance the following advantages of a 
scientific realism approach, regarding the research objective exists: the 
positivism based articles, critically assessed in section 3, use ‘closed system’ 
approaches for their quantitative research. As there is a huge controversy 
concerning how the effect of Basel II looks, this provides evidence that there 
is no unitary corporate finance world. Therefore a positivism ‘worldview’ 
(Kavous, 2003) seemed to have its limitations on the verge of moving from 
the Pre-Basel II to the Post-Basel II era. Natural science mechanisms cannot 
be applied in corporate finance as objects like SMEs and financiers are 
interlinked on several layers. For example, financiers are searching for 
financing too – be it by looking for co-investors or by requesting for bank 
loans in the case of LBOs. Furthermore, mechanisms are context sensitive. 
The current credit volume limits, for example – a bank’s possibility of granting 
new loans under the Basel-II regulation. In addition, an atomistic construction 
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is not applicable in a stratified world (‘pool credit loans’ have a different risk 
profile than the sum of individually assessed loans).  
The advantage of realism in corporate finance research is that rather than 
falsifying a theory, realism seeks for providing evidence. This is different from 
‘objective’ positivism. However, realism means to also apply scientific 
methods (see research design in section 4.2). Realism is a tribute to a more 
complex ontology and an ‘open systems’ perspective.  
 
Using triangulation will enable the author to use these quantitative studies 
and set them into perspective. Realism acknowledges that mechanisms are 
context sensitive as they trigger actions to certain outcomes. In the case of 
corporate finance papers assessed in section 3, the context parameters are: 
segmentation on SMEs regarding company size, country the SME is 
operating in and a one- / multi-factor approach.  
Another advantage of realism in this specific corporate finance research 
(here: effect of recently introduced Basel II) is what Sayer (1998:59) calls 
‘trying to reconcile the objective approach like positivism with a 
phenomenological subjective’. 
Furthermore, taking a realism stance in Basel II related research enables the 
dominant ideological structures to be revealed (Bhaskar 1975). For example, 
Roldan’s article (2006), on the positive advances in converting Basel-II into 
national laws, must be analysed in the light of the author’s role as chairman 
of the European Central Bank – taking elements of social constructivism.  
 
Whereas, positivists are strongly focused on empirical, quantitative methods, 
realists also rely on qualitative methods in order to gain knowledge. 
Qualitative analysis is regarded as being scientific: Brewer and Hunter (1989) 
propose a pragmatic approach to reconcile quantitative and qualitative 
studies. 
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Applying such a pragmatic approach leads the author to a specific 
exploratory sequential mixed-method design, as described in section 4.2.2. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ISSUES 
Based on suggestions from Creswell (2003), Robson (2003) and Saunders et 
al (2007) the research design (see Figure 27) will be derived as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 27 Generic research design deduction 
4.2.1 Research Purpose, Question, Type and Unit 
The purpose of the DBA research is to establish the effect of Basel II 
regulation on financing of SMEs in Germany and how SMEs can cope with 
the effect. Therefore, the research question has to answer what is the effect 
of Basel II regulation on financing of SMEs in Germany and how SMEs can 
cope with the effect. 
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The research type is exploratory in nature as it is one of the first researches 
to take place after all Basel II elements became law in Germany in 2008. The 
aim is to explore the effect immediately after. Based on these initial Post-
Basel II research experiences it will evaluate how SMEs can cope best. This 
seems a valid rationale as the early Basel II papers were exploratory in 
nature as well. Only the consecutive later stage research papers were 
explanatory based – relating to Pre-Basel II findings based on a year long 
trend series data from a Pre-Basel II history. Therefore, explanatory research 
would have little strategic fit because Basel II came into effect only recently. 
Furthermore, the research can be regarded as probably the first Post-Basel II 
research to be conducted during the financial crisis, as the quantitative data 
collection took place just after the Lehman Brothers default. As the spill-over 
effect of the initial peak of the crisis has to be controlled and the overall 
dimension could not be foreseen during the analysis phase an explanatory 
approach would be unsuitable. On the other hand, a mere descriptive 
approach would not be valid either due to the extensive historic set of Pre-
Basel II research to build on. 
 
The research unit comprises SMEs, as well as banks and other ‘financiers’, 
such as private equity and providers of alternative forms of finance, like 
mezzanine or factoring. The SME definition of the European Commission 
(2003b) will be used in this thesis.  
4.2.2 Research Methodology 
In order to set this diverging Pre-Basel II research into perspective with the 
current research, the author will use quantitative and qualitative data 
gathering and analysis methods as a means of ‘triangulation’. The specific 
mixed method used is ‘sequential exploratory’ (based on Creswell’s 
‘sequential explanatory’, 2003:216) as displayed in Figure 28. As described 
in section 4.1, this suites best to the scientific realism stance of the author. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 143 of 463 
 
Figure 28 Sequential exploratory design 
 
This triangulation approach seems therefore a valid rationale to limit bias and 
to enhance reliability (Saunders et al, 2007:149). This is justified as follows: 
according to Saunders et al (2007:602), a mixed-method approach is ‘when 
both quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques and analysis 
procedures are both used in a research design’.  
According to Tshakkori and Teddlie (2003), such a multiple method approach 
(like mixed-method), helps to extend the trust and interferences made from 
the research findings in providing more richness. This is in line with Saunders 
et al (2007:147) who state that the first advantage of mixed-method 
approaches is that ‘different methods can be used for different purposes’. 
 
In the case of the author’s study, the quantitative part enables statements of 
statistical significance, to be made, based on questionnaires (effect-of-cause, 
see section 4.1); whereas, the qualitative part addresses several aspects 
which emerged from the quantitative analyses. This could be evaluated in 
more depth by means of open-ended questions in the semi-structured 
interviews (causes of causes, see section 4.1). The quantitative analysis 
provides initial answers to the first part of the research question by testing the 
hypotheses in general, regarding the effect of Basel II on SMEs and on 
financiers. In addition, the qualitative part provides deeper insight into the 
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causes of causes relationship (Olsen, 2003), regarding these hypotheses 
and it will turn out that the hypotheses were amended by means of the 
findings from the elite interviews. In addition, the qualitative analysis in 
section 6 provides in-depth insight into the second part of the research 
question, how SMEs can cope best with the effect of Basel II. This is in line 
with Goldberger (1991) who differentiates between statistical significance and 
‘practical or economic significance’. 
 
The second advantage of a mixed-method approach according to Saunders 
et al (2007) the ‘advantage of using mixed methods is that it enables 
triangulation to take place’. Saunders et al (2007:139) defines triangulation 
as ‘the use of two or more independent sources of data or data collection 
methods within one study in order to help ensure that the data are telling you 
what you think they are telling you’. According to Robson (2002:174) 
triangulation is ‘a valuable and widely used strategy ... it involves multiple 
sources to enhance the rigour in research’.  
‘Data triangulation’ (questionnaires and interviews) as well as 
‘methodological triangulation’ (combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches) are used (Denzin, 1988). 
 
Initially, a qualitative phase was applied at the background gathering stage of 
discussing Basel II related issues with personally-known experts from banks, 
non-bank financiers and SME managers, as proposed by Saunders et al 
(2007:386). The aim was to get a better understanding of the building blocks 
for the author’s own survey.  
Furthermore, this helped to set (Pre-) Basel II literature research into 
perspective. This is in line with other corporate finance research like Schmidt 
and von Elkan (2006), for example. As a next step a pre-test of the 
questionnaire was carried out in cooperation with an SME and a financial 
centric magazine (see section 4.3.3). 
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In order to comply with ‘mainstream academic finance’ (Ardalan, 2003:199) 
quantitative data collection and analysis (see section 4.3 and 5) builds the 
initial phase of the sequential research design. Within the second part of the 
primary research the findings of the quantitative phases are triangulated with 
qualitative elite-interviews (or respondent interviews, Saunders et al, 
2007:312) in the qualitative phase (see section 4.4 and 6). The synopsis of 
the triangulation is provided in section 7). 
This sequential triangulation methodology as described above in this 
methodology section is used as it fits best with the author’s research 
philosophy (see section 4.1). Furthermore, this approach tries to circumvent 
potential flaws of using quantitative or qualitative methodologies solely, 
especially in terms of limiting bias:  
 
1. If a positivist based quantitative approach is valid, the findings related to 
the same cause-of-effects relationship (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, here: 
‘effect of Basel II on SME financing’) should be reproducible in a unitary 
world. However, this is not the case, as described in the literature review (see 
section 3). Therefore Wahlström (2009), for example, in line with Goldberger 
(1991), opts for ‘qualitative significance’, which evaluates the cause-of-effects 
in addition to ‘statistical significance’ in his Basel II research. Quantitative 
methods, for example, do not pay special attention to important cases like 
very big SME financiers. This extension beyond mere statistical significance 
will be regarded as a means of reducing bias. As the criteria of inclusion of 
‘special cases’ are defined upfront in line with Saunders et al (2007:232), 
bias is limited as it is less subject to bias of selection. 
On the other hand, triangulation by means of qualitative methods enhances 
the richness and depth of research. According to Miles and Huberman 
(1994:147), qualitative analysis can deal ‘with complex networks of events 
and processes’. The aim of the qualitative approach is interpretative, the 
researcher makes interpretation of data by means of a ‘filter though a 
personal lens’. 
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2. Basel II was set-up using intense quantitative methods in order to regulate 
the market (BCBS, 2004). Therefore SMEs and financiers have to comply 
with this statistical approach, even if the statistical approach of Basel II is 
questioned by Ozdemir (2009), for example, who argues for a holistic 
validation process, rather than a mere statistical based one. Nevertheless, 
using qualitative methods only would have little strategic fit related to the 
worldview of the research units and would be in a way ‘per se’ a biased 
approach. 
 
Furthermore, as the vast majority of corporate finance research is based on 
quantitative methods it is essential to incorporate these too in order to set the 
author’s findings into perspective with the extant literature. The advantage of 
this mixed-method design is what Saunders et al (2007:146) refer to as: ‘use 
different methods for different purposes’ which is in line with an international 
Basel II study by Steiner et al (2003), for example covering Germany, 
France, UK and US. They applied an exploratory sequential mixed method 
design was well. 
4.2.3 Hypotheses Tested 
In order to limit bias, the hypotheses are derived from extensive literature 
research (see section 3), as suggested by Robson (2002). Therefore, for 
each of the following hypotheses, a-priori evidence in literature is provided in 
order to explain how they are derived, with little bias involved. A justification 
of the hypotheses is provided below (see Appendix B.1 for additional 
information). Linking the initial hypotheses, ex-post, with the findings of the 
qualitative analysis (see section 6) provides further evidence. Therefore 
some exemplary elements from section 6 are displayed in this section in 
order to provide evidence regarding the validity of the initial hypotheses, and 
to provide perspective on how the initial hypotheses were amended within 
the synopsis (see section 7). 
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In addition, the interviews in the background gathering phases as well as the 
intense pre-testing (publications of the pilot-questionnaire in two publications) 
provide evidence that the initial hypotheses are a sound based regarding 
validity. 
The hypotheses are expressed in operational terms, which propose a 
relationship between two specific concepts or variables, in line with Robson 
(2002). 
 
The three initial hypotheses are: 
 
1. Corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because the 
‘house bank principle’ is deteriorating. 
As stated above, the Sachverständigenrat (2005), an advisory committee to 
the German government, argues that the famous ‘house bank principle’ is 
eroding (Sachverständigenrat, 2005). The financing situation changed when 
guarantees of the state-owned Landesbanken or Sparkassen were removed 
(Monti, 2003). A reduction in credit supply (Reize, 2007) and the rise in credit 
rates (Kerle, 2006) on the verge of Basel II are indicators that this 
fundamental German ‘house bank principle’ is deteriorating, as already 
discussed extensively in section 3. BdB (2005) and Sandvoß (2007) explain, 
from a bank and bank association point of view that the role of the bank 
might shift from a ‘sole provider of money’ to a ‘facilitator of financing’. As 
stated in section 6.5, the findings from the qualitative analysis support this 
view. In particular, SMEs argue that credits will become dearer as Basel II is 
used to improve margins. They believe that the relationship between the 
banker and the entrepreneur becomes ‘mechanistic’ in contrast to the former 
trusted ‘relationship banking’.  
 
2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: 
a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or 
b) they adjust their strategy as stated in hypothesis 3. 
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Rating seems to act in a twofold way: it improves the access to bank loans 
and non-bank investors enforce a positive effect on ratings, according to 
Nitschke and Kuper (2007). Already, 12% of the respondents from 
corporations of this explanatory, quantitative research believe that 
incorporating private equity will improve their Basel II rating. Approximately 
one quarter of the companies under review already regard private equity as a 
financing option. They ascribe this to the low equity ratio of German 
companies and the respective poor rating. 30% of the companies who regard 
Basel II as a risk are in favour of private equity. Only 25% of the Basel II 
critics state being sufficiently financed in relation to 46% of the whole sample. 
 
Again, the qualitative analysis provides evidence regarding hypothesis 2.a. 
As explained in detail in section 6.6; specifically, the ‘good SMEs’ became 
increasingly aware of rating parameters and aligning their focus accordingly 
by providing enhanced transparency and by improving financial management 
which is regarded by the interviewed financiers as a key-issue. ‘Good SMEs’ 
realised that ‘improving rating means improving business’. 
 
Hypothesis 2.b is directly derived from hypothesis 3 as an alternative to 
rating based bank-loans and is justified below. 
 
3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME 
corporate finance when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth 
with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for exit 
strategies. 
Whereas there had been little non-bank investment in SMEs in the past, 
Basel II is estimated to be a driver for change, according to Ackermann 
(2003). Based on the author’s background gathering and the author’s 
professional experience, a growth strategy and exit orientation will be 
decisive. 
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On the grounds of a quantitative, questionnaire-based survey, Hollasch and 
Berg (2007) argue that SMEs, in particular, are becoming increasingly 
interested in alternative forms of financing. This is in line with Pre-Basel II 
findings and suggestions by Hartl (2002). According to Ries and Trout (2000) 
a sustainable unique selling proposition (henceforth USP) is a prerequisite for 
gaining a competitive edge in order to reach a leading (niche) market posi-
tion. The elements of USPs manifest in the indicators of company potential 
and are based on Nagl (2003) and Jobber (1995). Based on elite interviews, 
Hedtstück (2007) points out that private equity companies foster the 
development of SMEs with a focus on growth rather than cost cutting. Growth 
is the major motivation for going public, as Frey and Kuhn (2007) point out. 
This is an indication that growth is important. Using BVK data, Cowley (2002) 
states that 81% of VC fund investments go to companies with less than 100 
employees. Hollasch and Berg (2007) argue that about one-third of all SMEs 
gathered experience with alternative finance, such as private equity. 
According to Kuhn and Frey, 24.1% of the major German SMEs consider 
going public. This is an indication for a stronger exit orientation of SMEs. 
 
The findings from the literature research correlate with the findings from the 
background gathering phase and the empirical qualitative research. As stated 
in section 6.7, the findings provide evidence that the ‘company strategy 
focus’ became unconsciously ‘private equity affine’ and the focus on 
valuation is an indicator regarding a growing openness towards non-bank 
financiers with Basel II as the trigger. Figure 29 illustrates the hypothesis 
deduction process. 
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Figure 29 Hypotheses derived from research objectives 
4.2.4 Variables Employed and Operationalised 
The author uses the same structured deductive approach regarding the 
selection of variables as explained in section 4.2.3. The aim of this top-down 
deduction process from hypotheses to latent variables and to manifest 
variables is in order to limit bias. This approach is in line with Blumberg et al 
(2005) that investigative questions are needed in order to answer 
satisfactorily each research question and to meet each objective. 
Latent as well as manifest variables are dependent variables. Latent 
variables are meta-variables which are not observed directly but ‘manifests’ 
in manifest variables (henceforth: indicators). ‘Ease of getting a loan’ and 
‘changes in affinity of SMEs to non-bank financiers’ will serve as latent 
variables for the first hypothesis as these are directly related to changes in 
the ‘house bank principle’ (Sachverständigenrat, 2005). The combination of 
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various rating-related categories serves as latent variables regarding the 
rating scale, according to BCBS (2004).  
 
The ‘general investment attitude towards SMEs’, a ‘business vision for 
growth’, and a ‘willingness for incorporating new financiers’ comprise latent 
variables regarding hypotheses 2.b and 3, as indicated above. 
 
A detailed justification of the latent variables used, regarding the three 
hypotheses based on the literature review in section 3, can be found in 
Appendix B.2. The justification regarding the SME related manifest variables 
can be found in Appendix B.3 and the justification of the respective 
financiers’ indicators is provided in Appendix B.4. 
 
Figure 30 to Figure 32 show how each latent variable manifests, by means of 
a set of indicators. For example, the usage of certain financial instruments, 
such as ‘formal supplier credits’ (see Wilson, 2004, for example, on the 
importance of supplier credits) or ‘factoring’, are indicators regarding the 
difficulties of an SME in getting a bank loan according to BWI (2002). 
 
Figure 30 Variables regarding hypothesis 1 
Subset H1: latent / manifest (dependent) variables
Ease of get-
ting a loan
Hypothesis SME:
1. CF is becoming
more difficult be-
cause the ‘house
bank principle’ is
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_ / F
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S / F
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Figure 31 Variables regarding hypothesis 2.a 
 
 
Figure 32 Variables regarding hypotheses 2.b and 3 
 
In order to get a holistic picture, the variables employed consist of behaviour 
variables (like financing sources), opinion variables (such as opinions about 
financing trends), and attribute variables (such as size of funds under 
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management) using terminology by Dillman (2000). On several occasions 
indexes were built when the combined measure of variables comprises an 
indicator for a latent variable. The attribute variables are independent; the 
others dependent in a ‘quasi experimental’ setting (Robson, 2002:87) with 
Basel II regulation being used as an ‘instrument’ in order to explain the effect 
of Basel II. 
 
The variables mentioned above build the basis for the mathematical models 
set up and tested as described in section 5. The following implementation 
mode was chosen (see sections 4.3 and 4.4) in line with the sequential 
exploratory approach as it fits best with the author’s philosophical position, 
the research objective and the consecutive data analysis in relation to other 
Basel II research.  
4.3 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Following an initial background gathering (see section 4.3.1), the sample 
frame was defined (see section 4.3.2) before the quantitative data collection 
(see section 4.3.3) took place by means of self-administered questionnaires 
(Robson, 2002:236). This is in line with other corporate finance research 
according to Aziz and Humayon (2006) who evaluated 180 surveys. The 
questionnaires can be found as additional information in Appendix C. 
 
Within the quantitative analysis, statistical procedures were used in order to 
comply with the quantitative mainstream in the financial research. That 
means for each of the three hypotheses, one or two models (SME and 
financier) were set up and tested. 
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4.3.1 Background Gathering Phase 
The background data collection phase comprised literature research focusing 
on academic journals as well as special interest journals. This was 
complemented by unstructured elite interviews with selected opinion leaders 
as qualitative methods are good at capturing meaning, process and context 
(Espíndola, 2007). The aim of this phase was to refine the initial research 
hypotheses and variables and to reduce bias. 
A purposive sample (Saunders et al, 2007:230) was taken from the author’s 
professional database in order to select the interviewees as random sampling 
would have been inappropriate in this early phase due to the effort-outcome 
relationship. This is in line with academic literature. 
As this is the early background gathering phase and various measures (see 
above and below) were undertaken to limit bias, the danger of biased 
influence on the research methodology and outcome seems limited. 
Owing to this early brainstorming phase the informed consent was brief and 
informal as was data collection. It consisted of taking notes rather than taping 
the interviews. Anonymity was granted as the feedback from the background 
gathering would not be entered directly into the research. 
4.3.2 Sample Frame regarding Quantitative Research 
As one of the prime objectives of this research is to consider Basel II from an 
SME’s, as well as from a financier’s, perspective, these two populations had 
to be considered in the data collection and analysis. In terms of SMEs, 3,000 
addresses were initially randomly selected from the ‘bedirect’ database (see 
section 4.3.3) in order to avoid the two reasons of sample selection bias, as 
mentioned in Heckman (1979:53): self-selection by the individuals being 
investigated and sample selection decisions by analysts. 
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The author is grateful to ‘bedirect’ who provided the random SME addresses. 
‘Bedirect’ is a joint venture between Creditreform and AZ Bertelsmann, the 
biggest address broker in Germany. Creditreform is an association founded, 
in 1879, to protect its members from ‘harmful credit’ (Creditrefom, 2008). It 
comprises of 165,000 members in Europe who can get creditworthiness data 
from every corporation from 130 Creditreform locations in Germany. The 
evaluation is based on official German registers in which every corporation 
and therefore every SME, according to the classification of the European 
Union (European Commission, 2003b) which is used in this research, is 
covered. Creditreform is one of the most widely used databases in 
(academic) finance research in Germany (see literature review in section 3). 
For example, researchers like Dietsch and Petey (2004), Ehrhardt and 
Zimmermann (2007) or Schäfer et al (2006) based their research on 
Creditreform data. 
 
Regarding the sampling frame of financiers, the author relied on 
associations; this is in line with the majority of research studies in Germany 
that were under review (see again literature review in section 3). In line with 
other German Basel II research, the member list of the following associations 
was used regarding financiers: banking association BdB (like Sandvoß, 2007, 
for example), private equity association BVK (Frommann, 2006a) or Suhl and 
Weber, 2005, for example) and finance associations, such as leasing 
associations (BDL, such as SFS, 2006) or factoring associations (DFV), 
regarding alternative forms of finance (see Bruch, 2007, for example).  
This sample frames can be regarded as comprehensive in terms of SME 
financing: according to a statement on request from a BVK representative, for 
example, the percentage of members regarding SME financing is nearly 
100%. As suggested by Robson (2002:254), the marginal difference 
mentioned above regarding the SME and financier samples can be 
neglected. He states that Random Digital Dialling (RDD) is sufficient for 
statistical significance, although less than 98% of adults are listed in a phone 
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book. In line with other researches in renowned journals, like the Journal of 
Finance or Journal of Banking and Finance, such as those by Degryse and 
Ongena (2005), Dietsch and Petey (2004), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Carey 
et al (2003) or Leary and Roberts (2005), a random selection is stated in the 
author’s thesis as well. As the whole population from these associations is 
taken as sample it is per definition ensured that no section of the population 
is (systematically) left out. Therefore the second reason for sample bias 
according to Heckman (1979) does not apply as well. The acquisition of data 
was very costly, as only one database was free of charge. Therefore, it was 
decided to send the data questionnaire out to a subset of SMEs in order to 
comply with the budget of 10,000 euros for the: acquisition of data, carrying 
out the mailing, follow-up calls and the travel expenses for the qualitative 
interviews. Therefore, all financier data sources were included (524 in total) 
and the same number was randomly selected from the SME database 
provided by ‘bedirect’. 
4.3.3 Implementing Quantitative Data Collection Methods 
The survey was conducted by means of self-administered postal 
questionnaires (one for SMEs, one for financiers) in order to set these 
findings into relation with the research hypotheses and other Pre-Basel II 
research. According to Sue and Ritter (2007:7) postal surveys have the 
advantage of low cost, wide geographic reach, no interviewer bias and 
possible anonymity. This outweighs the disadvantages of low response rate 
and little affectivity regarding contingency questions, as a two-step pre-
testing process was applied and the findings would be triangulated with face-
to-face-interviews. This allows the posing of complex questions according to 
Sue and Ritter (2007:7). According to Saunders et al (2007:138) this 
comprises the mainstream approach in deductive phases. Furthermore this is 
in line with other finance / Basel II research, as questionnaire-based surveys 
were carried out in all but one of the primary research articles under review. 
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Robson (2002:227-268) states that self-administered questionnaires are 
good when the researcher can be confident the questions will be interpreted 
in the same way by all respondents. This can be reassured by intensive pre-
testing as mentioned above. 
 
Both questionnaires have a funnel design (Robson, 2002:227-258), starting 
with a warm-up phase on general issues, primarily using dichotomic 
questions (funds usage, for example) or open questions (age of the 
company, for example). In order to provide evidence for the three hypotheses 
described in section 4.2.3, the latent variables (see again section 4.2.3) were 
chosen according to their suitability for providing evidence regarding the 
hypotheses (see Appendix B for a detailed justification). The two 
questionnaires therefore contain a set of manifest (dependent) variables, 
which serve as indicators regarding the respective latent variables.  
The survey gathers cases of manifest variables before and after Basel II 
(henceforth, Pre-Basel II and Post-Basel II) came into effect. These manifest 
variables build the base for the respective mathematical models (described in 
section 4.3.4) needed to answer the research question (stated in section 
4.2.1), by testing the three hypotheses using the appropriate statistical tests. 
 
When the questionnaires were finalised in autumn 2008 the financial market 
crisis was at its peak. Deferral of the research would not have been 
appropriate as no expert could estimate when the crisis would be over. In 
order to limit bias by means of a spill-over effect some ‘control questions’ 
were introduced. Participants were asked, after relevant question modules as 
a kind of control question, the extent to which changes in their assessment 
from the Pre- to the Post-Basel II era could be ascribed to Basel II. 
Furthermore, participants were asked about the impact of various effects, 
such as Basel II or the subprime crisis, on SME financing in general. 
In line with the literature under review the questionnaires contain sections on 
background data, performance parameters (SMEs), company strategy (from 
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an SME and bank / investor view), financing focus (SME) and strategies 
(bank / investor) in relation to the three hypotheses tested. This structure is 
used to reduce individual bias and to enable a better comparability regarding 
other research papers too.  
The bulk of the questions concentrate on collecting the manifest variables by 
using Likert scales which complies with the majority of respective (German) 
Basel II primary research. In order to evaluate the Basel II effect, for each 
variable the value prior to Basel II and after Basel II came into force was 
evaluated (like usage of financial sources on a Pre- and Post-Basel II basis). 
 
A four item Likert scale is used in line with other studies in the corporate 
finance sector in Germany (Schalast and Barten, 2008, for example). This 4-
point Likert scale variant ensures a good compromise between being specific 
and sensitive (Lee, 2007a). Sue and Ritter (2007, 51) argue that a 4- or 5-
point Likert scale will be most suitable. The Likert scales are coded in 
ascending order from 1 to 4 as suggested by Saunders et al (2006:378). 
Time series data (Gujarati, 2003:25), are used, for example, for changes in 
revenues. The questionnaire contains category questions such as sector, 
rating questions such as usage of financing sources, and quantity questions 
such as size (Saunders et al, 2007:370-372). The wording is in line with best 
practices suggested by Saunders et al (2007:376), such as avoidance of 
embarrassment and leading phrases. 
 
The final questionnaire consists of seven pages, which is in the range of four 
to eight pages suggested by Saunders et al (2007:381), although it seems 
that in corporate finance some are more extensive, probably because of the 
professional receptors: Cumming and Johan (2007), for example, used a 13 
page survey to evaluate the effect of regulation on private equity. On the 
other hand, Frey and Kuhn (2007) stuck to the minimum of four pages. The 
layout of the questionnaire is in line with best practices summarised by 
Saunders et al (2007:383). 
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The deductive approach (‘from latent variables to manifest variables’, see 
section 4.2.4) is used to enhance validity according to the classification by 
Blumberg et al (2005). Content validity is ensured by leading back from 
manifest variables to latent variables. Measurement questions related to the 
indicators ensure predictive validity and construct validity as the categories 
are linked to other Basel II research categories. 
 
A two-step pre-testing phase, as suggested by Robson (2002:229), was 
applied in order to ensure a high validity and reduce bias by means of an 
iterative refinement of the questionnaire: 
1. A kind of informal pre-test was made within a purposively selected group 
of SMEs and financiers from the author’s professional network. 
2. Two pilot-surveys in cooperation with two target group magazines were 
carried out as a means of pre-test. 
After a discussion with the editor in chief of Markt & Mittelstand an article was 
published with reference to the author’s research project within issue 7/2008. 
Markt & Mittelstand is one of the leading magazines with a focus on 
Mittelstand and has a circulation of 87,039 issues (and 155,000 readers, 
according to media analysis by IVW, M&M, 2008). With a reach of 47.3% it 
ranks second, close behind the leading Magazine of the Chamber of 
Commerce with 48.8% (TNS Emnid, 2003). Within the article a reference was 
made to the Global Value Management (GVM) internet address, the 
homepage of the author’s corporate finance consultancy on which the draft 
questionnaire was published.  
 
The pilot study was announced through a renowned financial news service: 
vc-facts is the publisher of two widely distributed newsletters to the corporate 
finance community comprising the vc-facts newsletter and the M&A 
newsletter (issue 35/2008). Within each online newsletter the research 
project was introduced containing a link to the questionnaires which were 
published on the author’s homepage. 
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The one-off study and consequential large investment in both time and 
money lead to an online-based pre-test format in order to ensure economy 
and effectiveness. Coverage error (Sue and Ritter, 2007:3) seems low as the 
professional member sampling unit is regarded to have internet access. 
Besides economy-of-delivery the online / web-based variant has the following 
advantages according to Sue and Ritter (2007). Speed, direct data entry and 
worldwide geographic reach. Therefore, various (practitioner) researchers 
make use of online surveys, such as Nitschke and Kuper (2007), even for 
main parts of the research. The pilot questionnaires were published on the 
homepage of the author’s corporate finance consultancy GVM (see Figure 
33). The article in Markt & Mittelstand, as well as in the corporate finance 
newsletters (M&A news and VC / PE news), refers to the GVM homepage. 
 
 
Figure 33 Publications of the pilot questionnaires on the GVM homepage 
 
As suggested by Bell (2005) a short follow-up survey (telephone interview 
with a number of randomly selected participants) was conducted in order to 
get feedback on areas of improvement. For example, ambiguous questions 
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or feedback on whether all relevant topics were covered. To illustrate further, 
the understanding of technical terms were checked for. As a result, liquidity 
related ratios were left out and the focus was placed on earning ratios 
because liquidity ratios were interpreted differently (in contrast to the earning 
ratios used). Carrying out these test phone calls was conducted through a 
purposive sample of respondents from the pilot study.  
For example, the layout was changed: Pre- and Post-Basel II questions 
referring to the same issue were placed side by side in one table rather than 
in two consecutive ones. Furthermore, questions that were too detailed 
regarding financial performance were left out as SMEs were reluctant to 
answer them. 
 
In order to lower the disadvantages of self-administered questionnaires, such 
as ‘danger of ambiguities and misunderstanding’ (Robson, 2002:233), the 
author established a hotline via telephone and e-mail.  
 
As suggested by Jones (1995), a multi-level mail process was used to 
enhance the rate of response, starting after the first week (see Saunders et 
al, 2007:393): postal mailing with questionnaire, then an e-mail reminder (if e-
mail was available), and/or selected follow-up calls to 100 people on a 
random basis. In addition, during these calls the understanding of technical 
terms was checked. This showed that the technical terms were well 
understood, which was a result of the intensive pre-testing mentioned above. 
This multi-level procedure is in line with other Basel II research by 
practitioners like Kolbeck et al (2002). Furthermore, in line with suggestions 
by Edwards et al (2002) an incentive was given (‘text marker’) and a 
response envelope was enclosed. 
Mails were sent out at the beginning of the week with no public holiday in it in 
line with Saunders et al (2006:391). However, there is the danger of so-called 
response bias which has to be checked for: Creswell (2003:160), for 
example, suggests contacting non-respondents and cross-checking their 
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responses with respondents. If late respondents are close to the feedback of 
late respondents, this is an indicator that late respondents can be regarded 
as non-respondents. Yet, this has not been the case. 
In order to enhance reliability (Robson, 2002:101) data typed in was checked 
by a separate person in order to check data for errors (Saunders et al, 
2007:407) with respective ‘data cleaning’ activities (see Sue and Ritter, 
2007:106-107), like obviously transposed digits.  
This questionnaire-based implementation mode was chosen because it is in 
line with the majority of corporate finance research and addresses a broad 
range of questions. This gave viable indications for the consecutive 
qualitative phase (Robson, 2002:233). In line with other Pre-Basel II research 
probability sampling (Sue and Ritter, 2007:28-31) was used as this allowed 
for making statements of statistical significance with no sample bias, as 
explained in section 4.3.2. 
Regarding the quantitative phases, Saunders et al (2007:213) suggests 
checking for refusals to respond, ineligibility to respond, inability to locate 
respondents and respondent located but unable to make contact, in order to 
cope with bias. Due to the selection by professional address brokers the last 
three issues mentioned by Saunders et al (2007) should not apply to a great 
extent, as the address broker updates the database regularly. According to 
deVaus (2002) the main reasons for missing data are: non-response (unit 
and item non-response, Sue and Ritter, 2007:35), did-not-know, missed by 
mistake, or as Saunders et al (2007) add, leaving part of the questionnaire 
blank implies an answer too. The latter was hardly the case. The author’s 
strategy regarding missing values is replacing them by the mean in line with 
other Basel II related research. As the basis for the self-administered 
questionnaire is a probabilistic sample the author contacted some non-
respondents (refusals, see above) from the sample and tried to get the 
questionnaire filled in for validation reasons. Therefore, these initial non-
respondent responses were compared to the ‘normal’ responses. In general, 
the answers did not produce any major differences. 
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4.3.4  Implementing Quantitative Data Analysis 
From the background gathering phase and the literature review (see section 
3), three hypotheses had been derived in order to explore the effect of Basel 
II on corporate financing of SMEs. An important part of the research gap (see 
section 1.1) is to consider the effect of Basel II from the SMEs’ and the 
financiers’ perspectives in one single comprehensive piece of research. 
Therefore, relevant aspects need considering from both sides: on the one 
hand, SMEs are questioned about their assessment of a specific aspect like 
‘rejection criteria regarding bank credits from a Pre- and Post-Basel II 
perspective’; and, on the other hand, financiers are asked to give their 
opinion on the same topic. In addition, several aspects relate either to the 
SMEs’ or the financiers’ part of a specific hypothesis; for example, the 
development of credit rates of the subjects company which is an SME item 
only. 
 
Based on these variables and variable formulation, a specific model is intro-
duced for each hypothesis with respect to either the SMEs or the financiers. 
The three hypotheses are (see section 4.2.3): 
> Hypothesis 1 (henceforth, H1): 
Corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because the ‘house 
bank principle’ is deteriorating. 
> Hypothesis 2.a (henceforth, H2): 
SMEs can cope best with the effect when they proactively engage in rating 
and improve the parameters. 
> Hypothesis 2.b and Hypothesis 3 (henceforth, H3): 
Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME corporate 
finance when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth with the aim of 
niche market leadership and when they open up for exit strategies. 
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Hypothesis testing is used as a means of ‘confirmation or refutation of … 
theories on the basis of sample evidence’ (Gujarati, 2003:8). Within a first 
step, two indexes for each hypothesis were created, one index for SMEs and 
one for financiers (with the exception of H2, as H2 is related to SMEs only). 
Each index consists of several items which are derived from the variable 
selection and justification provided in section 4.2.4. The meaning of these 
indexes is to create a ‘measure’ for each index. In the case of H1 this relates 
to creating an index which provides a possibility to measure the extent of the 
‘deterioration of the house bank’ principle.  
 
The indexes related to SMEs are using items of the returned SME 
questionnaires only. The financier indexes are, likewise, just using items of 
the returned financier questionnaires (see Appendix C). In a next step, the 
index values related to the Pre- and the Post-Basel II assessment are 
compared to determine the influence of Basel II on the indexes and hence on 
the respective hypotheses. 
 
As open questions are the focus of the qualitative part, the coding of the 
questionnaire is straightforward so as to facilitate consecutive coding 
regarding data analysis, as described below. Following Saunders et al 
(2007:415), existing coding schemes are used for categorical data, for 
example, the industrial classification. Other data, such as the ratio data 
variable revenue will be coded by transferring the values into categorically 
ranked data, in line with the SME classification of the European Union 
(European Commission, 2003b). Open ended Likert scale questions are 
coded on a scale from 1 to 4, in ascending order, for providing evidence 
regarding the hypotheses. 
 
The codebook (see, Sue and Ritter, 2007:102-104), regarding the variables 
used, can be found in Table 48 and Table 49 within Appendix D. In general 
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the data is split into questions for SMEs and questions regarding financiers 
(FIN). All observed variables will be denoted by ܺௌொ,௜ and ܺிூே,௜. Where 
ܺௌொ,௜ refers to ‘question module i’ for SMEs and ܺிூே,௜ to ‘question module i’ 
for financiers. ‘Question module’ refers to question sections in the respective 
SME or financier questionnaire (see Appendix C), for example, ‘bank credit 
financing’ or ‘non-bank financing’. Each line in the codebook (see Appendix 
D) provides for ‘item j’ (which is the jth-question in ‘question module i’) a 
description of the associated ‘question module item’, the number and 
description of the item and the resulting variable specification used in the 
hypotheses testing sections 5.4 to 5.6. 
Furthermore, each question-module contains several items which are related 
to a specific question in the questionnaire which was filled-out by the 
participants. 
 
As discussed in section 4.3.3 the variables consist primarily of Likert scales, 
for example, ‘importance of private equity as a means of finance’. In many 
cases the answers are two-fold, referring to Pre- and Post-Basel II 
assessments of the survey participants, regarding topics like the ‘importance 
of the usage of mezzanine’. To differentiate between this Pre- and Post-
Basel II assessment, the following notations will be used: 
௝ܺ  := Answer to ‘item j’ 
௝ܺ,௣ := Answer to ‘item j’ referring to the respective Pre-Basel II assessment 
of the subject (݌  ൌ  ݌ܽݏݐ, ݅. ݁. ܲݎ݁ െ ܤܽݏ݈݁ ܫܫ) 
௝ܺ,௙ := Answer to ‘item j’ referring to the respective Post-Basel II 
assessment of the subject (݂  ൌ  ݂ݑݐݑݎ݁, ݅. ݁. ܲ݋ݏݐ െ ܤܽݏ݈݁ ܫܫ) 
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Together this results in variables of the form ௝ܺ,௙
ௌொ,௜, for example, referring to 
the Post-Basel II evaluation of the j-th item of the i-th question module for 
SMEs. 
 
This leads to the following formulation: 
Let ுܻ௡,௣/௙்௒௉ா  denote the index value for Pre- and Post-Basel II periods for ‘Hn’ 
(which is hypothesis n), with ‘TYPE’ = ‘SME’ (for SME index) or ‘FIN’ (for 
financier index). 
 
Then ுܻ௡,௣/௙்௒௉ா  is defined as the sum of the values of the m items, 
௝ܺభ,௙/௣
்௒௉ா,௜, … , ௝ܺ೘,௙/௣்௒௉ா,௜  , included in the index, hence: 
ுܻ௡,௣்௒௉ா ∶ൌ ௝ܺభ,௣்௒௉ா,௜ ൅ ⋯൅ ௝ܺ೘,௣்௒௉ா,௞ 
ுܻ௡,௙்௒௉ா ∶ൌ ௝ܺభ,௙்௒௉ா,௜ ൅ ⋯൅ ௝ܺ೘,௙்௒௉ா,௞ 
Thus, the delta between Pre- and Post-Basel II values is defined as: 
∆ ுܻ௡்௒௉ா ∶ൌ ுܻ௡,௙்௒௉ா െ ுܻ௡,௣்௒௉ா 
 
The choice of the items ௝ܻ,௣
்௒௉ா,௜ contained in the indexes is based on the 
research design, as explained in the section 4.2.4, where the latent and 
manifest variables employed were introduced. The stated manifest variables 
(dependent variables) are included into the indexes as these can be 
observed, and they serve as indicators for the latent variables, which provide 
evidence for the respective hypotheses as described and justified in section 
4.2.4. The distinct company answering the questionnaire (either SME or 
financier) is the ‘independent variable’; the variables used in the indexes are 
the dependent ones. 
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For each item it has to be decided if a positive shift from Pre- to Post-Basel II 
values supports the hypothesis or objects it. If the increase is supporting the 
hypothesis the influence is referred as being ‘positive’ and in the case of an 
objection, it is ‘negative’. 
This means in relation to H1, for example, if SMEs believe in an increase of 
‘generic credit rejection criteria’ from a Pre-Basel II to a Post-Basel II 
perspective (‘positive shift’), this will support H1. On the other hand, a 
decrease in ‘credit supply by banks’ (‘negative shift’) from a Pre-Basel II to a 
Post-Basel II perspective will also support H1 (‘deterioration of house bank 
principle’). 
‘Negative shifts’ are included into the model in a coherent way, the values 
were inverted. Negative shifts occur in several, four item, Likert scale 
instances. Therefore, the values of these variables were transformed in order 
to achieve the results by inverting the index values: 4  1; 3  2; 3  2; 1 
 4. That means that a decrease from a Pre- to Post-Basel II assessment 
(‘negative shift’) will – due to the transformation – have a positive delta value 
and will therefore support the respective hypothesis. In case the Likert scales 
have more than four, a transformation to a range from ‘1’ to ‘4’ was 
conducted. 
 
In order to test H1, H2 and H3, the Pre-Basel II and the Post-Basel II index 
values for H1, H2 and H3 were checked to determine whether they are 
significantly different. Regarding SMEs, separate models are set up for H1, 
H2 and H3. Financiers’ models are introduced for H1 and H3 only, because 
H2 deals with the rating affinity of SMEs from an SME perspective, as shown 
in section 4.2.4. Missing values were replaced by the means of the 
respective variables, in order to achieve a constant sample size on which the 
analysis is based, this is in line with other financial research (see section 3). 
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The data analysis is thus carried out by using the appropriate statistical tests: 
the author’s quantitative research design on Basel II can be compared to a 
non-blinded ‘experiment’ (Robson, 2002:95-162), with no control group (Lee, 
2007b), as all SMEs are subject to Basel II. The ‘instrument’ applied is the 
Basel II regulation. Some research papers, e.g. Dietsch and Petey (2004) or 
Altman and Sabato (2005), use the same methods when they developed new 
models of research in the Pre-Basel II phase. As discussed in section 4.4.3, 
a major proportion of questions in the data collection section take the form of 
a Likert scale, which means that the underlying variables of the ‘scale 
questions’ (Saunders et al, 2007:409) are categorical ordinal data (Gujarati, 
2003:31). In order to make use of similar statistics with quantifiable data, in 
terms of descriptive statistics (like means etc.), the author follows Blumberg 
et al (2005). They argue that these data can be analysed as quantifiable 
interval data, because such data are likely to have similar gaps between the 
data values. 
According to Stutely (2003), a minimum sample size of 30 for each category 
(here: SME and financiers) will generally be sufficient for statistical analysis. 
According to the ‘law of large numbers’ (Saunders et al, 2006:601) ‘samples 
of larger absolute size are more likely to be representative of the population 
… in particular the mean calculated for the sample is more likely to equal the 
mean of the population, provided that the samples are not biased’. As 
discussed in section 4.3.2, the samples were randomly selected from a 
probabilistic sample frame and are therefore not biased. As the sample size 
in this thesis is approximately twice as high, the rate of the author’s 
quantitative data collection is therefore sufficient and is in line with the 
research articles under review (see section 3). Based on Central Limit 
Theorem (henceforth CLT, see Train, 2009:245) within the following section, 
normal distribution is assumed as Saunders et al (2006:2010-2011) states: 
‘Statisticians have proved that the larger the absolute size of a sample, the 
more closely its distribution will be to normal distribution and thus the more 
robust it will be. .. This relationship known as the central limit theorem occurs 
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even if the population from which the sample is drawn is not normally 
distributed. Statisticians have also shown that a sample size of 30 or more 
will usually result in a sampling distribution for the mean that is very close to 
a normal distribution’. 
 
The CLT in an abbreviated manner implies the following: given that ଵܺ, … , ܺ௡ 
are independent, they have identically distributed random variables: 
ܧሺ ௜ܺሻ ൌ  ߤ௫ and ݒܽݎሺ ௜ܺሻ ൌ  ߪ௑ଶ where 0 ൏  ߪ௑ଶ ൏  ∞, ∀݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊.   
Then: as ݊  → ∞, the distribution of ሺ೉೔షఓೣሻఙ೉ഥ , with ߪ௑ത
ଶ ൌ ఙ೉మ௡ , becomes arbitrarily 
well approximated by the standard normal distribution. 
 
Tests of significance are used as they are ‘a procedure by which sample 
results are used to verify the truth or falsity of a null hypothesis’ (Gujarati, 
2003:129). In addition, basic statistics, histograms and Q-Q plots in sections 
5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, are presented in order to analyse whether the underlying 
data is normally distributed. 
To check if the Pre- and Post-Basel II index values are significantly differing, 
two different approaches are proposed. First, under the assumption of 
normally distributed index data, paired t-tests (in case of equal variance for 
Pre- and Post-Basel II index data) or the Welch t-tests (for the case of non-
equal variances) are applied. Both tests employ the Pre- and Post-Basel II 
mean index values and test whether they can be regarded as equal. 
 
The second approach which is proposed and used, in case the assumption of 
normally distributed index data could be questioned, is a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. These tests are applied to safeguard the findings as this ‘is a 
nonparametric equivalent of the paired two-group t-test’ (Robson, 2002:441). 
A significance level of 95% was chosen, which is used in all the finance 
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research articles mentioned in this thesis, and is typical for social science 
research in an area like finance (see Robson, 2002:409).  
 
Paired t-tests test the hypothesis that the mean of the Pre-Basel II index 
values is equal to the mean of the Post-Basel II index values (ܪ଴ሻ, against 
the alternative hypothesis (ܪଵ) that the difference in means is not equal to 0. 
Paired t-test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ൌ  ߤ௙       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ് ߤ௙    
 
Analogues, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test tests the null hypothesis, that the 
mean of the Pre-Basel II index values is greater or equal than the mean of 
the Post-Basel II index values (ܪ଴ሻ, against the alternative hypothesis (ܪଵ) 
that the mean of the Post-Basel II index values is greater than the mean of 
the Pre-Basel II index values. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ൒  ߤ௙       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ൏ ߤ௙ 
 
The model building and testing is at the core of the quantitative analysis in 
section 5. In addition, at the beginning of this quantitative analysis, 
descriptive analysis is used in order to set the findings in relation to the 
sample frame of other research projects. Model building is the dominating 
method regarding Basel II research under review in this paper; to illustrate, in 
section 3, 38% of the articles under review used model building. 
 
Furthermore, analysis of correlation (Gujarati, 2003:23) and regression 
(Gujarati, 2003:42) was undertaken in line with other Basel II researchers, 
like Altman and Sabato (2005), for example. 
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Therefore, regarding multiple linear regression, it is evaluated if the changes 
in the five model index values could be explained by factors characterising 
the SMEs or the financiers. In order to achieve this, a variety of possible 
factors influencing the hypotheses models were chosen. Among these 
factors those are extracted which provide the ‘best’ linear regression model, 
according to the so called ‘Akaike Information Criterion’ (henceforth, AIC, see 
Train, 2009:367). In principle, the AIC measures the fit of the considered 
model (see Gujarati, 2003:219) but also takes into account the model 
complexity by introducing a penalty term depending on the number of 
variables used (Akaike, 1974). 
 
Regression diagnostics is carried out by means of F-statistic (see Gujarati, 
2003:219). This means that the F-test using the null-hypothesis that all 
variable coefficients are zero (Robson, 2002:442) will be rejected (or not). 
The multiple R-squared measure is used to evaluate the variation in the data 
explained by the model (Gujarati, 2003:81-87).  
In order to evaluate the fit of the proposed model it is necessary to take a 
look at regression diagnostics. Therefore the residuals of the model are 
plotted against the fitted values. A second important part is to check the 
residuals for normality and homoscedasticity as these assumptions are 
essential for linear models. Q-Q plots and Scale-Location plots of the 
standardised residuals, against the fitted values, are provided. It is checked if 
the residuals in the Q-Q plot are reasonably close to the Q-Q line which 
indicates normality of those. Furthermore, within the Scale-Location plot, it is 
checked if no strong variations among the variances can be detected. Cooks 
distance of each residual will be illustrated too. The Cooks distance is a 
measure of the influential power of an observation to the model (Cook, 2000). 
In general the critical value is chosen to be 1. It is checked if the respective 
plot does not show any observations exhibiting a Cooks distance of greater 
than one which means that there are no influential observations. 
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4.4 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Based on the findings of the quantitative data analysis a subsequent 
qualitative section follows, in order to set the quantitative findings regarding 
the three hypotheses into perspective, as a means of triangulation and in 
order to enhance the richness of the analysis (as discussed in section 4.1 
and 4.2).  
 
Following a background gathering phase (see section 4.4.1) a purposive 
sample of 17 top-level executives was selected (see section 4.4.2). As will be 
explained below, in detail, important cases were taken into account (see 
section 4.4.2) in the qualitative phase. This comprises SMEs which only use 
one or a variety of funds, as well as financiers, with a strong focus on SME 
financing before and after Basel II came into effect. Only top-level executives 
were taken into account. For example, the wealth manager of an industrial 
family, with a wealth comprising several billion euros, agreed for the first time 
ever to participate in such a study because of a long-lasting relationship with 
the author, from prior business cooperation. 
 
The data collection was carried out by means of semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews (Saunders et al, 2007:312) which are justified in section 4.4.3. The 
interview schedule can be found as additional information in Appendix E and 
the informed consent letter, comprising ethical considerations, is provided in 
Appendix F. 
 
The author’s approach to qualitative analysis is to use deductively-based 
analytical procedures (Saunders, 2006:489), as described in section 4.4.4, 
because this is suited best for answering the research question. Regarding 
the qualitative analysis methods for drawing conclusions (see 4.4.4), 
triangulation is the main element of verification, in conjunction with the 
foregoing quantitative part. The noting of patterns, seeing plausibility and 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 173 of 463 
building a logical chain of evidence were the three main tactics (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) used as methods for drawing conclusions (‘interpretation of 
meaning of data’, Creswell, 2003:194). A sample session summary sheet 
(Robson, 2002) is shown in Appendix G. 
4.4.1 Background Gathering Phase 
Again a pre-testing phase proceeded with selected financiers and SMEs 
known to the author from his professional role in order to enhance quality. 
These interviews built the basis for the author’s qualitative analysis. 
4.4.2 Sample Frame regarding Qualitative Research 
In line with the Basel II literature research, purposive sampling is used in the 
qualitative phase. The use of purposive samples in this phase is in line with 
Saunders et al (2007:232), as such a selection ‘enable you to use your 
judgement to select cases that will best enable you to answer your research 
question(s)’. Therefore ‘important cases’ (Creswell, 2003:221), will be taken 
into account. Regarding SMEs, companies were selected which already had 
experience with only internal finance or a variety of financing methods 
(heterogeneous sampling, Saunders et al, 2007:207). In addition, significant 
outliers were ‘automatically’ selected, as suggested by Creswell (2003:221), 
in order to gain deeper insights (critical case sampling), such as only one 
finance form over the whole firm’s life-cycle. 
 
Selection criteria for the financiers’ side, comprised experience and a track 
record in SME financing, before and after Basel II (homogeneous sampling, 
Saunders et al, 2007:207). From each financier type, one prominent example 
was taken. This is in line with Wahlström’s (2009:58) interviewee selection, 
regarding the Basel II acceptance, who argues: ‘This wide distribution of 
employee positions allowed for the collection of a broad range of empirical 
data about opinions of Basel II at the banks’. Authors like Cowley (2002) or 
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Hedtstück (2007) used such an approach to triangulate their findings. As the 
criteria for purposively selecting the ‘important cases’ were defined upfront, 
bias is not excluded, but it is limited as the selection is not arbitrarily 
conducted afterwards as it seems fit. 
A detailed description of the sample frame, the procedure of the sampling 
and interview process, is shown at the beginning of the empirical qualitative 
section (section 6.1). 
4.4.3 Implementing Qualitative Data Collection Methods 
Based on the interpretation of the quantitative data collection, an open ended 
flexible design (Robson, 2003:163-200) will be used by means of semi-
structured, in-depth interviews (Saunders et al, 2007:312). The interview 
schedules (see Appendix E) and the ethical issues included in the informed 
consent letter (see Appendix F), for SMEs and financiers, were created in 
line with the best practices introduced by Creswell (2003:277). The interviews 
started with a general introduction and the informed consent letter and were 
followed by a warm-up phase, collecting information about the professional, 
as well as the company background. During the interviews, the 
understanding of technical terms was checked for; it showed that the 
technical terms were well understood. The main body was set up analogous 
to the questionnaire section. However, the decisive difference is that the 
questions would be open ended. In addition, further probing questions 
(Saunders et al, 2007:330) were included to evaluate how SMEs can cope 
best with the effect of Basel II – from the standpoint of financiers as well as 
SMEs. 
Semi-structured interviews (Saunders et al, 2007:312) built the basis for the 
qualitative phase and the two triangulation methods, mentioned in section 
4.2.2. The justification for using semi-structured interviews is as follows. 
Robson (2002:271) states that qualitative research interviews are most 
appropriate when a study is focussing on ‘the meaning of particular 
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phenomena’ and when it is important how ‘particular phenomena developed’. 
Creswell (2003:188) adds to this that interviews are ‘intended to elicit views 
and opinions from the participants’ which aligns to the ‘economic significance’ 
aspect (see Goldberger, 1991). 
 
Saunders et al (2007:313) state that in relation to the semi-structured mode 
of interviews that they ‘are used to gather data, which are normally analysed 
qualitatively. These data are likely to be used not only to reveal and 
understand the ‘what’ and ‘how’ but also to place more emphasis on 
exploring the ‘why’’.  
According to Saunders et al (2007), semi-structured interviews are of 
advantage in the following situations, which are applied in the author’s 
research context: 
1. The purpose of research is exploratory (Blumberg et al, 2005). It is 
essential to understand the reasons for attitudes and opinions (Saunders et 
al, 2007). 
2. It is of significance to establish personal contact regarding this in-depth 
evaluation. Top-level executives are not willing to answer in-depth questions 
by postal mail, according to Saunders et al (2007). 
3. The nature of questions is complex (see below: ‘confrontation with the 
findings from the quantitative analysis’) and open-ended. 
4. The length of time required and the completeness of the process, as the 
interviews turned out to be between 47 and 81 minutes long and all questions 
were discussed without a single one being omitted. 
 
Robson (2007:271) reflects on the strong fit between conducting interview in 
the qualitative phase as a means of triangulation, following a quantitative 
phase. He states that interviews are most appropriate when ‘a quantitative 
study has been carried out, and qualitative data are required to ... illustrate 
the meaning of the findings’. In the same sense, Saunders et al (2007:139) 
points out that ‘qualitative data collected by semi-structured ... interviews may 
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be a valuable way of triangulating data collected by other means such as a 
questionnaire’. In relation to the research purpose (see section 3.2), 
Saunders et al (2007) argue that such an approach is helpful in exploratory 
studies which aim, according to Robson (2002:59), to ‘find out what is 
happening [and] to seek new insights’. This is in line with Wass and Wells 
(1994) who state that semi-structured interviews are used in a sequential 
design after a questionnaire survey, in order to explore the themes which 
were derived by quantitative analysis. 
 
Linking the definition of Saunders et al (2007) to the author’s study means 
that triangulation by means of semi-structured interviews ensures that the 
quantitative findings are interpreted in a greater richness regarding the 
cause-of-effects relationship of the effect of Basel II on SMEs and financiers. 
For example, the concept of the changes in the house bank principle could 
be explored in more depth by probing questions, which leads to a change in 
the first hypothesis as illustrated in the synopsis in section 7. Setting the 
qualitative analysis into relation with theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003, here: 
hypotheses tested), allows for an enhanced significance according to 
Marshall and Rossman (1999). Finally, only top-level executives were 
selected in the qualitative phase. According to Saunders et al (2007) they are 
more willing to take part in interviews rather than answering questionnaires. 
Creswell (2003) adds to this by quoting that interviews allow the ‘researcher 
to “control” the line of questioning’ (Creswell, 2003:186) which is especially 
important at a top-executive level as they are more reluctant to stick to a 
given guideline (of a questionnaire or a fully structured interview, Robson, 
2002:270). 
 
In order to triangulate the quantitative findings with qualitative data the 
interviewees would be ‘confronted’, in the second half of the interview, with 
the findings of the quantitative survey. The aim is to get a deeper insight into 
interpretation of the quantitative data analysis through a detailed discussion. 
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Furthermore, this reduces bias by reflecting on the quantitative side with in-
depth opinions of ‘important cases’.  
This ‘confrontation’ was conducted in the following way. The interviewees 
were provided with the findings from the qualitative analysis (as shown in 
Appendix E, Part II), on a question by question basis (showing them the 
findings on paper, step by step). For each section they were asked about 
their opinion by open questions: ‘what do you think about [particular topic] 
from the questionnaire based survey?’ 
In addition, the author reflected, during the interviews, towards relevant 
issues derived from the quantitative analysis. For example, the finding that 
financiers believe in a much stronger reduction of the use of credits then 
SMEs do on a Pre- to Post-Basel II basis. The same applies when the 
interviewee expressed a strong position regarding a certain issue of the 
quantitative analysis which brought a new aspect to this topic. For example 
(see session summary sheet in Appendix G), the Director of a Savings Bank 
pointed out that the ‘house bank principle will not deteriorate but will become 
a core bank principle’.  
 
The interviews conclude with a typical cool-off-phase and closure (Appendix 
E contains the interview schedule as supplementary information). 
 
All participants acknowledged the taping of the interviews. As several 
interviewees asked for anonymity due to bank or company corporate 
governance regulations it was decided to make the interviewee section totally 
anonymous to provide a consistent picture. 
4.4.4 Implementing Qualitative Data Analysis 
The aim of the author’s project is an in-depth exploration of the Basel II 
effect. This is an intrinsic feature of qualitative data analysis in order to set 
diverging, quantitative Pre-Basel II research (see the literature review in 
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section 3) and the author’s own quantitative analysis (see section 5) into 
perspective by means of a flexible design (Robson, 2002:95-200). This 
triangulation provides more richness beyond mere statistical significance 
(Creswell, 2003), as described in section 4.2.2.  
 
Various methodological elements are used, based on suggestions of Miles 
and Huberman (1994). They address qualitative analysis from a realist 
philosophical stance (see section 4.1) as they look for ‘structures and 
mechanisms’. 
The author’s approach to qualitative analysis is to use deductively-based 
analytical procedures (Saunders, 2006:489) as this is suited best for 
answering the research question. As a quantitative phase precedes in this 
sequential exploratory design, themes are – contrary to a grounded theory 
approach (Saunders et al, 2007:499-502) – predetermined. The theory (here: 
the three initial hypotheses) was set-up, upfront, by means of a Pre-Basel II 
literature review prior to the quantitative phase. The predefinition of themes 
provides good guidance, according to Miles and Huberman (1994). The aim 
of such a deductive approach is to ‘discover regularities derived from theory’ 
(Tesch, 1990) and builds the basis for ‘developing and testing hypotheses’ as 
Silverman (1993) points out, as these are ‘testable propositions’ in a 
qualitative approach. 
As suggested by Crabtree and Miller (1992), key codes were determined on 
an ‘a priori’ basis – on the basis of the research question and the findings of 
the quantitative analysis being the theoretical framework. Deriving these 
codes from the research question and the hypothesis tested in the 
quantitative analysis is in line with Saunders et al (2007) who – like Crabtree 
and Miller (1992) – opt for deriving the codes from a predetermined analytical 
framework. The coding scheme, the labels attached to the categories and the 
justification of the coding scheme, is explained in detail in the empirical 
qualitative section (see section 6.3). 
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Using such a theoretical framework (here: hypotheses tested in the 
quantitative phase of the sequential design) as a basis for the qualitative 
analysis has the advantage of providing an initial analytical framework, 
according to Yin (2003). 
However, authors like Bryman (1988) point out potential bias issues due to 
the pre-defined framework. On the other hand, this structured approach, 
which is based on a predefined framework, is useful in order to limit the 
various forms of bias described by Robson (2002:460). Data overload is 
managed by working with a manageable number of purposive samples. The 
bias of ‘first impressions’ and ‘inconsistency’ is taken care of by the 
structured scheme. A variety of SMEs and financiers with strong footprints in 
the respective field are used to protect against ‘positive instances bias’ and 
unintended ‘internal consistency’, ‘uneven reliability’, ‘missing information’ or 
‘fictional bias’. The ‘confrontation’ of the interviewees with the quantitative 
findings is a proactive way of coping with ‘revisions of the hypothesis’, 
‘confidence in judgement’, ‘inconsistency’ and ‘co-occurrence’. 
 
To summarise, the author’s approach (in terms of the Saunders et al, 2007) 
the ‘dimensions of data analysis’ is more structured, procedural and primarily 
deductive.  According to Miles and Huberman (1994) qualitative analysis 
consists of a concurrent flow of three activities: data reduction, data display 
and conclusion drawing / verification. The remainder of this section is 
structured accordingly. 
 
Data Reduction 
The documentation of the transcripts (see qualitative data collection 
described above) will build the basis for the author’s analysis. As suggested 
by Robson (2002), session summary sheets will be prepared as a method of 
data reduction.  
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A sample session summary sheet is provided in Appendix G, as an example 
of a session sheet. The interview with a top-level executive of one of the 
biggest savings banks was selected because he has decades of experience 
in SME financing and some elements provide evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis which finally led to the amended hypothesis, as described in the 
synthesis. The session summary sheets are already structured according to 
themes (variables, see section 4.1). Codes are added as ‘notes’ to the 
session summary sheet: ‘green notes’ provide evidence regarding an initial 
hypothesis, ‘red notes’ regarding the alternative hypothesis and ‘yellow notes’ 
refer to issues on how SMEs can cope best with the effect of Basel II. 
Nonverbal elements, like emotions or posture and links to other sections, 
were added in [brackets] directly into the text.  
The categorising (Saunders et al, 2007:479) of the data is done by grouping, 
according to the building blocks of the quantitative parts. This is in line with 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) who suggest deriving these categories and terms 
/ labels for these categories from theoretical frameworks. Therefore, only 
second level coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) is used. That means that 
grouping the number of themes to the category is used, rather than first level 
coding (attaching labels to groups of words or to key words) due to the 
preceding quantitative-based research done already. Data are consequently 
‘unitised’ by assigning parts of the various interview summary session sheets 
to the respective categories. 
 
Data Display 
‘Causal networks’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) are used regarding display of 
data as this causality has a high strategic fit with the quantitative part of 
hypothesis testing and the author’s philosophical stance. Furthermore, 
networks are better in pointing out relationships in a context sensitive way, 
rather than a matrix.  
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The ‘causal networks’ are built-up as follows, in order to illustrate the context 
sensitive action outcome relationship from a scientific realism stance (see 
section 4.1). Basel II is the mechanism which triggers the action of ‘corporate 
financing’ in the context of the current environment of the financial crisis. The 
future outcome, due to this context related, triggered action could be changes 
in the ‘house bank’ principle and means of financing described in the 
hypotheses mentioned in section 4.2.3. 
The generic causal network is illustrated in Figure 34, with the boxes showing 
respective important variables of the relevant categories and the arrows 
displaying the relationship between them (the dependent variables are 
represented by the hypotheses being tested). The thicker the arrow, the more 
interviewees reflected upon these issues. A ‘green arrow’ is an indication that 
evidence is provided regarding the respective hypothesis. 
Within category systems which are designed to test a theory, it is just as 
important to look for negative evidence data that amends the theory (see 
section 4.1) as it is to provide evidence that supports the theory. Therefore, 
negative examples get special attention as these are illustrated as ‘red 
arrows’ with a link to the ‘alternative hypothesis’ (see section regarding 
Popper with link to realism in section 4.1). In fact it turned out that two 
hypotheses had to be amended, based on the findings from the qualitative 
analysis, as discussed in the synopsis in section 7. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 182 of 463 
 
Figure 34 Causal Network structure 
 
Conclusion Drawing and Verification 
Regarding methods for drawing conclusions, triangulation (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) is the main element of verification, in conjunction with the 
foregoing quantitative part. 
The following tactics from the portfolio, as suggested by Miles and Huberman 
(1994:245-246), are used as methods for drawing conclusions (‘interpretation 
of meaning of data’, Creswell, 2003:194) as these are suited best to the 
context-related causality-seeking stance of the author. ‘Seeing plausibility’, 
‘making contrasts and comparisons’, ‘factoring’, ‘finding intervening variables’ 
(mechanism triggers action which leads to outcomes in a context sensitive 
way), ‘clustering’, ‘subsuming particulars into the general’ and ‘building a 
logical chain of evidence’ (derived from quantitative research). 
One of the deductively-based analytical procedures (Yin, 2003) is pattern 
matching, as this is a logical consequence of the sequential design the 
author chose. Yin suggests deriving a set of dependent variables from a set 
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of independent variables. These two sets had been already defined prior to 
the quantitative analysis and could therefore be studied in more depth during 
this qualitative phase. Therefore an explanation building approach would be 
not suitable in this context (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, the author agrees with 
Saunders et al (2007:491), who point out that this approach has the 
advantage of predefining the sample in a more consistent way. 
 
In addition, this deductive approach builds the basis for ‘developing and 
testing hypotheses’ as Silverman (1993) points out, as these are ‘testable 
propositions’ in a qualitative approach. Therefore, the appearance of a 
relationship or a connection between categories will be tested. It will be 
checked for intervening variables, such as the context of the financial crisis, 
and negative examples will be explained (see Figure 34). Moreover, the 
tactics mentioned above are essential in refining the themes of the categories 
(Saunders et al, 2007:482). For example, the explanation for the hypothesis 
could be explored in more depth by new themes generated from the 
interviews, such as ‘catalyst’, ‘accelerator’ or ‘core bank regarding certain 
segments’ rather than generic ‘house bank’.  
The methods for verification suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) will 
be applied. In terms of data quality this includes ‘checking for researcher 
effects’ (see section 4.5.8), ‘triangulation’ and ‘weighting the evidence’ (by 
selecting important cases regarding the interviewees). However, the 
purposive sample is not suitable regarding the ‘representative’ tactic, which is 
yet triangulated by the initial quantitative research. 
Regarding testing patterns, ‘outliers’ will be checked and ‘negative examples’ 
looked for (by challenging different positions in relation to the quantitative 
study findings, for example). ‘Extreme cases’ will be used, for example, by 
incorporating a family office manager, because family offices are small in 
number but normally comprise a high fund volume, which is managed by a 
small staff compared to an average private equity company. 
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In terms of testing explanations the prime tactics used will be: ‘making if-then 
tests’ (as the interviews cover various aspects of financing means or 
sectors), ‘ruling out spurious relationships’ (by reflecting on the longer term 
issue of Basel II vs. the current financial crisis), ‘replicating a finding’ and 
‘repeating in different context’ (by the structured approach of the semi-
structured interviews) as well as ‘checking out rival explanations’ (see testing 
patterns above). 
4.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
During data collection and data analysis ethical implications have to be 
considered carefully as SMEs have hardly any obligations regarding the 
publication of financial data. In Germany, only from the year 2007 onwards 
did companies have the obligation to publish at least some basic balance 
sheet data (BMWI, 2008). The author therefore complies with ‘ethical best 
practices’ introduced by Oliver (2003) and university standards such as those 
of the University of Bradford (2003) or ESRC (2005). The ethical impact 
matrix, shown in Figure 35, provides an overview followed by a detailed 
description. Ethical considerations have been highlighted within the 
qualitative interview guide (see Appendix E) as the informed consent letter 
(see Appendix F) is introduced at the beginning of the interview. For each 
shaded box a course of action is applied, such as an informed consent letter 
in the qualitative data collection phase (see Appendix F). In addition, when 
arranging the semi-structured interviews, by means of phone calls, the main 
elements of the informed consent letter had already been introduced. 
 
Regarding the generalisability of the findings, coping with bias is essential. 
Therefore the various issues of bias in quantitative and qualitative research 
are evaluated in depth in section 4.5.8. 
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Figure 35 Research design phase – ethics impact mapping 
4.5.1 Voluntary Participation 
The self-administered questionnaire allows ‘per se’ for voluntary participation 
(see Oliver, 2003:58). Therefore, the issue of voluntary participation arises, in 
particular, in the interviews during the background gathering and data 
collection and – in the case of call backs – in the data analysis phases too. 
Making a clear division between the author’s corporate business and the 
DBA research is crucial, as outlined by Robson (2002:543) when he 
describes the ‘research consultant role’ (see below ‘informed consent letter’). 
In addition, the author makes it clear throughout the multiple research stages 
described below that it is possible to leave the study at any time or that 
passages can be excluded by saying issues ‘off the record’ (Hannabuss, 
1996:25). Furthermore, the participant has the right to exclude their data. 
Every interviewee received a copy of the interview for reviewing and 
reflecting on participating further. 
Voluntary
participation
Informed
Consent
Privacy
Anonymity
Confidentiality
No harm /
beneficience
Responsible
dissemination
Validity
Background
gathering
Sampling
stage
Data collection 
stage
Data analysis 
stage
Return data 
collection
Final data 
analysis
Interpretation 
stage
Dissemination 
stage
 strong  weak  not applicable
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 186 of 463 
4.5.2 Informed Consent 
Due to the ‘dual role’ of the researcher who is a consultant too, the danger 
arises that he could use the ‘neutral’ umbrella of DBA research in order to get 
access to decision makers of potential clients, which would not have 
happened in the same way otherwise. In line with Sue and Ritter (2007:22), 
an extensive ‘informed consent letter’ clarifies that the study is sponsored by 
a corporate finance consultancy. 
Regarding the interviews, oral consent was obtained during the taped inter-
view, as described by Oliver (2003:45), by reading the ‘informed consent let-
ter’ upfront (see Appendix F). Furthermore, notes were kept in case the ta-
ping failed (see Saunders et al, 2007:326), which was however not the case. 
On the other hand, participants might hope to get free of charge advice which 
would oppose the ‘no harm to non-participation’ principle stated below. 
Thielemann (2000:22) points out that researchers ‘circumvent the destructive 
feature of the market’. Anonymity was required by several interviewees and 
therefore was granted for all interviewees. 
4.5.3 Privacy 
The research topic is a standard business issue. Yet, the information 
gathered on corporate financing is sensitive. This applies to the Internet as 
well, although some authors, such as Berry (2004) opt for an ‘open source’ 
approach. Therefore, privacy is an issue, especially in the data collection and 
dissemination stage.  
This fact means that the data must be disseminated in a way that no 
interference could be possible to a specific company (see below). This 
reflects on the issue that confidentiality is important as a means of intellectual 
privacy. 
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4.5.4 Anonymity 
According to the author’s knowledge, corporate finance research done, for 
example, by Claessens et al (2005) or Schrör and Kayser (2006) was carried 
out using confidentiality rather than anonymity, as standard business matters 
are normally not highly personal risk-laden, like, for example, research on 
refugees. In order to comply with research standards in this field, informed 
consent was used in addition to confidentiality. However, anonymity was 
granted on request (Oliver, 2003:80) during data dissemination, for example. 
As Jones (1995) points out, this is especially important in Internet 
publications, due to extended information linking and tracing possibilities. In 
addition, it was possible to send in the questionnaire anonymously. 
4.5.5 Confidentiality 
In order to ensure confidentiality in case of data loss or unauthorised access, 
several practical actions were taken. Confidentiality was ensured by using 
secured or encrypted files for the questionnaire reply forms and the interview 
files. The tape was destroyed (by overwriting) as soon as the interview was 
approved by the interviewee. Following informed consent the transcript 
(recording) was mailed via secured e-mail using a password which was only 
orally transmitted.  Within the (final) data analysis and interpretation phase 
the author made sure that only aggregated figures were used. An important 
issue arises if the sample size of a certain sector is so small that by making a 
sector based aggregation an individual company could be traced back, even 
if it is not mentioned by name. Yet, this was not the case. 
The confidentiality issue is even more crucial when using findings from the 
interviews. It must not be possible to derive a specific company or investor 
via the data published. In the instance that police matters are affected, a 
special policy was defined upfront. This applies if the authors obtain 
knowledge that, for example, some of a company’s funds were gained by not 
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paying taxes properly due to manipulated accounts. As the author is a 
journalist, there is confidentiality protection regarding information obtained by 
the Bavarian Press Law (BayPrG, 2000). Yet, such an issue did not occur. 
4.5.6 No Harm / Beneficence 
As discussed, corporate finance research possesses less harm potential 
regarding, for example, physical danger, as could be the case with clinical 
research. However, non-maleficience (Saunders et al, 2007:181) is an issue. 
For example, other persons could use the published findings in a way not 
intended by the author. Therefore, the original research findings were 
disseminated as a source of comparison, extensively and enduringly, in print 
and on the Internet (author’s corporate homepage). 
In order to provide beneficence (Oliver, 2003:35) a two step approach was 
used: every participant got an individual evaluation of his corporate finance 
situation in relation to the peer group. This would assist them in optimising 
their corporate finance strategy in relation to the Basel II effect. According to 
Göritz (2005), such ‘nonmaterial incentives’ enhance response rates. 
The author made sure that a broad business audience (managers, investors 
and other consulting competitors of the author) benefitted from the research 
too; articles about the research findings in corporate finance and SME related 
magazines were published by the author and by journalists, with support from 
the author. In addition, articles were published in the renowned financial 
news service vc-facts and M&A news and Going Public magazine. 
Furthermore, a press release was distributed to several hundred journalists 
regarding target group publications. The summarised findings could be found 
on the author’s company homepage too. With these measures the author 
could limit the comparative benefit for participants over non participants, and 
in addition, reduce competitive advantage for the author’s own consultancy 
over competing consultancies. 
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4.5.7 Responsible Dissemination of Data / Results 
In addition to the specific actions already described the author coped with 
ethical issues as follows. The findings were disseminated only in an 
aggregated manner allowing no interferences to an individual company. 
Otherwise, if a bank could recognise that its client is in a potential crisis this 
could impose substantial harm on the participant. Providing anonymity for 
direct quotes on request, and providing a high status of confidentially (see 
above), provides a high degree of harm protection.  
4.5.8 Validity 
As explained in section 4, the sequential mixed methods design, in its 
specific set-up, ensures a high degree of internal and external validity 
(Robson, 2002:102). The author follows the approach of Brewer and Hunter 
(1989) who propose a pragmatic approach to reconciling quantitative and 
qualitative studies. 
Furthermore, the author prepared guidelines upfront on how to cope with 
typical issues in quantitative research, such as ‘missing data’ (see Robson, 
2002:396) or interview bias. As discussed, the interviews were carried out 
solely by the author –trained as a member of the Journalists Association – in 
order to ensure a high consistency. As discussed, coping with the threat of 
reliability and bias is essential in terms of generalisability. In the following 
paragraphs, the various elements are considered and explanations for how 
this is managed will be given. 
 
Coping with threats to reliability 
According to Robson (2002) four threats to reliability exist. The author will 
cope with these issues, in order to enhance reliability and to avoid bias to a 
major extent, as follows: 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 190 of 463 
1. Subject or participant error – be it by change or purposely  
An extensive two-step pre-testing phase, as suggested by Robson 
(2002:229), was applied in order to ensure a high validity and reduce bias 
by means of an iterative refinement of the questionnaire (see below). 
2. Subject or participant bias 
This occurs if a participant tries to be nice or puts their own company in a 
good light (Saunders et al, 2007:149). As suggested by Saunders et al 
(2007), an introductory statement will be used regarding questions which 
could lead to unease. For example, participants could feel uncomfortable 
with answering questions as to how often credit is declined. An 
introductory statement, such as the following, could foster an honest 
answer: ‘according to surveys the number of declined SME credits is on 
the rise in recent years’. Furthermore, in line with Saunders et al 
(2007:383), a neutral title is used regarding the questionnaire.  
3. Observer error, e. g. by means of various interviewers 
Face-to-face interviews will be carried out solely by the author in order to 
ensure a high consistency. The author has been trained intensively as a 
member of a German Journalist’s Association in interview techniques. 
4. Observer bias, regarding the interpretation of the answers 
A two-step quantitative and qualitative analysis phase should reduce bias 
by means of triangulation. The quantitative analysis was defined prior to 
sending out the questionnaires and was carried out in a consistent, 
repeatable way. Cross-checking with the surveys from other researchers 
with similar research designs was used to limit bias. 
 
Coping with bias during data collection and analysis 
 
In order to avoid the two reasons of sample selection bias, mentioned by 
Heckman (1979:53), probability sampling is chosen with the underlying 
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sample frame comprising of the whole population under the assumption 
mentioned by Robson (2002:254), regarding RDD in section 4.3.2. 
Regarding the deployment of data analysis strategies, Kervin (1999) refers to 
the importance of dealing with the two means of measurement bias regarding 
data collection and analysis. The author coped with these issues as follows in 
order to enhance reliability and to avoid bias to a major extent: 
 
1. Deliberate or intentional distortion of data 
Regarding the presentation of data the author ensured that it complied 
with academic standards presented, for example, by Lapin (1993) or Lee 
(2007a).  
Questions were displayed in a neutral non-leading style. Regarding 
sensitive questions an introductory (neutral) statement ensured lowering 
the barriers to answering honestly, as discussed. 
2. Changes in the way data are collected 
The consistency in data collection was ensured as all data were collected 
by means of the same self-administered questionnaire in the quantitative 
phase and the same interviewer using the same semi-structured interview 
schedule for all interviews in the qualitative phase. 
 
Regarding conducting interviews Saunders et al (2007:218) refers to two 
forms of bias to be careful of: 
1. Interviewer bias 
The tone of the interview, as well as a (neutral) non-verbal behaviour 
(Saunders et al, 2007:325), is decisive during the interviews. Therefore, 
the interviews will be taped (with the advantage that the ‘tone’ can be 
captured as well, see Saunders et al, 2007:324) or notes taken. Informed 
consent would be established which is essential due to the dual role of the 
interviewer as ‘researcher and consultant’. Furthermore, these face-to-
face interviews will be carried out solely by the author in order to ensure a 
high consistency. The author is a member of a German Journalists 
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Association. Journalists are trained in coping with the seven competencies 
listed by Saunders et al (2007:329), such as appropriate opening of the 
interview, using appropriate language, questioning, listening, testing and 
summarising understanding, recognising and dealing with difficult parts 
and recording data. 
For example, consistent wording was used, as suggested by Sue and 
Ritter (2007:57). This should help to reduce bias within the interviews. In 
terms of bias concerning interpreting results, the issues discussed already 
apply in the qualitative phase too. 
2. Interviewee or response bias 
Saunders et al (2007:218) point out that some aspects may not be 
revealed as this might lead to probing questions. In order to avoid making 
interviewees feel uneasy some introductory statements will be made 
upfront. Furthermore, during the semi-structured interviews open 
questions will be used to a major extent. According to Easterby-
Smith et al (2002) open questions ensure a reduction of bias. 
As interviews are more time-consuming some participants will not want to 
attend (Robson, 2002). However, the issue of non-participation did not 
apply. 
Furthermore, the author will provide a recording and a summary of each 
interview in order to ‘scope test understanding’ as a means of coping with 
bias, according to Saunders et al (2007:326). 
The danger of misinterpretation due to cultural-misunderstanding 
(Saunders et al, 2007:325) seems to be of minor relevance as the SME 
managers, as well as financiers, seem in general to have a similar cultural 
background to the author. 
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5 RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The following analysis is based on the returned self-administered 
questionnaires, as described in section 4.3. For each of the three 
hypotheses, a model was set-up which was tested based on a comparison of 
Pre-Basel II and Post-Basel II data for SMEs on the one hand, and financiers 
on the other hand (besides rating related issues which were tested for SMEs 
only). This is in line with the predominant approach in Basel II research, as 
evaluated in the literature review section 3. All five models supported the 
three hypotheses. In addition, checks for collinearity (see Gujarati, 2003:343) 
were made and multiple linear regressions (Gujarati, 2003:42) were 
conducted which provided evidence. These findings, from the hypotheses 
testing, provide the basis for the in-depth qualitative analysis as a means of 
triangulation, which is provided in section 6. 
5.1 QUANTITATIVE MODEL 
As described in section 4.3.4, the indexes to test hypothesis 1 (H1), 
hypothesis 2.a (H2) and hypothesis 2.b, which is equal to hypothesis 3 (H3), 
are defined as follows. 
Let ுܻ௡,௣/௙்௒௉ா  denote the index value for Pre- and Post-Basel II periods for ‘Hn’ 
(which is hypothesis n) with ‘TYPE’ = ‘SME’ (for SME index) or ‘FIN’ (for 
financier index). 
Then ுܻ௡,௣/௙்௒௉ா  is defined as the sum of the values of the m items 
௝ܺభ,௙/௣
்௒௉ா,௜, … , ௝ܺ೘,௙/௣்௒௉ா,௜  included in the index, with ‘݅’ representing the ‘question 
module i’, and ‘݆௞’ representing the ݆௞ th-question in ‘question module i’; ‘݌’ 
stands for Pre-Basel II values, ‘݂’ stands for Post-Basel II values as stated in 
section 4.3: 
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ுܻ௡,௣்௒௉ா ∶ൌ ௝ܺభ,௣்௒௉ா,௜ ൅ ⋯൅ ௝ܺ೘,௣்௒௉ா,௞ 
ுܻ௡,௙்௒௉ா ∶ൌ ௝ܺభ,௙்௒௉ா,௜ ൅ ⋯൅ ௝ܺ೘,௙்௒௉ா,௞ 
and the delta between Pre- and Post-Basel II values is defined as: 
∆ ுܻ௡்௒௉ா ∶ൌ ுܻ௡,௙்௒௉ா െ ுܻ௡,௣்௒௉ா 
A detailed justification of why specific manifest (dependent) variables were 
chosen is provided in Appendix B. The data analysis is thus carried out by 
using the appropriate statistical tests (see description in section 4.3.4) based 
the assumptions of Blumberg et al (2005), regarding the usage of Likert 
scales and the CLT (see Stutely, 2003 and Saunders et al, 2006:2010-2011) 
as justified in section 4.3.4. In order to check if the Pre- and Post-Basel II 
index values are significantly differing, or not, the paired t-test or the Welch t-
test is applied under the assumption of normally distributed index data, as 
described in section 4.3.4. In case the assumption of normally distributed 
index data could be questioned, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is applied. This 
is carried out to safeguard the findings as this ‘is a nonparametric equivalent 
of the paired two-group t-test’ (Robson, 2002:441). In addition, basic 
statistics, histograms and Q-Q plots in sections 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, are 
presented in order to analyse whether the underlying data is normally 
distributed and if homoscedasticity (Gujarati, 2003:68) or heteroscedasticity 
(Train, 2009:92) exists. 
5.2 BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sixty SMEs and 66 financiers sent back the self-administered questionnaires 
(see section 4.3) which were distributed by postal mail with a pre-paid postal 
return envelope, in October 2008. With 11.45% and 12.6% the return rates 
were in line with Basel II related studies under review, which showed return 
rates of between 8% and 15%. For example, KfW and 25 German 
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associations undertook an empirical study about corporate finance with a 
return ratio of slightly more than 10% (Plankensteiner and Zimmermann, 
2008). As discussed in the literature review section, the majority of the 
primary research on Basel II (in Germany) contains between 40 and 120 
respondents in terms of quantitative analysis, like Kolbeck et al (2002) or 
Grunert and Weber (2009), for example. 
 
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 present some basic statistics regarding the SME 
and financier sample. More detailed statistics, like certain statistical tests are 
beyond this introductory evaluation, and are left to the hypotheses testing 
with in-depth justified and tested in sections 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. The aim is to 
provide evidence regarding the three hypotheses as ‘confirmability increases 
with testability’ (Popper, 2002:291). As all tests regarding the models, with 
respect to the three hypothesis, showed statistically significant results, it ‘is at 
any rate not unworthy of being seriously considered and perhaps even of 
being believed – though only tentatively’ as Popper (2002:309) puts it. 
Therefore, the initial hypotheses build the basis for the consecutive 
qualitative phase in the author’s mixed-method sequential design (see 
section 6). 
5.2.1 SME Sample 
Only one of the 60 SMEs was not included because the revenue as well as 
the employee size did not fulfil the EU classification criteria.  
 
General company data 
The returned sample seems to provide a valid representation in terms of 
regional dispersion and sectors, as shown in Figure 36; although, 
reconciliation with statistical data is beyond the scope of this thesis and not in 
the focus of this research. 
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Sector and geographic region 
The German states (ܺଶௌொ,ଵ, see codebook in Appendix D) which provide the 
bulk of the GDP, like Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg or North Rhine-Westfalia 
(see statistical data of the Federal Republic of Germany, see Kertels, 2010), 
dominate in comparison to the new (East) German states, for example. The 
same applies in terms of sectors, where the traditional stronghold of the 
Germany industry, like plant and machinery, automotive, industry in general 
or pharmaceutical / chemical industry, dominate supplemented by consulting 
/ services (McKinsey, 2008). 
 
Figure 36 Cross tabulation German states and sector 
 
Plant and 
Machinery
Automotive
General 
Industry
MedTech / 
BioTech
IT&C, Media, 
High-tech
Chemistry and 
Pharma
Building,
Construct.
Food
Consumer 
Goods
Energy and 
Water
Retail and 
Trade
Financial Serv. 
Industry
Logistics
Consulting and 
Services
Agriculture and 
Mining
Total
Baden-
Wuerttemberg 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 9 16.4%
Bavaria 2 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 14 25.5%
Berlin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1.8%
Brandenburg 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3.6%
Free Hanseatic 
City of Bremen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0%
Free Hanseatic 
City of Hamburg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0%
Hesse 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 7.3%
Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1.8%
Lower Saxony 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 6 10.9%
North Rhine-
Westphalia 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 9 16.4%
Rhineland-
Palatinate 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5.5%
Saarland 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.8%
Saxony 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.8%
Saxony-Anhalt 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3.6%
Schleswig-
Holstein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0%
Thuringia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3.6%
Total 5 2 6 0 9 2 5 2 1 1 7 1 6 7 1 55 100.0%
9.1% 3.6% 10.9% 0.0% 16.4% 3.6% 9.1% 3.6% 1.8% 1.8% 12.7% 1.8% 10.9% 12.7% 1.8% 100.0%
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SME size 
The sample as a whole is characterised by the following descriptive statistics, 
in terms of SME revenues and employees, which are both a proxy to firm 
size as is stated by the European Commission (2003b:36). In terms of SME 
employees as well as with revenues (see below), the average of the years 
2006 to 2008 (between the European Basel II directive CRD and the 
inception of Basel II in Germany) are taken into account as this levels out 
annual fluctuations which might be derived from business cycles, for 
example. 
The descriptive statistics regarding employee size are illustrated in Table 2. 
Taking the arithmetic average of the years 2006 to 2008 into account, the 
employee number ( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ூଵ, see codebook in Appendix D) show a mean of 
80.567 and the revenue mean ( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ூଶ) is 19.085 million euros. 
 
 Min Max Mean (ߤሻ Median Variance (ߪଶሻ Stdev ሺߪ ሻ Skewness ሺߛሻ  
ܵܯܧா௠௣௟. 1.0 599.0 80.567 55.0 9,255.082 96.2033 3.161 
ܵܯܧோ௘௩. 0.1 221.0 19.085 8.5 1,256.973 35.4538 4.189 
Table 2 Basic statistics SMEs employees and revenues 
 
Both distributions show a strong positive skewness (ߛா௠௣௟. ൌ 3.161 and 
ߛோ௘௩. ൌ 4.189). This indicates that values which are on the left side of the 
mean (lower than the mean) are more likely to occur than values on the right 
side of the mean (higher than the mean). Figure 37 and Figure 38 show the 
histograms (class size according to EU criteria) and the respective box-plots. 
Regarding the number of employees (revenue size) 13.6% (20.3%) of the 
companies who responded were micro enterprises, 31.6% (33.9%) were 
small enterprises, and 50.9% (33.9%) were medium enterprises, according to 
the EU criteria mentioned above (leaving 3.5% (5.1%) for the two (three) 
major SMEs, see discussion of outliers below). 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 198 of 463 
   
Figure 37 Histograms and boxplots regarding SME employees 
   
Figure 38 Histograms and boxplots regarding SME revenues 
 
In a mixed-method sequential design, outliers / extreme values (more than 
1.5 / 3 times the interquartile range above the 75% percentile, Huizingh, 
2007:237) provide a rich source of additional information. These values can, 
for examples, be evaluated in-depth by means of the qualitative analysis (see 
section 6), followed by the quantitative one in this section. One of the values 
explained below belongs to an SME which already exists for decades with a 
strong growth in the last years, but is dedicated to internal finance only. 
Therefore, this case was included as ‘important case’ into the qualitative 
analysis in section 6 (see interviewee selection as described in section 4.4). 
The outlier in the employee boxplot (see Figure 37) belongs to a special 
machinery company which uses a labour intensive production methodology 
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to generate revenue of 36.0 million euros, maximum, within 2006 to 2008. 
The same applies to the extreme value of a transportation company which is, 
per se, a labour intensive business (a maximum of 43.0 million euros, which 
is within the EU SME criteria). The extreme revenue values, in Figure 38, 
refer to a company which belongs to the B2B services industry and two 
companies coming from the retail sector. As these sectors do not produce 
physical assets, it is typical that they are able to generate relatively large 
revenues with few employees (only 34 for financial services and 248 and 250 
for the retail / trade companies, which is still in line with the EU SME criteria). 
5.2.2 Financier Sample 
Only one financier was not active at all in SME financing and was therefore 
excluded. As described below, two financiers are outliers / extreme values, in 
terms of funds volume, regarding the subsets banks and non-bank financiers. 
These two financiers are a rich source of additional information. As these 
have a long track record in SME financing, in terms of experience as well as 
in terms of volume of SMEs financed (with various means), they were 
included as ‘important cases’ into the qualitative analysis in section 6 (see 
interviewee selection as described in section 4.4). 
 
Regional focus 
Three out of four financiers focus on Germany as a whole, or even on 
dedicated German states, as shown in the frequency Table 3, with Bavaria 
taking the lead with four mentions, followed by five other states with two 
mentions (ܺ଺ிூே,ଵ, see codebook in Appendix D). 
 
 German State Germany Europe Worldwide 
ܴ݁݃݅݋݈݊ܽ ݂݋ܿݑݏ 28.1 46.9 14.1 10.9 
Table 3 Regional focus of financiers 
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Duration of activity and funds size 
Table 4 provides some basic statistics regarding financiers as a whole and 
regarding the sub-set banks, as well as non-bank financiers with respect to 
years of business activities and funds volume. The mean of years of 
business activities is 27.46 years (ܺଶிூே,ଵ, see codebook in Appendix D), with 
banks already being in existence for decades (ߤ௒௘௔௥௦ ሺ஻௔௡௞௦ሻ ൌ 79.0). 
Whereas, the lower mean of non-bank financiers (ߤ௒௘௔௥௦ ሺே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞௦ሻ ൌ 13.5) 
reflects the fact that alternative means of finance is relatively new, as 
described by one of the founding fathers of a private equity association 
during the interview in the quantitative phase (see section 6). Only two 
financiers (private equity companies) were started in Germany since the 
inception of Basel II; all the others have been active for a much longer time – 
one for over two centuries. In terms of funds volume the mean of asset 
volume (average of 2006 to 2008, variable ଵܺ,௙/௣
ிூே,ூ଺, see Table 49) comprised 
more than one billion euros (ߤி௨௡ௗ௦ ሺிூேሻ ൌ 1,614.546). Banks operate on a 
larger scale (ߤி௨௡ௗ௦ ሺிூேሻ ൌ 7,726.377) compared to non-Bank financiers 
(ߤி௨௡ௗ௦ ሺே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞௦ሻ ൌ 285.887). This reflects the dependence on bank credits 
(see Jacobson et al, 2006, for example) in bank-based economies (Heid, 
2007) like Germany (Norden and Weber, 2005), as described in section 3.3. 
 
 Min Max Mean (ߤሻ Me-
dian 
Variance 
(ߪଶሻ 
Stdev 
ሺߪ ሻ 
Skew- 
ness ሺߛሻ
ܨܫ ௒ܰ௘௔௥௦ 1.0 209.0 27.46 12.0 1,950.486 44,164 3,101 
ܤܽ݊݇ݏ௒௘௔௥௦ 8.0 209.0 79.0 55.0 5,617.0 74.947 0.837 
ܰ݋݊ െ ܾܽ݊݇௒௘௔௥ 1.0 45.0 13.5 11.0 122.085 11.049 1.53 
ܨܫ ிܰ௨௡ௗ ௩௢௟. 0.2 49,333.333 1,614.546 123.0 4.738E7 6,883.64 6.422 
ܤܽ݊݇ݏி௨௡ௗ ௩௢௟. 0.933 49,333.333 7,726.377 485,0 2.379E8 15,425.568 2.633 
ܰ݋݊ െ ܾ݇ி௨௡ௗ ௩ 0.2 2,200.0 285.887 100.0 219,196.071 468,184 2.958 
Table 4 Basic statistics financiers 
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As regards funds volume, Figure 39 to Figure 41 provide the respective 
histograms and boxplots. The observed fund volume values show a high 
variance as credits and non-bank means of finance have various volumes as 
sources of finance, as described in section 2.10 about corporate financing of 
SMEs in Germany. 
The high positive skewness (ߛி௨௡ௗ ௩௢௟.  ሺிூேሻ ൌ 6.411, ߛி௨௡ௗ ௩௢௟.  ሺ஻௔௡௞௦ሻ ൌ
2.633 and ߛி௨௡ௗ ௩௢௟.  ሺே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞௦ሻ ൌ 2.828) shows that values which are on the 
left side of the mean (lower than the mean) are more likely to occur than 
values on the right side of the mean (higher than the mean). 
   
Figure 39 Histogram and boxplot for all financiers regarding volume  
 
   
Figure 40 Histogram and boxplot for sub-set banks regarding volume  
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Figure 41 Histogram and boxplot for sub-set non-bank financiers regarding volume  
 
The biggest extreme values belong to banks, which are shown in Figure 39, 
as these represent one-of the biggest commercial banks with often more than 
one hundred outlets (see extreme value in Figure 40, too).  
In terms of non-bank financiers (see Figure 41), the extreme values belong to 
an SME funds-of-funds investor and a very large mezzanine / private equity 
fund. The four outliers comprise private equity firms which partly offer other 
forms of finance as well. After a strong increase in funds size (see Figure 42) 
the funds volume of non-bank financiers showed a decline in 2008 which is in 
line with the literature review on non-bank financing in section 2.10 (see BVK, 
2009b, and EVCA, 2009). On the other hand, the volume of banks, of the 
participating banks, increased steadily even from 2007 to 2008. 
   
Figure 42 Funds development 
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5.3 GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
While sending out the questionnaires, the subprime crisis was in public 
discussion, as described in section 4.3. Therefore, when assessing certain 
hypotheses related to aspects of Basel II, the respondents were asked how 
they regard the importance of Basel II concerning their respective 
assessment. This served as a kind of control question regarding the influence 
of the current financial crisis on corporate financing in relation to the longer-
term Basel II effect. In general, the quantitative analysis provided evidence 
that Basel II is (in relation to the current subprime crisis), on average, of high 
importance, as illustrated in the summary section 5.7. This was confirmed by 
the consecutive qualitative phase (see section 6). 
On a scale, from 1 = ‘no importance’ to 4 = ‘(very) high importance’, SMEs 
rank Basel II (ߤ஻௔௦௘௟ ூூ ሺௌொሻ ൌ 3.07) nearly as high as the crisis of the SME 
banks (ߤௌொ ௕௔௡௞ ሺௌொሻ ൌ 3.12), leaving the subprime crisis (ߤௌ௨௕௣௥௜௠௘ ሺௌொሻ ൌ
2.98) and the crises of the investment banks (ߤூ௡௩.௕௔௡௞ ሺௌொሻ ൌ 2.74) behind 
( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ to ܺସௌொ,ଶ, see codebook in Appendix D). Financiers ( ଵܺிூே,ଷ to ܺସிூே,ଷ, 
see codebook in Appendix D), on the other hand, regard the crisis of the 
SME banks (ߤௌொ ௕௔௡௞ ሺிூேሻ ൌ 3.62) and the (bank related) subprime crisis 
(ߤௌ௨௕௣௥௜௠௘ ሺிூேሻ ൌ 3.56) to be of highest importance followed by Basel II 
(ߤ஻௔௦௘௟ ூூ ሺௌொሻ ൌ 3.19), with and the crises of the investment banks with 
respective distance (ߤூ௡௩.௕௔௡௞ ሺௌொሻ ൌ 3.0). With values well above ‘3’, SMEs 
as well as financiers regard Basel II as being of major importance. 
 
The non-parametric Friedman test is applied for related samples as this test 
does not need the assumption of a normal distribution and interval data. The 
Friedman test tests if the samples belong to the same distribution (ܪ଴) by 
comparing the medium ranks of the variables. For every item of every case 
the values are ranked. In the next step, the medium average rank of each 
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variable is evaluated. The significance value regarding ܪ଴ is calculated 
(Brosius, 2008). Hence, the Friedman test tests the null-hypothesis of equal 
means (ܪ଴ሻ against the alternative of different means (ܪଵሻ . 
Applying the Friedman test shows that the difference, regarding the means, 
is statistically significant (see Table 5). The test statistic regarding SMEs of 
߯ଶ ൌ 7.97 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.047. The same applies regarding 
financiers: the test statistic of ߯ଶ ൌ 30.664 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.0. 
Hence, the null-hypothesis that the means of the four effect values (Basel II, 
subprime crisis, crisis of investment banks, crises of SME banks) are equal is 
rejected on a significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 Friedman test Mean ranks   
 Test stat 
߯ଶ 
p-value Basel II Subprime Inv.bank SME 
bank 
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐௌொ 7.97 0.047 2.55 2.51 2.19 2.75 
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐிூே 30.664 0.0 2.21 2.85 2.02 2.92 
Table 5 Friedman test results regarding SMEs’ and financiers’ effect assessment 
5.4 TESTING HYPOTHESIS H1 
H1 states that corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because 
the ‘house bank principle’ is deteriorating (H1). This is tested by comparing 
the means of the SME related index values on a Pre- and Post-Basel II basis 
(as described in section 5.4.1) and by comparing the respective means in 
relation to the financier model (as introduced in section 5.4.2). The 
justification of the variables chosen is provided in section 4.3.4 and in 
Appendix B. Applying the respective tests (mentioned in section 5.1) provides 
evidence regarding hypothesis 1 – from the SMEs’ perspective (SME 
questionnaire sample) as well as from the financiers’ perspective (financier 
questionnaire sample). Figure 43 illustrates the subset manifest (dependent) 
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variables (grouped by latent variables, see comprehensive overview in 
section 4.2.4) used in order to test H1 in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2.  
 
Figure 43 Variables regarding H1 
5.4.1 H1: Model testing from an SME’s perspective 
The SME index, measuring the extent of the ‘house bank principle’ (H1), 
includes the nine variables displayed in Table 6. The selection of these nine 
variables was derived from the author’s background gathering phase (see 
section 4.3) and the literature review (see section 3). A detailed justification 
can be found in Appendix B.  
To explain further, ‘4 L’ means that the variables comprise a four item Likert 
scale. Alike, a ‘3 L’ represents a three item Likert scale which is transformed 
to a four item Likert scale so that they range from 1 to 4. This is carried out in 
order to guarantee that the items within the index are equally weighted. The 
‘scale’ value ‘1-4’ means that the transformed variable comprises values 
between 1 and 4 on an interval basis as they are the arithmetic mean of 
several four item Likert scale variables. Variable 8 represents the arithmetic 
average of variable ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ to variable ଵܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ. This comprises the non-credit 
sources of external finance: supplier credit, leasing, factoring, mezzanine, 
securities (ABS), private equity, strategic investor and IPO. In a similar way, 
Subset H1: latent / manifest (dependent) variables
Ease of get-
ting a loan
Hypothesis SME:
1. CF is becoming
more difficult be-
cause the ‘house
bank principle’ is
deteriorating.
Changes in
SME affinity
to banks and
non-bank fin.
Indicator that non-bank investors
are filling the credit gap
Credit terms and conditions and 
usage are indicators
Generic rejection criteria are an
indicator for ease of lending
_ / F
S / _
S / F
Indicators for focus on 
relationship lending
S / _
Changes in provision
of financial instruments
Changes in credit
related issues
Changes in credit
rejection criteria
Banking relationship
Hypotheses Latent
variables
Manifest
variables
RelevanceSurvey
SME / Financier
Estimate of SMEs and financiers
is an indicator for the trend
S / F Usage of non-credit
sources of finance 
Indicator for ease of lending in
relation to SME credit predictions
S / F Usage of credits
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variable 9 comprises the arithmetic average of the two generic rejection 
criteria ‘SME in general’ (ܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺) and ‘Certain sector’ (ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺) like 
‘automotive’, for example. In case of a ‘negative influence’ (variable 1 and 2) 
the inverted values are taken into account as described in section 5.1.  
The respective SME codebook (Saunders et al, 2006:593), regarding the 
SME variables, can be found in Table 48 within Appendix D. 
 
Number Variable Label Influence Scale 
1 ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ Usage of bank credits Negative 4 L 
2 ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ Usage of SME subsidies Negative 4 L 
3 ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଽ Development of No. of phone call Positive 3 L 
4 ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,ଽ Development of No. of meeting Positive 3 L 
5 ଵܺହ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ Development of overdraft Positive 3 L 
6 ଵܺ଺,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ Development of credit rates Positive 3 L 
7 ଵ଼ܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ Development of credit declines Positive 3 L 
8 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ூଷ Importance of non-credit financing Positive 1-4 
9 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ூସ Generic rejection criteria  Positive 1-4 
Table 6 Variables for H1 SMEs 
 
Testing H1 SMEs 
Let ுܻଵ,௣/௙ௌொ  denote the index value for Pre- and Post-Basel II assessments in 
relation to H1 from the SMEs’ point of view. 
Then ுܻଵ,௣/௙ௌொ  is defined as: 
ுܻଵ,௣ௌொ ∶ൌ ܺଷ,௣ௌொ,ସ ൅ ܺସ,௣ௌொ,ସ ൅ ܺହ,௣ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ܺ଻,௣ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵܺହ,௣ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵܺ଺,௣ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵ଼ܺ,௣ௌொ,ଽ
൅ ଵܺ,௣ௌொ,ூଷ ൅ ଵܺ,௣ௌொ,ூସ 
ுܻଵ,௙ௌொ ∶ൌ ܺଷ,௙ௌொ,ସ ൅ ܺସ,௙ௌொ,ସ ൅ ܺହ,௙ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ܺ଻,௙ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵܺହ,௙ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵܺ଺,௙ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵ଼ܺ,௙ௌொ,ଽ
൅ ଵܺ,௙ௌொ,ூଷ ൅ ଵܺ,௙ௌொ,ூସ 
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and the delta between Pre-Basel II and Post-Basel II values is defined as: 
∆ ுܻଵௌொ ∶ൌ ுܻଵ,௙ௌொ െ ுܻଵ,௣ௌொ 
Table 7 shows some basic statistics regarding the index values connected to 
H1 concerning SMEs. It can be observed that the Pre-Basel II values range 
from 17.513 to 26.088 with a mean value of ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ 21.919 and a 
variance of ߪଶ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ 4.771. The Post-Basel II values are shifted to the 
right and range from 18.86 to 28.772 with a mean value of 23.657 and a 
similar variance of 4.347. Finally, the delta index values range from – 5.68 to 
7.285, having a mean value of 1.184 (> 0) and a variance of 6.437. 
 
 Min Max Mean (ߤሻ Median Variance (ߪଶሻ Stdev ሺߪ ሻ Skewness ሺߛሻ 
ܪ1௣ ሺௌொሻ 17.513 26.088 21.919 21.923 4.771 2.184 -0.015 
ܪ1௙ ሺௌொሻ 18.86 28.772 23.657 23.875 4.347 2.085  0.027 
ܪ1∆ ሺௌொሻ -5.68 7.285 1.184 0.787 6.437 2.537 0.168 
Table 7 Basic statistics of H1 index values Pre- / Post-Basel II (SMEs) 
 
As described in section 5.1, it is checked whether the Pre-Basel II and the 
Post-Basel II index values, from an SME perspective, are significantly 
different in order to test H1. A standard test procedure which can be applied, 
under the assumption that the underlying index value are normally distributed 
and the two samples yield similar variances (which can be treated as equal, 
see justification below), is the paired t-test. In the given case, it tests the null-
hypothesis of equal Pre- and Post-Basel II mean index values (ܪ଴) against 
the alternative that ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ and ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ differ from each other (ܪଵ). 
Hence ܪ଴ and ܪଵ are given by:  
Paired t-test: ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ് ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ 
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In order to support H1, it is desirable to reject ܪ଴ on a given significance level 
of ߙ ൌ 5%. Applying the paired t-test shows that the difference of ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ 
and ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ is statistically significant (see Table 8). The test statistic of 
ݐ  ൌ  െ3.5854 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.0006911. Hence, the null-
hypothesis that the means of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values are equal is 
rejected on a significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 
 Paired t-test  
 Test stat t p-value 
ܪ1∆ ሺௌொሻ -3.5854 0.0006911 
Table 8 Paired t-test results for H1 (SMEs) 
 
The paired t-test can be applied because homoscedasticity exists as the 
variances of the Pre- and Post-Basel II index values (ߪ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻଶ ൌ  4.771, 
ߪ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻଶ ൌ  4.347) are similar (see Table 7) and can be treated as equal. In 
order to justify the second underlying assumption of the paired t-test (normal 
distribution of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values), histograms, boxplots and 
Q-Q plots are illustrated below.  
 
In addition to the graphical analysis, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for 
normality is provided. The KS-test provides evidence (see Table 9) that the 
index values are normally distributed. It tests the hypothesis, ܪ଴, that the 
given sample follows a Gaussian distribution. The KS-test statistics of 
ܦ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  െ0.0838, ܦ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.1042 and ܦ∆ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.1007 result in 
p-values of ݌௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.382, ݌௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.1144 and ݌∆ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.144 
for Pre- and Post-Basel II and Delta index values. All p-values are bigger 
than 0.05. Hence, the assumption that the underlying Pre- and Post-Basel II 
and Delta index values, which are normally distributed, cannot be rejected 
based on a significance level of 5%. 
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 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
 Test stat D p-value 
ܪ1௣ ሺௌொሻ 0.0838 0.382 
ܪ1௙ ሺௌொሻ 0.1042  0.1144 
ܪ1∆ ሺௌொሻ 0.1007  0.144 
Table 9 Normality test results for H1 (SMEs) 
 
Figure 44 shows histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values. The red 
line displays the theoretical density of a normal distributed random variable 
with mean and variance variables adjusted to the respective index data. Both 
histograms show a reasonably good fit to the normal density. The empirical 
densities show nearly no skewness (see Table 7: a slight negative skewness 
of ߛ ൌ െ0.015 for Pre-Basel II index and a slight positive skewness of 
ߛ ൌ 0.027 for the Post-Basel II index, see Huizingh, 2007) which is also a 
property of the normal distribution. 
 
 Index values Pre-Basel II Index values Post-Basel II 
Figure 44 Histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values 
including normal density plots (red line) regarding H1, SMEs 
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Figure 45 to Figure 47 provide, on the left-hand side, boxplots of the index 
values calculated for Pre- and Post-Basel II values as well as the delta of 
Pre- and Post-Basel II index values. The right-hand side show Q-Q plots of 
the respective data.  
All three Q-Q plots show a reasonably good fit, to theoretical normal 
quantiles, which indicates that the assumption of normal distributed index 
values (Pre-Basel II, Post-Basel II and delta values) is valid. This result is in 
line with the normality tests provided in Table 9.  
Yet, in the upper and lower tail of the Q-Q plots, the fit of the index values 
with the Q-Q line is questionable; however, as these values are connected to 
extreme index values and the majority of the values show good fit, the overall 
fit is reasonably good. 
 
 
Figure 45 Boxplot and Q-Q plot, Pre-Basel II (H1, SMEs) 
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Figure 46 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Post-Basel II (H1, SMEs) 
 
 
Figure 47 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Delta for H1, SMEs (Pre-Basel II to Post-Basel II)  
 
In the delta index values boxplot there are four outliers. The outlier at the 
lower scale belongs to a small construction company. According to the 
interviewees in the qualitative (background gathering) phase, the 
construction sector is strongly relying on bank / subsidised credits and benefit 
from subsidies in the construction industry. The three outliers at the upper 
scale comprise of micro and small enterprises from the logistics, food and IT 
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industries. As stated in the supply section 2.9.1, some authors, like Frey and 
Kuhn (2007), Gregory et al (2005) or Troubridge (2008), argue that smaller 
SMEs are affected stronger by Basel II in terms of credits, as primarily the 
medium-sized SMEs have access to non-bank financing options. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests, as well as the descriptive statistics 
(histograms, boxplots and Q-Q plots), provide evidence that the Pre- and 
Post-Basel II index values and the delta index values are normally 
distributed. These results are in line with those of Blumberg et al (2005, as 
described in section 4.3.4) and the arguments provided by the CLT (Gujarati, 
2003:109) concerning having a sample size larger than 30 items. However, 
as this assumption might be questioned, due to the deviations at the lower 
and upper ends of the index values, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is carried 
out in addition to the paired t-test, in order to test H1 because this non-
parametric test does not require distributional assumptions of the underlying 
index data. As described in section 4.3.4, the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
checks whether the median of the delta index value is equal to zero (ܪ଴) or 
not (ܪଵ). In order to support H1, it would be meaningful to check whether the 
median is smaller than zero or not. By formulating the null hypothesis, in 
terms of the mean index values, this results in the following: 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൒  ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൏ ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ 
 
Applying the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that the change of ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ 
and ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ is statistically significant (see Table 10). The test statistic of 
ܹ  ൌ  1,228.0 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.005856. The mean of the Post-
Basel II index value (ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  23.657) is bigger than the mean of the Pre-
Basel II index value (ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ௌொሻ ൌ  21.919) as shown in Table 7. Hence, the 
null-hypothesis, that the mean of Pre-Basel II index value is greater or equal 
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than the mean of the Post-Basel II index value, is rejected on a significance 
level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 
 Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 Test stat W p-value 
ܪ1∆ ሺௌொሻ 1,228.0 0.005856 
Table 10 Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for H1 (SMEs) 
 
As ܪ଴ is rejected on a significance level of 5% (see above, paired t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test) and the delta index values are a measurement for 
the ‘house bank principle’ (as explained in section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4), this 
provides evidence regarding H1 from an SME’s perspective. Hence, the 
‘house bank principle is deteriorating’ from an SME perspective. 
Correlations regarding H1 SMEs 
Figure 48 illustrates the correlation of the items regarding H1. In the lower left 
area which is shaded in red, the Pre-Basel II correlations are shown, 
whereas in the upper right area the respective Post-Basel II values are 
illustrated in green. 
The following analysis focuses on stronger correlations only (> 0.4). These 
values still can be regarded as low or moderate collinearity with regards to 
the Ballentine view of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003:344). As no high or 
very high multicollinearity exists, in line with Gujarati (2003:363), the author 
relates to Blanchard’s school of thought which is ‘do nothing’ as 
‘multicollinearity is God’s will, not a problem’. 
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Figure 48 Estimated correlations for items used in 
the SME index for H1 using Pre-Basel II data 
 
By analysing the correlation values, it shows that ‘usage of bank credits’ and 
‘usage of subsidised credits’ are positively correlated (ߩ௣ ൌ  0.41 and 
ߩ௙ ൌ  0.49) from a Pre- as well as from a Post-Basel II perspective. 
Subsidised credits are partly‚ state guaranteed credits with lower credit rates 
for the SME and lower risks for the banks (see section 2.9.3). They are 
handed out by the ‘house bank’ (BdB, 2005). Therefore, this correlation 
seems comprehensible as the SMEs which rely on credits will try to lower 
their rates by using subsidies. On the other hand, banks will try to reduce 
their risk by obtaining access to state guarantees. This is in line with the 
Usage of Bank 
Credit
Usage of SME 
subsidies
No. of phone 
call
No. of meeting
Financial 
Overdraft
Credit rate 
development
Credit declines
Imp. of Non-
Credit Fin.
Gen Rejection 
Criteria
Usage of Bank 
Credit 1 0.49 -0.07 -0.18 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.45 -0.05
Usage of SME 
subsidies 0.41 1 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.08 -0.58 0.01
No. of phone call -0.25 -0.13 1 0.70 0.05 0.31 -0.01 -0.11 -0.18
No. of meeting 0.00 -0.10 0.54 1 0.34 0.29 -0.14 -0.11 -0.25
Financial 
Overdraft 0.02 -0.07 0.13 0.31 1 0.12 0.13 -0.13 -0.04
Credit rate 
development 0.08 -0.04 0.14 0.19 0.18 1 -0.16 0.08 -0.01
Credit declines 0.23 0.13 -0.23 -0.30 -0.03 -0.09 1 -0.08 0.31
Imp. of Non-
Credit Fin. -0.50 -0.60 0.17 0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.07 1 -0.08
Gen Rejection 
Crit. -0.01 0.08 -0.00 0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.06 0.21 1
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findings from the qualitative analysis in section 6; for example, by quotes 
from a micro enterprise or a state owned bank. 
A similar positive correlation can be found for the Pre- and Post-Basel II 
values of ‘number of phone calls’ and ‘number of meetings’ (ߩ௣ ൌ  0.54 and 
ߩ௙ ൌ  0.70). The rationale behind this is that the number of meetings and 
number of phone calls are both indicators for the intensity of communication 
with the banks which seems to be influenced by Basel II in a positive way. 
 
As the literature review (in section 3.3) provides evidence that SMEs are 
reluctant to financial communications (see Drahten, 2007, and Diller et al, 
2005), this indicates that there is a certain enhanced pressure to 
communicate more intensively in a correlated way – by phone and by 
personal meetings. Finally, there is a negative Pre- and Post-Basel II 
correlation from ‘importance of non-Bank credit financing’ with ‘usage of bank 
credits’ (ߩ௣ ൌ  െ0.50 and ߩ௙ ൌ  െ0.45) on the one hand, and with ‘usage of 
bank subsidised credits’ (ߩ௣ ൌ  െ0.60 and ߩ௙ ൌ  െ0.48) on the other hand. As 
stated above, the standard bank credits and subsidised credits are 
correlated. This is in line with the literature review (see Achleitner and 
Geidner, 2007, Frommann, 2006a or Nitschke and Kuper, 2007, for example) 
as non-credit forms of finance are often used as substitutes to credit 
financing which explains the negative correlation. Furthermore, this is in line 
with the findings from the qualitative analysis (see section 6.5.2), especially 
concerning the statements from a stated-owned private equity company or a 
big savings bank. 
 
Multiple linear regression for H1 SMEs 
Testing H1 from an SME’s perspective, using the model above, provides 
evidence that the ‘house bank principle is deteriorating’ from an SME’s 
perspective. Therefore, in a next step, the question arises as to whether this 
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deterioration could be explained by factors characterising the SMEs. In order 
to achieve this, a variety of possible factors influencing the house bank 
principle were chosen. Among these factors seven are extracted which 
provide the ‘best’ linear regression model, according to the so called ‘Akaike 
Information Criterion’ (henceforth, AIC, see Train, 2009:367). In principle the 
AIC measures the fit of the considered model (see Gujarati, 2003:219), but it 
also takes into account the model complexity by introducing a penalty term 
depending on the number of variables used (Akaike, 1974). 
 
The resulting linear regression model consists of seven covariates and a 
slightly negative intercept (-0.53). Hence, the house bank principle of an SME 
could be explained by: 
∆Yୌଵୗ୑୉ ൌ െ0.53 ൅ 0.01 ∗ ଵܺௌொ,ଵ ൅ 0.47 ∗ ܺଶௌொ,ଶ ൅ 1.36 ∗ ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 1.44 ∗
ܺ଺,∆ௌொ,ଷ െ 0.81 ∗ ܺଶௌொ,଻ ൅ 0.66 ∗ ܺହௌொ,଻ െ 0.61 ∗ ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,଼ . 
The variable description can be found in the codebook in Table 48 (see 
Appendix D). 
It is observable that the ‘company age’ ( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଵ), the extent of ‘influence of the 
subprime crises on corporate financing’ (ܺଶௌொ,ଶ), the changes of the 
‘company strategy focus on quality’ (ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൌ  ܺସ,௙ௌொ,ଷ - ܺସ,௣ௌொ,ଷ) and the 
changes of the ‘company strategy focus on costs’ (ܺ଺,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൌ  ܺ଺,௙ௌொ,ଷ - ܺ଺,௣ௌொ,ଷ), 
as well as the ‘importance of press / the internet as source of information’ 
(ܺହௌொ,଻), all have a positive influence on the change of the house bank 
principle (see Table 11, column 1). On the other hand, the ‘importance of 
non-banks as information source’ (ܺଶௌொ,଻) as well as the changes in the 
assessment of ‘company potential regarding management’ (ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,଼ ൌ  ܺଷ,௙ௌொ,଼ 
- ܺଷ,௣ௌொ,଼) have a negative influence on the changes of the index value. 
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According to the p-values in Table 11, the delta values ‘company strategy 
focus regarding quality’ (ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .04) and ‘company strategy focus 
regarding cost’ (ܺ଺,∆ௌொ,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .03), as well as the ‘importance of non-bank as 
information source’ (ܺଶௌொ,଻ ൌ   .03) and the delta value of ‘company potential 
as regards management’ (ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,଼ ൌ   .01), are statistically significant. The 
other covariates show p-values between 0.1 and 0.2. However, these 
variables add explanatory power to the model as the overall model fit 
(according to the AIC) is sufficient as shown below. The overall F-statistic 
(see Gujarati, 2003:219) is 2.17, on 7 and 37 degrees of freedom, which 
results in a p-value of .059. This means that the F-test, using the null-
hypothesis that all variable coefficients are zero, will (Robson, 2002:442) be 
rejected at a confidence level of 0.1 but could not be rejected at a confidence 
level of 0.05. Furthermore, the multiple R-squared of 0.291 is sufficient. The 
multiple R-squared measures the variation in the data explained by the 
model (Gujarati, 2003:81-87). Hence, the model is capable of explaining 
about 30% of the variation inherited in the index data. 
 
Coefficients Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. Error P-Value 
Intercept -0.53 1.86 0.78 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଵ 0.01 0.01 0.19 
ܺଶௌொ,ଶ 0.47 0.28 0.10 
ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ 1.36 0.61 0.03 
ܺ଺,∆ௌொ,ଷ 1.44 0.68 0.04 
ܺଶௌொ,଻ -0.81 0.36 0.03 
ܺହௌொ,଻ 0.66 0.47 0.17 
ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,଼ -0.61 0.25 0.01 
Table 11 Overview of H1 SME regression coefficients 
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In order to evaluate the fit of the proposed model, it is necessary to take a 
look at regression diagnostics. Therefore, the (Pearson) residuals of the 
model are plotted against the fitted values (see Figure 49).  
 
Figure 49 Regression diagnostics for H1 SME 
 
As the plot in Figure 49 does not show any particular pattern or indicates 
some sort of functional relationship, the residuals indicate a reasonably good 
fit to the given data. Furthermore, it is important to check the residuals for 
normality and homoscedasticity as these assumptions are essential for linear 
models. Figure 49 provides a Q-Q plot and a Scale-Location plot of the 
standardised residuals against the fitted values. Both plots do not indicate a 
severe model misspecification. The residuals in the Q-Q plot are reasonably 
close to the Q-Q line which indicates normality of those. In addition, the 
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Scale-Location plot does not indicate strong variations among the variances. 
The last plot shows the so called Cooks distance of each residual. The 
Cooks distance is a measure of the influential power of an observation to the 
model (Cook, 2000). In general, the critical value is chosen to be 1. As the 
plot does not show any observations exhibiting a Cooks distance of greater 
than one, there are no influential observations. 
5.4.2 H1: Model testing from a financier’s perspective 
In order to test H1 from a financier’s perspective, the returned data from the 
financier questionnaires were used for this section. The index measuring the 
extent of the ‘deterioration of the house bank principle’ includes the five 
variables as displayed in Table 12. As discussed in section 5.4.1, the 
justification of the variables selected can be found in Appendix B which is 
based on the author’s background gathering phase (see section 4.3) and the 
literature review (see section 3). 
The respective financiers’ codebook regarding the financiers’ variables can 
be found in Table 49, within Appendix D. Alike with section 5.4.1, variable 1 
(‘negative influence’) was inverted, ‘4 L’ means that the variables comprise a 
four item Likert scale, ‘1-4’ represent the transformed variable with values 
between 1 and 4. The generic rejection criteria (variable 5) are defined as 
stated in the respective SME model in section 5.4.1. 
In terms of ‘number of sources provided’ and ‘number of phases supported’, 
the financiers could select one to seven variables, regarding ‘number of 
sectors supported’, the selection ranges from one to 15. Therefore, like with 
the three item Likert scales (see section 5.4.1), the values were transformed 
to a scale from 1 to 4 again (variable 2, 3 and 4). 
In cases of banks, a decrease in number of sources, phases and sectors 
(hence variables 2, 3 and 4 are ‘negative’ regarding banks) indicates that 
banks withdraw from SME financing which supports H1 (‘deterioration of 
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house bank principle’). Therefore for banks, the values are inverted 
(‘negative’ influence). Contrary to non-bank financiers, an increase (rather 
than a decrease as with banks) in number of sources, phases and sectors 
(hence variables 2, 3 and 4 are ‘positive’ regarding non-bank financiers) 
indicates that non-bank financiers fill in the gap left by banks which supports 
H1 as well (‘deterioration of house bank principle’). Variable 5 corresponds to 
variable 8 in the SME section of H1 (arithmetic average of non-credit sources 
of external finance) and variable 6 to variable 9, in the respective SME 
section of H1 (two generic rejection criteria), as described in section 5.4.1.  
 
Number  Variable Label Influence Scale 
1 ܺଷ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ Usage of bank credits Negative 4 L 
2 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଵ Number of sources provided Non-banks: pos. 
/ Banks: negative 
1-4 
3 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଶ Number of phases supported Non-banks: pos. 
/ Banks: negative 
1-4 
4 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଷ Number of sectors supported Non-banks: pos. 
/ Banks: negative 
1-4 
5 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூସ Avg. imp. of non-credit financing Positive 1-4 
6 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூହ Average generic rejection criteria Positive 1-4 
Table 12 Variables for H1 financiers 
 
Testing H1 financiers 
Let ுܻଵ,௣/௙ிூே  denote the index value for Pre- / Post-Basel II assessments 
regarding H1. 
Then ுܻଵ,௣/௙ிூே  is defined as: 
ுܻଵ,௣ிூே ∶ൌ ܺଷ,௣ிூே,ସ ൅ ଵܺ,௣ிூே,ூଵ ൅ ଵܺ,௣ிூே,ூଶ ൅ ଵܺ,௣ிூே,ூଷ ൅ ଵܺ,௣ிூே,ூସ ൅ ଵܺ,௣ிூே,ூହ 
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ுܻଵ,௙ிூே ∶ൌ ܺଷ,௙ிூே,ସ ൅ ଵܺ,௙ிூே,ூଵ ൅ ଵܺ,௙ிூே,ூଶ ൅ ଵܺ,௙ிூே,ூଷ ൅ ଵܺ,௙ிூே,ூସ ൅ ଵܺ,௙ிூே,ூହ 
The delta between Pre-Basel II and Post-Basel II values is defined as: 
∆ ுܻଵிூே ∶ൌ ுܻଵ,௙ிூே െ ுܻଵ,௣ிூே  
Table 13 provides some basic statistics of the index values regarding H1, in 
terms of financiers. The Pre-Basel II values range from 6.071 to 20.233, with 
mean ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ 10.405 and variance ߪଶ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ 7.475. The Post-Basel II 
values are shifted to the right and range from 6.81 to 20.233, with a mean 
value of 11.390 and a variance of 8.354. The delta index values range from -
0.676 to 4.34, with a mean value of 0.984 and a variance of 1.101. 
 
 Min Max Mean (ߤሻ Median Variance (ߪଶሻ Stdev ሺߪ ሻ Skewness ሺߛሻ 
ܪ1௣ ሺிூேሻ 6.071 20.233 10.405 9.952 7.475 2.734 1.09 
ܪ1௙ ሺிூேሻ 6.810 20.233 11.390 10.714 8.354 2.890 0.816 
ܪ1∆ ሺிூேሻ -0.676 4.34 0.984 0.779 1.101 1.049 0.807 
Table 13 Basic statistics of H1 index values Pre- / Post-Basel II (financiers) 
 
As described in section 5.1, it is checked whether the Pre-Basel II and the 
Post-Basel II index values, from a financier’s perspective, are significantly 
different in order to test H1. As illustrated above (Table 13), homoscedasticity 
can be assumed as the variances of the Pre- and Post-Basel II Index 
(ߪଶ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ 7.475, ߪଶ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ  8.354) values are similar. The slight 
enhancement, of the variances from Pre- to Post-Basel II, indicate that the 
assessment of the future values is a bit vaguer when compared to the historic 
ones. Therefore, under the assumption of normally distributed index values, 
the paired t-test is used to check whether H1 is supported or not. Now, the 
null hypothesis and respective alternative hypothesis are given by (see SME 
test of H1 in section 5.4.1): 
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Paired t-test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ  ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ് ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ 
 
Applying the paired t-test shows that the difference of ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ and 
ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ is statistically significant (see Table 14). The test statistic of 
ݐ  ൌ  െ7.5645 results in a p-value of ݌  =  1.890E‐10. Hence, the null-
hypothesis, that the means of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values are equal, 
is rejected on a significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 
 Paired t-test  
 Test stat t p-value 
ܪ1∆ ሺிூேሻ -7.5645 1.890E-10 
Table 14 Paired t-test results for H1 (financiers) 
 
Again, justification regarding the normality assumption of the Pre- and Post- 
Basel II index values is needed. Similar to the SME section 5.4.1, 
histograms, boxplots and Q-Q plots are provided as graphical tools and, in 
addition, the KS-test for normality is applied. 
 
Figure 50 shows the histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values. 
Again, the red line displays the theoretical density of a normal distributed 
random variable with the mean and variance variable adjusted to the 
underlying data. The empirical densities show a positive skewness (ߛ ൌ 1.09 
for Pre-Basel II index and ߛ ൌ 0.816 for the Post-Basel II index, see Table 
13). This indicates that values which are on the left side of the mean (lower 
as the mean), are more likely to occur than values on the right side of the 
mean (higher as the mean). Both histograms do not show a proper fit to the 
normal density.  
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 Index values Pre-Basel II Index values Post-Basel II 
Figure 50 Histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values 
including normal density plots (red line) regarding H1, financiers 
 
 
Figure 51 to Figure 53 show, on the left-hand side, boxplots of the index 
values calculated for the Pre-Basel II (past) and Post-Basel II (future) index 
values as well as the delta of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values for 
financiers regarding H1. The right-hand side shows Q-Q plots of the 
respective data. 
 
Only the delta Q-Q plot shows a reasonably good fit to theoretical normal 
quantiles which indicates that the assumption of normally distributed delta 
index values is valid. In contrast, Pre- and Post-Basel II Q-Q plots show only 
a good fit within a limited section with strong deviations, especially in the 
upper section. This is in line with the normality tests, provided in Table 15, 
which reject the assumption that the Pre- and Post-Basel II index values are 
normally distributed. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 224 of 463 
 
Figure 51 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Pre-Basel II (H1, financiers) 
 
 
 
Figure 52 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Post-Basel II (H1, financiers) 
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Figure 53 Boxplot and Q-Q plot delta for H1, financiers (Pre-Basel II to Post-Basel II) 
 
All outliers comprise of non-bank financiers and such financiers which pro-
vide private equity only. They can be regarded as the other end of the scale 
in terms of bank credit, as it implies ownership and control rather than gran-
ting money in exchange of credit rates. The two outliers regarding the Post-
Basel II boxplots values are already included in the Pre-Basel II boxplots. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test provides evidence (see Table 15) that the 
index values are only normally distributed regarding the delta index. The KS-
test statistics of ܦ∆ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.1015 results in a p-value of ݌∆ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ
 0.09369. The p-value for the delta index values is bigger than 0.05. This 
means that the assumption that the underlying delta index values are 
normally distributed cannot be rejected, given a significance level of 5%. 
On the other hand, this cannot be concluded for the Pre- and Post-Basel II 
index, where the assumption of normally distributed Pre- and Post-Basel II 
index values is rejected: KS-test statistics of ܦ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.1532 and 
ܦ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.1509 result in p-values of ݌௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.0006423 and 
݌௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.0008445. 
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 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
 Test stat D p-value 
ܪ1௣ ሺிூேሻ 0.1532 0.0006423 
ܪ1௙ ሺிூேሻ 0.1509 0.0008445 
ܪ1∆ ሺிூேሻ 0.1015 0.09369 
Table 15 Normality test results for H1 (financiers) 
 
Hence, the null hypothesis of normally distributed Pre- and Post-Basel II 
index values is rejected on a significance level of 5%. As described above, 
the Q-Q plots indicate that, at least in the Pre- and Post-Basel II cases, 
problems with normality also exist. Therefore, the paired t-test which relies on 
the normality assumption is not meaningful for the financiers’ perspective of 
H1 and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test is applied, as this test 
does not make assumptions on the distribution of the underlying values: the 
assumption of normally distributed index values is not necessary. As a ‘posi-
tive shift’ in the index values from Pre- to Post-Basel II is of interest, a version 
of the standard Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used which tests directly for 
‘higher’ Post-Basel II values in relation to Pre-Basel II ones (see section 
5.4.1). Hence, the null hypothesis of ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ being higher or equal than 
ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ is tested against the alternative that ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൏ ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൒   ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ ൏ ߤ௙ ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ 
The results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that the change of 
ߤ௣ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ and ߤ௙ሺுଵ,ிூேሻ is statistically significant (see Table 16). The test 
statistic of ܹ  ൌ  1,619.5 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.01092. Hence, the null-
hypothesis, that the mean of Pre-Basel II index values is greater or equal 
than the mean of the Post-Basel II index values, is rejected on a significance 
level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
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 Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 Test stat W p-value 
ܪ1∆ ሺிூேሻ 1,619.5 0.01092 
Table 16 Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for H1 (financiers) 
 
As ܪ଴ is rejected on a significance level of 5% (see above) and the index 
values are again a measurement for the ‘house bank principle’ (as explained 
in section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4), this provides evidence regarding H1 from a 
financier’s perspective. Hence the ‘house bank principle is deteriorating’ from 
an SME perspective. 
Correlations regarding H1 financiers 
Figure 54 illustrates the correlation of the financier items regarding H1. 
Again, in the lower left area (shaded in red), the Pre-Basel II correlations are 
shown, whereas in the upper right area the Post-Basel II values are 
illustrated (in green). 
 
Figure 54 Estimated correlations for items used in 
the financiers’ index for H1 using Pre-Basel II data 
Usage of bank 
credits
No. of sources 
provided
No. of phases 
supported
No. of sectors 
supported
Importance of 
non-credit fin.
Generic rejec. 
criteria
Usage of bank 
credits 1 0.09 -0.09 0.01 0.12 0.34
Number of 
sources provided 0.18 1 0.21 0.43 -0.01 0.10
No. of phases 
supported 0.09 0.24 1 0.52 0.06 -0.12
No. of sectors 
supported 0.07 0.37 0.52 1 0.14 -0.02
Importance of 
non-credit fin. 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.08 1 0.09
Generic rejection 
criteria 0.02 0.07 -0.18 -0.06 0.34 1
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By analysing the correlation values, it shows that the ‘number of sectors 
supported’ is positively correlated, on a Pre- and Post-Basel II basis, with the 
‘number of sources provided’ (ߩ௣ ൌ  0.37  and ߩ௙ ൌ  0.43) as well as with the 
‘number of phases supported’ (ߩ௣ ൌ  0.52  and ߩ௙ ൌ  0.52). 
 
This seems a valid rationale which underpins the findings from the 
background gathering phase as well as those from the qualitative interviews 
(see section 6). The more sectors financiers have in their sweetspot, the 
more phases they have to support and therefore the more means of finance 
they have to provide. For example, a leading German seed investor stated 
that within the young high-tech industry ‘per se’, no credits are granted due to 
the high risks and the lacking track record of innovative firms in this sector. 
On the other hand, traditional German industries like the plant and machinery 
industry, with tightened industry structures, are more capital intensive but 
normally have more stable positive cash flows. Thus, they require more 
traditional means of finance like leasing. 
 
Multiple linear regression for H1 FIN 
Testing H1 from a financier’s perspective, using the model above, provides 
evidence that ‘corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because 
the house bank principle is deteriorating’. 
Again, the question arises concerning how characterising factors of the 
financiers influence this appraisal. In order to achieve this, a variety of 
possible factors influencing the deterioration of the house bank principle from 
a financier’s perspective are chosen. Five of those are extracted which 
provide the ‘best’ linear regression model according to the AIC (Train, 
2009:367). The resulting linear regression model consists of five covariates 
and a negative intercept (-1.33). Hence, the change of the house bank 
principle from a financier’s perspective could be explained by: 
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∆Yୌଵ୊୍୒ ൌ െ1.33 ൅ 0.0002 ∗ ଵܺிூே,ଵ െ 0.00008 ∗ ܺସிூே,ଵ ൅ 0.54 ∗ ܺସிூே,ଷ ൅ 0.017 ∗
ܺଷ଺,∆ிூே,ଶ െ 0.20 ∗ ଵܺ,∆ிூே,ூଵ. 
The variable description can be found in the codebook in Table 49 (see 
Appendix D). 
 
The ‘number of employees’ ( ଵܺ
ிூே,ଵ), the ‘importance of state owned banks on 
SME corporate financing’ (ܺସிூே,ଷ) and the change of the ‘sweetspot EBIT 
maximum’ (ܺଷ଺,∆ிூே,ଶ) influences the deterioration of the house bank principle 
from a financier’s perspective in a positive manner. By looking at the other 
regression coefficients, it is observable that the ‘volume of funds under 
management in 2007’ (ܺସிூே,ଵ), i. e. the pre-crises fund-raising volume, as well 
as the change in ‘number of financing sources provided’ ( ଵܺ,∆
ிூே,ூଵ), has a 
negative influence on the deterioration of the house bank principle from a 
financier’s perspective.  
 
According to the p-values in Table 17, the ‘number of employees’ 
( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଵ, ܲ ൌ .03), the ‘importance of state owned banks’ (ܺସௌொ,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .03) and 
the change of the ‘sweetspot EBIT maximum’ (ܺଷ଺,∆ிூே,ଶ, ܲ ൌ .04) are statistically 
significant. The ‘volume of funds under management in 2007’ (ܺସிூே,ଵ, ܲ ൌ .06) 
and the ‘number of financing sources provided’ ( ଵܺ,∆
ிூே,ூଵ, ܲ ൌ .18) yielded p-
values above .05 and therefore do not show statistical significance. However, 
these variables add explanatory power to the model because the overall 
model fit (according to the AIC) is good enough, so they are included.  
 
The overall F-statistic (see Gujarati, 2003:219) is 4.5 on 5 and 38 degrees of 
freedom, which results in a p-value of .0026. This means that the F-test, 
using the null-hypothesis that all variable coefficients are zero will (Robson, 
2002:442) be rejected at a confidence level of 0.0026 which is a really good 
result and well beyond .05. Furthermore, the multiple R-squared of 0.3719 is 
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high. The multiple R-squared measures the variation in the data explained by 
the model (Gujarati, 2003:81-87). Hence, the model is capable of explaining 
about 37% of the variation inherited in the index data which is a good value in 
the context of such data. 
 
Coefficients Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. Error P-Value 
Intercept -1.33 0.86 0.13 
ܺଶிூே,ଵ 0.0002 0.0001 0.03 
ܺସிூே,ଵ -0.0008 0.00004 0.06 
ܺସிூே,ଷ 0.54 0.24 0.03 
ܺଷ଺,∆ிூே,ଶ 0.017 0.0078 0.04 
ଵܺ,∆ிூே,ூଵ -0.20 0.14 0.18 
Table 17 Overview of H1 FIN regression coefficients 
 
Regression diagnostics 
In order to evaluate the fit of the proposed model, it is necessary to take a 
look at regression diagnostics. Therefore, again, the (Pearson) residuals of 
the model are plotted against the fitted values (see Figure 55).  
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Figure 55 Regression diagnostics for H1 FIN 
 
The plot of the (Pearson) residuals, against the fitted values in Figure 55, 
shows no particular pattern or any sort of functional dependency. Therefore, 
based on the residuals, there is no evidence to challenge the fit of the model 
to the data. The second important part is to check the residuals for normality 
and homoscedasticity as these assumptions are essential for linear models. 
Figure 55 provides a Q-Q plot (upper left) and a Scale-Location plot (lower 
right) of the standardised residuals against the fitted values. The Q-Q plot 
shows deviations from the normality assumption, mainly in the lower tail, yet, 
the overall fit is good. Furthermore, the Scale-Location plot does not indicate 
that the variance for the standardised residuals is changing over the range of 
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the values in a significant manner. Again, some outliers yield higher 
standardised residual values but they are not influential which can be 
observed by looking at the lower right plot. This is in line with the previous 
results and shows that the model yields a good fit to the provided data. 
Again, the last plot shows the so called Cooks distance of each residual as a 
measure of the influential power of observation to the model. In general, the 
critical value is chosen to be 1. There is one particular observation with a 
Cooks distance above one, but this observation is not marked as an outlier in 
the previous plot; hence, it is not disturbing the model fit. The rest of the 
observations do not show Cooks distances which are greater than one and 
are hence not influential. 
5.5 TESTING HYPOTHESIS H2 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that SMEs can cope best with the effect induced by 
Basel II when they proactively engage in rating, and improve the rating 
parameters. Again, the justification of the variables chosen for the respective 
test is provided in section 4.3.4 and in Appendix B. H2 is tested by comparing 
the means of the SME related index values on a Pre- and Post-Basel II basis 
(as described in section 5.5.1). Applying the respective tests (mentioned in 
section 5.1) provides evidence regarding H2 from the SME perspective (SME 
questionnaire sample), as only SME data were taken into account. H2 
evaluates the rating importance from the intrinsic SME perspective only. 
Figure 56 illustrates the subset manifest (dependent) variables (grouped by 
latent variables, see comprehensive overview in section 4.2.4) used in order 
to test H2 in the following section 5.5.1. 
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Figure 56 Variables regarding H2 
 
In general (see section 5.5.1), SMEs seem to have ‘intuitively’ a high 
alignment to the rating parameters. However, regarding the formal aspects 
there seems to be a knowledge gap (see ଼ܺௌொ,ଽ in Table 48): 61.225% of the 
responding SMEs stated either not to be rated (16.327%) or did not know the 
rating (44.898%). Furthermore, the knowledge about the rating process of 
banks is still poor (see ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଽ in Table 48): 70.909% of the respondents do 
not know which rating based approach (SA, F-IRB or A-IRB) their bank was 
using, which hampers their ability to adjust their strategy accordingly. 
5.5.1 H2: Model testing from an SME’s perspective 
In order to test H2 from an SME perspective, the returned data from the SME 
questionnaires were used for this section. The index measuring the extent of 
the ‘rating affinity’ includes two variables (see Table 18). As discussed in 
section 5.4.1 the justification of the variables selected can be found in 
Appendix B. The respective SME codebook regarding the SME variables can 
be found in Table 48 (within Appendix D). Again, ‘3 L’ comprise a three item 
Likert scale and ‘1-4’ represent the transformed variable with values between 
1 and 4. 
Subset H2: latent / manifest (dependent) variables
Hypothesis SME:
2. SME cope best by
a) Engaging in ra-
ting and optimi-
sing parameters
b) restructuring to
fit for non-bank
financiers (see 3)
2.a) SME
Rating focus
2.b) see
hypothesis 3
S / _ Rating Knowledge Indicator regarding the impor-
tance attributed to rating
Hypotheses Latent
variables
Manifest
variables
RelevanceSurvey
SME
/ Financier
S / _ Rating Development Trend estimate is an indicator
for the SME focus on rating
S / _ Rating performance
parameters
Rating indicators (non-financial
and financial part of rating)
S / _ Knowing bank
rating approach
Indicator regarding the impor-
tance attributed to rating
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The average SME rating potential (variable 2) is defined as the average of 
the potential variables ( ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,଼ to ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,଼): profitability, financial situation, 
management, research and development, production and logistics, marketing 
and sales as well as controlling and administration. 
 
Number Variable Label Influence Scale 
1 ܺଽ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଽ Rating value development Positive 3 L 
2 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ூହ Average SME rating potential Positive 1-4 
Table 18 Variables for H2, SMEs 
 
Testing H2 SMEs 
Let ுܻଶ,௣/௙ௌொ  denote the index value for Pre- and Post-Basel II assessments 
regarding H2. Then ுܻଶ,௣/௙ௌொ  is defined as; 
ுܻଶ,௣ௌொ ∶ൌ ଽܻ,௣ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵܻ,௣ௌொ,ூହ 
ுܻଶ,௙ௌொ ∶ൌ ଽܻ,௙ௌொ,ଽ ൅ ଵܻ,௙ௌொ,ூହ 
The delta between Pre-Basel II and Post-Basel II values is defined as: 
∆ ுܻଶௌொ ∶ൌ ுܻଶ,௙ௌொ െ ுܻଶ,௣ௌொ 
Table 19 shows some basic statistics regarding the index values connected 
to H2 concerning SMEs. It can be observed that the Pre-Basel II values 
range from 3.193 to 6.467 with mean ߤ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ 5.047 and variance 
ߪଶ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ 0.396. The Post-Basel II values are shifted to the right and 
range from 4.177 to 8.0 with a mean value of 5.916 and a variance of 0.659.  
In terms of SMEs, the variances nearly double from a Pre-Basel II to a Post-
Basel II perspective which indicates that SMEs have a far more dispersed 
picture of the future development compared to their Pre-Basel II assessment. 
The delta index values range from -1.43 to 3.52 with a mean value of 0.869 
(> 0) and a variance of 0.993. 
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 Min Max Mean (ߤሻ Median Variance (ߪଶሻ Stdev ሺߪ ሻ Skewness ሺߛሻ 
ܪ2௣ ሺௌொሻ 3.193 6.467 5.047 5.097 0.396 0.629 -0.364 
ܪ2௙ ሺௌொሻ 4.177  8.0 5.916 5.932 0.659 0.812  0.157 
ܪ2∆ ሺௌொሻ -1.43  3.527 0.869 0.993 0.993 0.996 0.376 
Table 19 Basic statistics of H2 index values Pre- / Post-Basel II (SMEs) 
 
As described in section 5.4.2, it is checked whether the Pre- and the Post-
Basel II index values, from an SME perspective, are significantly different in 
order to test H1. Therefore, in line with section 5.2 regarding normally 
distributed index values, KS-tests are carried out. In addition further graphical 
evidence, regarding the assumption of normally distributed index values, 
provides the analysis of histograms, boxplots and Q-Q plots. Again, like with 
H1 regarding SMEs, the KS-test provides evidence (see Table 20) that the 
index values are normally distributed. The KS-test statistics of ܦ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ
 0.1038, ܦ௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.085 and ܦ∆ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.1034 result in p-values of 
݌௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.4185, ݌௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.3607 and ݌∆ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ  0.1207. All p-
values are bigger than 0.05 which means that the assumption that the 
underlying Pre- and Post-Basel II as well as the delta index values are 
normally distributed cannot be rejected with a significance level of 5%. 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
 Test stat D p-value 
ܪ2௣ ሺௌொሻ 0.1038 0.4185 
ܪ2௙ ሺௌொሻ 0.085  0.3607 
ܪ2∆ ሺௌொሻ 0.1034  0.1207 
Table 20 Normality test results for H2 (SMEs) 
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The descriptive statistics support this evidence too. Figure 57 shows 
histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values: both histograms show a 
reasonably good fit to the normal density (see also section 5.4.1). The 
empirical densities are skewed. Whereas, the Post-Basel II index shows an 
only a slight positive skewness (ߛ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ 0.157, see Table 19), the Pre-
Basel II index values shows a bigger negative skewness of ߛ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ
െ0.364. 
 
Figure 57 Histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values 
including normal density plots (red line) regarding H2, SMEs 
 
Figure 58 to Figure 60 illustrate, on the left-hand side, boxplots of the index 
values calculated for Pre- and Post-Basel II index values as well as the delta 
of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values. The right-hand side shows Q-Q plots 
of the respective data. All three Q-Q plots show a reasonably good fit to 
theoretical normal quantiles which indicates that the assumption of normal 
distributed index values (Pre-Basel II, Post-Basel II and delta values) is valid. 
This is in line with the results of the KS-tests provided in Table 20. 
Yet, like with the SME plots in section 5.4.1, in the upper and especially lower 
tail of the Q-Q plots, the fit of the index values with the Q-Q line is 
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questionable. As this is the case for extreme index values rather than the 
majority of the values, the overall fit is reasonably good. 
 
 
Figure 58 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Pre-Basel II (H2, SMEs) 
 
 
Figure 59 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Post-Basel II (H2, SMEs) 
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Figure 60 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Delta for H2, SMEs (Pre-Basel II to Post-Basel II) 
 
The outliers in the lower sections of the Pre- and Post-Basel II index values 
(see boxplots above) comprise two small-enterprises in the retail sector 
which are relying on supplier credits rather than rating related credits. This is 
in line with the findings from the background gathering phase. The other one 
belongs to a medium-sized automotive supplier which experienced 
subsidised credits with lowered rating demands (see section 5.4.1). The 
outliers on the upper end of the Post-Basel II and delta index values 
comprise a medium-sized machinery, and an IT, company which have to 
ensure a valid rating as no special subsidises are provided. 
 
Under the assumption that the index values are normally distributed (see 
above) and due to the fact that the variances of the Pre- and Post-Basel II 
index values differ (heteroscedasticity samples, see Table 19: ߪ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ
0.396 ൏ σ୤ ሺୌଶ,ୗ୑୉ሻ ൌ 0.659), Welch’s version of the standard (paired) t-test is 
applied. Welch’s t-test uses the same null-hypothesis and alternative as the 
paired t-test (see section 4.3.4). This test allows for non equal variances in 
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Pre- and Post-Basel II samples. Hence, the hypotheses are formulated as 
follows: 
Welch t-test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൌ  ߤ௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ് ߤ௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ 
 
The resulting test statistic of ݐ  ൌ  െ6.7017 shows that the difference of 
ߤ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ and ߤ௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ is statistically significant (see Table 21). The 
corresponding p-value of ݌  ൌ 9.274E‐09 leads to a rejection of ܪ଴ on a 
significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05).  
 
 Welch t-test  
 Test stat t p-value 
ܪ2∆ ሺௌொሻ -6.7017  9.274E-09 
Table 21 Welch t-test results for H2 (SMEs) 
 
Again, the KS-test and the descriptive statistics provide evidence that the 
Pre- and Post-Basel II index values as well as the delta index values are 
normally distributed. For the same reasons as stated in section 5.4.1, 
additional to Welch’s t-test, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is carried out. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൒  ߤ௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ ൏ ߤ௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ  
The results again show that the change of ߤ௣ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ and ߤ௙ ሺுଶ,ௌொሻ is 
statistically significant (see Table 22). The test statistic of ܹ  ൌ  651.5 results 
in a p-value of ݌  ൌ 2.308E‐09. Hence, the null-hypothesis, that the mean of 
Pre-Basel II index values is greater or equal than the mean of the Post-Basel 
II index values, is rejected on a significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
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 Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 Test stat W p-value 
ܪ2∆ ሺௌொሻ 651.5 2.308E-09 
Table 22 Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for H2 (SMEs) 
 
As ܪ଴ is rejected on a significance level of 5% (see above, paired t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test) and the index values are a measurement for the 
‘rating affinity’ (as explained in section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4), this provides 
evidence regarding H2. Hence, the ‘rating affinity’ increases (from an SME 
perspective). 
 
Correlations regarding H2 SMEs 
Figure 61 illustrates the correlation of the SME items regarding H2. In the 
lower left area which is shaded in red, the Pre-Basel II correlations are 
shown, whereas in the upper right area the Post-Basel II values are 
illustrated in green. 
 
Figure 61 Estimated correlations for items used in 
the SME index for H2 using Pre-Basel II data 
 
Analysing the correlation values shows that only weak positive correlations 
exist. 
 
Financial rating 
value
Average SME 
rating pot.
Financial rating 
value 1 0.02
Average SME 
rating potential 0.14 1
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Multiple linear regression for H2 SME 
Like with H1, testing H2 from an SME’s perspective using the model above 
provides evidence from an SME’s perspective that ‘SMEs can cope best with 
the effect when they proactively engage in rating and improve the 
parameters’. Again, the question is how characterising factors of the SMEs, 
influence this change. In order to achieve this, eleven factors influencing the 
ability to cope best where chosen which provide the ‘best’ linear regression 
model according to the AIC (see Train, 2009:367). The resulting linear 
regression model consists of eleven covariates and a slightly negative 
intercept (-0.72). Hence, the ability to cope with the effect of Basel II while 
engaging proactively in rating and improving the parameters, this could be 
explained by: 
 
∆Yୌଶୗ୑୉ ൌ െ0.72 ൅ 2.26 ∗ ଵܺௌொ,ଶ െ 2.00 ∗ ܺସௌொ,ଶ ൅ 2.00 ∗ ଵܺ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 2.77 ∗
ܺଶ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 2.50 ∗ ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 4.37 ∗ ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 4.31 ∗ ܺହ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 2.08 ∗ ܺ଺,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 1.28 ∗
ܺ଻,∆ௌொ,ଷ െ 1.59 ∗ ܺଶௌொ,଻ െ 1.39 ∗ ܺହௌொ,଻ . 
 
The variable description can be found in the codebook in Table 48 (see 
Appendix D). 
The ‘importance of Basel II as regards SME financing’ ( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ), as well as all 
strategic focus elements, have a positive influence on H2. These are: 
‘strategic focus on financial stability / liquidity’ ( ଵܺ,∆
ௌொ,ଷ), ‘strategic focus on 
increasing profitability’ (ܺଶ,∆ௌொ,ଷ), ‘strategic focus on enhancing market 
position’ (ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,ଷ), ‘strategic focus on quality excellence’ (ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ), ‘strategic 
focus on technology excellence’ (ܺହ,∆ௌொ,ଷ), ‘strategic focus on cost excellence’ 
(ܺ଺,∆ௌொ,ଷ) as well as ‘strategic focus on increasing company valuation’ (ܺ଻,∆ௌொ,ଷ). 
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It is observable that the ‘importance of the crises of state owned banks as 
regards SME financing’ (ܺସௌொ,ଶ), ‘importance of non-bank financiers as 
information source’ (ܺଶௌொ,଻) and the ‘importance of trade press / internet as 
information source’ (ܺହௌொ,଻), all have a negative influence on H2. 
 
According to the p-values in Table 23, the following values are statistically 
significant: ‘importance of Basel II as regards SME financing’ ( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ, ܲ ൌ
.003), ‘importance of the crises of state owned banks as regards SME 
financing’ (ܺସௌொ,ଶ, ܲ ൌ .001), ‘strategic focus on increasing profitability’ 
(ܺଶ,∆ௌொ,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .005), ‘strategic focus on quality excellence’ (ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ܲ ൌ .0003), 
and ‘strategic focus on technology excellence’ (ܺହ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ܲ ൌ .005). The other 
variables yield p-values between 0.07 and 0.23 which shows that these 
variables are not significant. However, these variables do add explanatory 
power to the model, as the overall model fit (according to the AIC) is good 
enough, so they should be included. 
 
The overall F-statistic (see Gujarati, 2003:219) is 2.37, on 11 and 33 degrees 
of freedom, which results in a p-value of .027. This means that the F-test, 
using the null-hypothesis that all variable coefficients are zero, will (Robson, 
2002:442) be rejected at a confidence level of 0.05. This means a good 
model fit to the given data. Furthermore, the multiple R-squared of 0.441 is 
high. The multiple R-squared measures the variation in the data explained by 
the model (Gujarati, 2003:81-87). Hence, the model is capable of explaining 
44% of the variation inherited in the index data which is a good value in the 
context of such data. 
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Coefficients Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. Error P-Value 
Intercept -0.72 2.93 0.81 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ 2.26 1.02 0.03 
ܺସௌொ,ଶ -2.00 0.72 0.01 
ଵܺ,∆
ௌொ,ଷ 2.00 1.10 0.08 
ܺଶ,∆ௌொ,ଷ 2.77 0.68 0.05 
ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,ଷ 2.50 1.37 0.09 
ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ 4.37 1.41 0.003 
ܺହ,∆ௌொ,ଷ 4.31 2.05 0.05 
ܺ଺,∆ௌொ,ଷ  2.08 1.39 0.15 
ܺ଻,∆ௌொ,ଷ  1.28 1.04 0.23 
ܺଶௌொ,଻  -1.59 0.85 0.07 
ܺହௌொ,଻  -1.39 0.86 0.11 
Table 23 Overview of H2 SME regression coefficients 
 
In order to evaluate the fit of the proposed model, it is necessary to take a 
look at regression diagnostics. Therefore, the (Pearson) residuals of the 
model are plotted against the fitted values (see Figure 62).  
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Figure 62 Regression diagnostics for H2 SME 
 
The plot in Figure 62 shows that the residuals, in the tails, are a bit smaller 
than around the mean of the distribution. The overall pattern does not show 
any particular misfit to the data. The deviations in the tails are due to the size 
of the sample used. 
A second important part is to check the residuals for normality and 
homoscedasticity as these assumptions are essential for linear models. 
Figure 62 provides a Q-Q plot and a Scale-Location plot of the standardised 
residuals against the fitted values. The residuals in the Q-Q plot show a good 
fit to normality, in the body of the distribution, and little deviations in the upper 
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and lower tail. But, the overall fit is still good. Furthermore, the Scale-
Location plot indicates that the variance for delta index values of 0 is smaller 
than for values above and below 0. This is in line with the previous results 
and shows that the model fit for small delta index values is better than in the 
tails. But, as mentioned before this might be due to the sample size; the 
general fit of the model is good which is shown by the p-value of the F-
statistic and the R-squared. 
Like with H1, the last plot shows the so called Cooks distance of each 
residual, as a measure of the influential power of an observation to the 
model. In general, the critical value is chosen to be 1. As the plot does not 
show any observation exhibiting a Cooks distance of greater than 1 there are 
no influential observations. 
5.6 TESTING HYPOTHESIS H3 
H3 (which are hypotheses 2.b and 3) states that non-bank financiers will 
engage in SME corporate finance when they adjust their strategy in terms of 
growth with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for 
exit strategies. Like with H1 and H2, this is tested by comparing the means of 
the SME related index values on a Pre- and Post-Basel II basis. Applying the 
respective tests, mentioned in section 5.1, provides evidence regarding H3 – 
from the SMEs’ perspective (SME questionnaire sample) as well as from the 
financiers’ perspective (financier questionnaire sample). As described below 
only non-bank financiers are taken into account, as H3 is related to a non-
bank perspective only. 
Figure 63 shows the subset manifest (dependent) variables (grouped by 
latent variables, see comprehensive overview in section 4.2.4), which are 
used in sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, in order to test H3. As described in sections 
5.4 and 5.5, the justification of the variables chosen is provided in section 
4.3.4 and in Appendix B. 
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Figure 63 Variables regarding H3 
 
Prior to testing the respective models, alike to H1 and H2, some introductory 
evaluations were made to provide evidence regarding the affinity of SMEs 
and non-bank financiers. Firstly, the importance of non-bank financiers, as 
information sources, is evaluated as it is an indicator regarding the 
perception of non-bank financiers. 
 
Importance of non-bank financiers as an information source 
Comparing the assessment of SMEs, banks and non-banks shows that, on a 
scale from 1 = ‘no importance’ to 4 = ‘(very) high importance’, the respective 
groups regard the importance of non-bank financiers as an information 
source as follows: SMEs (ܺଶௌொ,଻, see codebook in Table 48) as lower than 
medium (ߤே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ ௜௡௙௢ ௦௢௨௥௖௘ ሺௌொሻ ൌ 2.16ሻ, banks as higher than medium 
(ߤே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ ௜௡௙௢ ௦௢௨௥௖௘ ሺ஻௔௡௞ሻ ൌ 2.64ሻ, and non-bank financiers (ܺ଺ிூே,ଷ, see 
codebook in Table 49) as high (ߤே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ ௜௡௙௢ ௦௢௨௥௖௘ ሺே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ሻ ൌ 3.34ሻ. The 
finding that non-bank financiers estimate their own role to be much stronger 
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than conceded by SMEs indicates that non-bank financiers lay a strong focus 
on SME financing, as they have the perception that they already have an 
influential role on SMEs. This is acknowledged by the qualitative analysis in 
section 6. Figure 64 shows the respective histograms. 
SMEs’ assessment Banks’ assessment   Non-banks’ assessment 
Figure 64 Histograms regarding the importance of non-banks information source in 
the view of SMEs, banks and non-bank financiers (from left to right) 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test tests if the samples belong to the same distribution 
(ܪ଴) by using the same cases of various variables. For every item of every 
case the values are ranked. In a next step, the medium average rank of each 
variable is evaluated. The significance value regarding ܪ଴ is thus calculated 
(Brosius, 2008). The null hypothesis (ܪ଴) of the Kruskal-Wallis test is that the 
mean importance of non-bank financiers, as a source of information, is equal 
for all three groups of companies (SMEs, non-bank, banks). The alternative 
is that they differ from each other (ܪଵ). 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ ௜௡௙௢ ௦௢௨௥௖௘ ሺௌொሻ ൌ  ߤே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ ௜௡௙௢ ௦௢௨௥௖௘ ሺ஻௔௡௞ሻ
ൌ ߤே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ ௜௡௙௢ ௦௢௨௥௖௘  ሺே௢௡ି௕௔௡௞ ி௜௡.ሻ 
ܪଵ ∶  ݊݋ݐ ܪ଴ 
Applying the Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the difference is statistically 
significant (see Table 24); the test statistic of ߯ଶ ൌ 39.089 results in a p-value 
of ݌  ൌ  0.0. Hence, the null-hypothesis, that the mean values regarding the 
importance of non-bank financiers as an information source from an SME, 
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bank and non-bank financiers’ perspective are equal, is rejected on a 
significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 
 Kruskal-Wallis test Mean ranks  
 Test stat ߯ଶ p-value SME Bank Non-bank
ܲܧ ܫ݂݊݋ െ ݏ݋ݑݎܿ݁  39.089 0.0 41.77 56.25 81.97 
Table 24 Kruskal-Wallis test results non-bank financiers as information source 
 
The top-three priorities, in terms of future importance of non-bank financiers’ 
investment criteria, from an SME perspective are (the following variable 
labels refer to Table 48 and Table 49 in the codebook in Appendix D): 
leading edge technology (ߤ்௘௖௛௡௢௟௢௚௬ ሺௌொሻୀ 3.53, see ܺସ,௙ௌொ,ହ), position 
(ߤ௉௢௦௜௧௜௢௡ ሺௌொሻୀ 3.47, see ܺଷ,௙ௌொ,ହ) and growth (ߤீ௥௢௪௧௛ ሺௌொሻୀ 3.47, see ଼ܺ,௙ௌொ,ହ). 
Non-bank financiers have the same top-three priorities in a slightly different 
order: position (ߤ௉௢௦௜௧௜௢௡ ሺிூேሻୀ 3.85, see ܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,଺), growth (ߤீ௥௢௪௧௛ ሺௌொሻୀ 3.85, 
see ܺ଻,௣/௙ிூே,଺) and leading edge technology (ߤ்௘௖௛௡௢௟௢௚௬ ሺிூேሻୀ 3.7, see ܺଷ,௣/௙ிூே,଺) in 
the third position. Figure 65 shows the Post-Basel II assessments of SMEs 
(left, ܺଶ,௙ௌொ,ହ to ܺଽ,௙ௌொ,ହ) and non-bank financiers (right, ଵܺ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ to ଼ܺ,௣/௙ிூே,଺) 
regarding non-bank investment criteria (means in descending order). 
  
Figure 65 Average importance of non-bank investment criteria 
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5.6.1 H3: Model testing from an SME’s perspective 
As stated in section 5.1, H3 represents the hypotheses 2.b and 3. H3 is 
tested from an SME perspective by using the data returned from the SME 
questionnaires. The index measuring the extent of the ‘affinity to non-bank 
financiers’ includes 8 variables (see Table 25). As discussed in section 5.4.1, 
the justification of the variables selected can be found in Appendix B. The 
respective SME codebook regarding the SME variables can be found in 
Table 48 (within Appendix D). Again, ‘4 L’ comprise a four item Likert scale, 
‘1-4’ represent the transformed variable with values between 1 and 4. The 
average importance of non-credit financing is defined as the average of the 
importance of non-credit forms of finance (ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ to ଵܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ), namely supplier 
credit, leasing, factoring, mezzanine, securities (ABS), private equity, 
strategic investor and IPO. 
 
Number     Variable Label Influence Scale 
1 ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ Good market position Positive 4 L 
2 ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ Leading edge products / technology Positive 4 L 
3 ଼ܺ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ Future growth options Positive 4 L 
4 ܺଽ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ Willingness of shareholders to in-
corporate new non-bank financiers 
Positive 4 L 
5 ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ Pot. of company Research & Dev. Positive 4 L 
6 ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ Pot. of company Product. & Logist. Positive 4 L 
7 ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ Pot. of company Marketing & Sales Positive 4 L 
8 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ூଷ Average Imp. of Non-Credit Fin. Positive 1-4 
Table 25 Variables for H3, SMEs 
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Testing H3 SMEs 
Let ுܻଷ,௣/௙ௌொ  denote the index value for Pre- and Post-Basel II assessments 
regarding H3. 
Then ுܻଷ,௣/௙ௌொ  is defined as: 
ுܻଷ,௣ௌொ
∶ൌ ଷܻ,௣ௌொ,ହ ൅ ସܻ,௣ௌொ,ହ ൅ ଼ܻ ,௣ௌொ,ହ ൅ ଽܻ,௣ௌொ,ହ ൅ ଷܻ,௣ௌொ,଼ ൅ ସܻ,௣ௌொ,଼ ൅ ହܻ,௣ௌொ,଼ ൅ ଵܻ,௣ௌொ,ூଷ 
ுܻଷ,௙ௌொ
∶ൌ ଷܻ,௙ௌொ,ହ ൅ ସܻ,௙ௌொ,ହ ൅ ଼ܻ ,௙ௌொ,ହ ൅ ଽܻ,௙ௌொ,ହ ൅ ଷܻ,௙ௌொ,଼ ൅ ସܻ,௙ௌொ,଼ ൅ ହܻ,௙ௌொ,଼ ൅ ଵܻ,௙ௌொ,ூଷ 
The delta between Pre-Basel II and Post-Basel II values is defined as: 
∆ ுܻଷௌொ ∶ൌ ுܻଷ,௙ௌொ െ ுܻଷ,௣ௌொ 
 
Table 26 provides some basic statistics of the index values regarding H1 in 
terms of SMEs: the Pre-Basel II values range from 13.5 to 27.61 with mean 
ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ ൌ 21.506 and variance ߪଶ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ ൌ 10.137. The Post-Basel II 
values are again shifted to the right and range from 13.63 to 30.11 with a 
mean value of 23.41 and a variance of 12.433. The delta value ranges from -
5.0 to 9.6, with a mean value of 1.904 (again > 0) and a variance of 8.636.  
 
 Min Max Mean 
(ߤሻ  
Median Variance 
(ߪଶሻ 
Stdev 
ሺߪ ሻ 
Skewness ሺߛሻ
ܪ3௣ ሺௌொሻ 13.5 27.61 21.506 21.68 10.137 3.184 -0.284 
ܪ3௙ ሺௌொሻ 13.63 30.11 23.41 23.327 12.433 3.526 -0.424 
ܪ3∆ ሺௌொሻ -5.0 9.6 1.904 1.609 8.636 2.939 0.545 
Table 26 Basic statistics of H3 index values Pre- / Post-Basel II (SMEs) 
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As described in section 5.1, it is checked from an SME perspective whether 
the Pre-Basel II and the Post-Basel II index values are significantly different 
in order to test H3. As illustrated above (Table 26), the variances of the Pre- 
and Post-Basel II index values (ߪଶ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ = 10.137, ߪଶ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ = 12.433) 
are similar.  
As explained in section 5.4.1, a paired t-test is used to check whether the 
means of Pre-Basel II index values (ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ) and the Post-Basel II index 
values (ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ) are equal. The null hypothesis and its alternative are 
stated below: 
Paired t-test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ ൌ  ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ ് ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ 
 
Applying the paired t-test shows that the difference of ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ and 
ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ is statistically significant (see Table 27). The test statistic of 
ݐ  ൌ  4.9759 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  6.131ܧ06. Hence, ܪ଴ can be rejected 
on a significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 Paired t-test  
 Test stat t p-value 
ܪ3∆ ሺௌொሻ 4.9759  6.131E 06 
Table 27 Paired t-test results for H3 (SMEs) 
 
To verify the assumption of normally distributed index values, KS-tests and 
graphical tools, such as histograms, box-plots and Q-Q plots, are provided. 
As has been the case regarding SME models for H1 and H2, the KS-test 
does not reject the null hypothesis of normally distributed index values and 
delta index values (see Table 28).  
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 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
 Test stat D p-value 
ܪ3௣ ሺௌொሻ 0.0692 0.6877 
ܪ3௙ ሺௌொሻ 0.0608 0.8494 
ܪ3∆ ሺௌொሻ 0.1123 0.06165 
Table 28 Normality test results for H3 (SMEs) 
 
Again, the descriptive statistics provide supporting evidence: Figure 66 
provides histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values. Both histograms 
show a reasonably good fit to the normal density.  
The empirical densities (see Table 26) show a (slight) negative skewness 
(ߛ ൌ െ0.284 for the Post-Basel II index values and ߛ ൌ െ0.424 regarding the 
Pre-Basel II index values. 
 
 
Figure 66 Histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values 
including normal density plots (red line) regarding H3, SMEs 
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On the left-hand side of Figure 67 to Figure 69, boxplots of the index values 
calculated for Pre-Basel II and Post- Basel II index values as well as the delta 
of the Pre- and Post-Basel II index values are shown. On the right-hand side, 
Q-Q plots of the respective data are displayed. All three Q-Q plots show a 
reasonably good fit of the index values with theoretical normal quantiles 
which indicates that the assumption of normally distributed index values (Pre-
Basel II, Post-Basel II and delta values) is valid. 
Whereas, in the middle range the fit with the Q-Q line is good, in the upper 
(delta values) and lower tails (Pre- and Post-Basel II values) of the Q-Q plots, 
the fit of the index values with the Q-Q line is questionable. However, as 
these values are connected (see section 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.5.1) to more 
extreme index values, and the majority of these values show again good fit. 
The overall fit is reasonably good. 
 
 
Figure 67 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Pre-Basel II (H3, SMEs) 
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Figure 68 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Post-Basel II (H3, SMEs) 
 
 
Figure 69 Boxplot and Q-Q plot delta for H3, SMEs (Pre-Basel II to Post-Basel II) 
 
The two outliers (one is identical in the Pre- and Post-Basel II boxplot), at the 
lower end of the scale of the Pre- and Post-Basel II index values, belong to a 
medium-sized construction company and a small energy trade company 
which benefit from subsidies, as already described in section 5.4.1. The 
outlier at the lower end of the delta index values comprises a medium-sized 
company. According to financiers interviewed, chemical companies need a 
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high economy-of-scale in order to become attractive to non-bank financiers. 
The outliers on the upper end of the scale belong to micro and small 
enterprises in the IT and general industry, operating on a low profitability 
which fosters an openness for non-bank financiers (see section 3.3) as 
stated by Schäfer et al (2004 and 2007) as well as Nitschke and Kuper 
(2007). 
 
As described in section 5.2 and 5.5, the KS-test as well as the descriptive 
statistics (histograms, box-plots and Q-Q plots) provide evidence that the 
Pre- and Post-Basel II index values and the delta index values are normality 
distributed. However, for the analogues reasons (see H1 SME and H2 SME 
in section 5.4.1 and 5.5.1) a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is carried out. 
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ ൒  ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ ൏ ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ 
 
Applying the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that the change of ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ 
and ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ௌொሻ is statistically significant (see Table 29). Hence, the null-
hypothesis, that the mean of Pre-Basel II index values is greater or equal 
than the mean of the Post-Basel II index values, is rejected on a significance 
level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 
 Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 Test stat W p-value 
ܪ3∆ ሺௌொሻ 1,192.0 0.003181 
Table 29 Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for H3 (SMEs) 
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As ܪ଴ is rejected, on a significance level of 5% regarding the paired t-test as 
well as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and the index values are a 
measurement for the ‘affinity to non-bank financiers’ (as explained in section 
4.2.3 and 4.2.4), this provides evidence regarding H3 from an SME 
perspective. Hence, the ‘affinity to non-bank financiers’ from an SME 
perspective is enhanced. 
 
Correlations regarding H3 SMEs 
Figure 70 illustrates the correlation of the SME items regarding H3. The lower 
left area contains the Pre-Basel II correlations (which are shaded in red) and 
the (green) upper right area displays the Post-Basel II correlation values. 
 
 
Figure 70 Estimated correlations for items used in 
the SME index for H3 using Pre-Basel II data 
Good market 
position
Leading edge 
prod. / tech.
Future growth 
options
Willingness of 
to inc. new inv.
Pot. of comp.
R&D
Pot. of comp.
Prod. & Log.
Pot. of comp.
Mkt. & Sales
Average Imp. of 
Non-Credit Fin.
Good market 
position 1 0.72 0.37 0.38 0.14 -0.10 0.07 0.30
Leading edge 
prod. / tech. 0.68 1 0.34 0.30 -0.02 -0.09 0.09 0.25
Future growth 
options 0.45 0.45 1 0.40 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.20
Willingness of to 
inc. new inv. 0.41 0.33 0.40 1 0.10 0.01 0.29 0.30
Pot. of company 
R&D 0.07 -0.10 -0.01 0.09 1 0.36 0.33 0.05
Pot. of company 
Product. & Log. -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.24 0.31 1 0.60 0.06
Pot. of company 
Mkt. & Sales -0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.14 0.22 0.55 1 0.16
Average Imp. of 
Non-Credit Fin. 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.08 0.11 0.27 1
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As discussed in section 5.4.1, the following analysis focuses on stronger 
correlations only. From a Pre-Basel II perspective, a ‘good market position’ is 
strongly positively correlated to ‘leading edge products / technology’, ‘future 
growth options’ and the ‘willingness to incorporate new non-bank financiers’. 
This is in line with the literature review in section 3 (see Schäfer et al, 2004 or 
Schäfer et al, 2007, for example) as a good market position is, on the one 
hand, regarded as the result and, on the other hand, as the basis of a 
technological edge and extended growth (ߩ௣ ൌ  0.68 and ߩ௙ ൌ  0,45), which is 
aligned with a non-bank financiers’ focus. This correlation of market position 
is acknowledged by the interviewed SMEs, banks and non-bank financiers 
(see qualitative analysis in section 6). 
As stated by a major German and a European private equity firm (see 
sections 6.2 and 6.7, specifically), non-bank financiers are looking for a ‘good 
market position’ – especially in the Post-Basel II era. Therefore, the 
‘willingness to incorporate new financiers’ shows the strongest correlation 
(ߩ௣  ൌ  0.68) for Pre-Basel II and even for Post-Basel II (ߩ௙ ൌ  0.72). Several 
authors, like Ahrweiler et al (2007) or Dietsch and Petey (2004), as well as 
non-bank financiers (see qualitative research in section 6) believe that, with 
Basel II, credit financing will become more difficult for SMEs. In addition, the 
interviewees from the banking side argue (like a private bank and a savings 
bank, see section 6) that the ‘good SMEs’ will be in a better financing position 
which enables non-bank financiers to leverage their capital investments. 
Another strong correlation can be found between the potential of companies 
regarding production and logistics, as well as marketing and sales from a 
Pre- and Post-Basel II perspective (ߩ௣ = 0.55 and ߩ௙ = 0.60). The argument 
is that in order to be successful in the market you need to have a valid 
integrated supply chain which includes good ‘push and pull marketing’ for 
selling products which can be delivered by an optimised just-in-time 
production and supply-chain, as stated in a study by Geiger et al (2009), 
across several European countries. 
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Multiple linear regression for H3 SME 
Testing H3, from an SME’s perspective, using the model above provides 
evidence that SMEs can cope best with the effect of Basel II if they deploy a 
niche market leadership strategy. Again, the question arises concerning how 
the characterising factors of the SMEs, influence this change. In order to 
achieve this, a variety of possible factors, influencing the importance of niche 
market leadership focus are taken into account, of which six are extracted 
which provide the ‘best’ linear regression model according to the AIC (see 
Train, 2009:367). The resulting linear regression model consists of six 
covariates and a slightly negative intercept (-0.59). Hence, the change of the 
importance of the focus, on niche market leadership of an SME, could be 
explained by: 
 
∆Yୌଷୗ୑୉ ൌ െ0.59 ൅ 0.82 ∗ ଵܺௌொ,ଶ െ 1.05 ∗ ܺସௌொ,ଶ ൅ 1.46 ∗ ଵܺ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 2.02 ∗
ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 2.14 ∗ ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ ൅ 0.69 ∗ ܺଷௌொ,଻. 
The variable description can be found in the codebook in Table 48 (see 
Appendix D). By looking at the regression coefficients it is observable that the 
extent of ‘influence of Basel II on corporate financing’ ( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ) has a positive 
influence regarding the importance in terms of focus on niche market 
leadership. The same applies to the changes in the ‘company strategy focus 
on financial stability’ ( ଵܺ,∆
ௌொ,ଷሻ, the changes in the ‘company strategy focus on 
enhancing market position’ (ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,ଷ), the changes in the ‘company strategy 
focus on quality excellence’ (ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ), as well as the ‘importance of chartered 
accountants as information source’ (ܺଷௌொ,଻). On the other hand, the 
‘influence of the crisis of stated owned banks on corporate financing’ (ܺସௌொ,ଶ) 
has a negative influence. 
According to the p-values in Table 30, the delta values: ‘importance of the 
crisis of state owned SME banks on corporate financing’ (ܺସௌொ,ଶ, ܲ ൌ .01), 
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‘company strategy focus on financial stability’ ( ଵܺ,∆
ௌொ,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .03ሻ, ‘company 
strategy focus on enhancing market position’ (ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .01) and the delta 
values of ‘company strategy focus on quality excellence’ (ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .002), 
all yield a statistically significant influence on H3. The ‘importance of Basel II 
on corporate financing’ ( ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ, ܲ ൌ .13) as well as the ‘importance of 
chartered accountants as information source’ (ܺଷௌொ,଻, ܲ ൌ .11) yield p-values 
above 0.05 and are thus not statistically significant. However, these variables 
do add explanatory power to the model as the overall model fit (according to 
the AIC) is good enough, so they should be included.  
The overall F-statistic (see Gujarati, 2003:219) is 4.64, on 6 and 38 degrees 
of freedom, which results in a p-value of 0.0013. This means that the F-test, 
using the null-hypothesis that all variable coefficients are zero, will (Robson, 
2002:442) be rejected on a confidence level of 0.0013. Furthermore, the 
multiple R-squared of 0.4229 is high. The multiple R-squared measures the 
variation in the data explained by the model (Gujarati, 2003:81-87). Hence, 
the model is capable of explaining about 42% of the variation inherited in the 
index data which is a good value in the context of such data. 
 
Coefficients Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. Error P-Value 
Intercept -0.59 1.75 0.74 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ 0.82 0.52 0.13 
ܺସௌொ,ଶ -1.05 0.40 0.01 
ଵܺ,∆
ௌொ,ଷ 1.46 0.63 0.03 
ܺଷ,∆ௌொ,ଷ 2.01 0.74 0.01 
ܺସ,∆ௌொ,ଷ 2.14 0.65 0.002 
ܺଷௌொ,଻  0.69 0.42 0.11 
Table 30 Overview of H3 SME regression coefficients  
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Regression diagnostics 
In order to evaluate the fit of the proposed model, it is necessary to take a 
look at regression diagnostics. Therefore, the (Pearson) residuals of the 
model are plotted against the fitted values (see Figure 71).  
 
Figure 71 Regression diagnostics for H3 SME 
 
The plot of the (Pearson) residuals, against the fitted values in Figure 71, 
show no particular pattern or functional dependency; hence, based on the 
residuals there is no evidence to challenge the fit of the model to the data. 
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The second important part consists of checking the residuals for normality 
and homoscedasticity as these assumptions are essential for linear models. 
Figure 71 provides a Q-Q plot (upper left) and a Scale-Location plot (lower 
right) of the standardised residuals against the fitted values. The Q-Q plot 
shows mainly a good fit to normal distribution expected from some outliers in 
the upper and lower tail of the distribution. But, the overall fit is very good. 
Furthermore, the Scale-Location plot does not indicate that the variance of 
the standardised residuals is changing over the range of the fitted values. 
Again, some outliers yield higher standardised residual values, but they are 
not influential – this can be observed by looking at the lower right plot. This is 
in line with the previous results and shows that the model fit is, in general, 
good. 
The last plot shows the so called Cooks distance of each residual, as a 
measure of the influential power of an observation to the model. In general 
the critical value is chosen to be 1. As the plot does not show any 
observation exhibiting a Cooks distance of greater than one, there are no 
influential observations. 
 
5.6.2 H3: Model testing from a financier’s perspective 
Alike with SMEs, H3 is tested from a non-bank financier’s perspective by 
using the data returned from the financier questionnaires. Returns from non-
banks are used only, as H3 is dedicated to the non-bank perspective 
assessing the affinity of non-bank financiers towards SMEs. The index 
includes eight variables (see Table 31). As discussed in section 5.4.1, the 
selection of these variables was derived from the author’s background 
gathering phase (see section 4.3) and the literature review (see section 3). 
Again, a detailed justification can be found in Appendix B. The respective 
financier codebook regarding the financier variables can be found in Table 49 
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within Appendix D. Again, ‘4 L’ comprise a four item Likert scale, ‘1-4’ 
represent the transformed variable with values between ‘1-4’ as follows: 
Variable 1 and 2 are clustered according to the SME definition of the 
European Commission, as described in section 2.5.1. Micro enterprises are 
coded with 1, small enterprises with 2, medium enterprises with 3 and bigger 
enterprises with 4. In terms of ‘number of sources provided’ (variable 6) and 
‘number of phases supported’ (variable 7), the financiers could select one to 
seven variables. Therefore, as discussed in section 5.4.2, the values were 
transformed to a scale from 1 to 4. The same applies to the 15 sectors 
selected (variable 8).  
 
Number   Variable Label Influence Scale 
1 ܺଷ଼,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  Sweetspot revenue minimum Positive 1-4 
2 ܺଷଽ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  Sweetspot revenue maximum Positive 1-4 
3 ܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ Good market position Positive 4 L 
4 ܺଷ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ Leading edge products / technology Positive 4 L 
5 ܺ଻,௣/௙ிூே,଺ Future growth options Positive 4 L 
6 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଵ Number of sources provided Positive 1-4 
7 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଶ Number of phases supported Positive 1-4 
8 ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଷ Number of sectors supported Positive 1-4 
Table 31 Variables for H3 financiers 
Testing H3 financiers 
Let ுܻଷ,௣/௙ிூே  denote the index value for Pre- and Post-Basel II assessments 
regarding H3. 
Then ுܻଷ,௣/௙ிூே  is defined as: 
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ுܻଷ,௣ிூே ∶ൌ ଷ଼ܻ,௣ிூே,ଶ ൅ ଷܻଽ,௣ிூே,ଶ ൅ ଶܻ,௣ிூே,଺ ൅ ଷܻ,௣ிூே,଺ ൅ ଻ܻ,௣ிூே,଺ ൅ ଵܻ,௣ிூே,ூଵ ൅ ଵܻ,௣ிூே,ூଶ ൅ ଵܻ,௣ிூே,ூଷ 
ுܻଷ,௙ிூே ∶ൌ ଷ଼ܻ,௙ிூே,ଶ ൅ ଷܻଽ,௙ிூே,ଶ ൅ ଶܻ,௙ிூே,଺ ൅ ଷܻ,௙ிூே,଺ ൅ ଻ܻ,௙ிூே,଺ ൅ ଵܻ,௙ிூே,ூଵ ൅ ଵܻ,௙ிூே,ூଶ ൅ ଵܻ,௙ிூே,ூଷ 
 
The delta between Pre-Basel II and Post-Basel II values is defined as: 
∆ ுܻଷிூே ∶ൌ ுܻଷ,௙ிூே െ ுܻଷ,௣ிூே  
 
Table 32 provides some basic statistics of the index values regarding H3, in 
relation to financiers: it can be observed that the Pre-Basel II values range 
from 15.076 to 29.462, with mean ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ 21.536 and variance 
ߪଶ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ 7.941. The Post-Basel II values are shifted to the right and 
range from 17.076 to 29.971 with a mean value of 22.164 and a variance of 
7.428. This results in delta index values which range from -1.533 to 4.81 and 
have a mean value of 0.628 and a variance of 1.396. 
 
 Min Max Mean (ߤሻ Median Variance (ߪଶሻ Stdev ሺߪ ሻ Skewness ሺߛሻ 
ܪ3௣ ሺிூேሻ 15.076 29.462 21.536 21.610 7.941 2.818 0.108 
ܪ3௙ ሺிூேሻ 17.076 29.971 22.164 21.790 7.428 2.726 0.690 
ܪ3∆ ሺிூேሻ -1.533 4.81 0.628 0.508 1.396 1.182 1.039 
Table 32 Basic statistics of H3 index values Pre- / Post-Basel II (financiers) 
 
Analogous to the model in section 5.2.2, regarding the financiers’ H1 
indexes, homoscedasticity can be assumed as the variances of the Pre- and 
Post-Basel II index (ߪଶ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ 7.941, ߪଶ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  7.428) values are 
similar.  
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Therefore, the paired t-test is applied again, in order to test if the means of 
Pre-Basel II index values (ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ) and the Post-Basel II index values 
(ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ) are equal (ܪ଴) or not (ܪଵ). 
Paired t-test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ് ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ 
 
Applying the paired t-test shows that the difference of ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ and 
ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ is statistically significant (see Table 33). The test statistic of 
ݐ  ൌ  െ6.2353 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ 1.014E‐07. Hence, the null-
hypothesis, that the means of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values are equal, 
is rejected on a significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 
 Paired t-test  
 Test stat t p-value 
ܪ3∆ ሺிூேሻ -6.2353 1.014E-07 
Table 33 Paired t-test results for H3 (financiers) 
 
As in the previous sections, the index values are checked for normality as 
this is needed for assessing the validity of the paired t-test. Figure 72 shows 
histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values. Yet, the Pre-Basel II 
histograms provide not a very good fit to the normal density (red line). 
Whereas, the Post-Basel II index (see Table 32) shows only a very slight 
positive skewness (ߛ ൌ 0.078), the Pre-Basel II index values show a greater 
negative skewness (ߛ ൌ െ0.485ሻ. 
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 Index values Pre-Basel II Index values Post-Basel II 
 
Figure 72 Histograms of Pre- and Post-Basel II index values 
including normal density plots (red line) regarding H3, financiers 
 
Figure 73 to Figure 75 provide, on the left-hand side, boxplots of the index 
values calculated for Pre- and Post-Basel II index values, as well as the delta 
of the Pre- and Post-Basel II index values. The right-hand side illustrates the 
Q-Q plots of the respective data. 
 
The Q-Q plots, especially the delta one, do not show a reasonably good fit to 
the theoretical normal quantiles in the lower and upper sections of the values. 
This is in line with the normality tests provided in Table 34 which rejects the 
assumption that the delta index values are normally distributed. 
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Figure 73 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Pre-Basel II (H3, financiers) 
 
 
Figure 74 Boxplot and Q-Q plot Post-Basel II (H3, financiers) 
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Figure 75 Boxplot and Q-Q plot delta for H3, financiers (Pre-Basel II to Post-Basel II) 
 
The outliers, as shown in the boxplots above, comprise again of only non-
bank financiers with a focus on private-equity, the outliers in the upper end 
are to a major extent identical with the outliers in section 5.4.2 (see justifica-
tion there). The two outliers at the lower end comprise two private equity 
companies which have a large fund size. Larger fund sizes indicate, accor-
ding to the financiers interviewed (see section 6), a focus on major SMEs / 
companies which normally implies a stronger leverage of the equity provided 
with credits. As described in the supply section 2.9.1, LBOs will become 
increasingly difficult which might be the explanation for these outliers. 
Only the KS-test for the Post- and Pre-Basel II index values (see Table 34) 
provide evidence for normality. The KS-test statistics of ܦ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.118 
and ܦ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ 0.1013 result in p-values of ݌௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.07896 and 
݌௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.2252. The two p-values are bigger than 0.05. This means that 
the assumption that the underlying Pre- and Post-Basel II values are normal-
ly distributed cannot be rejected with a significance level of 5%. On the other 
hand, this cannot be assumed for the delta index, where the assumption of a 
normal distribution is rejected (ܦ∆ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.1643, ݌∆ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  0.001712). 
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 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
 Test stat D p-value 
ܪ3௣ ሺிூேሻ 0.118 0.07896 
ܪ3௙ ሺிூேሻ 0.1013 0.2252 
ܪ3∆ ሺிூேሻ 0.1643 0.001712 
Table 34 Normality test results for H3 (financiers) 
 
The KS-test rejects the null hypothesis of normally distributed delta index 
values on a significance level of 5%. As described above, the Q-Q plots 
indicate that in this case problems with normality are present too. Due to 
these facts, the paired t-test which relies on the normality assumption is not 
meaningful for the financiers’ perspective of H3. In order to verify the 
financiers’ perspective of H3, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
applied. As this test does not make assumptions on the distribution of the 
underlying values, the assumption of normally distributed delta index values 
is not necessary. As a ‘positive shift’ in the index values from Pre- to Post-
Basel II is of interest, a version of the standard Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
used which tests directly for ‘higher’ Post-Basel II values in relation to Pre-
Basel II ones (see section 5.4.2). Hence, the null hypothesis of ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ 
being higher or equal than ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ is tested against the alternative that 
ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൏ ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
ܪ଴ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൒   ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ       ܪଵ ∶   ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൏ ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ 
 
Applying the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that the change of ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ 
and ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ is statistically significant (see Table 35). The test statistic of 
ܹ  ൌ  939.5 results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.01627. As illustrated in Table 32, 
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the mean of the Post-Basel II index values (ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  21.860) is bigger 
than the mean of the Pre-Basel II index values (ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ ൌ  20.838). Hence, 
the null-hypothesis, that the mean of Pre-Basel II index values is greater or 
equal than the mean of the Post-Basel II index values, is rejected on a 
significance level of 5% (ߙ ൌ0.05). 
 
 Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 Test stat W p-value 
ܪ3∆ ሺிூேሻ 939.5 0.01627 
Table 35 Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for H3 (financiers) 
 
As ܪ଴ is rejected on a significance level of 5% (see above, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test) and the index values are a measurement for the ‘affinity to non-
bank financiers’ (as explained in section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4), this provides 
evidence regarding H3 from a financiers’ perspective too. Hence, the ‘affinity 
to non-bank financiers’ from a financiers’ perspective is enhanced. 
 
Correlations regarding H3 financiers 
Figure 76 illustrates the correlation of the financiers’ items regarding H3. In 
the lower left area, which is shaded in red, the Pre-Basel II correlations are 
shown, whereas in the upper right area the Post-Basel II values are 
illustrated, in green. 
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Figure 76 Estimated correlations for items used in 
the financiers’ index for H3 using Pre-Basel II data 
  
As discussed in section 5.4.1, the following analysis focuses on stronger 
correlations only. From a Pre- and Post-Basel II perspective, the minimum 
and maximum revenue thresholds are positively correlated. This is sensible 
as the background gathering interviews provide evidence that non-bank 
financiers try to have a sharp focus regarding investment sweetspots. 
Therefore, they either go for greater or for smaller companies, with the lower 
and upper bound, which are changed into the same direction. Analogous to 
SMEs, there is a positive correlation as explained in section 5.6.1 regarding 
the following variables: Post- and Pre-Basel II assessment of ‘market 
position’ and ‘leading edge technology’ (ߩ௣ ൌ  0.51 and ߩ௙ ൌ  0.47), the Pre-
Sweetspot min. 
revenue
Sweetspot max 
revenue
Good market 
position
Leading edge 
prod. / tech.
Future growth 
options
No. of sources 
provided
No. of phases 
supported
No. of sectors 
supported
Sweetspot 
revenue min. 1 0.47 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.38 -0.12 0.10
Sweetspot 
revenue max. 0.51 1 -0.19 -0.13 -0.10 -0.23 0.16 0.19
Good market 
position 0.24 0.09 1 0.43 0.33 -0.10 -0.18 -0.24
Leading edge 
prod. / tech. 0.11 -0.08 0.59 1 0.08 0.01 -0.13 -0.30
Future growth 
options -0.00 -0.08 0.59 0.56 1 -0.10 0.08 -0.18
No. of sources 
provided -0.42 -0.27 -0.04 0.11 0.14 1 0.00 0.10
No. of phases 
supported -0.19 0.13 -0.09 -0.14 0.20 0.10 1 0.28
No. of sectors 
supported 0.08 0.14 -0.03 -0.12 0.04 0.13 0.30 1
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 271 of 463 
Basel II assessment of ‘future growth option’ and ‘good market position’ 
(ߩ௣ ൌ  0.59) as well as ‘leading edge technologies’ (ߩ௣ ൌ  0.56). In terms of 
Post-Basel II, the financiers – unlike the SMEs – expect a far lower positive 
correlation. An explanation is provided by the qualitative analysis in section 6, 
as financiers focus stronger on financial stability in the Post-Basel II era. 
Finally, the ‘number of financial sources’ provided is negatively correlated to 
the minimum revenue threshold, especially from a Pre-Basel II perspective 
(ߩ௣ ൌ  െ0.42). As stated in the literature review (see section 3) and 
acknowledged by the financiers’ interviewees (see section 6.7), it is stated 
that IPOs or private equity is an option for the major SMEs only (see Frey 
and Kuhn, 2007, or Troubridge, 2008, for example). Therefore, for smaller 
SMEs the range of financial sources provided has to be widened in order to 
address the needs and potential of smaller SMEs. 
 
Multiple linear regression for H3 – financiers 
Finally, testing H3 from a financier’s perspective, using the model above, 
provides evidence that ‘financiers will engage in SME corporate finance when 
they adjust their strategy in terms of growth with the aim of niche market 
leadership and when they open up for exit strategies’. Now, the question is 
how do characterising factors, of the financiers, influence this appraisal. In 
order to achieve this, a variety of possible factors, influencing the willingness 
to engage in SME finance, are chosen. Among these factors, six are 
extracted which provide the ‘best’ linear regression model according to the 
AIC (Train, 2009:367). In principle, the AIC measures the fit of the considered 
model (see Gujarati, 2003:219), but it also takes into account the model 
complexity by introducing a penalty term, depending on the number of 
variables used (Akaike, 1974). 
The resulting linear regression model consists of six covariates and a 
negative intercept (-0.86). Therefore, the willingness of financiers to engage 
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in SME corporate financing, when they adjust their strategy in terms of 
growth with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for 
exit strategies, could be explained by: 
 
∆Yୌଷ୊୍୒ ൌ െ0.86 െ 0.17 ∗ ܺ଻ிூே,ଵ െ 0.0052 ∗ ଼ܺிூே,ଵ ൅ 2.56 ∗ ܺଽிூே,ଵ െ 0.083 ∗
ܺଷହ,∆ிூே,ଶ ൅ 0.53 ∗ ܺଽிூே,ଷ െ 0.47 ∗ ଵܺ,∆ிூே,ூଵ. 
The variable description can be found in the codebook in Table 49 (see 
Appendix D). 
 
By looking at the regression coefficients, it is observable that the ‘geographic 
focus on Germany’ (ܺ଻ிூே,ଵ) and on ‘Europe’ (଼ܺிூே,ଵ) yields a negative 
influence on H3. The same applies to the changes in the ‘sweetspot EBIT 
minimum’ (ܺଷହ,∆ிூே,ଶሻ as well as to the change in the ‘number of financing 
sources provided’ ( ଵܺ,∆
ிூே,ூଵ). On the other hand, the ‘geographic focus: 
worldwide’ (ܺଽிூே,ଵ), as well as the ‘importance of trade press / internet as info 
source’ (ܺଽிூே,ଷ) has a positive influence on H3 from a financier’s perspective. 
According to the p-values in Table 36, the influencing variable ‘geographic 
focus: worldwide’ does have a very statistically significant influence on H3 
(ܺଽௌொ,ଵ, ܲ ൌ .0000053). The ‘importance of the trade press / internet as info 
source’ (ܺଽிூே,ଷ, ܲ ൌ .006), the change of the ‘sweetspot EBIT minimum” 
(ܺଷହ,∆ிூே,ଶ, ܲ ൌ .04) as well as the ‘number of financing sources provided’ 
( ଵܺ,∆
ிூே,ூଵ, ܲ ൌ .001) are statistically significant too. The two factors ‘geographic 
focus: Germany’ (ܺ଻ௌொ,ଵ, ܲ ൌ .52) and ‘geographic focus: Europe’ (଼ܺௌொ,ଵ, ܲ ൌ
.99) are not significant but should be used as they add explanatory power to 
the model.  
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The overall F-statistic (see Gujarati, 2003:219) is 7.234, on 6 and 36 degrees 
of freedom, which results in a p-value of .000041. This means that the F-test 
using the null-hypothesis that all variable coefficients are zero will (Robson, 
2002:442) be rejected, at a confidence level of 0.000041 which is a very 
good result (the best for all hypothesis). Furthermore, the multiple R-squared 
of 0.5466 is very high. The multiple R-squared measures the variation in the 
data explained by the model (Gujarati, 2003:81-87). Hence, the model is 
capable of explaining about 55% of the variation inherited in the index data 
which is a very good value in the context of such data. 
 
Coefficients Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. Error P-Value 
Intercept -0.86 0.50 0.09 
ܺ଻ிூே,ଵ -0.17 0.27 0.52 
଼ܺிூே,ଵ -0.0054 0.34 0.99 
ܺଽிூே,ଵ 2.56 0.48 0.0000053 
ܺଷହ,∆ிூே,ଶ -0.083 0.040 0.04 
ܺଽிூே,ଷ 0.53 0.18 0.006 
ଵܺ,∆
ிூே,ூଵ  -0.47 0.14 0.001 
Table 36 Overview of H3 FIN regression coefficients 
 
Regression diagnostics 
In order to evaluate the fit of the proposed model, it is necessary to take a 
look at regression diagnostics. Therefore, the (Pearson) residuals of the 
model are plotted against the fitted values (see Figure 77).  
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Figure 77 Regression diagnostics for H3 FIN 
 
The plot of the (Pearson) residuals, against the fitted values in Figure 77, 
show no particular pattern or some sort of functional dependency; hence, 
based on the residuals there is no evidence to challenge the fit of the model 
to the data. The second important part is to check the residuals for normality 
and homoscedasticity as these assumptions are essential for linear models. 
Figure 77 provides a Q-Q plot (upper left) and a Scale-Location plot (lower 
right) of the standardised residuals against the fitted values. The Q-Q plot 
shows some minor deviations from the normality assumption, in the upper 
and lower tail. But, the overall fit is good. Furthermore, the Scale-Location 
plot indicates some minor changes in the variance for the standardised 
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residuals, but this change is not really significant and seems not to be 
functional when related to the fitted values. This is in line with the previous 
results and shows that the model yields a good fit to the provided data. 
The last plot shows the so called Cooks distance of each residual. The 
Cooks distance is a measure of the influential power of an observation to the 
model. In general, the critical value is chosen to be 1. As the plot does not 
show any observation exhibiting a Cooks distance of greater than one, there 
are no influential observations. 
5.7 SUMMARY OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
As stated in section 5.1, five models were set-up in order to test H1 (‘house 
bank principle’) and H3 (‘affinity of SMEs and non-bank financiers’) from the 
SMEs’ and financiers’ perspective, as well as H2 (‘rating affinity’) from the 
SMEs’ point of view. 
In order to provide evidence regarding the three hypotheses, the paired t-test 
(or Welch t-test in case of heteroscedasticity) is applied in order to show if 
the difference of ߤ௣ ሺு௡,்௒௉ாሻ and ߤ௙ ሺு௡,்௒௉ாሻ is statistically significant, given 
that the index values are normally distributed. As normality can be 
questioned regarding the financiers’ models, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
applied, in addition. These tests show that the change of ߤ௣ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ to 
ߤ௙ ሺுଷ,ிூேሻ is statistically significant. 
It turned out that the paired t-tests and the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, 
regarding all five models for SMEs and financiers, were statistically 
significant regarding the differences / changes in the Pre- to Post-Basel II 
means. 
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> H1, SME: the test statistic t  ൌ  െ3.5854 of the paired t-test results in a p-
value of p  ൌ  0.0006911. The test statistic of W  ൌ  1,228.0 of the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test results in a p-value of p  ൌ  0.005856. 
> H1 FIN: the t-test test statistic of ݐ  ൌ  െ7.5645 of the paired t-test results in 
a p-value of ݌  ൌ 1.890݁ െ 10. The test statistic of ܹ  ൌ  1,619.5 of the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.01092. 
> H2 SME: the test statistic of ݐ  ൌ  െ6.7017 of the Welch t-test results in a p-
value of ݌  ൌ 9.274݁ െ 09. The test statistic of ܹ  ൌ  651.5 of the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ 2.308݁ െ 09. 
> H3 SME: the test statistic of ݐ  ൌ  4.9759 of the paired t-test results in a p-
value of ݌  ൌ  6.131݁06. The test statistic of ܹ  ൌ  1,192.0 of the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.003181. 
> H3 FIN: the test statistic ݐ  ൌ  െ6.2353 of the Welch t-test results in a p-
value of ݌  ൌ 1.014e-07. The test statistic of ܹ  ൌ  939.5 of the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test results in a p-value of ݌  ൌ  0.01627. 
 
The regression diagnostics, at the end of each section, provided further 
evidence regarding each of the five models. Furthermore, all Post-Basel II 
index value means were bigger than the Pre-Basel II ones. In summary, the 
quantitative analysis provides evidence regarding the three hypotheses 
explained in section 4.2.3. 
 
As discussed in section 4.3.3, some kind of control questions were 
introduced in order to assess how strong the participants regard the influence 
of Basel II with regards to changes in their assessment from a Pre- to a Post- 
Basel II point of view and regarding important question modules, used in the 
models tested in sections 5.4 to 5.6. 
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Figure 78 shows, on the left-hand side, the assessment regarding relevant 
SME question modules and, on the right-hand side, the respective financiers’ 
counterpart. On a scale from 1 = ‘no importance’ to 4 = ‘(very) high 
importance’, all assessments are well above 2.5. The variables (see 
codebook in Appendix D) included from the returned SME questionnaires are 
‘generic effect’ (Xଵୗ୑୉,ଵ), ‘investment criteria of non-bank financiers’ (Xଵ଴ୗ୑୉,ହ), 
‘sources of finance’ (Xଵଷୗ୑୉,ସ) and ‘company focus’ (X଼ୗ୑୉,ଷ). In terms of 
returned financier questionnaires, ‘generic effect (Xଵ୊୍୒,ଷ), ‘sources of finance’ 
(Xଵଷ୊୍୒,ସ), ‘credit rejection criteria’ (Xଵଵ,୮୊୍୒,ହ) and ‘investment criteria of non-bank 
financiers’ (Xଽ୊୍୒,଺) were taken into account. 
 
    
Figure 78 Assessment of Basel II influence regarding question modules 
3.25
3.07
2.79 2.66
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
G
en
er
ic
 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
B
as
el
 II
 
C
rit
er
ia
 o
f 
no
n-
ba
nk
 fi
n.
S
M
E
 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
fin
an
ce
S
M
E
 
co
m
pa
ny
fo
cu
s
Assessment of SMEs
3.19
3.08
3.02
2.78
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
G
en
er
ic
 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
B
as
el
 II
 
S
M
E
 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
fin
an
ce
C
re
di
t 
re
je
ct
io
n 
cr
ite
ria
C
rit
er
ia
 o
f 
no
n-
ba
nk
 fi
n.
Assessment of financiers
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 278 of 463 
6 RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
As discussed already, the qualitative analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews is used to triangulate the findings and to provide richness beyond 
mere statistical significance (Creswell, 2003), which Goldberger (1991) calls 
‘practical or economic significance’, as described in section 4. Deductively-
based analytical procedures (Saunders et al, 2006:489) are used as these 
are most appropriate for answering the research question. The methods used 
are based on suggestions from Miles and Huberman (1994). 
The first part of this section is connected with the generic parts of the 
interviews and summarises the SMEs’ and the financiers’ points of view on 
the ‘catalyst effect’ of Basel II on SME financing and the changes imposed. 
The second part details the SMEs’ and financiers’ points of view on the 
findings of the quantitative part of the study in order to obtain a deeper 
insight. Their answers were set in relation to the various sections, the 
hypotheses tested and to each other. ‘Causal networks’ are used to illustrate 
the bundled effects and to illustrate not only the effect-of-cause relationship 
but the causes of causes relationship (Olsen, 2003). In general, the findings 
from the quantitative section of the study and, therefore, the three 
hypotheses, were affirmed. However, the in-depth interviews provided 
additional insights, besides mere statistical significance. For example, views 
on the ‘deterioration of the house bank principle’ were only partly 
acknowledged and led to a refinement of the original hypothesis. This leads 
to partly amended hypotheses in line with Popperian methods (2002). Nearly 
all interviewees claimed that Basel II was a catalyst for change in terms of 
professionalising finance and controlling of SMEs, which led to a greater 
openness for non-credit alternatives. This would have otherwise not taken 
place. However, with regards to credit, some bank executives, in particular, 
believe that in a way the ‘credit function’ house bank principle is strengthened 
because shopping around for credit has become too cumbersome and 
ratings have become more equal. Putting these views together with the 
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contrary opinion from non-bank financiers indicates a shift from a ‘house 
bank’ principle to a ‘core bank’ principle, as described below. 
6.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND INTERVIEW PROCEDURE 
As described in section 4.4.3, the aim of selecting interviewees as a 
purposive sample was to select important cases with certain ‘qualitative 
representativeness’. This meant that SMEs from various industries were 
selected, covering all SME clusters (micro enterprises, small enterprises and 
medium enterprises), and having varying financing strategies. Regarding 
financiers, the intention was to select cases from a broad spectrum with a 
strong footprint in SME financing. As discussed in section 4.3.2, the selection 
was based on the pre-defined selection criteria. The aim regarding manage-
ment level was to include interviewees on a top-executive level as this will 
determine experience and insight of the subject matter. All interviewees 
selected fulfilled those criteria. The aim regarding ‘SME type’ was to include 
at least one important case in each SME category, according to the 
categorisation of the European Commission (2003b). According to various 
studies, like Gregory et al (2005) or Frey and Kuhn (2007), for example, 
‘medium sized companies’ have a higher potential to incorporate various 
forms of corporate financing compared to smaller SMEs. Therefore, two 
examples of ‘medium sized companies’ are included. In every case it could 
be managed to interview the founder, CEO and owner of the respective SME. 
An analogous procedure was applied as regards the financiers: one example 
from each relevant category, based on the literature review (see section 3), 
was chosen. This comprises a mix of various types of banks and providers of 
alternatives to credit (alternative funds and various types of private equity). 
Again, only top-level executives participated. One interviewee, for example, 
was a wealth-manager who is in charge of a family office comprising several 
billion euros in assets, with a focus in SME financing too. If the management 
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team comprised several team members, the Director / General Manager or 
Board Member was selected who was in charge of SME financing. 
In addition to SMEs and financiers, one top-level executive of a leading 
industry association and a leading chartered accountant with a focus on 
SMEs, were included, as associations and chartered accounts play an 
important role in advising SMEs regarding Basel II. This became evident from 
the author’s background gathering phase and the research about information 
infrastructures regarding credits (see section 2.9.3). 
Following these selection criteria, 17 interviews were carried out in total, as 
all the interviewees selected agreed to participate. This shows a high rigour, 
as other mono-method Basel II related research, which did not include a 
quantitative phase upfront, used a lower sample size, showed much shorter 
interview times and / or a far lower seniority level when compared to the 
qualitative survey used in this paper. Arons (2008), for example, based his 
findings about financing situations in Germany on interviews with managers 
from 11 banks. Wahlström (2009) conducted interviews, of 30 to 40 minutes 
in length, with managers (including middle management) from four banks, 
regarding the acceptance of Basel II. 
The access to senior executives was conducted via the telephone directly 
and not via the assistant. During these calls, the author informed the 
interviewees about the purpose, scope and procedure as well as the ethical 
issues involved; this was based on a script, in order to ensure a unified 
information flow. 
The interviewer asked the interviewees at which place the interviewee 
wanted to be interviewed. All interviews stated that the interview should be 
carried out at the premises of the interviewees, in their office or a separate 
conference room (two in the dining room facilities), which is in line with 
Saunders et al (2007:321). He points out that ‘you should choose a location 
for your interviews which is convenient for your participants, where they feel 
comfortable and where the interview is unlikely to be disturbed’. 
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The interviews were carried out between mid March 2009 and the end of May 
2009 (see Table 37). The interviews lasted between 47 and 81 minutes in 
length. As described in section 4.5, ethical considerations were brought 
forward, on a general basis, during the arrangement of the interview 
appointments and, in detail, at the beginning of the semi-structured 
interviews by means of going through the informed consent letter (see 
Appendix F). All interviewees acknowledged conducting the interview on the 
basis stated in the informed consent letter. 
 
Abbreviation 
used in text 
Type of 
company 
Classification of 
company 
Professional 
role of 
interviewee 
Interview was 
conducted  
Duration 
MicroSME SME Micro enterprise Founder, CEO 
and Owner 
May 24th 2009 64 minutes 
SmallSME SME Small enterprise Founder, CEO 
and Owner 
April 9th 2009 76 minutes 
MachinerySME SME Medium-sized 
enterprise 
Founder, CEO 
and Owner 
April 20th 2009 81 minutes 
ServicesSME SME Medium-sized 
enterprise 
Founder, CEO 
and Owner 
April 27th 2009 50 minutes 
SavingsBank Financier Savings-Bank Director May 27th 2009 63 minutes 
StateBank Financier State-owned 
bank 
Director April 27th 2009 59 minutes 
LargeBank Financier Large commercial
bank 
Director April 28th 2009 58 minutes 
PrivateBank Financier Private bank Director May 25th 2009 74 minutes 
Mezzanine 
Bank 
Financier Large provider of 
alternative funds 
Director March 26th 
2009 
62 minutes 
SeedPE Financier Private equity 
company with 
focus on micro 
SME financing 
Founder and 
CEO 
March 15th 
2009 
48 minutes 
GermanPE Financier Private equity 
company with 
focus on SME 
financing in 
Germany 
Member of the 
Board 
March 30th 
2009 
57 minutes 
StatePE Financier State-owned 
private equity 
company with 
focus on SMEs 
Managing 
Partner 
March 24th 
2009 
56 minutes 
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InternationalPE Financier Private equity 
company with 
focus on SME 
financing in 
Europe 
Principal 
Partner 
April 30th 2009 57 minutes 
RestructuringPE Financier Private equity 
company with 
focus on SME 
turn-around 
financing in 
Germany 
General 
Manager 
April 23rd 2009 73 minutes 
FamilyOffice Financier Private-wealth 
Manager of one 
of the biggest 
German industrial 
families in 
Germany with 
focus on SMEs 
CEO March 20th 
2009 
47 minutes 
Chartered 
Accountant 
Inter-
mediary 
One of the 
biggest chartered 
accountant with 
focus on SMEs  
Managing 
Partner 
March 31st 
2009 
58 minutes 
SMEAssociation Inter-
mediary 
One of the 
biggest Industrial 
Associations 
Director SME 
politics 
April 16th 2009 62 minutes 
Table 37 Interview overview 
6.2 SELECTED SAMPLE 
Before the findings from the qualitative study are explained, the personal and 
company backgrounds of the interviewees is provided to set the scene. It 
enables to provide evidence for the validity of the purposive qualitative 
sample (senior level and experience of the interviewees as well as leading 
position of the financiers), and to point out potential bias within the answers. 
6.2.1 Purposive Sample SME 
 
MicroSME 
MicroSME is a company with four employees and three full-time equivalents. 
The set-up of the company was stated to be ‘involuntarily’. When his former 
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employer laid off 10% of the workforce more than 15 years ago, the founder 
started as a consultant, with his wife, for his former employer. With a growing 
customer base major clients urged the entrepreneur to fund a limited 
company. He never regretted this move from a manager to an entrepreneur 
because of the degree of freedom, despite problems the company was facing 
in between. In the beginning, the company started in the publishing sector 
with up to 15 employees and a high dependency on two to three companies. 
When the special publishing market became more and more commoditised 
they moved towards IT programming, on a lower revenue scale, but with less 
dependency as the revenue is spread out over 15 customers now and more 
freelancers are included. In terms of financing he stuck to his house bank 
due to the good relationship with management and the high level of trust. The 
bank, for example, supported trying to find financing alternatives in difficult 
times of strategic restructuring. During the evaluation of subsidised loans, the 
entrepreneur became aware of rating and its importance. Furthermore, 
private equity was evaluated during this period of restructuring for future 
growth options as ‘a bank is not risk taking’. Credit is securitised and 
MicroSME provides the bank with regular Basel II information due to the 
rating experience. 
 
SmallSME 
SmallSME is in the educational business. After a short period as a manager 
he set-up his business exactly 20 years ago. He has currently 20 employees 
and approximately 15 full-time equivalents on a sub-contractor basis which is 
typical for this kind of business. During his entrepreneurial background he 
gained a lot of experience in corporate financing. In order to set up his 
business he made a business plan to get a state-funded loan which was 
denied. Instead he got a private bank loan which was used with the 
knowledge from the savings bank to set-up his business. As the business 
grew steadily the relationship with the house bank ran smoothly until Basel II 
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was on the radar. Whereas in the first 15 years the relationship was close 
with the board, it changed from one day to another to a ‘mechanistic one’. 
Since then, credit has had to be secured with up to 50%, credit limits were 
drastically reduced and his private house financing with the bank, which had 
been welcomed initially, became a problem due to the ‘bulk risk comprising 
company and entrepreneur as a private client’. Despite a profitable and 
steady business, his rating, which was very good for an SME, deteriorated by 
two steps, ‘due to superordinate reasons’ the banker could not explain. 
Because of this experience investments were deferred, other means of 
finance had been considered, such as subsidised loans on apprentices or 
leasing. Currently he is evaluating private equity to finance growth in future 
markets. 
 
MachinerySME 
MachinerySME is a medium enterprise with a one-digit million euros number 
in revenues and more than 10 employees. However, MachinerySME ranks 
as the leading automotive and production company amongst its clients and 
delivers special purpose machines to three continents. This is possible with 
such a small team as the majority of parts are bought and only special 
purpose elements and innovative electronic control devices are added. As 
the company’s business is a project driven one there are major deviations in 
sales between years of up to 50%. 
The CEO and owner of the company set-up the business in the 1980s after 
working in the German subsidiary of a US machinery company. When he 
realised that this huge company did not live up to its potential in Germany he 
set up his own enterprise in order to ‘make things better in a special niche 
area’ and to enjoy more freedom in decision taking. MachinerySME is a 
typical SME example of an industrial ‘Mittelstands’ firm. Stability and ‘degrees 
of freedom’ are main goals rather than market share and goals. This is 
reflected in an equity capital ratio of more than 40%.  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 285 of 463 
MachinerySME is working with one house bank (a state related savings 
bank). In the past he looked around at other opportunities (other banks and 
mezzanines) in order to compare rates. However, rather than having the 
absolute best rate, the manner of dealing with the financial institute is of 
decisive importance. For example, the saving bank provides the entrepreneur 
with regular reports on sector benchmarks in terms of labour cost etc. which 
is highly appreciated. On the other hand, internal financing is preferred, credit 
is used primarily as working capital financing and regarding project financing 
to a small extent. At least once a year a major meeting is set up regarding 
rating and benchmark issues. The rating is therefore known and credit rates 
developed positively since Basel II due to the comparable favourable rating 
results. 
 
ServicesSME 
ServicesSME has much more than one hundred employees and some tens 
of million euros in revenues. It is a typical medium sized SME set-up by a 
self-made entrepreneur. He has been active for decades in the area of B2B 
services. Despite the financial crisis he experienced two digit growth rates 
and believes himself to be a winner in the cut-throat competition. He started 
his venture right after his diploma as he did not want to be subordinate to 
other people with less capabilities compared to his own. The primary 
motivation of becoming an entrepreneur, right from the start, was a high 
degree of self-determination. Therefore he is reluctant to look for finance as 
this lowers his degree of self-determination. Financing is used primarily for 
project financing and as working capital buffer. In order not to disclose 
account statements he posted securities; in order to stay self-determined, he 
even deferred investments. On the other hand, his company is working 
strongly for the financial services industry and made one of the earliest 
studies regarding the Basel II effect several years ago. 
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6.2.2 Purposive Sample Financiers 
 
SavingsBank 
With a balance sheet comprising several billion euros and several thousand 
employees, SavingsBank is one of the leading savings banks in Germany. 
The interviewee started with the bank after an apprenticeship and ran 
through various jobs. When the savings bank split up, dividing into a private 
and a corporate section, he moved to the corporate section because it 
offered him the chance to gain detailed insights into sectors and companies. 
Since 2001, he has been dedicated to the SME business which suits him 
best as he is ‘down to earth’ and because SavingsBank does not have a 
strategy shift every three years as is often the case with the larger banks. He 
recently was promoted to be director of a major client region. 
 
StateBank 
StateBank is a state owned SME centric bank with several thousand 
employees. The manager has been active for nearly 20 years and was active 
in the working group on Basel II which was responsible – besides the 
activities of the respective governmental departments – for defining the SME 
packages fostered by the German government. The focus of his DBA thesis 
was on regulation in the banking / SME context. He published several articles 
in the Basel II area and is a lecturer on congresses. 
 
LargeBank 
LargeBank ranks amongst the largest European banks with a strong origin 
and footprint in Germany. LargeBank covers all kinds of banking activities 
with a strong and successful SME focus. On the verge of Basel II the bank 
expanded its SME funds to provide other forms of financing, such as 
mezzanine, and consulting regarding corporate financing.  
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The LargeBank manager conducted his thesis in the area of SME financing 
in the Pre-Basel II era. He worked in various departments of the bank as an 
analyst and relationship manager – covering SMEs as well as larger 
corporations. 
 
PrivateBank 
Like any typical ‘private bank’, PrivateBank is focused on entrepreneurs with 
all their needs – from asset management to credits for their ‘Mittelstand’ 
company. It is part of a major bank. PrivateBank is regionally focused and 
offers a broad portfolio besides credit via its mother company, and other 
financial services are provided as a ‘one stop shop’. The interviewee joined 
PrivateBank 24 years ago, right after his MBA with a focus on taxes and legal 
affairs. He started in the credit department, moved to the area of subsidised 
credits and thereafter to corporate banking. He has headed the corporate 
banking department since 2005. 
 
MezzanineBank 
The interviewee is the Senior Director of one of the biggest mezzanine banks 
in Germany which belongs to a big general bank. He has a track record in a 
broad spectrum of means of finance, ranging from credit, to mezzanine and 
equity capital. He was engaged in SME financing for nearly 10 years at a 
renowned SME centric bank selling long-term credit to SMEs. Within the 
same institute he was responsible for the private equity assets of the bank. 
After that he moved to MezzanineBank as he had already conducted joint 
projects with his previous employer and wanted to be active in a more 
international setting, regarding SME financing. 
When he joined MezzanineBank private equity services were provided before 
the bank switched its focus to mezzanine. The special variant is ‘individual 
mezzanine’ rather than generic ‘program mezzanine’. There are several 
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hundred million euros of mezzanine funds under management, spread over 
nearly 100 SMEs. SMEs should have at least 15 million in revenues. The 
team comprises more than 10 managers with additional people added on a 
project basis. He works in SME financing because of the long-term 
relationship with the SMEs, in contrast to the transaction-oriented financing 
needs of major corporations. 
 
SeedPE 
SeedPE primarily focuses on seed financing from the foundation of a 
company or spin-off to the first venture capital round. It has a successful 
track record with a ROI beyond five, even in difficult times. With more than 10 
employees in recent years, more than 10 million euros have been invested – 
with no leverage involved. The sweetspot is an investment of 1 to 2 million 
euros, especially in the high-tech area. SeedPE focuses on contra-cyclical 
investments. The founder and CEO is a serial entrepreneur who built up and 
sold several high-tech businesses, including a very successful public listed 
company. His motivation is to enable other entrepreneurs to become 
successful as well, and to leverage his entrepreneurial experience. Therefore 
the SeedPE team provides money only in ‘homeopathic dosages’. In addition 
to money, a broad portfolio of capabilities and advice is offered to the 
portfolio companies. 
 
GermanPE 
With several hundred SME growth financing and buy-out transactions in 
recent decades, GermanPE takes a leading role in non-credit corporate 
financing of SMEs in Germany. The focus is on technology-driven companies 
and industry-related services with a valid growth potential, an attractive 
market environment, a strong niche market position and a ratio potential 
regarding operations. The focus is on growth financing and buy-outs. The 
sweetspot comprises major ‘Mittelstand’ companies with sustainable EBITs 
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beyond 10% (‘in normal times’). Normally, a two digit million euros amount of 
equity is invested per case. The board member, who was willing to 
participate, started his career as a chartered accountant at a Big 4 company 
in the area of mergers and acquisitions. He moved into the private equity 
business because he wanted to work on a strategic relationship basis, rather 
than on a short-term transactional one as is the case with M&A consulting. 
 
StatePE 
StatePE is one of the biggest providers of non-credit financing for SMEs in 
Germany. The general manager of StatePE has been active in private equity 
for more than 20 years and is one of the (founding) fathers of a renowned 
private equity association. Prior to his current responsibility he worked in 
senior positions at one of the oldest and most renowned German private 
equity companies with a dedication to SMEs, as well as one of the biggest 
private equity companies on a worldwide basis for the German market. His 
interest in SME financing is in the project-based approach and the strategic 
impact of his business, rather than ‘making pricing calculation on rocket-high 
exit-valuations’. 
 
InternationalPE 
InternationalPE is dedicated to SMEs with a fund volume of several hundred 
million euros in Europe. The German team invests, typically, some tens of 
million euros in SMEs with a good market position and a valid growth option. 
Nearly 10% of the employees are based in Germany which is – besides the 
United States – the most important market. In the case of LBOs, the credit 
terms and conditions and covenants are facilitated as a package for the new 
portfolio company. As InternationalPE is looking for companies with a good 
market position these SMEs typically have high EBIT ratios and valid ratings. 
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RestructuringPE 
The private equity company is focused on carve-outs from major corporations 
and on buy-outs of SMEs where a restructuring effort and therefore special 
skills are needed in addition to financing. It comprises tens of employees at 
the headquarters, as well as on-site at the portfolio companies. There is no 
special focus regarding sector or size of the SMEs. The focus lies on the deal 
structure (pricing) and operational leverage which can be exploited. 
The interviewee is experienced in the buy side as well as the sell side. He 
started as a portfolio manager and sales trader regarding various (structured) 
products and is now in charge of deal structuring, as well as financing of 
portfolios and the holding company. His motivation to work for the private 
equity company was to get to know the cash-in side of the business.  
The variety of financial instruments ranges from credit for well situated 
portfolio SMEs to asset based forms like factoring, sale-and-lease-back as 
well as trademark financing, which is not yet accepted in Germany.  
 
FamilyOffice 
A family office manager was selected as, according to an AT Kearney survey 
(Hoyningen-Huene, 2008), state-funds and family offices will play a strong 
role in financing due to the credit crunch. 
The family office is responsible for the investment strategy of parts of an 
industrial family fortune of several billion euros. It comprises various means 
of financing, including direct investments in SMEs on a venture and on a buy-
out basis covering a broad range of phases and industries. Key-decision 
criteria include the management capability and the alignment of the strategy 
of the management with the strategy of the industrial family represented by 
the family office. The core managerial focus is on strategy discussions and 
alignment, rather than day-to-day controlling. The interviewee is the CEO of 
this family office. 
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6.2.3 Purposive Sample SME Intermediates  
In order to triangulate the views from SMEs and financiers, two important 
intermediaries with a sole focus on SMEs were added: a leading chartered 
accountant as well as a leading SME association. 
 
CharteredAccountant 
CharteredAccountant is one-of the leading German accountants dedicated to 
SMEs with some tens of premises around the globe. As a kind of one stop 
supply the various business units offer consulting, chartered accountant 
services as well as legal advice services to SMEs. The interviewee is the 
managing partner and has been with the company due to a close relationship 
with the founder for more than 20 years. His motivation for working with 
SMEs in the financial area is to work directly with the owners of the 
companies and to accompany strategic issues on a long-term basis. 
 
SMEAssociation 
The SME lobbying association comprises nearly a hundred economy or 
employer associations and some tens of corporations in a strong economic 
region covering several million SME employees. The manager had been the 
general manager of an SME-centric research institute, which was associated 
with a renowned German university for several years. He moved to the SME 
association several years ago and worked there in several areas before 
becoming responsible for the SME policy deployment resort a couple of 
years ago.  
6.3 ANALYTICAL APPROACH REGARDING QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The analytical approach is in line with Saunders et al (2007:491). Starting 
with a theoretical framework (here: hypotheses tested in the empirical 
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quantitative section 5), the pre-selecting of suitable cases, and the literature 
and theory reviewed, shaped the data collection, as occurred in the 
quantitative part of the study. Creswell (2003:131) adds to this by pointing out 
that qualitative research, during the 1980s, underwent a transformation to 
broaden its scope of inquiry to include ‘these theoretical lenses’. He states 
that ‘mixed-methods studies may include theory [here: the findings from the 
quantitative analysis] deductively in theory testing and verification’ (Creswell, 
2003:136). 
The specific type applied is the template approach, introduced by Crabtree 
and Miller (1992). As suggested by Crabtree and Miller (1992), key codes 
were determined on an ‘a priori’ basis – on the basis of the research question 
and the findings from the quantitative analysis being the theoretical 
framework. The deriving of these codes from the research question and the 
hypothesis tested in the quantitative analysis, is in line with Saunders et al 
(2007) who – like Crabtree and Miller (1992) – opts for deriving the codes 
from a predetermined analytical framework (here: hypotheses tested). These 
codes are used as templates, in terms of the data analysis; therefore, only 
second level coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) is applied. That means that 
grouping the number of themes to the category is used, rather than first level 
coding (attaching labels to groups of words) due to the preceding 
quantitative-based research. Data are consequently ‘unitised’ by assigning 
parts of the various interview summary session sheets to the respective 
categories. 
The aggregation takes place in a two-step process in line with Robson 
(2002). In the first step, the interview text was reduced by means of session 
summary sheets (as discussed in section 4.4.4). Based on these session 
summary sheets (see example in Appendix G) notes / memos were added to 
the initial codes. In deriving the coding scheme, the author follows what 
Robson (2002:329) calls the ‘mainstream methodological view’ to derive it 
from the research question. In the quantitative part of this thesis, the three 
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hypotheses were introduced to initially answer the research question within 
the first phase of the sequential mix-methods design, by means of a 
quantitative analysis. Therefore, the coding scheme is directly aligned to 
these three research hypotheses. This means that no pre-defined coding 
(Saunders et al, 2007) scheme for this exploratory study can be used. The 
categories are therefore related to the ‘linguistic behaviour’ (Robson, 
2002:327) which covers whether the ‘content of talking’ supports the 
hypothesis or supports the alternative hypothesis, as a kind of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive coding scheme (henceforth: MEE, Robson, 
2002:335).  
 
The aim of the qualitative analysis is to provide deeper insights based on the 
findings of the foregoing quantitative analysis. Therefore, the coding scheme 
is extended by attaching ‘labels’ to the categories in the session summary 
(see example in Appendix G). The coding scheme was set up using the 
guidelines proposed by Robson (2002). It is shown in Table 38, the 
respective categories, codes and one sample ‘label’ per category, derived 
from the session summary sheets, are identified.  
 
Code Category Label (example) 
H1 Evidence regarding Hypothesis 1 is 
provided: ‘corporate finance is 
becoming more difficult for SMEs 
because the house bank principle is 
deteriorating’. 
‘Enhanced Awareness for 
Finance & Administration fosters 
looking for no-credit options.’ 
Not-H1 Evidence regarding alternative 
hypothesis to hypothesis 1. 
‘SMEs might lack alternatives for 
house banks.’ 
H2a Evidence regarding hypothesis 2.a is 
provided: ‘SMEs can cope best by 
improving rating parameters’. 
‘Basel II serves as a catalyst.’ 
Not-
H2a 
Evidence regarding alternative 
hypothesis to hypothesis 2.a. 
‘Rating parameters are not as 
important as the financial crisis 
puts a focus on cash rather than 
rating parameters.’ 
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H3 
(= H2b) 
Evidence regarding Hypothesis 2b 
and 3 is provided: ‘financiers 
(especially non-bank financiers) will 
engage in SME corporate finance 
when they adjust their strategy in 
terms of growth with the aim of niche 
market leadership and when they 
open up for exit strategies’. 
‘SME strategy is in general 
private equity affine.’ 
 
Not-H3 
(= Not-
H2b) 
Evidence regarding alternative 
hypothesis to hypothesis 2.b and 3. 
‘Private equity becomes more risk 
averse due to Basel II and the 
current financial crisis.’ 
Table 38 Coding scheme 
 
The labels support what Robson (2002:329) calls the ‘hypothesis generation 
function’ in exploratory research designs. As will be shown in section 7, the 
initial hypotheses will be amended by the findings from the qualitative 
analysis. The labels will be set in relation to the research question, by means 
of causal networks (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The labels were not 
attached directly into the session summary sheets, but evolved during the 
construction of the causal networks (see section 4.4.4). As mentioned above, 
only second level coding rather than first level coding is used. Therefore, the 
software used is a text processor which is suitable, according to Robson 
(2002), for such kinds of qualitative research. Assigning labels to the 
categories, within causal network design, is the essential task due to the 
predefined context of the quantitative analysis and the hypotheses derived 
from the research questions. 
 
Figure 79 shows an excerpt from an amended session summary report and, 
in Figure 80, a sample causal network is also provided. Codes which provide 
evidence regarding the hypothesis are displayed as ‘green coloured notes’, 
codes which provide evidence regarding the alternative hypothesis are 
displayed as ‘red coloured notes’. Codes which referred to the second half of 
the research question (how SMEs can cope best with the effect of Basel II), 
are displayed as ‘yellow coloured notes’. 
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Figure 79 Excerpt session summary sheet with codes 
 
The analysis of the codes in the session summary sheets, provides the basis 
for the qualitative analysis by means of causal networks. An example 
regarding hypothesis 1 is shown in Figure 80. 
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Figure 80 Sample causal network (here regarding hypothesis 1)  
 
As illustrated in Appendix E, the interview schedules regarding SMEs and 
financiers differ only in the introductory part (personal and company back-
ground, etc.), whereas, the second part (‘confronting with the findings from 
the quantitative analysis’) is identical. Furthermore, the open questions part, 
in the introductory section of the interviews, is similar as the SME question-
naire reflects the demand side, whereas, the financier questionnaire reflects 
the supply side. Therefore, the coding scheme is identical as the second 
level coding is related to the initial hypothesis evaluated in the quantitative 
part. Yet, the labels attached differ which provides the intended ‘practical, or 
economic significance’ (Goldberger, 1991) by means of triangulation. 
6.4 GENERAL ISSUES ON BASEL II AND SME FINANCING 
Nearly all interviewees reflected on Basel II as being a long-term catalyst 
compared to the – hopefully – relatively short term effect of the financial 
crisis. This is in line with Nikitin and Smith’s (2007) research, stating that the 
House Bank principle 
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Basel II
Causal Network regarding Hypothesis 1:
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financial crisis can be regarded as both a fundamental-based and a self-
fulfilling prophecy-based phenomenon. 
6.4.1 The SME View on Basel II 
Interestingly enough, the SMEs interviewed regard Basel II not (only) as a 
threat but as part of an SME improvement process. Yet, SMEs believe that 
non-credit financiers and especially the Chambers of Commerce could do a 
much better job as neutral advisors to financing. ServicesSME and 
MachinerySME believe that Basel II urges SMEs to become more 
professional regarding finance and controlling, which is not the traditional 
stronghold of SMEs. Furthermore, the risk based approach favours 
companies with a high equity capital. MicroSME compared the rating to a 
school grade: ‘you get a grade that means you must try to behave 
accordingly in order to get a good grade, for example regarding stability and 
equity capital’. On the other hand, SmallSME and ServicesSME believe that 
Basel II is the prime reason for deferred investments of the ‘Mittelstand’. 
ServicesSME states: ‘Basel II caused lasting damage to the German 
economy. ... a significant amount of liquidity has been pulled out of the 
system with the consequence that entrepreneurs stopped investments’. 
SmallSME raises a typical German Mittelstand concern that ‘SMEs do not 
want to disclose too many internal corporate details’. 
Contrary to the findings of the quantitative study, ServicesSME and 
MicroSME believe that rating is not a prime issue anymore, as the discussion 
took place extensively three years ago. However, the screening upfront to 
grant credit has been more intense compared to Pre-Basel II times. On the 
other hand, the ‘house bank’ principle is not a one-way street – it is two 
directional. It means that SMEs have to be loyal too to a major extent and not 
always try to shop around even if fixed-income interest rates are temporarily 
more attractive at another financial institute. Conversely, in times of decline 
the options of shopping around are limited. This is especially true for smaller 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 298 of 463 
SMEs according to MicroSME. SmallSME talked about the ‘arrogance of the 
bankers’, fostered by Basel II, as a pressure tool. In particular: ‘we increased 
revenue and earnings, however we were rated down by two steps. The bank 
manager explained that there had been a change in the superordinate rating, 
but he could not or wanted not to explain in detail as it had just come out of 
the computer’. 
 
MachinerySME and MicroSME believe that the negative view on Basel II is 
primarily a classic prejudice, similar to, for example, the negative German 
view on the ‘European Union’. However, SmallSME believes that the house 
bank principle will deteriorate and even smaller SMEs will search for and use 
alternative means of finance due to a reduced supply of credit, with higher 
costs and securities incurred. This ‘accelerating factor’ is in line with findings 
from Siemens Financial Services (SFS, 2009) amongst companies in France, 
Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain. In Germany the proportion of companies 
which expected rising credit rates rose from 29.9% to 55.2%. According to 
the survey, companies are trying to broaden their financing portfolio. 
However, an obstacle is that the private equity market for SMEs is not 
transparent enough. On the other hand, ServicesSME and SmallSME regard 
Basel II to be damaging for the economy in general, and for German SMEs in 
particular. Due to Basel II, liquidity (according to ServicesSME is ‘the life 
blood of the economy’) has been withdrawn. This has led to some SMEs 
going bankrupt or stopping investment. ServicesSME experienced a growing 
arrogance by bank directors who used the rating process as a ‘weapon’. 
Furthermore, he distrusts even more regulation because the ‘state is not a 
good entrepreneur, as history and current examples show’. SmallSME raises 
another issue by pointing out that German SMEs have a competitive 
disadvantage: ‘German SMEs use German accounting principles rather than 
international ones, which don’t have the same concept of EBITDA, for 
example.’ 
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6.4.2 The Financiers’ View on Basel II 
All financiers interviewed acknowledged the catalytic effect of Basel II. 
Contrary to the view of ServicesSME (‘damage to economy’). 
SMEAssociation adds to that: ‘Basel II has a very positive effect if you look at 
the development of the equity ratios. This was a position of points, induced 
by Basel II, which will turn out to be very beneficial!’  
Similar to the SMEs, financiers like LargeBank, PrivateBank and StateBank, 
for example, believe that Basel II will exert an effect on professionalising 
finance and controlling. A prerequisite for sufficient financing is high 
transparency (StateBank or MezzanineBank, for example). LargeBank states 
that Basel II triggered a change process: ‘Basel is a catalyst for various 
changes regarding corporate financing’. This change is fostered by the ‘rating 
incentive’ as PrivateBank concludes: ‘SMEs are increasingly interested in 
learning how to improve the rating parameters’. SavingsBank points out that 
Basel II is advantageous for good SMEs: ‘prior to Basel II, the good SMEs 
subsidised the bad ones’. 
The majority of interviewees, like GermanPE, expect professionalism of 
company management in general, too, which has already begun according to 
SMEAssociation. He traces rising equity ratios back to Basel II related rating 
issues. As a next step SMEs realise that rating is not a means in itself, but 
that ‘Improving rating means improving business’. Yet, SavingsBank points 
out: ‘this imposes a learning curve’, in order to understand that the 
assessment is not on the entrepreneur side alone, but also on the company 
side too. Furthermore, Basel II was used by banks to repair their SME 
margins – this brings forth the fact that SMEs have taken ratings more 
seriously in order to lower the cost of credit financing. According to a survey 
of German magazine ‘finance’, in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Arons, 2008), 
bank lending managers acknowledged that margins improved due to low 
margins in the past and a lack of alternatives like ABS. Yet, SavingsBank 
comes to a different conclusion: as rating fosters a greater spread there will 
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be a battle to win the high-quality SMEs – for the sake of the margin. 
PrivateBank adds an interesting point: ‘In total, credit rates did not become 
cheaper and it is a pity that margins did not become higher; margins went 
down a bit, but risk was significantly reduced. Thus, meaning that the 
reduction in margins does not only have a negative effect’. He believes that 
margins have become fairer due to enhanced information exchange. 
The catalytic effect of Basel II affects banks as well: from a subjective ‘gut 
feeling’ assessment to a more objective, standardised mode. LargeBank 
points out: ‘one cannot heal poor performance by a good relationship, as a 
few key figures are decisive’. Yet, a few point out that the ‘gut feeling’ is still 
relevant, as noted by PrivateBank, yet it is built into ‘numbers’. On the other 
hand, SavingsBank and PrivateBank in particular, acknowledged that their 
internal Pre-Basel II mechanisms became much more professional and 
sophisticated due to Basel II and much more internally accepted within the 
bank. As a consequence, PrivateBank has realised ‘that the rating 
assessments have become more and more similar between various 
institutes. LargeBank adds to this: ‘prior to Basel II the assessment was more 
individualised, now it is more standardised via Bafin [German bank 
supervisory body]’. 
In general, the majority of interviewees believe that SME financing will 
become more difficult / dearer due to Basel II. However, some argue that the 
subprime crisis is a strong accelerator of this trend and ‘Basel II is taken as 
an excuse’ as LargeBank states. According to SeedPE, young companies 
are especially affected by Basel II as ‘they do not have an adequate rating 
history and no realisable securities’. However, this view is not unitary: 
StateBank was directly involved in the Basel II definition refinement process 
regarding SMEs; therefore he is, in general, satisfied with the changes 
achieved. According to evaluations based on the biggest SME databases, 
Basel II should have a neutral effect on SME financing; taking the tailored 
SME securities into account it should be even cheaper. Therefore, he 
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believes that the different perception is due to a ‘perception time lag’: ‘when 
the first Basel II draft was produced, nobody took care. After the first 
analyses were made, the SME associations and Chambers of Commerce 
became alert and stated that Basel II will be harmful for SMEs. This, 
however, took place when the first SME related modifications already took 
place. However, the perception that there is an SME package started slowly, 
only two to three years ago!’ 
SavingsBank, the main provider of SME credits in Germany, adds: ‘the 
differentiation of credit rates will be substantial which will not lead to 
increased margins at the end’. Furthermore, he believes that credit rates do 
not play a prime role, but a dedicated bank relationship manager who cares, 
does. RestructuringPE goes one step further, he believes that: ‘Basel II is 
taken as an appreciated excuse to withdraw from SME financing’ on an 
individual basis or on a broader scale. On the other hand, he argues that, in 
theory, shopping around should be reduced as the pricing decision depends 
on margin goals rather than personal assessment, therefore rating should 
lead to a greater standardisation of assessments. 
However, InternationalPE doubts that private equity as an alternative to credit 
will become easier. New deals are dependent, to a certain extent, on external 
financing (LBOs): ‘this will be more difficult as new credits, in general, will 
become more difficult due to Basel II.’ The dependency on banks is pointed 
out more directly by the ECIMS (2006). The importance of Basel II on private 
equity can be seen from the fact that banks are with 22.3% (together with 
pension funds with 22.6%) the biggest investors in private equity in Europe 
(based on data between 1999 and 2005). 
Overall, there is a general view from the banking, rather than the non-
banking, side that the negative view on Basel II is more about perception 
than reality; similar to the ‘fairy tale’ that the euro introduction led to higher 
prices. Some take Basel II to be an excuse if a credit is declined, although 
the reasons lie in the underlying company-specific economic factors. 
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6.5 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS REGARDING HYPOTHESIS 1 
As discussed in section 4.2.3, the first initial hypothesis is: ‘corporate finance 
is becoming more difficult for SMEs because the ‘house bank principle’ is 
deteriorating’. The qualitative analysis acknowledges this hypothesis, yet 
evidence is provided that the ‘house bank principle’ will not only deteriorate 
but it will become different: from a house bank principle towards a ‘core bank’ 
principle. That means that the importance of banks will deteriorate as sole 
providers of finance. However, Basel II will foster the trend that bank credits 
will be provided by only one core bank. 
The qualitative analysis is grouped around the respective elements of the 
qualitative semi-structured interviews, with regards to hypothesis 1. The key 
findings – which will be evaluated, in detail by means of causal networks, in 
this section – are: 
> The ‘SME potential areas’ are in general ‘unconsciously private equity 
related’ and a growing awareness, regarding controlling and finance, will 
foster the seeking of alternatives for bank credits. 
> Regarding ‘financing preferences’, Basel II is a ‘catalyst’. The financial 
crisis serves as an accelerator for changes in corporate finance 
preferences from a house bank principle towards a core bank principle (as 
banks are handing out state subsidies, too). SMEs are seeking 
alternatives and are well advised to do so. 
> Evaluating the generic ‘reasons of credit declines’ the general opinion from 
financiers is that credits are still available. Yet, due to enhanced 
requirements of Basel II and the financial crisis, they are becoming more 
difficult to obtain. Communication and transparency are becoming highly 
important due to Basel II. 
> Regarding ‘financial performance and credit rates’, SMEs, especially, 
believe in a reduction of credits to improve margins. On the other hand, 
financiers assume that the bargaining power of top rated SMEs increases. 
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6.5.1 Hypothesis 1: Company Potential Areas 
In terms of potential areas nearly all interviewees found themselves 
reconfirmed in the view of the typical technical / market driven entrepreneur. 
This assessment has to change under the Basel II regime in order to stay 
sufficiently financed, which is partly under way. 
The key findings in relation to the hypothesis 1 are: 
> The focus regarding potential areas of SME entrepreneurs is strongly 
private equity affine. 
> The growing focus on finance and controlling has a spill-over effect as 
dealing with internal finance will foster interest in potential financing 
alternatives to bank credit. 
 
Figure 81 shows the causal network regarding ‘company potential areas’, by 
taking the author’s scientific realism philosophical stance into account. As 
discussed, the qualitative causalities (‘action’) from the ‘mechanism Basel II’ 
(‘controlled for the environment context of the financial crisis’) are illustrated 
with respect to the three hypotheses. The thickness of the arrow indicates the 
strength of the trigger, in the upper half of the figure. The green colour of an 
arrow, in the lower half, indicates that there is evidence for the respective 
hypothesis. In this case, the evidence regarding hypothesis 1 with respect to 
‘company potential areas’. A red arrow (see following figures and excursus 
about Popperian methods and the concept of triangulation in section 4) 
indicates evidence for the alternative hypothesis, also listed below. 
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Figure 81 Causal network hypothesis 1 regarding ‘company potential areas’ 
The comprehensive findings from the self-administered questionnaires are 
displayed in Table 39. 
 
Potential areas Current poten- Future poten-  
   tial (1 to 4) tial (1 to 4) 
 
Profitability (in rel. to sector avg.) 2.67 2.79 + 4.4% 
Financial situation (equity ratio. 2.79 2.86 + 2.4% 
liqu. in rel. to sector avg.) 
Management 3.02 3.02 + 0% 
Research & Development 2.05 2.46 + 19.9% 
Production & Logistics 2.56 2.77 + 8.5% 
Marketing & Sales 2.79 3.12 + 11.8% 
Controlling & Administration 2.83 2.82 - 0.1% 
 
 
Table 39 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding company potential areas 
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Potential of Niche Market Leadership (in line with non-bank investment 
criteria) 
StatePE confirms the findings of the study and points out that the primary 
issue is to create a ‘company-specific economic boom’. SavingsBank and 
PrivateBank believe that the current decade is a special situation in the SME 
eco-system life cycle. The ‘founder generation’ built up the SMEs under 
difficult situations in the 1950s / 1960s and grew in the boom phases in the 
1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, these often saw the next generation take 
over and they have had to struggle in the current decade as the company 
had become complacent in the last 20 years. Therefore, there is a major 
backlog demand in terms of R&D and marketing, which is in line with the 
assessment of SmallSME. MicroSME points out that the high value of 
management reflects the essential role of the manager in SME environments. 
As SavingsBank puts it: ‘one single failure can set the whole company at 
risk’. 
By comparing the answers of some interviewees, like StateBank or 
InternationalPE, regarding strategic SME focus and private equity financier 
criteria (findings from the quantitative analysis) it is possible to see a high 
alignment. 
 
Awareness on Finance and Controlling Fosters Openness Regarding 
Financing Options 
Many interviewees, such as SmallSME, point out that lack of control is still a 
weak point. For example, StateBank states: ‘controlling is mere number 
crunching, but controlling is not used to drive an improvement process!’ On 
the other hand, SME interviewees stress the importance of strong control, 
especially ServicesSME: ‘I regard controlling as very important, as I steer 
other areas by means of key performance indicators, these should be 
improved further’. 
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MachinerySME makes an interesting point: banks make greater demands on 
financial information due to Basel II rating issues. This provokes SMEs to be 
more concerned with financial issues and this education fosters a stronger 
awareness regarding financing and bank-credit alternatives. RestructuringPE 
points out that a focus on cost (see section 6.6.2) is related to finance and 
control, as ‘keeping costs in line, needs valid financial management’. 
6.5.2 Hypothesis 1: Corporate Financing Preferences of SMEs 
In a comparison of 48 countries between 1995 and 1999 (Beck et al, 2008) 
Germany ranked in the middle (No. 28) in terms of bank financing with 
16.84%, ranked second regarding equity with 23.13%, and third in the usage 
of subsidized credits. This assessment corresponds to the BDI SME panel 
(BDI, 2007). On a scale from 1 to 5, equity had the highest priority (3.68), 
followed by credit (2.57), leasing (2.46), subsidies (1.88), private equity (1.48) 
and mezzanine (1.35). 
In general, the financiers believe that the assessment of the financial 
community regarding the questionnaires is more valid, especially with regard 
to the reduction in credit. They name the following reasons for the high 
dependency on bank credit for the decades prior to Basel II: high availability 
of cheap money (‘loans have been mispriced’ according to GermanPE or 
MezzanineBank, for example) and for tax reasons (CharteredAccountant or 
GermanPE, for example). The tax focus and ‘identity’ between company and 
owner is regarded by GermanPE as one of the prime reasons for a low 
capital market orientation – in combination with low interest rates. 
 
However, Basel II is a catalyst for a sustainable change and openness 
regarding other forms of finance, as all interviewed SMEs and nearly all 
financiers stated: this is in line with a survey by Suhl and Weber (2005) 
amongst BVK members where 90% of the private equity financed companies 
regarded the influence of private equity companies to be ‘(very) important’ 
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which goes beyond pure financing. Only 2.4% believe that the development 
would have been faster without private equity. Furthermore, portfolio 
companies stated, in the majority, that the cooperation with private equity 
stakeholders is better than with banks. Interestingly enough, the portfolio 
companies argued that the main know-how provided is achieved from dealing 
with banks. However, the results of the portfolio companies might be biased 
as these companies depend strongly on private equity financing. This 
hampers validity (Girden, 2001:4-5). 
 
Yet, several studies regarding other forms of corporate financing like Gregory 
et al (2005) on SMEs in general, Nitschke and Kuper (2007) on private 
equity, Frey and Kuhn (2007) on IPOs, or BdB (2005) on Asset Backed 
Securities, for example, provide evidence that a variety of corporate financing 
options is only available for SMEs with revenues of more than, on average, 5 
million euros. 
 
The overall summary regarding hypothesis 1 with regard to ‘corporate 
finance preference’ is as follows: 
> From ‘house bank principle’ to ‘core bank principle’: 
Basel II is a catalyst for change, however, the change will be accelerated 
by the current crisis. The focus is on reducing dependency. As banks have 
been the sole providers of finance for decades that means reducing bank 
credit and building up equity. 
> SMEs are seeking alternatives and are well advised to do so. Alternative 
means of finance, private equity and strategic investors are therefore on 
the rise; this is regarded as a direct outflow of the Basel II catalysing effect 
and a new entrepreneur generation which is more open minded. However, 
they question whether the freedom of choice is apparent for all SMEs, or 
only the major ones. 
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> Furthermore, in the current financial crisis the German Federal 
Government allocated a lump sum of subsidised credits. These were 
transferred to the SMEs not directly, but via ‘house banks’ (BdB, 2005), 
which strengthened their position. 
> On the other hand: the financial crisis led to an economic one (Strategic 
Direction, 2009) which leads to deteriorating earnings and cash flows for 
SMEs, which reduced their financing options outside their ‘house banks’. 
As Weber and Darbellay (2008) point out: bank failures are associated 
with high social cost. 
 
Figure 82 shows the causal network ‘corporate finance preferences’. 
 
Figure 82 Causal network hypothesis 1 regarding ‘corporate finance preferences’ 
 
The summarised findings from the questionnaire feedback can be found in 
Table 40. There seems to be a stronger substitutive demand for credit-
financing. Whereas bank credits will decline, all assessments regarding the 
various other means of financing will increase. MezzanineBank and 
MicroSME regard this as an outflow of more alternatives available.  
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How do you assess the financing preferences of SMEs in the past (prior to 
Basel II, i.e. prior to 2007/2008) and in the future?  
 
Usage of financing 
options: 
SMEs SMEs   Finan- 
ciers 
Finan-
ciers 
 
 Pre-
Basel II 
Post-
Basel II 
  Pre-
Basel II 
Post-
Basel II 
 
Retained earnings 3.19 3.47 8.8%  3.52 3.77 7.1%
Share holder (equ/loan) 2.53 2.54 0.4%  3.35 3.60 7.5%
Bank credit 3.00 2.95 -1.7%  3.84 3.52 -8.3%
SME subsidies 2.38 2.28 -4.2%  3.16 3.27 3.5%
Supplier credit 2.28 2.26 -0.9%  3.43 3.65 6.4%
Leasing 2.81 2.93 4.3%  3.26 3.44 5.5%
Factoring 1.41 1.59 12.8%  2.60 3.13 20.4%
Mezzanine 1.20 1.43 19.2%  2.32 2.63 13.4%
Securities (ABS)  1.13 1.13 0.0%  1.56 1.52 -2.6%
Private Equity 1.29 1.49 15.5%  2.29 2.79 21.8%
Strategic Investor 1.36 1.72 26.5%  2.21 2.59 17.2%
IPO (e. g. Entry Std.)  1.05 1.16 10.5%  1.92 1.84 -4.2%
 
Table 40 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding the Pre- and Post-Basel II 
assessments by SMEs and financiers in terms of ‘sources of finance’  
 
It is not only the finance crisis which adds to increased demand for credit 
alternatives: MezzanineBank and StatePE point out that a high volume of 
‘underpriced’ mezzanine has to be refinanced by SMEs. 
 
Internal Financing 
Several empirical research studies, like Deloitte & Touche (2007), regarding 
German SMEs, Ou and Haynes (2003) for the US, or Beck et al (2008) 
based on data from 48 countries, provide evidence that internal finance is the 
prime source of finance. Growth is funded primarily by retained earnings. 
Generating equity out of retained earnings or including shareholder loans 
from the sole owner of the company are regarded as the silver bullet by 
nearly all interviewees – especially in times of a crisis (SmallSME). It is the 
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cheapest method of financing, as MezzanineBank and SMEAssociation put 
it, and the one which makes an SME most independent (SmallSME, for 
example). Basel II is seen as the trigger which has been accelerated by the 
financial crisis. This is in line with Landskroner and Paroush (2008) who 
argue, based on a theoretical model with empirical evidence that exogenous 
shocks will result in more equity financing by corporations. 
 
From ‘House Bank’ to ‘Core Bank’ Principle 
The majority of interviewees, such as InternationalPE or SMEAssociation, do 
not believe that the house bank principle will completely cease to exist. 
However, it will change substantially. SMEAssociation and MezzanineBank, 
for example, believe that – initiated by Basel II – there will not only be one 
bank for all issues in the future, but one ‘core bank’ for a special means of 
financing. Due to regulatory issues and the financial crisis there is little 
possibility to transfer. In addition, banks have been trying to recover their 
relatively low margins with reference to Basel II, which had been low due to 
the high competition in the cheap-money era of the past. ServicesSME state: 
‘banks want to optimise margins; therefore they have no interest in providing 
good ratings nor passing the margins on’. In total, this provides evidence for 
a reduction of the trusted house bank principle. 
StateBank argues in a similar direction that some banks will intensify and 
expand their portfolio, whereas other specialised institutes will serve 
specialised needs. On the other hand, GermanPE makes a point that the 
relationship is bidirectional in times of the worldwide financial crisis. He 
states: ‘it might be difficult to find a bank which will survive the crisis’. 
SmallSME regards the findings from the quantitative analyses that bank 
loans will be nearly unchanged and credit alternatives will be enhanced a 
confirmation that ‘SMEs invest anti-cyclically, due to low interest rates’, 
contrary to large corporations. 
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Credits 
Bank credits will remain the core element as SMEAssociation and 
MezzanineBank highlight. PrivateBank points out that, nowadays, SMEs 
even pay a commitment charge to secure currently unused credit lines. This 
was not questioned by any financier interviewed, despite a growing number 
of alternatives. The market is still not transparent enough for SMEs.  
Regarding the reduction in credit, nearly all financiers believe that SMEs are 
too optimistic regarding the decline in credit. It will be much more dramatic, 
especially according to GermanPE. Covenants will become more important 
due to Basel II and the current crisis due to an increasing professionalism 
amongst bankers. As discussed already, MezzanineBank believes that there 
will be a shift from ‘one house bank’ to ‘several core banks’: ‘nowadays, the 
tendency is that an entrepreneur is searching for core banks, nobody will be 
dependent, everybody is searching for a bank, in a specialist area, where the 
respective bank has the highest competence’. 
Furthermore, bank credits were not priced adequately prior to Basel II. There 
had not been a risk-adjusted pricing due to high competition between the 
banks (MezzanineBank) and the availability of cheap money (GermanPE). In 
order to provide an affordable mix in the future, banks will more proactively 
use state subsidised funds (StateBank). Regarding ‘good SME clients’, banks 
can offer this additional advantage to enhance customer loyalty (see ‘house 
bank principle’). Regarding SMEs with an unfavourable rating, this could be 
the only way to offer credits in a reasonable way. He believes in a 
‘renaissance’ of the house bank principle because shopping around between 
banks becomes laborious due to the rating effort. In parallel, some banks will 
broaden or deepen their offerings. On the other hand, specialised providers 
of financing will emerge. 
This is a relatively new trend in relation to findings from Beck et al (2008). 
Smaller firms rely, in general, more strongly on internal finance, as the usage 
of funds from subsidy banks is lower than compared to bigger companies. 
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Only CharteredAccountant and MachinerySME point out that for SMEs the 
situation might improve. Banks are searching for well positioned SMEs 
because the financing volume is much smaller compared to the major 
corporations. Similarly SMEAssociation believes that the financing situation 
will deteriorate (if this is really the case) for very small and very big SMEs.  
As a minority opinion, ServicesSME believes that the reduction is not only 
geared by the banks but by the SMEs too: ‘SMEs had been disappointed by 
banks – therefore they felt offended and were seeking alternatives to bank 
credits, as a kind of counter action’. 
 
Private Equity 
FamilyOffice distinguishes the role of private equity in relation to the 
shareholder base: ‘there are two criteria for privately owned companies, it 
makes sense to clear up the balance sheet, the second is growth capital. 
Regarding publicly listed companies, it makes sense for companies with a 
high free float to search for an anchor investor’. This sounds like the former 
‘house bank principle’. However, care has to be taken if the entrance of 
private equity is campaigned by a high leverage: all issues like restructuring 
can be done without a private equity investor. Therefore, an SME should 
carefully think about that option, in particular, it should not serve as an 
excuse for change. 
StatePE points out that private equity is relatively young in Germany, but is 
growing well: ‘when the private equity association [BVK] was founded we 
were 10 people in a room – now hundreds of people attend the meeting’. 
SavingsBank traces this back to a greater openness, of the ‘new 
entrepreneurial generation’, and the credit limits of banks per investments. 
Regarding the findings, he refers to the question of Basel II as ‘cause and 
effect’. In the way that credit financing will become dearer due to the low 
equity ratio, private equity will be a natural remedy according to GermanPE. 
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The still relatively low values – in relation to other financing alternatives – for 
private equity and strategic investors is explained as follows (especially 
GermanPE): SMEs mix up the problems of some highly geared portfolio 
companies with private equity in general. Non leveraged SME-centric private 
equity is not as strongly affected as the large buy-out funds. On the other 
hand, banks like LargeBank and PrivateBank believe that a substitute effect 
is mere wishful thinking. Similarly, StateBank points out: ‘what is for sure is 
that, with Basel II, stakes in companies became more expensive for banks’. 
Basel II makes portfolio holdings for banks more expensive – this has 
implications on private equity as approximately 50% of all fund inflows came 
from the financial services industry in Germany in 2007 (BVK, 2008). 
Furthermore, he argues that the discussion on private equity has not always 
been objective. And the bank rationale that private equity investors will have 
to make additional payments in case of a liquidity gap, which makes a bank’s 
investment more reliable, might not become true in all instances. If the 
company valuation is lower than the amount of credit the private equity firm 
will not step in. Given the decline in valuations since the beginning of the 
subprime crisis this is a major issue in geared investments, which is typical 
for transactions related to major companies. Buy-outs crashed from 82.8% of 
all investments in Germany to 10.9% one year later (BVK, 2009b). 
MachinerySME, MicroSME and RestructuringPE believe that private equity is 
still the ultimate ratio for ‘traditional old-economy SMEs’ if banks refuse to 
grant credit. They believe that the relatively high increases in private equity / 
strategic investor values are induced by marketing and press rather than 
commonplace practice. 
 
Strategic Investor 
Furthermore, partly due to Basel II, several interviewees stressed the 
growing importance of strategic investors like Business Angels (regarding the 
seed / growth phase, as SeedPE believes), or ‘strategic investors’ (regarding 
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takeovers, as FamilyOffice and PrivateBank states). From the point of view of 
a strategic investor SeedPE believes in a revival. Entrepreneurs of larger 
corporations will not entrust their money to wealth management departments 
any longer due to the negative experience of the financial crisis: they will 
manage their family funds better on their own. 
FamilyOffice and RestructuringPE point out that strategic investors are 
regarded as good guys with deep pockets (FamilyOffice). The latter is 
doubted by RestructuringPE who believes that it ‘is a falsehood that strategic 
investors would not change structures as much as a financial investor would’. 
The author adds that it seems as though German SMEs have a ‘traditional 
aversion’ towards strategic investors, as these consist, in the SME area, 
primarily of close competitors. CharteredAccountant and MezzanineBank 
point out that a strategic investor is not essentially a means of substitute, 
according to their experience, but is primarily an issue of succession 
planning. Primarily, strategic investors will be on the buy side 
(MezzanineBank) due to pricing issues. ServicesSME, for example, took over 
several smaller companies in order to provide marketing and sales capacity 
and strategic market guidance. 
 
Alternative Forms of Finance 
In general, some financiers, like InternationalPE or LargeBank, as well as 
SMEAssociation, estimate that alternative forms of finance serve as a 
substitute to tighter bank credit in times of a risk-based capital requirements 
approach. Hartl (2002), for example, refers to the issue that extensive leasing 
reduces credit options. 
However, this might derive from a prior perception that audits regarding 
leasing and factoring are more lax. Yet, SmallSME, for example, believes 
that leasing requirements are still far lower than credit requirements.  
Regarding mezzanine, it is necessary to distinguish between ‘program 
mezzanine’ and ‘individual mezzanine’. Program Mezzanine has been priced 
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too cheaply, according to GermanPE, and will vanish completely. This makes 
it now difficult for SMEs to get follow-up financing (like individual mezzanine) 
at an affordable price. SMEAssociation adds to this that SMEs are not yet 
adjusted to mezzanine to a major extent. This is in line with Bruch (2008): the 
market for standard mezzanine collapsed completely and was replaced by 
individual mezzanine. According to the Mezzanine Report, the securitisation 
of mezzanine reached a record height of 1.4 billion euros in 2006, but then 
was reduced to 0.6 billion in 2007 and vanished completely in 2008. Mezza-
nineBank, as well as StatePE, as providers of such a form of finance, believe 
that this can be regarded as a valid substituting alternative to private equity 
due to its equity equivalent function. This is in line with Brokamp et al (2004).  
Regarding factoring, StatePE points out that this is an instrument which could 
be used as a one-shot measurement to gain liquidity after the financial crisis. 
It depends on the leverage structure. RestructuringPE traces back the strong 
increase in the growing acceptance of factoring: ‘factoring is now becoming 
socially acceptable. It is similar to ‘leasing’ ten years ago, now leasing has 
reached a stable high level’. LargeBank regards factoring as a clever 
alternative for entering new markets. For a short time, refinancing of factoring 
providers has been available again (PrivateBank). 
SeedPE refers to special limitations for (leading edge) SMEs. He explained 
the case of a high-tech company stating that the leaser declined leasing of 
special machinery as it was not conventional, like ‘machinery for window 
frames’ is. He regards that as an outflow of a more restrictive banking 
approach. This is in line with FamilyOffice who regards factoring as being 
‘cumbersome and complicated’. 
StateBank believes in a return of ABS in the long run (stated currently by 
other interviewees as: ABS is ‘dead’). The assessment of ABS corresponds 
to an earlier survey Steiner et al (2003).  
According to GermanPE, ‘the increase in IPOs is regarded as a hypothetical 
option’. However, LargeBank points out that the level of alternative finance is 
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still low as the markets are still dominated by classic non-banks whereby 
‘banks to a certain extent try to enter the markets by providing mezzanine or 
by offering consulting on a fee basis. However, alternative means, like 
factoring and leasing, are still dominated by non-bank institutes’. 
6.5.3 Hypothesis 1: Reasons for The Decline of Bank Credits 
The biggest mismatch in assessment between the interviews with SMEs and 
financiers is that SMEs believe much more that banks are withdrawing from 
SME financing in general, or from certain sectors, whereas financiers believe 
that is not the case and it is just a pretext (especially SavingsBank, 
PrivateBank and InternationalPE). SMEAssociation and SavingsBank state 
that special sectors are more under scrutiny than others, but there is no 
broad brush approach. Others, like LargeBank, believe that Basel II has a 
positive effect as it objectifies decision taking. 
The key findings regarding hypothesis 1, in terms of ‘reasons for credit 
decline’ are: 
> ‘Credit crunch’: credits are still available, yet, due to enhanced 
requirements of Basel II and the financial crisis they are becoming more 
difficult to obtain. 
> The communication between banks and SMEs has to be improved, 
despite the year-long house bank principles. This is a two-way issue. 
> There are deficiencies in transparency.  
> Basel II fosters a mechanistic approach rather than an in-depth 
understanding. 
> SMEs believe that major private banks have withdrawn more strongly from 
SME financing than savings banks and cooperative banks. 
 
Figure 83 shows the causal network regarding ‘reasons for declining bank 
credits’ . 
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Figure 83 Causal network hypothesis 1 regarding ‘reasons for rejecting bank credits’ 
 
The summarised findings from the quantitative survey are displayed in Table 
41. 
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How do you assess the rejection criteria of bank credits regarding SMEs in the 
past (prior to Basel II, i. e. prior to 2007/8) and in the future (next two years)? 
 
Rejection criteria bank 
credits: 
SMEs SMEs   Finan- 
ciers 
Finan-
ciers 
 
 Pre-Basel 
II 
Post-
Basel II 
  Pre-
Basel II 
Post-
Basel II 
 
to SMEs in general 2.24 3.04 35.7%  2.07 2.54 22.7%
Poor sector outlook 2.68 3.47 29.5%  3.21 3.48 8.4%
Poor market position 
comp: to competitors 
2.71 3.33 22.9%  3.33 3.63 9.0%
Profitability in the past 3.00 3.47 15.7%  3.12 3.30 5.8%
Financial situation in the 
past (equity ratio, liqu.) 
3.12 3.75 20.2%  3.21 3.45 7.5%
Insufficient Securities / 
Liabilities 
3.32 3.81 14.8%  2.67 2.82 5.6%
Unfavourable outlook 
(Rev., earnings, …) 
3.25 3.79 16.6%  3.65 3.82 4.7%
Quality of 
management team 
2.98 3.52 18.1%  3.56 3.77 5.9%
Differences in assess-
ment of comp. Strategy 
2.76 3.11 12.7%  2.98 3.28 10.1%
Personal friction betw. 
management a. banker 
2.80 2.89 3.2%  2.86 2.91 1.7%
 
Table 41 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding the Pre- and Post-Basel II 
assessments of SMEs and financiers regarding ‘credit rejection criteria’ 
 
According to CharteredAccountant it is interesting that all the values go up, 
which provides evidence that credits will become dearer in general (due to 
Basel II and the financial crisis).  
 
Generic versus Specific Reasons 
In general, financiers, like RestructuringPE and SavingsBank, believe that 
SMEs make mistakes by believing that generic reasons like ‘blacklisting of 
SMEs in general or with regard to specific sectors’ are the primary ones. 
PrivateBank points out that the process of scrutiny is just more intense. 
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MezzanineBank, for example, believes that there will be a refocus by SMEs 
on valid business models and sound financial planning to get access to credit 
in times of Basel II. MicroSME differentiates according to size: ‘the sector 
outlook plays a role regarding major SMEs. These are affected more than 
smaller SMEs, who find a niche somewhere’. GermanPE comes to a similar 
conclusion, but from a different perspective: due to Basel II and the subprime 
crisis local banks will finance local business again, rather than SMEs abroad 
in order to gain market share. That means that German private banks will 
return to German SME financing. However, the question is whether all private 
banks will sooner or later become state banks. This is in line with 
StateBank’s comments. However, there are diverging views: MachinerySME 
believes that major private banks have withdrawn more strongly from SME 
financing than savings banks and cooperative banks. SmallSME believes 
that ‘certain sectors like gastronomy have been blacklisted due to Basel II’. 
SeedPE sees politics as being in the driving seat to ‘change Basel II or to 
take away fears regarding the future of SMEs’. He believes that enhancing 
state guarantees does not help as banks either want to finance a company or 
they do not. If so, they are looking for valid margins which will be diminished 
by state guarantees. MezzanineBank believes that in times of Basel II and 
the financial crisis it is ‘a matter of securities which are still left to cover rating 
related issues’. Therefore, the high significance of liquidity is recognised. 
Some financiers believe that the issue of securitisation is an outflow from pro-
actively shaping the private wealth of the entrepreneur. However, as 
StateBank points out, the SME package of Basel II offers new options which 
are yet not widely known by all participants. InternationalPE ascribes this to 
the growing importance of securities in the financial crisis. 
On the contrary, PrivateBank and SavingsBank believe that the issue of 
securities is overvalued by SMEs. Valid SMEs with a good rating do not need 
securities, or only need them to lower the regulatory capital in order to get 
lower rates. On the other hand, if the rating indicates that the SME is not in a 
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good position, securities do not help. Furthermore, SMEs are still not aware 
that only realisable secessions are viable for a bank. SmallSME questions 
this: ‘banks are not co-entrepreneurs and therefore securitisation is key for a 
bank’. 
Interestingly enough, GermanPE sees a link between private equity and 
access to credit. Private equity firms are professionally managed in terms of 
focusing on increasing company valuation rather than being technology 
driven (regardless of the market) or focused on saving employment. This 
enables a better management of resources.  
SmallSME believes that Basel II fosters better planning (‘Basel II planning 
requirements are a business plan light’) and acknowledges that ‘prior to 
Basel II it was easier to fool the banker which becomes now more difficult’. 
 
Indirect Effect of Basel II Regulation 
Due to Basel II (fostered by the financial crisis) covenants in credit contracts 
have become close to private equity contracts (MezzanineBank). 
Furthermore, Basel II forces banks to increase their regulatory capital in 
terms of SME credits in general, according to his opinion.  
FamilyOffice goes even further as he doubts that banks have the right 
instruments for assessing SMEs: ‘banks do not have a broad understanding 
for companies. I know a current case where a bank granted a million euro 
credit on the verge of a default. The problem is a mechanistic procedure, 
combined with a pressure to achieve super returns’. On the other hand, 
future world market leaders might not get credit in the early growth phase at 
all. Or, savings bank directors which are closely linked to political decision 
makers in municipalities often adjust their decisions politically. He argues that 
banks, in general, lack the in-depth understanding of an SME business. On 
the other hand, he believes that banks will come back to the playing field – 
not because of a growing understanding, but for profit reasons. In the past, 
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SME financing was not profitable enough due to ‘fabricated’ higher profits, 
such as with subprime credits. This is in line with SmallSME who points out 
that SMEs are regarded as less risky nowadays. In summary, the 
combination of Basel II as a ‘mechanistic approach’ (in line with SeedPE or 
SmallSME who points out ‘prior to Basel II, I had direct discussion with the 
Board of Directors which ceased ... they seem now to be consumed internally 
with reporting’), the ‘quest for super-returns’ and ‘political interference at 
savings banks’ is harmful in terms of SME financing in general. 
 
Communication and Transparency 
One of the most interesting findings from the interviews, according to the 
author, is that financiers unequivocally state bi-directional communication 
problems between SMEs and banks as one of the biggest obstacles to credit 
financing. This is astonishing as the house bank principle has been active for 
decades. RestructuringPE believes that for SMEs rating is just an ‘abstract 
construct’. Banks sell ratings as a ‘Black-box’ as SMEAssociation puts it: ‘if I 
am a banker and the rating is too bad, then I am in a meeting of 3 to 4 hours, 
after which I do not have anything at all. There are examples: if you want 
additional information you have to pay’. FamilyOffice believes that banks 
have to learn to know their SME clients better; the rating based approach is 
not a valid judgement instrument. On the other hand, PrivateBank assumes 
that ‘it is nearly impossible to explain to a self-confident entrepreneur that his 
company does not meet the requirements of the banking (rating) criteria’. 
6.5.4 Hypothesis 1: Financial Performance and Cost of Finance 
The quantitative analysis (see section 5) provides evidence that SMEs would 
enhance earnings and equity ratios in the future and would reduce the usage 
of current accounts. However, SMEs believe that credit rates will rise for 
them and the rate of credit declines will increase. The interviews agree with 
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this, but believe the reasons have to be found outside Basel II. Chartered-
Accountant goes even one step further: the question with rating under the 
Basel II regime is not only if credits will become dearer, but getting a credit at 
all. On the other hand, the interviewed bankers argued that Basel II provides 
a chance to improve credit rates. The key findings related to hypothesis 1 
with regards to ‘financial performance and credit rate development’ are: 
> Due to the risk-agnostic Basel I paradigm and the ‘affluence of cheap 
money’ in recent years, Basel II is the trigger with which to improve 
margins in the SME area. This is in line with the majority of, but not all, 
interviewees.  
> Due to shortage of money in times of the banking crisis, credits are 
sanctioned. 
> Basel II is the chance for valid SMEs to lower their credit rates; the 
bargaining power of the top-rated SMEs fuels banking competition. 
Figure 84 shows the causal network regarding ‘financial performance’. 
 
 
 
Figure 84 Causal network hypothesis 1 regarding ‘financial performance’ 
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LargeBank points out that the fear of higher credit rates, despite the positive 
assessment in terms of EBIT and equity development (see Table 42, 
summary of the quantitative survey), is ‘typical German pessimism’. 
 
  The Pre-Basel II 
value was … 
The Post-Basel II value 
will prob. be … 
 Current value 1 = lower, 2 = equal, 
3 = higher 
1 = lower, 2 = equal, 
3 = higher 
No. of employees 
finance department 
2.9 Persons 1.94 2.21 
No. of phone calls with 
bank manager p. year 
14.8 times p. a. 1.96 2.00 
No. of meetings with 
bank manager p. year 
3.2 times p. a. 1.94 2.08 
EBIT ratio (Pre-tax 
Profit / revenue) 
6.6% 1.75 2.29 
Equity ratio 37.9% 1.94 2.38 
Height overdraft 
(in % of revenue) 
5.8% 2.11 1.82 
Development of credit rates 2.15 2.27 
No. of credit application 
rejections 
____ times 1.83 2.04 
 
Table 42 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding the assessment of financial 
performance (Pre- and Post-Basel II) 
 
Basel II = Credit Rates Up – Bank Margins Up? 
All interviewees unequivocally (even SMEs) believe that credit rates will rise 
as they have been historically low prior to Basel II, especially fostered by the 
US central bank policy. The enhanced transparency of Basel II enables 
banks to use the additional information creation options to go back to risk-
based pricing in a less competitive environment. In addition, the abolition of 
state guarantees of savings banks in Germany in 2005 (Monti, 2003), and the 
problems of the state-owned SME bank IKB (Hall, 2008), enable non-public 
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banks to become competitive again. The combined factors lead to the effect 
that for one of the biggest banks (LargeBank) the SME business became the 
biggest in volume within a few years, providing the highest margins. 
Therefore, the risk based capital allocation approach enables banks, 
according to LargeBank, SmallSME and MicroSME, to improve margins. 
Under the rating regime the granting of credits has become more objective. 
In addition, banks lost money in investment banking (structured products) 
and want to recover the margin base at the expense of the SMEs who have 
less financing alternatives. Yet, StateBank believes that the assessment of 
rising interest is still derived from the ‘perception gap’ (of the early Basel II 
version). According to several studies, Barfield (2004b), for example, the high 
competition in Germany will not allow for increasing margins. GermanPE 
therefore advises SMEs to ‘actively manage the passive side of the balance 
sheet’.  
In addition, PrivateBank and SavingsBank believe that the bargaining power 
of good SMEs will improve, as only a portion of the high-margin ‘bad SMEs’ 
will survive. The competition to get the good one will result in lower credit 
rates and lower margins. Furthermore, it has become more difficult for banks 
to refinance themselves due to the subprime crisis. In particular, the surplus 
in the two to three year range is substantial. This is the prime reason why 
banks do not provide ratings of very good SMEs voluntarily, according to 
PrivateBank. This correlates with Valverde and Fernández (2007), who write 
about a ‘paradoxical coexistence’ derived from a literature review and their 
own models. By widening the portfolio to non-credit financial services the 
following can be observed: ‘decreasing interest margins and increasing 
market power in European banking sectors’. This is in line with the German 
Banking Association (BdB, 2009) who argues that due to the financial crisis 
margins have come under pressure. However, from a LBO perspective, 
InternationalPE experienced a slight decrease in credit rates as margins 
have increased by more than 50% (from 2.5 to 4.0 base points – at the same 
time the Euribor declined at an even greater rate, from 4.0 to 1.4.  
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Communication Issues 
Again, the communication issue is regarded as one of the prime reasons for 
problems in the banking relationship. CharteredAccountant believes that 
‘SMEs only talk to their bank when credit is needed’. This is not the right 
strategy for lowering their credit rates, as the positive MachinerySME 
example shows. 
6.6 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS REGARDING HYPOTHESIS 2.A 
As discussed in section 4.2.3, the first part of the second initial hypothesis is: 
‘SMEs can cope best with the effect when they proactively engage in rating 
and improve the parameters’. The qualitative analysis is grouped around the 
respective elements of the qualitative semi-structured interviews, with 
regards to hypothesis 2.a. The key findings – which will be evaluated in detail 
by means of causal networks in this section – are: 
 
Company strategy 
> Relating ‘company strategy focus’, Basel II serves as a trigger. The 
financial crisis is regarded as an accelerator towards a stronger focus on 
finance and controlling, and therefore on rating. However, in the times of 
the financial crisis ‘cash is king’ in relation to longer term rating issues. 
> Transparency by better communication is a key ‘potential area’, as is a 
focus on finance and controlling which leads to a better rating. However, a 
focus on finance is still regarded as a defensive strategy for SMEs. 
> With regards to ‘rating issues’, the focus on finance improves the rating 
parameter which leads to an educational effect. Rating is not a means in 
itself as it improves business parameters as well. However, banks are 
partly not willing to pro-actively engage in rating discussion with SMEs. 
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6.6.1 Hypothesis 2.a: Company Strategy focus 
In terms of strategy, a growing focus on cost and liquidity is not surprising 
due to the ‘change management imposed by Basel II’ given the current 
financial crisis. StatePE points out that in former times different sectors were 
affected differently. Now, no sector is omitted. Therefore, for example, 
automotive OEMs proactively pay their suppliers upfront to keep them from 
falling into bankruptcy. 
 
The key findings referring hypothesis 2.a, in terms of ‘company strategy 
focus’ are: 
> Basel II is a trigger, the financial crisis an accelerator regarding a stronger 
focus on finance and controlling and therefore on rating. 
> The financial crisis exerts an influence on company strategy especially in 
terms of a short-term focus on liquidity management. 
 
Figure 85 illustrates the causal network regarding ‘company strategy focus’. 
 
Figure 85 Causal network hypothesis 2.a regarding ‘company strategy’ 
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The comprehensive findings from the self-administered questionnaires are 
displayed in Table 43. 
 
Focus on … SME SME 
   Pre-Basel II Post-Basel II 
 
… financial stability / liquidity  3.25 3.78 + 16.2% 
… increasing profitability  3.37 3.49 + 3.5% 
… enhancing market position  3.08 3.28 + 6.2% 
… quality excellence 3.25 3.32 + 2.6% 
… technology excellence 3.05 3.08 + 1.1% 
… cost excellence 3.34 3.54 + 6.1% 
… increasing company valuation 2.75 3.12 + 13.6% 
 
Table 43 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding company focus  
(Pre- and Post-Basel II) 
 
‘Basel II as catalyst, financial crisis as accelerator’ 
Many interviewees stated that Basel II has a catalyst function with the 
financial crisis as a trigger – especially with regards to keep an eye on 
liquidity management rather than financial engineering. Especially, financiers 
reflect to the relatively low importance of the financial strategic elements: this 
can be derived from the fact that issues like R&D are more ‘measurable’ 
(MicroSME). SmallSME partially traces this back to the ‘work overload’ of a 
typical entrepreneur.  A focus on cost relates, according to MachinerySME, to 
the dedication and the mutual dependency between company and 
entrepreneur, which is normally the owner. Therefore, keeping costs in line is 
essential regarding safeguarding company assets, especially by keeping 
fixed costs low, as SmallSME or PrivateBank point out. On the other hand a 
focus on cost implies a stronger impact of finance and controlling and 
therefore on improving rating parameters as, for example, PrivateBank points 
out. Therefore nearly all interviewees believe that the focus on finance & 
controlling and therefore on rating will rise due to Basel II. 
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Cash is king 
Especially banks like SavingsBank or StateBank stress the importance of 
liquidity in business terms too. Due to the financial crisis watching and 
improving liquidity is more important in the short term due to the financial 
crisis in relation to a long term improvement of rating parameters. 
6.6.2 Hypothesis 2.a: Company Potential Areas 
In terms of potential areas nearly all interviewees found themselves 
reconfirmed in the view of the typical technical / market driven entrepreneur. 
This assessment has to change under the Basel II regime in order to stay 
sufficiently financed, which is partly under way. 
 
Relating to hypothesis 2.a, the key findings in terms of ‘company potential 
areas’ are: 
> Financial communication and an enhanced transparency are the key 
areas of improvement under the Basel II regime. 
> Cognitive dissonance: a focus on finance would be a defensive strategy. 
SMEs still underestimate the value of finance and controlling as a 
‘navigator function’ in terms of Basel II, but in terms of business as well. 
> On the other hand, several interviewees believe that controlling & finance 
is on the rise due to Basel II – with a positive effect on rating. 
 
Figure 86 illustrates the causal network regarding ‘company potential areas’. 
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Figure 86 Causal network hypothesis 2.a regarding ‘company potential areas’ 
 
The comprehensive findings from the self-administered questionnaires are 
displayed in Table 44. 
 
Potential areas Pre-Basel II Post-Basel II 
   potential (1 to 4) potential (1 to 4) 
 
Profitability (in rel. to sector avg.) 2.67 2.79 + 4.4% 
Financial situation (equity ratio. 2.79 2.86 + 2.4% 
liqu. in rel. to sector avg.) 
Management 3.02 3.02 + 0% 
Research & Development 2.05 2.46 + 19.9% 
Production & Logistics 2.56 2.77 + 8.5% 
Marketing & Sales 2.79 3.12 + 11.8% 
Controlling & Administration 2.83 2.82 - 0.1% 
 
Table 44 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding company potential areas 
(Pre- and Post-Basel II assessment) 
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Potential of Finance and Controlling 
In general, all financiers in unison quote that the highest potential is still in 
finance and controlling: from mere number crunching to planning and 
forecasting (SavingsBank, for example). 
CharteredAccountant differentiates between SMEs: major, professional 
managed SMEs have already set-up a valid controlling and reporting line. 
However, patriarchal organised family businesses are still primarily techno-
logy driven, with administration issues (like finance) ranking low on the exe-
cutive agenda. This is in line with SavingsBank who refers to the important 
role of chartered accountants in terms of supporting the entrepreneur with 
planning as ‘only few SMEs are able to evaluate liquidity demands’. 
Therefore, the importance is often not yet common sense. MachinerySME 
endorses this by claiming that many SMEs have not yet recognised the 
importance, SavingsBank believes in the next generation entrepreneurs. 
RestructuringPE goes one step further by pointing out: ‘adhering to 
employees or year-long suppliers belongs to the entrepreneurial freedom, 
even if it could not be justified by economic reasons. This means that they 
set targets against which controlling measures of success are adjusted. 
However, if the measures are the wrong ones, the assessment can only be 
wrong too. Therefore, controlling could easily acknowledge these wrong 
targets as these are arbitrarily and not benchmark-based’. SMEAssociation 
focuses on the linkage to costs too: ‘a valid controlling is needed, in order to 
keep cost under control: controlling has a navigator function!’ 
 
Potential of Transparency 
Due to Basel II, SMEs have begun to understand the importance of ‘capital 
markets communication’ even as a PHB. The usage of cheap mezzanine in 
the past, as a reaction to rating related credit reductions, was a good 
exercise.  
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CharteredAccountant argues that especially major SMEs ‘learned to play the 
game’ and optimise the quantity and quality of communication in order to 
enhance transparency. The majority of interviewees stated that a combined 
focus on growth and on transparency is the silver bullet as it helps the 
corporation to make the right investment decisions. 
 
Controlling as ‘Defensive Strategy’ 
On the other hand, InternationalPE, for example, argues that control is rightly 
not of such a high importance if the SME is entrepreneurially owned: 
entrepreneurs typically focus on niche markets and have, in this area, viable 
growth options – therefore order intake is essential due to positive 
contribution margins rather than costs. Fluctuating earnings are not so 
important – contrary to private equity owned SMEs with their covenants. Yet, 
he acknowledges, in non-growth environments, the importance of financial 
management in order to comply with Basel II. 
Similarly, GermanPE and ServicesSME regard the focus on R&D and 
marketing as a typical ‘entrepreneurial answer’. Controlling is regarded as a 
defensive strategy. LargeBank adds to this by pointing out that ‘controlling 
does not make business go round. If only controlling would have reigned, 
various good ideas would not have hit the market’. PrivateBank relates this to 
the strong self-confidence of the entrepreneur in terms of business decisions 
which does not need sophisticated control. This is in line with ServicesSME 
who regards administration as profligacy. 
6.6.3 Hypothesis 2.a: Rating Issues 
Whereas rating was a major issue three to five years ago it has now become 
commonplace according to several interviewees. Interestingly enough, the 
majority of SMEs state that ratings have induced more positive than negative 
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effects in terms of business professionalism and strength. The key findings 
relating to hypothesis 2.a, with regards to ‘rating issues’ are: 
> Explaining a Basel II rating is partly avoided by banks because it is too 
time-consuming and very complex to explain, or it will strengthen the 
bargaining position of the SME in terms of getting better ratings.  
> On the other hand, SMEs lack interest in rating as it is a ‘mere number’ for 
them. They either underestimate its importance or have ‘learned to play 
the game’. 
> Therefore, many SMEs and financiers state that the importance of rating is 
still undervalued. The silver bullet for SMEs is to use rating criteria as 
strategic management tools, especially in terms of planning (liquidity 
forecast etc.), rather than backward oriented controlling. Banks should 
regard the time for explaining a rating as an investment in a stabilised 
banking relationship. 
Figure 87 provides the graphical illustration of the causal network regarding 
‘rating’. 
 
Figure 87 Causal network hypothesis 2.a regarding ‘rating issues’ 
SMEs cope best by im-
proving rating param.
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Interestingly enough only 28.6% of all SMEs who participated in the self-
administered questionnaire stated that they knew their rating value, 52.3% 
did not know, 19.1% stated not to be rated and the rest did not answer. This 
is a slight improvement in relation to a KfW survey from 2007 where 25% 
said they had no rating at all (Zimmermann, 2007). A summary of the 
quantitative survey is displayed in Table 45. 
 
  The Pre-Basel II 
value was … 
The Post-Basel II value 
will prob. be … 
 Current value 1 = lower, 2 = equal, 
3 = higher 
1 = lower, 2 = equal, 
3 = higher 
Rating value 
 
28.6% know rating 
52.3% not known 
19.1% not rated 
1.77 2.3 
 
Table 45 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding the assessment of financial 
performance (Pre- and Post-Basel II) 
 
Is Rating Already Common Place? 
Some interviewees, such as MicroSME, LargeBank and ServicesSME state 
that rating had been a major issue prior to the official inception of Basel II. 
Now SMEs are used to it – or have even learned to play the game, as 
MicroSME points out. Within banks too, a learning curve took place over the 
last couple of years, as LargeBank argues. SMEs are well advised to 
coordinate the acceptance of external ratings upfront in order to avoid 
disappointment, as only a few agencies are accepted (PrivateBank). 
Yet, banks like SavingsBank differentiate between an intense rating and a 
kind of scoring based on account history. However, every SME gets its value 
communicated. Despite this, LargeBank points out that ‘intelligent SMEs 
know that rating is not a means to an end – if a higher stock makes sense in 
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terms of serving customers better, an SME would not refrain from having this 
for the sake of a slightly better rating’. 
 
Reluctance Regarding Ratings 
StateBank and SmallSME argue that there is still a strong demand for 
increased communication on rating from the state and the banking side. For 
example, StateBank points out: ‘especially regarding securities, 
communication is needed by banks on how SMEs can improve terms and 
conditions by means of securities’. This is essential in order to make ratings 
of various institutes more comparable. LargeBank believes that SMEs are 
mainly interested in rating if a credit has been declined. Otherwise they do 
not care so much, which is a mistake. SmallSME believes that SMEs do not 
want to know as they fear they will be disappointed. Furthermore, ratings are 
regarded as arbitrary as there are no possibilities to alter them with 
discussion: ‘there is still a huge demand in terms of Basel II understanding. 
Transparency by banks regarding rating is by far not sufficient’. 
Reflecting on the fact that more than 67.8% of the SMEs under review did not 
know their rating, or had not been rated the explanation was unequivocal. 
Banks do not want to be ‘bearers of bad news’ as LargeBank points out and 
therefore have no interest in communicating the ratings, as 
CharteredAccountant puts it. In particular, good SMEs – who underestimated 
the importance of ratings for so long (GermanPE) – are very disappointed 
about their relatively poor rating results compared to the big transnational 
companies. This is a pity as ‘SMEs will benefit more from the rating process 
than banks do’. GermanPE said it is very convenient to sell ratings to SMEs 
as a ‘black box’. This is in line with Tegelkamp and Dartsch (2007). A valid 
rating discussion takes about two to three hours (SavingsBank). On the other 
hand, PrivateBank experiences ratings to be a starting point for a structured 
and cooperative discussion.  
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Missing Focus on Planning 
MachinerySME argues that ‘SME entrepreneurs do not pay enough attention 
to the commercial part of the business’. Therefore Basel II is positive as it 
has an ‘educational effect’ for SMEs. PrivateBank argues that there are still 
major deficiencies in terms of planning; SavingsBank believes that a good 
chartered accountant can help out as smaller SMEs lack the knowledge. 
6.7 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS REGARDING HYPOTHESIS 2.B AND 3 
The initial hypotheses 2.b and 3 (section 4.2.3): ‘financiers (especially non-
bank investors) will engage in SME corporate finance when they adjust their 
strategy in terms of growth with the aim of niche market leadership and when 
they open up for exit strategies’ is acknowledged to a great extent by the 
qualitative analysis. In addition, the qualitative analysis provides evidence 
that a sound financial basis / management is of more and more importance. 
 
The qualitative analysis is grouped around the respective elements of the 
qualitative semi-structured interviews, with regards to hypotheses 2.b and 3. 
The key findings –which will be evaluated in detail by means of causal 
networks in this section – are: 
 
> The ‘company strategy focus’ is unconsciously private equity affine and 
the focus on valuation is an indicator regarding a growing openness 
towards non-bank financiers. 
> In terms of ‘investment criteria’, the interviewees acknowledged the high 
alignment between SMEs and non-bank financiers with a focus on 
leadership within a niche-market rather than financial ratio optimisation. 
Yet, on a short term basis, financial stability becomes important due to a 
growing risk awareness of non-bank financiers because of the financial 
crisis.  
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6.7.1 Hypotheses 2.b and 3: Company Strategy focus 
The qualitative analysis provides evidence regarding a stronger affinity 
towards non-bank financing. The key findings referring hypotheses 2.b and 3 
in terms of ‘company strategy focus’ are: 
> The SME entrepreneurial strategy is unconsciously private equity affine. 
> The focus on valuation is an indicator regarding a growing openness 
towards non-bank financiers. 
 
Figure 88 shows the causal network regarding ‘company strategy focus’. 
 
Figure 88 Causal network hypotheses 2.b and 3 regarding ‘company strategy’ 
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The comprehensive findings from the self-administered questionnaires are 
displayed in Table 46. 
 
Focus on … SME SME 
   Pre-Basel II Post-Basel II 
 
… financial stability / liquidity  3.25 3.78 + 16.2% 
… increasing profitability  3.37 3.49 + 3.5% 
… enhancing market position  3.08 3.28 + 6.2% 
… quality excellence 3.25 3.32 + 2.6% 
… technology excellence 3.05 3.08 + 1.1% 
… cost excellence 3.34 3.54 + 6.1% 
… increasing company valuation 2.75 3.12 + 13.6% 
 
Table 46 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding company focus 
(Pre- and Post-Basel II) 
 
Company Strategy is Unconsciously Private Equity affine 
FamilyOffice points out that strategy is the most decisive element: SMEs 
have to blame themselves when they put their focus on tax optimising 
models rather than, for example, trying to reduce their dependence on bank 
loans or special sectors, like automotive on time. If SMEs do their homework 
(on technology, cost and market leadership) in terms of business strategy, 
rather than financial engineering, they will cope better with Basel II and the 
economic crisis. Nearly all interviewees stated that issues like a top 
positioning in an attractive niche market are intrinsic strategies for an 
entrepreneur which is ‘unconsciously’ private equity affine. 
 
Company Valuation Should Not be a Means in Itself 
Regarding the high increase in the importance of company valuation, inter-
viewees such as StatePE, ServicesSME, PrivateBank and InternationalPE, 
argue that this an issue primarily prior to a sell off – currently fuelled by the 
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low valuations due to the crisis. Yet, the majority state that this is a sign for a 
stronger openness of SMEs with regard to non-bank corporate financing. 
GermanPE regards company valuation as a residual value which can be 
derived from the other ones. However, he states, as will be explained below 
(see section 6.5.3), that it is crucial in getting additional finance in times when 
credit financing is believed to have become more difficult due to Basel II. If 
the company valuation falls below the amount of credit, a further investment 
in such a situation is not possible for a private equity company. This is in line 
with MachinerySME. In addition, LargeBank and SmallSME point out that the 
valuation focus is important as it shows that entrepreneurs orient their actions 
more on value creation and therefore on enhancing company valuation. 
6.7.2 Hypotheses 2.b and 3: Investment Criteria of Non-Bank Financiers 
The assessment of SMEs and private equity is highly correlated, in terms of 
their assessment, which indicates that both sides come close to each other. 
MicroSME traces this back to the entrepreneurial spirit of non-bank financiers 
as this is close to entrepreneurs and is contrary to a potentially risk-averse 
banker’s approach. Regarding hypotheses 2.b and 3 the key findings with 
respect to the criteria of non-bank financiers are: 
> The findings from the quantitative study regarding niche market leadership 
are acknowledged by the vast majority of interviewees. This confirms the 
findings from the quantitative analysis (see section 5) that the assessment 
regarding non-bank criteria are more aligned between SMEs and 
financiers compared to credit rejection criteria. 
> The current importance of financial stability is a combined effect of Basel II 
and the financial crisis. Private equity is becoming more risk averse due to 
limited refinancing options. SMEs have learned how essential financial 
stability is in order to have freedom of choice. 
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> Private equity fosters soft facts and market related issues. This is partly in 
contrast to the perception of the bankers’ approach which stresses the 
importance of balance sheet related ‘hard facts’ under the Basel II regime. 
 
Figure 89 shows the causal network regarding ‘investment criteria of non-
bank financiers’. 
 
Figure 89 Causal network hypotheses 2.b and 3 regarding ‘investment criteria of non-
bank financiers’ 
 
The interviewees largely acknowledge the findings from the quantitative 
analysis. Yet, FamilyOffice believes that private equity has no strategic 
approach, but that it is ‘solely cash-flow and deal structure driven – focusing 
on the bonus’. Quoting Warren Buffet who said, the devil is out of the box 
and no one can put him back’.  
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How do you assess the importance of the following investment criteria regarding your 
financing / investment decisions in the past (prior to Basel II, i. e. prior to 2007/8) and 
in the future (next two years)? 
 
Investment criteria of non-
bank financier  
SMEs SMEs   Finan- 
ciers 
Finan-
ciers 
 
 Pre-
Basel II 
Post-
Basel II
  Pre-
Basel II 
Post-
Basel II 
 
Financial stability in the past 
(Equity ratio, liqui.) 
2.87 3.32 15.7%  3.29 3.49 6.1%
Good market position  3.19 3.47 8.8%  3.58 3.76 5.0%
Leading edge 
prod./technology 
3.33 3.53 6.0%  3.47 3.63 4.6%
Good comparative cost 
position in rel. to comp. 
3.02 3.21 6.3%  3.16 3.34 5.7%
Ambitious management 
regard. comp. valuation 
3.17 3.45 8.8%  3.17 3.26 2.8%
Strong financial 
management  
2.96 3.40 14.9%  3.15 3.46 9.8%
Future growth options  3.35 3.47 3.6%  3.68 3.85 4.6%
Willingness to incorporate 
new investors with 
respective rights 
2.36 2.52 6.8%  2.75 3.07 11.6%
 
Table 47 Summary of the quantitative analysis regarding the assessment of 
investment-criteria of non-bank financiers (Pre- and Post-Basel II) by SMEs and 
financiers 
 
Correlation of Assessment  
The assessment of the various investment criteria as well as the trend from 
Pre- to Post-Basel II is highly correlated. Interviewees like InternationalPE, 
ServicesSME, LargeBank, SmallSME and StateBank believe that thriving for 
growth and a valid market position as well as a sound technology basis, are 
the key criteria. They are all based on strong management. Nearly every 
interviewee detected the strong correlation between the assessments of 
SMEs and financiers. MicroSME believes that the strong correlation is 
because ‘non-bank financiers act more like entrepreneurs themselves, in 
comparison to risk-avoiding bankers’. 
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The stronger related SME and financier values in terms of investment criteria 
of non-bank financiers (derived from the questionnaires) are shown in Figure 
90. Figure 91 illustrates the somewhat vastly diverging views of SMEs and 
financiers regarding the importance of credit rejection criteria. 
Figure 90 Pre- and Post-Basel II 
assessment of investment criteria by 
SMEs and financiers 
Figure 91 Pre- and Post-Basel II 
assessment of credit rejection criteria by 
SMEs and financiers 
 
MezzanineBank believes that the high correlation can be explained by the 
different aims of banks, private equity and SME managers: ‘entrepreneurs 
and private equity managers are both company valuation driven; whereas, 
the bank manager is cash-flow oriented, as it is most important for banks to 
know how the credit can be paid back’. In contrast, non-bank financiers have 
only the exit in mind. The ‘typical entrepreneur is technologically interested’ 
(MachinerySME), which is the ‘niche market leadership-issue’ and seeks to 
enhance the company valuation. This is in line with the private equity goal of 
exit orientation. Only SavingsBank wonders why all are still not striving for 
‘sustainable growth rather than uncontrolled growth’. He adds: ‘sustainable 
growing companies are at the end the most successful ones’. 
 
Importance of Financial Stability 
GermanPE states that credits will become dearer. Therefore financial 
management is of essential importance, which is in line with SavingsBank or 
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SmallSME. The other issues refer more to the financial crisis rather than to 
Basel II. Therefore, stability becomes more important as non-cyclical 
businesses (like services) are more stable than cyclical ones, which will lead 
to an adjustment in the business focus of private equity companies. Prior to 
the financial crisis the credo had been: ‘there will not be any business cycles 
any more’. Consequently, company valuations rose to record heights, as 
FamilyOffice points out. Contrary to the other interviewees he points out that 
private equity has always focused more on cash flows than on strategic 
issues in order to safeguard an investment. He does not believe that the 
financial industry will learn from the experience of unsuccessful and highly 
leveraged buy-outs in the past. It depends only on the new availability of 
funds until the next ‘bonuses driven bubble’ emerges. 
The importance of liquidity is astonishing, as many interviewees point out 
(SMEAssociation, for example). GermanPE said that it is one of the primary 
aims of private equity to provide liquidity. FamilyOffice and PrivateBank 
provide some explanation by pointing out that private equity companies are 
cash flow and cost orientated. That means that they can start from a 
considerable comfortable position. 
The interviewees from the financial community, RestructuringPE for example, 
attribute this to the difficult situation of non-bank financiers themselves: ‘in 
times of financial crisis they will currently focus on financial stability in order 
to reduce investment per transaction’. Furthermore, InternationalPE points 
out that it will become more and more difficult to compensate liquidity 
fluctuations with bank credits: in times of Basel II and the financial crisis, 
credit is more difficult to acquire. Furthermore he states: ‘covenants will 
become much tighter’, prior to Basel II ‘there had been covenants in a light 
version’. 
SMEAssociation adds to this: whereas banks under the Basel II regime opt 
for increased securitisation (like land charges on the house of the owner), 
private equity companies do not use such securities and have to have a 
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special focus on a valid financial basis. In addition, interviewees, such as 
LargeBank and StatePE, indicate that financial stability is essential for 
enhancing the equity ratio and the freedom of choice regarding corporate 
financing. 
CharteredAccountant came up with another interesting explanation. He 
argues that valid liquidity management shows that managers are capable of 
managing their own money efficiently, which indicates that they will do so 
also with foreign money. SeedPE and MezzanineBank follow into the same 
direction by stating that it needs a valid management to reduce gearing. An 
a-priori valid liquidity position enables a higher potential gearing and 
therefore a lower risk due to a smaller equity ticket by the investor. 
 
Soft Facts versus Hard Facts 
In line with the hypothesis, MezzanineBank argues that private equity 
investors look for management and markets as well as other soft facts as 
these are the drivers for exits and exit valuation. For MezzanineBank, the 
increase in all values is an indicator that SMEs are becoming increasingly 
aware and knowledgeable of private equity. On the other hand, SeedPE 
wonders why management ranks so low. FamilyOffice provides a more 
agnostic view by pointing out that ‘the only real criterion is the exit’. 
 
Affinity to Non-Bank Financing 
According to MachinerySME non-bank financing is becoming more important 
due to Basel II and the current crisis: SMEs with a poor (financial) 
performance will have difficulties due to the rating-based capital requirements 
to get credit. Shopping around is hardly possible due to the objective rating 
approach. Therefore, non-bank financing will increase as this will be the last 
financing possibility for those SMEs. 
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LargeBank believes that this ‘last chance’ perception is connected with a 
necessary change in mind-set regarding handing over part of the decision 
taking. On the other hand, the pro-active marketing of private equity firms etc. 
enhances awareness regarding financiers, despite control and voting rights 
beyond bank requirements.  
6.8 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS HOW SMES CAN COPE BEST WITH THE 
EFFECT OF BASEL II 
Within the interviews, SMEs and financiers expressed their views on the 
future of corporate financing of SMEs in the Post-Basel II era. The comprised 
findings can be found in sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.2. These findings, in relation 
to other opinions expressed within the 17 semi-structured interviews, build 
the basis for suggestions on how SMEs can cope best with the effect of 
Basel II, as stated in the synopsis section 7.3. 
6.8.1 The SMEs’ View on Future Corporate Financing of SMEs 
ServicesSME believes that due to Basel II banks lost credibility and trust. A 
credit application has to be filled in, rather than the bank providing a ‘buying 
offer’ for finance. Therefore SMEs are looking for alternatives to credit 
financing: independence is the key. Furthermore, it is an issue of financing 
cost and securities, as Basel II makes credit more expensive. 
On the other hand, MachinerySME believes that the house bank principle will 
last regarding the good SMEs, as ‘bad SMEs are good customers’ of banks. 
Banks still play the key role as an information source as an SME does not 
want to have great publicity in terms of finance. This acknowledges earlier 
findings from Deloitte & Touche (2007), as a valid alternative or 
supplementation of subsidised credits is assumed in this case (SmallSME). 
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This is in line with MicroSME who believes that, in general, it will be 
dispersed more widely, but this is not only voluntarily. Some SMEs have had 
to look elsewhere as they were ‘rated’ out by their banks. In the voluntary 
cases, the bank might be the facilitator of, for example, mezzanine or state-
subsidised loans. Therefore MicroSME and MachinerySME believe that the 
best way for an SME to stay sufficiently financed is to improve its rating 
parameter. This means enhancing the equity ratio by focusing especially on 
the finance and controlling side. For example, restructuring the liability side 
via leasing etc. is not focused upon by the primarily technical-oriented SMEs. 
Furthermore, the focus on a house bank has been comfortable because 
SMEs are primarily locally oriented (which reflects their low assessment of 
the subprime crisis). The assessment of financiers that non-bank financiers 
play a major role as an information source is regarded as a leaded answer 
due to ‘own interests’. 
6.8.2 The Financiers’ View on Future Corporate Financing of SMEs 
Similar to the SMEs, the majority of financiers acknowledge the findings from 
the quantitative analysis that SMEs are more local centric, meaning that the 
influence of investment banks and the subprime crisis is assessed less 
strongly compared to the financial community. 
Some financiers, such as SeedPE or MezzanineBank, believe that bank 
credits will become dearer as SMEs will not really have a chance to obtain a 
rating as good as a major corporation. However, the traditional banking 
sector (like SavingsBank) believes that there is no general credit crunch in 
terms of SMEs. It is interesting that hardly any of the non-bank financiers 
were knowledgeable about the favourable SME adjustments made in the 
later phases of the Basel II process. Initiated by Basel II, fuelled by the 
current financial and economic crisis, it becomes more important, according 
to some financiers like SavingsBank, to have a valid ‘banking relationship’ 
(including more than one house bank). It is argued that bank credit will still be 
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the most attractive form of finance after retained earnings, as other forms of 
finance will become even more expensive. SMEAssociation regards the 
German ‘house bank’ principle as ‘unique’. On the contrary, FamilyOffice 
believes that ‘financial engineering’ should be only of minor importance – the 
key is not to avoid dependence on a bank, but to avoid dependence on 
customers, business lines or sectors. 
Yet, the assessments on the development of the house bank principles are 
mixed: whereas the majority of the private equity companies believe it will 
cease, some banks, such as StateBank, SavingsBank and PrivateBank, 
believe it will be strengthened. This is partly due to Basel II as ratings are 
laborious which makes shopping more time consuming compared to the past. 
Furthermore, if one single bank has all the knowledge this enables the bank 
to provide a better assessment. 
 
StateBank believes that subsidies (state backed credits) in particular will 
become more accepted in the future. Yet, the banks state that this is 
especially valid in terms of credit, however, they acknowledge that major 
SMEs (beyond 10 million euros, SavingsBank) will widen their portfolios to 
non-credit alternatives (due to Basel II). However, the immediate reaction 
which is wanted by politics, in extending the subsidy volume, will not happen 
at that speed.  
The general advice given by financiers is to become more bank independent 
by either focusing on internal financing from generated cash flows (as 
FamilyOffice favours, for example), or by broadening the financing variety (as 
GermanPE suggests, for example). However, SeedPE adds that equity-
based financing should be used sparingly due to the low valuation in times of 
financial crisis. 
The key term is: ‘restructuring the liability side of the balance sheet’, as 
GermanPE puts it. This includes a short term one-off in the case of factoring, 
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for example, as financiers like GermanPE advocates, as well as the longer 
term methods. RestructuringPE, for example, favours sale-and-lease-back as 
well as reverse factoring to suppliers. LargeBank adds that a greater 
openness is beneficial for the banks too: ‘a greater openness for non-bank 
alternatives is in the interest of the bank too: a broader and more stable basis 
is advantageous for the SME and for the bank!’ However, the issue might be 
that approximately 50% of the private equity funds come from banks and 
insurance companies (Frommann, 2006a) – refinancing will become more 
difficult according to GermanPE and SeedPE. 
6.9 SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994) the categories of the qualitative 
analysis seem fitting as there is evidence regarding the three hypotheses. 
The qualitative analysis brought deeper insights to the findings through 
triangulation which led to a modified hypothesis, as the synopsis in section 7 
shows. For example, new themes generated from the interviews, such as 
‘Basel II as a catalyst’ and ‘financial crisis as an accelerator’ were generated 
by the author. The notion of a ‘core bank’ regarding certain segments rather 
than a generic ‘house bank’ was adopted from the thoughtful insights of the 
interviewees with their strong banking experience. 
The key findings are: 
> Basel II is a strong catalyst / trigger for change in SME corporate finance; 
the financial crisis is an accelerator of this change. 
> Despite the long and intense discussion on Basel II for nearly ten years 
now, there are still widely different perceptions in terms of SMEs. 
StateBank talks of a ‘perception gap’ as the ‘Basel II SME package’, which 
was added in 2003 / 2004, with its favourable elements is still not well 
received in the general perception of SMEs, SME associations and even 
banks. 
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> House bank principle – what comes next: ‘core bank’ rather than ‘house 
banks’?! But shopping around between banks has become more difficult. 
> Communication and transparency is key in improving relationships with 
one’s ‘(core) bank’. 
> Private equity fosters credit engagements as it enhances the equity ratio. 
> Political support is needed to reduce fear of Basel II and financial crisis.  
German PE points out that the law to protect against foreign investors 
(Außenhandelsgesetz, 2009) would not have been passed today on the 
verge of the subprime crisis.  
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7 CONCLUSION: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
SYNOPSIS 
The findings from the quantitative analysis in section 5 provide evidence 
regarding the three hypotheses, as stated in section 4.2.3. The subsequent 
qualitative analyses in section 6 provided a much deeper and differentiated 
insight than the mere quantitative analysis, which provides statements with 
(statistical) evidence regarding the cause-of-effects but little evidence 
regarding the causes of causes in scientific realism terms (see research 
design deduction in section 4). 
 
Triangulating the findings from the initial quantitative research part with the 
qualitative based research elements added new themes like ‘Basel II as a 
catalyst and financial crisis as an accelerator’. This led to slightly revised and 
amended hypotheses in the quantitative-qualitative synopsis, as provided in 
this concluding section. Furthermore, the findings from the qualitative 
analysis provided in-depth insights in terms of ‘practical, or economic 
significance’ (Goldberger, 1991), in addition to the quantitative analysis and 
literature review (see section 3), regarding how SMEs can cope best with the 
effects of Basel II.  
7.1 SUMMARY 
The research design rationale and three initial hypotheses were derived on 
the basis of the background gathering phase, which took into account elite 
interviews and an initial literature review: 
1. Corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because the ‘house 
bank principle’ is deteriorating. 
2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: 
a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or 
b) they adjust their strategy as stated in hypothesis 3 
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3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME corporate 
finance when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth with the aim of 
niche market leadership and when they open up for exit strategies. 
The structured literature review of primarily Pre-Basel II research provided 
evidence that no consistent pattern regarding the effect of Basel II on SME 
financing has emerged – neither on a country specific basis nor regarding 
‘discriminating’ Basel II related to the discriminating factors, ‘Financing focus: 
bank-based economies vs. financial-based economies’, ‘good protection of 
creditor rights / forbearance’, ‘effect on economic structure’, ‘effect on 
banking structure / sophistication’ and ‘Basel II intrinsic approaches’. 
Therefore, further and more refined research was needed in order to 
evaluate how the effect will look like and to consider how SMEs can cope 
best with Basel II. This was undertaken by applying a sequential exploratory 
mixed-method approach based on Creswell (2003), as this was suited best to 
the philosophic position of ‘scientific realism’ (Smith, 1998) as well as the 
research purpose. The extensive quantitative data analysis, based on self-
administered questionnaires from SMEs, banks and non-bank financiers, was 
then triangulated through a consecutive qualitative analysis. 
 
In line with the vast majority of researchers, data gained from the quantitative 
survey was analysed using various quantitative methods. Mathematical 
models were set up for each of the three initial hypotheses and they were 
tested using appropriate statistical tests, including an analysis of correlation 
as well as multiple linear regression. This extensive tool-set was used in 
order to set the author’s Post-Basel II research into perspective with a variety 
of quantitative Basel II research papers. The quantitative analysis provided 
strong evidence on a statistically or near statistically significant basis 
regarding the three initial hypotheses as stated in section 4.2.3. 
 
The subsequent qualitative analysis of the semi-structured in-depth 
interviews went beyond mere statistical significance and enabled explanation 
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of how SMEs can cope best with the Basel II effect. According to the author 
this supports to enhance external validity (Saunders et al, 2007:151) in 
relation to the mere quantitative studies under review. 
 
This research design was chosen to enhance interpretability (Robson, 
2002:371) and to avoid shortcomings of other methodologies, in line with 
Brewer and Hunter (1989) who proposed a pragmatic approach to reconciling 
quantitative and qualitative methods. This can be seen from the fact that the 
hypotheses were further refined and amended based on the triangulation 
undertaken through the qualitative analysis. 
7.2 FINDINGS FROM TRIANGULATION 
The triangulated findings are grouped according to the initial three 
hypotheses within the author’s research design. Whereas the findings from 
the quantitative analysis provided evidence for the hypotheses as is, the 
insights from the semi-structured elite interviews led to amendment of the 
first hypothesis and a slight modification of hypotheses 2.b and 3. 
 
Ad 1.) Corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because 
the ‘house bank principle’ is deteriorating. 
It is far too early to speak of the end of the house bank principle. The 
synopsis of the quantitative and the qualitative analysis provides a much 
more differentiated view. The quantitative findings provide evidence that the 
house bank has deteriorated in terms of the SME and financier models 
tested. However, the reflection of the 17 interviews provided a much more 
differentiated picture, beyond statistical significance, which leads to the 
following revised hypothesis, which will be explained in detail below. 
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Hypothesis 1 revisited: 
Corporate finance has become different for SMEs because the ‘house 
bank principle’ has changed to a ‘core bank principle’ due to Basel II. 
Shopping around regarding credits will be more difficult which makes 
financing more difficult. This could be overcompensated by major 
SMEs by using non-credit corporate financing which leads to a 
reduction of the ‘house bank’ principle. 
 
Basel II is regarded as a catalyst for change. However, the change will be 
accelerated and influenced by the current crisis. On the one hand, there is 
evidence that the ‘house bank principle’ will be reduced: the evidence, from 
the SMEs’ point of view from the self-administered questionnaires as well as 
from the interviews, is that credit will become dearer and more difficult to get. 
Because of ‘cheap money’ of the past and a risk-agnostic approach of Basel 
I, Basel II is regarded by the majority of interviewees, but not by all, as a 
trigger for improving margins in the SME area. 
Due to shortage of money in times of the banking crisis credits are 
sanctioned as some interviewees point out. SMEs believe that major private 
banks have been stronger in withdrawing from SME financing than savings 
banks and cooperative banks. This is in line with SavingsBank and 
PrivateBank comments. Based on experience from their own institutes they 
believe that the ‘credit crunch’ is more of an SME perception than reality. 
Credit is still available, yet, due to enhanced requirements of Basel II and the 
financial crisis it has become more difficult to obtain. Therefore, shopping 
around for credit alone becomes more difficult with the effect that the ‘house 
bank’ principle will be substituted by a ‘core bank’ principle. This means that 
a bank will become the sole provider of credit, but not of all financing. 
Regarding other means of finance, the ‘core bank’ might act as a kind of 
facilitator. 
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The focus of the SMEs is therefore to reduce dependency due to the 
perceived effect of Basel II that credit has become dearer or even more 
difficult to get at all. As banks have been the sole provider of finance for 
decades that means reducing bank credit and building up equity. SMEs are 
seeking alternatives, which is also favoured by banks who speak of a win-
win-situation for SMEs (more solid basis) and banks (reduced risk) alike. 
Alternative means of finance, private equity and strategic investors are there-
fore on the rise because of the Basel II rating effect and a more open-minded 
younger entrepreneur generation with a stronger educational and often more 
international background. However, banks like SavingsBank believe only 
major SMEs, beyond 10 million euros, have real freedom of choice. This is in 
line with studies such as those by Frey and Kuhn (2007) or BdB (2005). 
Although the findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis provide 
evidence that awareness of control and finance is too low, especially from the 
financiers’ point of view, it has started to increase due to Basel II. This will 
have a spill-over effect as dealing with internal finance will foster interest in 
potential financing alternatives to bank credit. On the other hand, some 
interviewees from banks believed in a revival of the ‘house bank principle’ 
due to Basel II. Shopping around under the Basel II regime is very time and 
cost intensive because an SME has to intensively prepare for the rating 
process which has become more harmonised throughout the banking sector. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis led to an economic crisis (Strategic 
Directions, 2009) which has led to deteriorating earnings and cash flows for 
SMEs. This reduced their financing options outside their ‘house banks’. In 
times of crisis subsidised state loans became more attractive which has 
strengthened the house bank principle as the subsidies are handed out via 
the ‘house bank’. 
As stated below regarding hypothesis 2.a, Basel II leads to a stronger dif-
ferentiation which could lead to even better corporate finance options for 
‘good SMEs’. 
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Ad 2.a) SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: 
a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or 
b) they adjust their strategy as stated in hypothesis 3. 
 
Note: Hypothesis 2.b will be explained together with the correlated 
Hypothesis 3. 
Whereas less than 30% of the participants from the self-administered 
questionnaire specified their rating, the interviewees believed that knowledge 
about rating was an issue three to five years ago but is now largely accepted. 
Yet, the focus on improving rating can be deduced from the analysis of the 
questionnaires by comparing the findings from the quantitative analysis on 
company strategy and company potential with the rating parameters. The 
increase in strategic elements and company potential elements indicate a 
clear – but maybe unconsciousness – urge to improve ratings. 
A good rating ‘nearly automatically’ leads, according to some interviewees 
from banks, to better terms. The ‘good SMEs’ will have easier access to 
capital and lower rates as banks will compete on them and because the 
‘good SMEs will not subsidise the bad ones any longer’. However, the deeper 
insights from the semi-structured elite interviews provide evidence that there 
is still room for improvement. 
SMEs still underestimate the value of finance and control in terms of Basel II 
and in terms of business as well. An explanation could be that a focus on 
finance is regarded as a defensive strategy, compared to striving for 
technology leadership or for gaining market share for a ‘real entrepreneur’. 
Yet, even the SMEs for which rating is a ‘mere number’ ‘learned to play’ the 
game and actively try to improve specific parameters. The most advanced 
ones recognised that the minor effect of a rating improvement includes better 
credit conditions, while the major benefit is a better and more sustainable 
competitive edge. 
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On the other hand, communication and transparency is improving, although it 
is still low from a bankers’ point of view – despite the year-long house bank 
principle. Yet, this is a two-way issue as banks should regard the time taken 
to explain a rating to be an investment in a stabilized banking relationship. 
 
Ad 2.b) and Ad 3) Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will 
engage in SME corporate finance when they adjust their strategy in 
terms of growth with the aim of niche market leadership and when they 
open up for exit strategies. 
The assessment of SMEs and financiers, in terms of ‘investment criteria of 
non-bank financiers in the past and in the future’, is to a large extent related, 
as the quantitative analysis of the self-administered questionnaires showed. 
SMEs and financiers see the same top-three priorities in terms of future 
importance, yet in a slightly different order: growth, market position and 
leading edge technology. This supports the hypothesis that non-bank 
financiers are searching for companies which show a business vision for 
gaining and enhancing a Unique Selling Proposition (henceforth USP). 
An interviewee traces this strongly related view back to the ‘entrepreneurial 
spirit’ of non-bank financiers, which is closer to the entrepreneurs themselves 
while it is contradictory to a potentially risk-averse banker’s approach. This 
urge for niche market leadership is widely acknowledged by the interviewees, 
with only one banker wondering why growth is still so dominant rather than 
sustainability. 
The combined findings provide evidence that the strategy of SME 
entrepreneurs is, in general, ‘unconsciously private equity connected’. Private 
equity fosters soft facts and ‘offensive, entrepreneurial’ market-related 
issues, such as striving for niche market leadership. This is partly in contrast 
to the perception of the bankers’ approach which stresses the importance of 
the balance sheet related ‘hard facts’ under the Basel II regime. Even the 
strong increase in company valuation (see quantitative analysis) is regarded 
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as an indicator for a greater openness towards non-credit financing with 
Basel II as a catalyst. 
In addition, the current financial crisis accelerates a new element which was 
initiated, according to the interviewees, by Basel II. The importance of 
financial stability is a combined effect of Basel II and the financial crisis. 
Private equity becomes more risk averse due to limited refinancing options. 
SMEs have learned how essential financial stability is in order to have 
freedom of choice.  
 
Therefore, the hypotheses, 2.b and 3, have been adjusted as follows: 
 
Hypotheses 2.b and 3 revised: 
Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME 
corporate finance when they have a sound financial basis / 
management and when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth 
with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for exit 
strategies. 
7.3 ADVICE TO SMES 
The advice initially stated in the hypotheses, that SMEs can cope best by 
optimising their rating or by adjusting their corporate strategy in terms of a 
niche-market leadership strategy and an openness towards new financiers, 
was strongly acknowledged by the findings from the quantitative as well as 
the qualitative analysis. In addition, the elite interviews in the qualitative 
phase provided further insights, as stated below. In general, especially as 
SMEs interviewed and FamilyOffice point out, it is important to have the right 
competitive strategy (for example, no mono-causal business focus, as 
ServicesSME puts it). If you lose competitiveness ‘financial engineering’ 
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cannot help you out if you are an SME. However, a stronger focus on finance 
and control is decisive for staying sufficiently financed. The key findings are: 
> The house bank principle will be partly strengthened and partly weakened 
with Basel II as the catalyst. This ambivalent finding is no contradiction. In 
terms of credit, shopping around will be reduced. On the other hand non-
credit alternatives will be increasingly used – with the placet of the banks. 
> The hypotheses are largely confirmed. The advice is either to improve the 
rating or to strengthen the equity ratio. However, there is no contradiction 
between these two options, especially in times of financial crisis. 
> The best financial strategy is a valid business strategy and deployment. 
For example StateBank believes that ‘the recommendation one can give to 
SMEs is: the better the equity ratio, the better the rating’. 
> Initiate or strengthen the paradigm shift: finance and controlling are key 
success factors due to Basel II (and the subprime crisis) as other areas, 
such as innovation or a close focus on market trends is already greatly 
prevailing. For example, SMEs have to manage the balance sheet pro-
actively. The focus should shift from cost of capital (credit rates) towards 
an optimal structure of financing. 
> Enhancing transparency is essential – regarding all forms of finance. 
As a golden rule nearly all financiers and SMEs confirmed the focus on rating 
(LargeBank, for example) and / or strengthening the equity base (especially 
ServicesSME).  
 
Business Strategy vs. Financial Engineering 
SMEAssociation and especially FamilyOffice believed that the best financial 
option is a solid business which is ‘neither financial engineering, nor tax 
optimised’. In Germany many entrepreneurs do not draw a clear dividing line 
between company interests and personal interests as owners. 
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Enhance Focus on Finance and Controlling 
Nearly all interviewees, such as StatePE or InternationalPE, pointed out that 
a stronger focus on finance (especially cash management) and controlling 
(especially planning and forecasting) is decisive. PrivateBank states, for 
example: ‘there is still no alignment to the duration of the respective 
financing’. LargeBank regards rating elements as key instruments for 
steering the company, not only regarding financial aspects, but ‘rating helps a 
company to steer the company better’. 
 The advice MezzanineBank will give to SMEs is that ‘financing is as 
important as, a production factor as are, the products the company is 
producing’. The best product is worthless if it cannot be financed. 
GermanPE and PrivateBank argue that SMEs should focus actively on the 
balance sheet – reducing debt and substituting it with equity. ServicesSME 
comes up with a straightforward approach: reduce investment in order to stay 
independent (‘spend only the money you have’). Therefore, financiers and 
the SME Association advise SMEs to put a strong focus, in the future, on 
planning for the sake of the rating value and business sustainability. The 
focus should not only lie on profit & loss planning, but more than ever on 
liquidity and cash-flow planning. 
LargeBank believes that SMEs have become more and more aware of 
ratings, equity ratio, etc. – however, at the end of the day credit rates are 
decisive. LargeBank has set up a consulting division to advise SMEs on that. 
Yet, SMEs are not yet willing to pay a bank for such a service, which would 
pay off according to his assessment. 
 
Transparency is Key 
As a remedy, all financiers and intermediaries CharteredAccountant and 
SMEAssociation, advise SMEs to be more pro-active regarding the 
disclosure of financial data. MezzanineBank states that SMEs should 
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‘actively’ improve planning and reporting. PrivateBank stresses the 
importance of open communication.  
LargeBank advises SMEs ‘to proactively scrutinise ratings in order to get an 
answer as to what one can do in order to improve the rating’. 
It seems that there is a paradigm shift regarding the former contradiction of 
‘sole house bank’ vs. ‘alternative forms’. As SavingsBank puts it, ‘if SMEs 
extend their means of corporate financing on a broader and stable basis 
everybody benefits – the SME as well as the house bank’. 
7.4 AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The findings above add to the debate on the effect of Basel II on SMEs. This 
study uses a comparative research design to negate a simple positivist 
answer of a homogeneous effect across countries and regarding important 
‘discriminating factors’, which is sometimes stated in the research papers 
under review. 
By means of a triangulated explorative mixed-method design evidence 
regarding the amended hypothesis is shown as is valid advice regarding how 
SMEs can cope best with regard to corporate financing under the new Basel 
II regime. 
However, care has to be taken, as Hudson (2003) points out. He believes 
that banks will be obsessed until the year 2009 / 2010 with interpreting the 
regulation, as there are transitional periods, according to Suyter (2008). 
Furthermore, more than 40 opt out clauses will make a unified comparison 
difficult and inconsistencies will arise regarding the nation-specific application 
when a multinational bank operates loans abroad. Therefore, the research 
could only represent preliminary findings regarding the current and initial 
state of Basel II. 
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In addition, further research is needed as the articles under review in this 
paper used empirical data based on the prospective implications of Basel II 
from a Pre-Basel II perspective. This seems valid as many banks had already 
applied the Basel II principles as a kind of trial run, even before the year 
2007, to a certain extent. Yet, a track record of three to five years is needed 
in order to use the advanced approaches. Nevertheless, future research, 
which should be based on a 3 to 5 year period of data after the official start of 
Basel II, could reshape these findings. This will further refine the picture in 
order to enhance external validity (Robson, 2002:100-107) of the author’s 
findings.  
Furthermore, the intense cross-country literature review and critique provided 
in section 3 and the methodology provided in section 4 can provide the basis 
for similar research regarding SMEs and the Basel II effect in other 
(European) countries. 
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Appendix A GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABS Asset Backed Securities 
Adverse 
Selection 
A company has a better credit quality than assessed and vice 
versa (Jankowitsch et al, 2007). 
AIG Accord Implementation Group 
A-IRB Advanced Internal Rating Based Approach 
AMA Advanced Measurement Approaches 
ASRF Asymptotic Single Risk Factor 
Asset 
Correlation 
The degree to which asset values of companies (and, therefore, 
according to the Merton model, default probabilities) move in 
tandem. Equity prices are widely taken as a proxy for asset 
correlation. 
Bafin German bank supervisory body 
Basel I Regulation from 1988‚ ‘to protect depositors and deposit 
insurance schemes from the consequences of inadequate or 
reckless portfolio management by banks and to prevent 
systemic instabilities arising from large-scale banking failures’. 
Under the 1988 Accord, banks have to hold capital of at least 
8% of their Risk Weighted Assets (henceforth RWA, BCBS, 
1988) as regulatory capital. 
Basel II The aim of Basel II (see CRD from 2006 in the EU) as New 
Accord was to ‘develop a framework that would further 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system’ and to ensure ‘more risk sensitive capital 
requirements’. 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIA Basic Indicator Approach, Operational Risk  
BVK German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
CCF Credit Conversion factor 
CDO Collateralised debt obligations 
CEBS Committee of EU Banking Supervisors 
CRD Capital Requirements Directive 
CRA Credit Rating Agency 
CRMT Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques 
DSGV German Savings Bank Association 
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EAD Exposure at Default: EAD is in simplified terms the height of 
credit at the time of the default which may be a result of 
creditors’ decisions or external conditions in case of market-
driven exposures. 
Economic 
Capital (EC)
Bank capital allocated by a bank via internal management 
decision (Scott, 2002). 
F-IRB Advanced Internal Rating Based Approach 
GFW ‘Law to foster venture capital’ in Germany, 2004. 
GroMiKV The last regulatory element so far comprises GroMiKV (2006) 
which substitutes Pre-Basel-II regulation on ‘major and million 
credits’ since 1st January 2008. 
ICAAP Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
ILG International Liaison Group 
IMA Internal Models Approach 
IRB Internal Rating Based (Approach) 
IRC Incremental Risk Charge  
K Capital Requirement Function 
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau: the state owned SME bank. 
KWG Kredit-Wesen Gesetz (‘credit sector law’ in Germany). 
LBOs Leveraged Buy-Out  
LGD Loss Given Default: expressed as a percentage of exposures, is 
an estimate of the portion of any exposure that will be lost when 
a creditor defaults. 
M Maturity of Exposures: the effective remaining time until the 
credit has to be repaid. 
MaRisk MaRisk: in Germany MaRisk provides the regulatory basis for 
an integrated risk management system regarding Pillar 2. 
MaRisk was defined in 2005 and came into effect in November 
2007. It substitutes the prior regulations MaH (trade book) and 
MaK (credit business) according to Schwirten and Zattler 
(2007).  
Market 
Risk 
Market Risk: in Basel II comprises the risk of losses derived 
from changes in market factors (BCBS, 2004:188).  
PD Probability of Default 
PHB Privately Held Businesses 
QIS  Quantitative Impact Study 
RAS Risk Assessment Process, Pillar 2. 
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RCCR Regulatory Capital (Credit Risk) 
Regulatory 
Capital 
(RC) 
Bank capital enforced by regulator under Basel II. 
Risk Loss 
Function 
Function to calculate the regulatory capital for unexpected 
losses. 
RWA Risk Weighted Assets 
SC Solvability Coefficient 
SolvV In Germany Basel II became a law as an amendment of the 
KWG 
and the so-called Solvabilitätsverordnung (SolvV). 
SREP Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process regarding Basel II, 
Pillar 2. 
Subprime 
sector of 
the market 
According to Hall (2008), the subprime sector of the market (i.e. 
those securities, such as residential asset-backed mortgages 
and CDOs), contaminated by defaults arising from ‘self-
certificated’ mortgages or mortgages otherwise granted on the 
basis of a high multiple of earnings or as a generous proportion 
(often 100% plus) of the market valuation. 
UL-only Unexpected Losses-Only: = 1.06 (adjustment factor from EU 
regulators due to ‘unexpected losses-only’ calculation). 
USP Unique Selling Proposition 
VaR Value at Risk 
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Appendix B LATENT AND MANIFEST VARIABLES 
The hypotheses are repeated for convenience reasons in section B.1 before 
the latent variables regarding each of the three hypotheses are justified in 
section B.2. 
 
Sections B.3 and B.4 provide the justification of the manifest (dependent) 
variables (indicators). Most indicators have to be checked in relation to_ 
- Post-Basel II Assessment (next two years, as the future is less predictive 
 than the remembrance of the past); 
- in relation to ‘Pre-Basel II’ (last three years). 
 
B.1 Hypotheses 
A hypothesis is a tentative answer to a question. From the literature review 
and background gathering phase by means of semi-structured elite inter-
views the following initial hypotheses were derived regarding SMEs and 
financiers: 
 
1. Corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because the 
‘house bank principle’ is deteriorating. 
 
2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: 
a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or 
b) they adjust their strategy (as stated in hypothesis 3). 
 
3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME 
corporate finance when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth 
with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for 
exit strategies. 
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Hypotheses regarding SME 
 
1. Corporate finance is becoming more difficult for SMEs because the 
‘house bank principle’ is deteriorating. 
> In testing that hypothesis: 
Evaluate which implications Basel II has on relationship banking in 
Germany and which SMEs seem more or less affected by the regulatory 
impact, in order to provide insight for strategies to cope with the impact in 
an optimal way. 
 
2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: 
a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters or; 
b) they adjust their strategy as (stated in hypothesis 3). 
-> In testing that hypothesis: 
Evaluate which kind of strategy and financial setting is appropriate in order 
to make either the acquisition of credits easier/cheaper or to become more 
attractive to non-bank financiers as an SME. 
 
3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME 
corporate finance when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth 
with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for 
exit strategies. 
-> In testing that hypothesis: 
Evaluate if these strategies are suitable to becoming more attractive for 
non-bank financiers. 
 
B.2 Latent variables 
As stated in section 4.3.3 latent variables can be regarded as meta-
‘dependent variables’. Regarding SMEs they comprise the following latent 
variables. 
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Latent Variables regarding hypothesis 1 
The latent variables regarding hypothesis 1 are as follows. 
 
> Ease of getting a loan 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question:  
‘Ease of getting a loan’ is a latent variable regarding the hypothesis that 
‘CF became more difficult because the house bank principle is 
deteriorating’ because of the following reason: 
SMEs have relied on bank loans for decades. According to DSGV (2005) 
the main source of SME financing was from bank loans. A reduction 
means that this decade long relationship is deteriorating. 
 
> Changes in SME affinity to banks and non-bank financiers 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
‘Changes in SME affinity to banks and non-bank financiers’ is a latent 
variable regarding the hypothesis that ‘CF became more difficult because 
the house bank principle is deteriorating’ for the following reason (based 
on the findings from the background gathering phase): 
Changes in the affinity from banks to other financiers (to illustrate, see 
Nitschke and Kuper, 2007), or internal funds is a sign that the ‘house bank 
principle’ is deteriorating as a kind of early indicator. 
 
Latent Variables regarding hypothesis 2.a 
The latent variables regarding hypothesis 2.a are as follows. 
 
> Rating related categories like quality of management, financial stability 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The respective occurrence of ‘rating related categories’ is a latent variable 
regarding the hypothesis that ‘SME cope best by optimising rating’ which 
is straightforward as the rating categories define the rating (see 
Zimmermann, 2007). 
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Latent Variables regarding hypotheses 2.b and 3 
The latent variables regarding hypotheses 2.b and 3 are as follows. 
 
> Investment attitudes regarding SMEs (hypothesis 3 only) 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The respective occurrence of ‘investment attitudes regarding SMEs’ (see 
growing SME focus, Höppner and Ostmeier, 2009) serves as a latent 
variable regarding the hypothesis that ‘financiers invest in SMEs if they 
either deploy a (niche) market leadership strategy and when they open up 
for exit strategies’ for the following reasons: an attitude towards SMEs in 
general is a prerequisite for investing in a particular SMEs which deploys a 
specific strategy (see below) which suites non-bank financiers (see 
Schäfer et al, 2004 and 2007). 
 
> Business vision for gaining/enhancing USPs 
Willingness for incorporating new financiers 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The respective occurrences of ‘business vision for gaining/enhancing 
USPs’ and ‘willingness for incorporating new financiers’ are latent 
variables regarding the hypotheses that ‘SMEs cope best by restructuring 
to fit for non-bank financiers’ and that ‘financiers invest in SMEs if they 
either deploy a (niche) market leadership strategy and when they open up 
for exit strategies’ for the following reasons: 
According to Ries and Trout (2000) a sustainable USP is a prerequisite for 
gaining a competitive edge in order to reach a leading (niche) market 
position. The elements of USPs manifest in the indicators of company 
potential and is based on Nagl (2003) and Jobber (1995). Based on elite 
interviews, Hedtstück (2007) points out that private equity companies 
foster the development of SMEs with a focus on growth rather than cost 
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cutting. Growth is the major motivation for going public, as Frey and Kuhn 
(2007) point out. This is an indication that growth is important. 
Furthermore, the willingness to incorporate new non-bank financiers is a 
prerequisite for an exit orientation as this is the main potential leverage 
revenue stream of non-bank financiers (BVK, 2006). 
 
B.3 Manifest Variables SME 
The manifest (dependent) variables regarding research unit SMEs comprise: 
 
Company background 
> Non-financial characteristics which provide basic information about the 
sample characteristic: 
- region 
- years of existence 
- sector 
- size (revenue, employees): last three years 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
As no general consistent picture regarding the effect of Basel II on SME 
financing has emerged, there might be certain patterns in relation to SME 
specific clusters such as. The variables are used in the multiple linear 
regression. 
- Region: state-fostered loans are different in each of the 16 federal 
 states. In Bavaria, for example, federal state owned BayernKapital 
 double the investment from the national state fostered programme of 
 the High-Tech-Gründerfonds (Huber, 2006).  
- Years of existence: according to authors like Schäfer et al (2007) the 
 type of financing is dependent of the maturity (and the drive for inno- 
 vation) of a company and furthermore state fostered loans are classified 
 according to years of existence (so-called ERP-capital, KfW, 2008). 
- Sector: the sector classification has derived from the main clusters 
 based on the official classification of the Federal Statistics Office 
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 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008). Such clustering is quite common in 
 financial research (Frey and Kuhn, 2007; Deloitte and Touche, 2007; 
 and BVK, 2008). 
- Size: number of employees and revenue size which are clustered 
 according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2003a). 
 
Strategic SME company focus 
> Company strategy focus in the past and in the future 
Focuses on … 
… financial stability/liquidity 
… increasing profitability 
… enhancing market position 
… quality excellence 
… technological excellence 
… cost excellence 
… and increasing company valuation 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The variables serve as an indicator for the latent variable ‘business vision 
regarding USP’ as described by Nagl (2003) and Jobber (1995), see 
strategic SME focus regarding investment criteria of non-bank financiers in 
section 5.6.1. 
According to Hedtstück (2007) and Schäfer et al (2007), and based on the 
interviews with elite investors, financiers invest if certain criteria are 
fulfilled. If SMEs aim for a sustainable USP (growth, niche market, 
technology leadership, brand building, cost leadership, see section 5.6.1, 
with reference to Nagl, 2003, and Jobber, 1995) this is an indicator for the 
tendency of (non-bank) financiers to invest in SMEs. The same applies to 
exit orientation (indicator: enhancing company valuation). Investors 
typically stay three to ten years (Schäfer and Fischer, 2008). If the strategy 
is more conservative focusing on cost, profitability, improving financial 
ratios and quality this is an indicator for a focus on improving ratings in 
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order to enhance the chances of getting access to cheaper bank loans. In 
2004, the main strategic focus for German SMEs was on cost cutting 
(Kühlhorn, 2004). 
 
Financing sources 
(including ‘attitude towards (near) equity financing areas’) 
> Financing sources in the past compared to preference in the future 
- retained earnings 
- share holder (equity/loan) 
- bank credit 
- SME subsidies 
- supplier credit 
- leasing 
- factoring 
- mezzanine 
- securities (ABS) 
- private equity 
- strategic investor 
- IPO (e.g. entry standard) 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
Changes in the financing behaviour are an indicator for the latent variable 
‘ease of getting a loan’ (usage of credits), ‘changes in SME affinity to 
banks and non-bank financiers’ (usage of non-credit sources of finance, 
see section 5.4.1). For example, Hartl (2002) acknowledges that factoring 
does not harm the deposit of securities of credits (as the creditworthiness 
of the client of a company is taken into account), whereas leasing is often 
used, when lines of credits are utilised. 
The classification is derived from general research on SME financing (Frey 
and Kuhn, 2007:35) and literature research focusing on selected financing 
sources like shareholder loans (Hartl, 2002), bank loans (Jacobson et al, 
2006) or mezzanine (Golland and Gehlhaar 2002). Wilson et al (2005) 
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found empirical evidence, based on UK data, that SMEs use trade credits 
more intensively than larger corporations, even in times of financial 
distress. Frommann (2006b) regard the new ‘entry standard’ due to the 
low entry barriers as an attractive IPO option for SMEs (and interesting 
exit option for SME financiers). 
The segmentation in the non-bank financier cluster is derived by looking at 
the various associations which represent providers of the main clusters of 
finance: Business Angels associations like BAND; associations for 
alternative investments like Bundesverband Alternativer Investments 
(mezzanine); Bundesverband Deutscher Leasing-Unternehmer (leasing); 
Deutscher Factoring Verband (factoring); and BVK (private equity and 
venture capital). 
 
Investment criteria of non-bank financiers like private equity 
> Estimates of SMEs regarding non-bank financiers’ investment criteria: 
- financial stability in the past (equity ratio, liquidity etc) 
- good market position 
- leading edge products/technology 
- good comparative cost position in relation to competitors 
- ambitious management regarding company valuation 
- strong financial management 
- future growth options 
- willingness to grant rights to investors  
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The manifest variable ‘investment criteria of non-bank financiers’ (see 
section 5.6.1) corresponds to the latent variable ‘business vision for 
gaining / enhancing USPs’ straightforwardly. The various elements 
correspond with the respective sub-elements of the latent variable in terms 
of the hypothesis like ‘a strategy in terms of growth with the aim of niche 
market leadership’ (see Schäfer et al, 2004 and 2007 as well as Nagl, 
2003, and Jobber, 1995).  
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The latent variable ‘willingness for incorporating new non-bank financiers’ 
corresponds to the manifest variable ‘willingness to grant rights to 
investors’ (see section 5.6.1) because it shows that the reluctance to 
disclose financial information is decreasing (see section 3.3, Diller et al, 
2005). 
 
Credit rejection criteria 
> Estimated general rejection criteria regarding loans: 
- reduction of credits to SMEs in general 
- poor sector outlook 
> Estimated company specific rejection criteria regarding loans: 
- poor market position compared to competitors 
- profitability in the past 
- financial situation in the past (equity ratio, liquidity, etc) 
- insufficient securities/liabilities 
- unfavourable outlook (revenues, earnings, etc) 
- quality of management team 
- differences in assessment of company strategy 
- personal friction between company management and banker 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The manifest variable ‘changes in credit rejection criteria’ is the pendant to 
‘investment criteria of non-bank financiers’. This arises directly from the 
fact that it is an indicator regarding the manifest variable ‘ease of getting a 
loan’ (changes in credit rejection criteria, see section 5.4.1).  
The generic rejection criteria reflect the general situation (SMEs in general 
or certain sectors in general). The elements like track record, outlook, 
planning consistency and management capabilities correspond to ‘soft 
fact’ rating issues (Nagl, 2003). Other issues like ‘different judgements 
regarding strategy’, ‘lacking consistency in planning’ or ‘personal frictions’ 
are specific to the SME and bank relationship (derived from elite-
interviews from the background gathering phase). 
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Importance of non-bank financiers as information sources 
> Information sources regarding SME corporate financing: 
- banks 
- non-bank financiers (like private equity) 
- chartered accountants 
- Chamber of Commerce  
- trade press/internet 
Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The latent variables ‘investment attitude regarding SMEs’ manifest in the 
importance of non-bank financiers as information sources in relation to 
other obvious information sources like banks. Straightforwardly, the more 
non-bank financiers play a role as information sources the more likely that 
SMEs will be financed not only by bank loans. The SME assessment is 
used to ‘benchmark’ the non-bank financiers’ own assessment regarding 
their importance (see section 5.6.2). 
 
> Bank relationship  
- how often do you have a call with the bank manager? 
- how often do you have a meeting with the bank manager? 
- number of employees in the finance department? 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
According to a finance communication study by Diller et al (2005) and 
feedback from bankers, in the background gathering phase, it was 
deemed that communication between SMEs and bankers was essential 
for building trust and ensuring transparency in order to have a valid credit 
relationship. The trend in frequency of calls and meetings (banking 
relationship, see section 5.4.1) is therefore an indicator for the latent 
variable ‘changes in SME affinity to banks and non-bank financiers’. Hartl 
(2002) regards the improvement of the information policy as one of the 
key-success factors for SMEs in coping with Basel II. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 403 of 463 
> Rating knowledge, Rating Development 
- knowledge about own rating  
- knowledge about bank rating approach 
- rating development 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
Authors like Nitschke and Kuper (2007) identify the importance of 
knowledge of the rating procedure which enhances the bargaining power 
regarding financing. Being knowledgeable about rating (rating knowledge 
and rating development, see section 5.5.1) is therefore an indicator 
regarding the latent variable ‘SME rating focus’. This includes knowing the 
rating approach a bank applies (Knowing bank rating approach, see 
section 5.5.1) in order ‘to play the game’ best. According to authors like 
Plankensteiner and Zimmermann (2007) knowledge about one’s own 
rating is still poor.  
 
Company potential areas 
> Judgement regarding potential areas which are used in Basel II Ratings: 
- profitability (in relation to sector average) 
- financial situation (equity ratio, liquidity, in relation to sector average) 
- management 
- research & development 
- production & logistics 
- marketing & sales 
- controlling & administration 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question:  
The main clusters of the ‘soft factors’ rating elements (Nagl, 2003) are 
taken as they serve as indicator (see section 5.5.1) for the latent variable 
‘SME rating focus’ in combination with the hard financial related factors 
(mentioned above and below). 
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Financial performance parameter 
> Financial performance parameter: 
- rating development (see above) 
- profitability (EBIT ratio)  
- equity ratio (equity to total capital employed) 
- height of overdraft 
- development of credit rates 
- application for a loan which was not accepted 
 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
A sub-set of financial performance parameters which determine rating 
(see above) financial performance and credit / credit rate development 
(changes in credit related issues, see section 5.4.1) are used for the 
following reasons: more sophisticated issues such as free cash flow would 
not be easily answered by SMEs and could lead to respondent-centred 
threats to validity (Sue and Ritter, 2007:39). In a comprehensive study 
Schindlbeck and Diringer (2007) found that strategic controlling was still 
lacking within SMEs. In support of the background gathering phase, EBIT 
and equity ratio as well as height of overdraft were taken as indicators 
regarding overall financial performance (changes in credit related issues). 
Thus supporting Frey and Kuhn’s (2007) notion that SMEs rely on ‘internal 
sources of finance’ next to bank loans. These are manifest variables 
regarding the latent variables ‘ease of getting a loan’ as a tight liquidity or 
increasing payment periods are indicators for a more difficult lending 
situation according to Euler Hermes (2004). Supply outpaces demand as 
described by Reize (2007:145) so that SMEs have to rely on overdrafts 
rather than other adequate means of finance in terms of alignment (for 
example, length of investment appreciation in line with length of credit 
contract). 
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General effect of Basel II 
> General Basel II effect on credits  
> General Basel II effect on non-bank financing  
> General importance of external effects on financing: 
- Basel II 
- Subprime crisis 
- problems of investment banks 
- problems of state owned SME banks 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
These broad brush questions serve as a kind of ‘control questions’ 
regarding the various related questions which evaluate the effect of Basel 
II regarding particular manifest variables. 
 
B.4 Manifest Variables Financiers 
The manifest (dependent) variables regarding research unit financiers are: 
 
Company background 
General focus on SMEs, shift in financing focus of non-bank financiers 
> Non-financial characteristics which provide basic information about the 
sample characteristic: 
- size (number of employees, funds volume)  
- years of existence 
- regional focus 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The introductory building block of the financier questionnaire is similar to 
the respective paragraph in the SMEs counterpart. As no consistent pic-
ture regarding the effect of Basel II on SME financing emerged in general, 
it is of interest how the participating financiers are distributed regarding: 
- size of financier (as indication of the number of companies to be 
 financed) 
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- longitude of investment (in order to assess if the financier has been 
 active before the Basel II discussion emerged) 
- funds under management 
- regional investment focus 
Elements like ‘regional focus’ are an indicator regarding ‘investment 
attitude regarding SMEs’ as SME affinity is in general related to a smaller 
regional scope according to the background gathering phase. 
 
Changes in provision of financial instruments 
> Investment focus in the past and in the future regarding: 
- sources of financing provided 
- investment phase supported 
- sector supported 
- company-specific financial parameter (revenues, EBIT) 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
A broadening portfolio regarding ‘sources of financing provided’ and 
‘phases and sector supported’, are indicators for: ‘ease-of-getting a loan’ 
as non-bank financiers fill the gap left by banks (changes in provision of 
financial instruments, see section 5.4.2) and a favourable ‘investment 
attitude regarding SMEs’ (shift in financing focus of non-bank financiers, 
see section 5.6.2). 
The same sector classification is used in the financier and SME question-
naire (see section B.3). The size range (general focus on SME, see 5.6.2) 
reflects the latent variable ‘investment attitude regarding SMEs’ as a focus 
on small enterprises and medium enterprises rather than micro enterprises 
or large enterprises is regarded as the most successful focus according to 
authors like Gregory et al (2005) or Frey and Kuhn (2007) as explained in 
section 3.3. 
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Sources of SME financing from a financiers’ perspective 
> (Estimated) finance sources in the past compared to preferences in the 
future: 
- retained earnings 
- share holder (equity/loan) 
- bank credit 
- SME subsidies 
- supplier credit 
- leasing 
- factoring 
- mezzanine 
- securities (ABS) 
- private equity 
- strategic investor 
- IPO (e.g. entry standard) 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
This manifest variable corresponds to the respective manifest variable in 
the SME questionnaires (see section B.3). As mentioned above, changes 
in financing behaviour is an indicator for the latent variable ‘ease of getting 
a loan’ (usage of credits, related to bank credits and subsidised credits, 
see section 5.4.2), and ‘changes in affinity to banks and non-bank finan-
ciers’ and ‘willingness for incorporating new non-bank financiers’ if the 
focus changes from the Pre- to the Post-Basel II era (see section 5.4.2). 
 
Investment criteria 
> Investment criteria of financiers: 
- financial stability in the past (equity ratio, liquidity etc) 
- good market position  
- leading edge products/technology 
- good comparative cost position in relation to competitors 
- ambitious management regarding company valuation 
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- strong financial management 
- future growth options 
- willingness of shareholders to incorporate new non-bank financiers with 
respective rights 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
The latent variable ‘investment criteria’ corresponds to the respective 
manifest variable in the SME questionnaire where SMEs are asked to 
judge the non-bank financiers’ investment criteria (see section B.3). It is an 
indicator for ‘investment attitude regarding SMEs’ as it determines this 
latent variable straightforwardly. In combination with the respective 
findings from the SME questionnaire, ‘investment criteria of non-bank 
financiers’ (see section 5.6.2) serve as indicators regarding the latent 
variable ‘business vision for gaining / enhancing USPs’.  
 
Credit rejection criteria 
> Estimated general rejection criteria regarding loans: 
- reduction of credits to SMEs in general 
- poor sector outlook 
> Estimated company specific rejection criteria regarding loans: 
- poor market position compared to competitors 
- profitability in the past 
- financial situation in the past (equity ratio, liquidity, etc) 
- insufficient securities/liabilities 
- unfavourable outlook (revenues, earnings, etc.) 
- quality of management team 
- differences in assessment of company strategy 
- personal friction between company management and banker 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
Again, the manifest variable ‘credit rejection criteria by banks’ corresponds 
to the respective manifest variable in the SME questionnaire (see section 
B.3), where SMEs are asked to estimate the rejection criteria of banks. 
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Alike, it is an indicator regarding the latent variable ‘ease of getting a loan’ 
(see section 5.4.2). 
 
Importance of non-bank financiers as information sources 
> Information sources regarding SME corporate financing: 
- banks 
- non-bank financiers (like private equity) 
- chartered accountants 
- Chamber of Commerce  
- trade press/internet 
Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
As discussed in section B.3 the latent variables ‘investment attitude 
regarding SMEs’ manifest in the importance of non-bank financiers as 
information sources in relation to other typical information sources like 
banks. If the non-bank financiers regard themselves as important (in 
comparison to the SMEs’ assessment this is an indicator regarding a 
growing affinity towards SME finance (see section 5.6.2). 
 
General effect of Basel II 
> General Basel II effect on credits  
> General Basel II effect on non-bank financing  
> General importance of external effects on financing: 
- Basel II 
- Subprime crisis 
- problems of investment banks 
- problems of state owned SME banks 
 Justification in relation to hypothesis/research question: 
Again, this broad brush question serves as a ‘control question’ regarding 
the various related questions which evaluate the effect of Basel II 
regarding particular manifest variables. 
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Appendix C Questionnaires 
SME Questionnaire 
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Financier Questionnaire 
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Appendix D Codebook Quantitative Analysis 
 
SME codebook 
 
Question 
module 
No. 
Question 
description 
Question 
No. 
Item description  Variable 
1 Company facts 1 Company age ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଵ 
1 Company facts 2 Sector ܺଶௌொ,ଵ 
1 Company facts 3 Revenue 2006 ܺଷௌொ,ଵ 
1 Company facts 4 Revenue 2007 ܺସௌொ,ଵ 
1 Company facts 5 Revenue 2008 ܺହௌொ,ଵ 
1 Company facts 6 Employees 2006 ܺ଺ௌொ,ଵ 
1 Company facts 7 Employees 2007 ܺ଻ௌொ,ଵ 
1 Company facts 8 Employees 2008 ଼ܺௌொ,ଵ 
2 Influencing factor: SME 
financing 
1 Importance of … Basel II ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଶ 
2 Influencing factor: 
SME financing 
2 … subprime crises ܺଶௌொ,ଶ 
2 Influencing factor: 
SME financing 
3 … investment banks ܺଷௌொ,ଶ 
2 Influencing factor: 
SME financing 
4 … state owned banks ܺସௌொ,ଶ 
3 Strategic focus 1 Focus on … fin. stability / 
liquidity 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଷ 
3 Strategic focus 2 … increasing profitability ܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଷ 
3 Strategic focus 3 … enhancing market 
position 
ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଷ 
3 Strategic focus 4 … quality excellence ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଷ 
3 Strategic focus 5 … technology excellence ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଷ 
3 Strategic focus 6 … cost excellence ܺ଺,௣/௙ௌொ,ଷ 
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3 Strategic focus 7 … increasing company 
valuation 
ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,ଷ 
3 Strategic focus 8 Importance of Basel II 
reg. strategic company 
focus 
଼ܺௌொ,ଷ 
4 Sources of finance 1 Usage of ... retained 
earnings 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 2 ... shareholder (equity / 
loan) 
ܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 3 ... bank credit ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 4 ... SME subsidies ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 5 ... supplier credit ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 6 ... leasing ܺ଺,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 7 ... factoring ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 8 ... mezzanine ଼ܺ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 9 ... securities (ABS) ܺଽ,௣/௙ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 10 ... private equity ଵܺ଴,௣/௙
ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 11 ... strategic investor ଵܺଵ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 12 ... IPO (e. g. entry 
standard) 
ଵܺଶ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 13 Importance of Basel II 
regarding fin. sources 
ଵܺଷ
ௌொ,ସ 
5 Non-bank financing 1 Effect of Basel II on non-
bank financing 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 2 Inv. criteria … fin. stability ܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 3 ... good market position  ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 4 ... leading edge 
products/technology 
ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 5 ... cost position ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 6 ... company mgmt. ܺ଺,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 7 ... strong financial 
management 
ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
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5 Non-bank financing 8 ... future growth options ଼ܺ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 9 ... willingness to 
incorporate new investors 
ܺଽ,௣/௙ௌொ,ହ 
5 Non-bank financing 10 Importance of Basel II 
reg. inv. criteria of non-
Bank fin. 
ଵܺ଴
ௌொ,ହ 
6 Bank credit financing 1 Effect of Basel II on bank 
credit financing 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 2 Credit rejection criteria: … 
SME in general 
ܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 3 ... poor sector outlook ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 4 ... poor market position ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 5 ... profitability in the past ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 6 ... financial situation in the 
past 
ܺ଺,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 7 ... insufficient 
securities/liabilities 
ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 8 ... unfavourable outlook  ଼ܺ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 9 ... quality of management 
team 
ܺଽ,௣/௙ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 10 ... differences in the 
assessment of strategy 
ଵܺ଴,௣/௙
ௌொ,଺ 
6 Bank credit financing 11 ... personal friction ଵܺଵ,௣/௙
ௌொ,଺ 
7 Information Source 1 Importance as info source 
… banks 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,଻ 
7 Information Source 2 ... non-bank financiers ܺଶௌொ,଻ 
7 Information Source 3 ... chartered accountants ܺଷௌொ,଻ 
7 Information Source 4 ... chamber of commerce  ܺସௌொ,଻ 
7 Information Source 5 ... trade press / internet ܺହௌொ,଻ 
8 Company Potential 1 Company potential: … 
profit 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,଼ 
8 Company Potential 2 ... financial situation  ܺଶ,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ 
8 Company Potential 3 ... management ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ 
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8 Company Potential 4 ... research & 
development 
ܺସ,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ 
8 Company Potential 5 ... production & logistics ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ 
8 Company Potential 6 ... marketing & sales ܺ଺,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ 
8 Company Potential 7 ... controlling & 
administration 
ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,଼ 
8 Company Potential 8 Importance of Basel II 
regarding company 
potential 
଼ܺௌொ,଼ 
9 Financial management 1 Credit risk approach of 
bank 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 2 No. employees in the 
financial department 
ܺଶௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 3 Development of no. 
employees financial 
department 
ܺଷ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 4 No. phone calls ܺସௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 5 Develop. of No. of phone 
calls 
ܺହ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 6 No. of meetings ܺ଺ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 7 Development of No. of 
meetings 
ܺ଻,௣/௙ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 8 Rating value ଼ܺௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 9 Development of rating 
value 
ܺଽ,௣/௙ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 10 EBIT ratio ଵܺ଴
ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 11 Development of EBIT 
ratio 
ଵܺଵ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ  
9 Financial management 12 Equity ratio ଵܺଶ
ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 13 Development of equity 
ratio 
ଵܺଷ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ  
9 Financial management 14 Overdraft ଵܺସ
ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 15 Development of overdraft ଵܺହ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ  
9 Financial management 16 Development of credit 
rates 
ଵܺ଺,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ  
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9 Financial management 17 No. of credit declines ଵܺ଻
ௌொ,ଽ 
9 Financial management 18 Development of credit 
declines 
ଵ଼ܺ,௣/௙
ௌொ,ଽ  
I1 Average employees 1 Arithmetic average 
employees 2006 – 2008 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,ூଵ 
I2 Average revenue 1 Arithmetic average 
revenue 
2006 – 2008 
ଵܺ
ௌொ,ூଶ 
I3 Average importance of 
non-credit sources of 
finance 
1 Arithmetic average of 
Xହ,୮/୤ୗ୑୉,ସ to Xଵଶ,୮/୤ୗ୑୉,ସ 
ଵܺ,௙/௣
ௌொ,ூଷ 
I4 Average generic 
rejection criteria 
regarding bank credits 
1 Arithmetic average of 
Xଶ,୮/୤ୗ୑୉,଺ and Xଷ,୮/୤ୗ୑୉,଺ 
ଵܺ,௙/௣
ௌொ,ூସ 
I5 Average SME rating 
potential 
1 Arithmetic average 
of Xଵ,୮/୤ୗ୑୉,଼ to X଻,୮/୤ୗ୑୉,଼ 
ଵܺ,௙/௣
ௌொ,ூହ 
Table 48 Codebook SME questionnaire 
 
 
Financier codebook 
 
Question 
module 
No. 
Question 
description 
Question 
No. 
Item description Variable 
1 Company facts 1 No. of employees ଵܺ
ிூே,ଵ 
1 Company facts 2 Years of activities in 
Germany 
ܺଶிூே,ଵ 
1 Company facts 3 Funds under mgmt. 2006 ܺଷிூே,ଵ 
1 Company facts 4 Funds under mgmt. 2007 ܺସிூே,ଵ 
1 Company facts 5 Funds under mgmt. 2008 ܺହிூே,ଵ 
1 Company facts 6 Geographic focus: 
German State 
ܺ଺ிூே,ଵ 
1 Company facts 7 Geographic focus: 
Germany 
ܺ଻ிூே,ଵ 
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1 Company facts 8 Geographic focus: Europe ଼ܺிூே,ଵ 
1 Company facts 9 Geographic focus: 
worldwide 
ܺଽிூே,ଵ 
2 Financing focus 1 Sources focus on … 
Credits 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 2 … Subsidies ܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 3 … Leasing ܺଷ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 4 … Factoring ܺସ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 5 … Mezzanine ܺହ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 6 … Securities (ABS) ܺ଺,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 7 … Equity ܺ଻,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 8 Importance of Basel II 
regarding sources 
provided 
଼ܺிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 9 Phase focus on 
… no preference 
ܺଽ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 10 … Seed financing ଵܺ଴,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 11 … Growth financing ଵܺଵ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 12 … Working Capital 
financing ଵܺଶ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 13 … MBO / MBI ଵܺଷ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 14 … Buy-out financing ଵܺସ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 15 … Turn-around financing ଵܺହ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 16 Importance of Basel II 
regarding phases 
supported 
ଵܺ଺
ிூே,ଶ
2 Financing focus 17 Sector focus on  
… no preference 
ଵܺ଻,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ
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2 Financing focus 18 … Plant / Machinery 
Industry 
ଵ଼ܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ
2 Financing focus 19 … Automotive ଵܺଽ,௣/௙
ிூே,ଶ
2 Financing focus 20 … General Industry ܺଶ଴,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 21 … MedTech / BioTech ܺଶଵ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 22 … ITK, Media, High-Tec. ܺଶଶ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 23 … Chemicals / Pharma ܺଶଷ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 24 … Food ܺଶସ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 25 … Building/Construction ܺଶହ,௣/௙ிூே,௜ଶ௕ 
2 Financing focus 26 … Consumer Good ܺଶ଺,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 27 … Energy / Water ܺଶ଻,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 28 … Retail / Trade ܺଶ଼,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 29 … Financial Services 
Industry 
ܺଶଽ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 30 … Logistics / Traffic ܺଷ଴,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 31 … Consulting / Service ܺଷଵ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 32 … Agriculture / Mining ܺଷଶ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 33 Importance of Basel II 
reg. sectors supported 
ܺଷଷிூே,ଶ 
2 Financing focus 34 Sweetspot EBIT 
relevance 
ܺଷସ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 35 Sweetspot EBIT minimum ܺଷହ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 36 Sweetspot EBIT 
maximum 
ܺଷ଺,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 37 Sweetspot revenue 
relevance 
ܺଷ଻,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
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2 Financing focus 38 Sweetspot revenue 
minimum 
ܺଷ଼,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 39 Sweetspot revenue 
maximum 
ܺଷଽ,௣/௙ிூே,ଶ  
2 Financing focus 40 Importance of Basel II 
reg. financial parameter 
sweetspot 
ܺସ଴ிூே,ଶ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
1 Importance of … Basel II ଵܺ
ிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
2 … subprime crises ܺଶிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
3 … investment banks ܺଷிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
4 … state owned banks ܺସிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
5 Importance as info source 
… banks 
ܺହிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
6 ... non-bank financiers ܺ଺ிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
7 ... chartered accountants ܺ଻ிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
8 ... chamber of commerce  ଼ܺிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
9 ... trade press / internet ܺଽிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
10 Effect of Basel II on bank 
credit financing 
ଵܺ଴
ிூே,ଷ 
3 Influencing factor and 
generic effects 
11 Effect of Basel II on non-
bank financing 
ଵܺଵ
ிூே,ଷ 
4 Sources of finance 1 Usage of ... retained 
earnings 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 2 ... shareholder (equity / 
loan) 
ܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 3 ... bank credit ܺଷ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
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4 Sources of finance 4 ... SME subsidies ܺସ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 5 ... supplier credit ܺହ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 6 ... leasing ܺ଺,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 7 ... factoring ܺ଻,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 8 ... mezzanine ଼ܺ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 9 ... securities (ABS) ܺଽ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ 
4 Sources of finance 10 ... private equity ଵܺ଴,௣/௙
ிூே,ସ  
4 Sources of finance 11 ... strategic investor ଵܺଵ,௣/௙
ிூே,ସ  
4 Sources of finance 12 ... IPO (e. g. entry 
standard) 
 
ଵܺଶ,௣/௙
ிூே,ସ  
4 Sources of finance 13 Importance of Basel II 
regarding financing 
sources 
ଵܺଷ
ிூே,ସ 
5 Bank credit financing 1 Credit rejection criteria: 
… SME in general 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 2 ... poor sector outlook ܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 3 ... poor market position ܺଷ,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 4 ... profitability in the past ܺସ,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 5 ... financial situation in the 
past 
ܺହ,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 6 ... insufficient sec. / 
liabilities 
ܺ଺,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 7 ... unfavourable outlook  ܺ଻,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 8 ... quality of management 
team 
଼ܺ,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
5 Bank credit financing 9 ... differences in the 
assessment of strategy 
ܺଽ,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
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5 Bank credit financing 10 ... personal friction ଵܺ଴,௣/௙
ிூே,ହ  
5 Bank credit financing 11 Imp. of Basel II reg. credit 
rejection criteria 
ଵܺଵ
ிூே,ହ 
6 Non-bank financing 1 Investment criteria 
… financial stability 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 2 ... good market position  ܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 3 .. leading edge 
products/tech. 
ܺଷ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 4 ... cost position ܺସ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 5 ... company mgmt. ܺହ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 6 ... strong financial 
management 
ܺ଺,௣/௙ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 7 ... future growth options ܺ଻,௣/௙ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 8 ... willingness to inc. new 
inv. 
଼ܺ,௣/௙ிூே,଺ 
6 Non-bank financing 9 Importance of Basel II 
reg. inv. criteria of non-
bank fin. 
ܺଽிூே,଺ 
I1 Financing focus 1 Number of sources 
provided 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଵ 
I2 Financing focus 1 Number of phases 
supported 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଶ 
I3 Financing focus 1 Number of sectors 
supported 
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ூଷ 
I4 Average importance of 
non-credit means of 
financing 
1 Arithmetic average of  
ܺହ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ to ଵܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,ସ  
ଵܺ,௙/௣
ிூே,ூସ 
I5 Average generic credit 
rejection criteria 
1 Arithmetic average of  
ଵܺ,௣/௙
ிூே,ହ and ܺଶ,௣/௙ிூே,ହ 
ଵܺ,௙/௣
ிூே,ூହ 
I6 Average funds volume 
2006 – 2008 
1 Arithmetic average of  
ܺଷிூே,ଵ and ܺହிூே,ଵ  
ଵܺ,௙/௣
ிூே,ூ଺ 
Table 49 Codebook financier questionnaire 
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Appendix E SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Interview Schedule 
The following provides a summary of the semi-structured in-depth interview 
schedule regarding SMEs and financiers; the financiers’ interview schedule is 
very similar and has therefore not been included as it differs only with 
regards to the financier specific questions. 
 
Preparation 
The preparation follows the structure presented by Saunders et al 
(2007:328): 
1. Phone up the interviewee and arrange the interview, in line with best 
practices, at the site of the interviewee which is normally favoured by 
interviewees for convenience reasons. Alternative arrangements to be 
made on request (Saunders et al, 2007:327). 
2. Provide the interviewee with the information listed in this introductory 
section, in order, to provide informed consent at an early stage. 
3. Send a letter or mail of confirmation using the information from this 
introductory section as a further basis for informed consent. 
 
Setting the scene 
The introduction/opening is in line with suggestions from Saunders et al 
(2007:324): 
1. Express that taking part in the interview is highly appreciated, this will 
provide substantial added value to the research project. 
2. Start with introducing that the interview will be taped and go through the 
‘informed consent letter’ if taping is approved. If this is declined, the notes 
need to be more extensive. 
3. Introduce the ‘informed consent letter’ (adopt the passage regarding 
taping depending on whether it is agreed or not) and reassure the 
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interviewee which will make them feel more relaxed according to Healey 
and Rawlinson (1994). 
 
Introduction of the scope 
 
The interview forms part of a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) 
programme at the University of Bradford. The project is sponsored by Global 
Value Management (GmbH), a corporate finance consultancy, focusing on 
assisting SMEs in terms of growth and restructuring financing, mergers & 
acquisitions as well as management buy-ins/buy-outs. 
 
The interviewer is the DBA candidate and the founder and CEO of Global 
Value Management. 
 
We appreciate that you are participating in this interview as your company is 
known for … [adopt accordingly]. 
 
The aim of the project is to evaluate the effect of Basel II on SME financing in 
Germany and how SME in your view can cope best with the changes. 
 
A survey was conducted which provided certain insights into the research 
objective. 
 
We are interested in your views on: the respective financing issues and 
regarding the findings derived from the survey. We will present these to you 
in the second part of the interview, to ensure that they do not become 
confused (and gain unbiased answers). 
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Interview Schedule: Part 1 SME 
 
1. SME: Personal & Company Background 
 
May I first ask you about your personal background? 
If yes, take details of: 
 
Did the participant take part in the survey? 
 
If yes and all the answers were given regarding company background, 
go to section 1.b: 
If no and some answers were missing, take details of all the missing 
elements: 
 
1.a) Company Background 
 
a) In which year was your company founded?
 ________________________ 
 
b) In which German state is your head office?
 ________________________ 
 
c) Number of employees 2006 – 2008: _______ _______
 _______ 
 
d) Revenues in mio. euro _______ _______
 _______ 
(2006, 2007, 2008) 
 
e) Regional focus (Region -> which one,  _______ 
nationwide in Germany or international) 
 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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f) What is the scope of your company? 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.b) Personal Background 
 
a) How did you become a manager/entrepreneur, explain your background? 
 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
b) What is important for you being an entrepreneur? 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. SME: General Assessments 
 
a) Can you explain in detail the evaluation process regarding corporate 
financing? 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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b) What is important for you when you think about external financing? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
c) What do you believe are the main reasons for an SME credit being rejected 
– can you explain in detail? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
d) What do you believe are the main reasons when a non-bank financier 
makes an investment in an SME? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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e) How will corporate financing change for SMEs? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
f) Please describe the relationship to your bank and bank manager 
(meetings, calls, behaviour, credit lines changes etc.)? 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
g) What about rating? 
(Have you been rated, rating development, bank approach) 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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h) How can other SMEs cope best in order to stay sufficiently financed in the 
future? 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
i) What specific advice would you give to other SMEs? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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Interview Schedule: Part 1 Financier  
 
1. Financier: Personal Background 
 
1. May I first ask you about your personal background. 
If yes, take details of: 
 
a) Years of being in business
 ________________________ 
 
b) How did you become a fund manager, explain your background 
 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
c) What is the scope of your company? 
 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. Financier: Company Background 
 
2.a) Financier: General Company Background 
 
Did the participant take part in the survey? 
If yes and all the answers were given regarding company background, 
go to section 2.b: 
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If no and some answers were missing, take details of all the missing 
elements: 
 
a) Date of company founding (active in GY) _______ 
 
b) Number of employees 2006 – 2008: _______ _______ _______ 
 
c) Funds under managements in mio. euro _______ _______ _______ 
(2006, 2007, 2008) 
 
d) Regional focus (Region -> which one,  _______ 
nationwide in Germany or international) 
 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.b) Financier: General Assessments 
 
Can you explain in detail the evaluation process regarding SME financing? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is important for you when you think about financing an SME – can you 
explain in detail? 
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What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
What are the main reasons when you reject financing an SME – can you 
explain in detail? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
How will corporate financing change for SMEs? 
Will the house-bank principle deteriorate? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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How have SMEs to do in order to stay sufficiently financed in the future? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
What specific advice would you give to SMEs? 
 
What changes are due to long-term issues like Basel II and what are due to short-
term (?) issues like the crisis of the financial markets (subprime crisis)? 
- either in general or in relation to certain criteria like size, sector, phase, funds etc. - 
 
Basel II (long-term)/subprime (short-term) 
Comments/Notes: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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Interview Schedule: SME and Financiers Part 2:  
Feedback on Findings from Quantitative Analysis 
 
I am highly interested in your feedback on the findings of the survey, which 
was undertaken in the fourth quarter of 2008.. 
Therefore, I will provide you with the main findings in the respective area – 
would you please be so kind to comment on that. 
 
2.b) Financier: Investment Focus 
 
a) Preference in sources of financing  
- in the last three years 
- in the next three years 
 Credits  Subsidies  Leasing  Factoring 
 Mezzanine  Securities (ABS)  Equity  
 
Instruments provided in the past in the 
future 
… on average by banks 3.80 3.67 
… on average by non-bank financiers 1.56 1.56 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … Financiers 
Basel II regarding sources of finance: 2.45 
 
Please comment on these findings from the questionnaire-based survey: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
b) Preference in phase related focus 
- in the last three years 
- in the next three years 
 No preference  Seed financing  Growth 
financing 
 Working Capital
 MBO / MBI  Buy-out 
financing 
 Turn-around 
finance  
 Others 
__________ 
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Phases supported in the past in the 
future 
… on average by banks 2.80 2.60 
… on average by non-bank financiers 2.27 2.44 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … Financiers 
Basel II regarding phases supported 2.41 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
c) Preference in sector focus  
in the last three years in % / in the next three years in % 
 Plant / Mach. 
Industry 
57% / 48% 
 Automotive: 
37% / 28% 
 General Industry
35% / 38% 
 MedTech / 
BioTech: 
38% / 40% 
 ITK, Media, High-
Tec. 
45% / 42% 
 Chemicals / 
Pharma 
31% / 34% 
 Building/Construct
25% / 18% 
 Food 
23% / 20% 
 Consumer Goods 
31% / 26% 
 Energy / Water
26% / 26% 
 Retail / Trade 
31% / 28% 
 Fin. Serv. Ind. 
12% / 11% 
 Logistics / Traffic 
29% / 26% 
 Consulting / 
Services 
25% / 22% 
 Agriculture / 
Mining 
11% / 9% 
 no answer 
9% / 14% 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … Financiers 
Basel II regarding sector choice: 2.44 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
d) Sweet spot regarding revenues (from … million euros to … million euros)  
- in the last three years 
- in the next three years 
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e) Sweet spot regarding EBIT (from … million euros to … million euros) 
- in the last three years 
- in the next three years 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … Financiers 
Basel II regarding company sweetspot 2.31 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. SME & Financier: Influencing Factors and General Effects on SME 
Financing 
 
According to your opinion, what importance have the following incidents had 
on the financing of German SMEs? 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
 
Importance of … SMEs Financiers       Delta 
Basel II: 3.07 3.19 3.9% 
subprime crisis: 2.98 3.56 19.5% 
problems of investment banks 2.74 3.00 9.5% 
problems of state owned SME 
banks 
3.12 3.62 16.0% 
… others (please name) 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
What role do the following information sources play regarding financing 
options? 
Findings from the questionnaire-based survey: 
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Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
 
Importance of … SMEs Financiers           Delta 
Banks 3.32 3.44 3.6% 
Non-bank financiers 2.16 3.18 47.2% 
Chartered accounts 3.07 2.98 -2.9% 
Chamber of Commerce 2.09 2.23 6.7% 
Trade press/internet 2.61 2.61 0% 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Effect of Basel II regarding SME financing 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study 
(Scale of 1 = much easier/cheaper to 4 = much more difficult/expensive) 
 
Due to Basel II … 
 SME Financier      Delta 
… SME credit financing via banks will be 3.25 3.08 5.5% 
… SME financing via non-bank financiers will be 2.57 2.28 12.7% 
 
Please comment on these findings from the questionnaire-based survey: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. SME: Strategy 
4.a) Strategic Focus 
 
How do you assess the importance of the following strategic elements in the 
past (prior to Basel II, i. e. prior to 2007/2008) and in the future (next two 
years)? 
 
Findings from the questionnaire-based survey: 
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Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
 
Focus on … SME SME Change 
   past future 
 
… financial stability/liquidity  3.25 3.78 + 16.2% 
… increasing profitability  3.37 3.49 + 3.5% 
… enhancing market position  3.08 3.28 + 6.2% 
… quality excellence 3.25 3.32 + 2.6% 
… technology excellence 3.05 3.08 + 1.1% 
… cost excellence 3.34 3.54 + 6.1% 
… increasing company valuation 2.75 3.12 + 13.6% 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … SMEs    
Basel II on inv. criteria of non-bank fin.: 2.61  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.b) Potential Areas 
 
 
How do you assess the current potential of your companies and what would 
you like to improve in the future?  
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
 
Findings from the questionnaire-based survey: 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 450 of 463 
Potential areas Current Future Change 
   potential potential   
 
Profitability (in rel. to sector avg.) 2.67 2.79 + 4.4% 
Financial situation (equity ratio. 2.79 2.86 + 2.4% 
liqu., in rel. to sector avg.) 
Management 3.02 3.02 + 0% 
Research & Development 2.05 2.46 + 19.9% 
Production & Logistics 2.56 2.77 + 8.5% 
Marketing & Sales 2.79 3.12 + 11.8% 
Controlling & Administration 2.83 2.82 - 0.1% 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … SMEs    
Basel II on inv. criteria of non-bank fin.: 2.34  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5. SME & Financier: Corporate Financing of SMEs 
5.a) SME & Financier: Financing Preferences of SMEs 
 
How do you assess the financing preferences of SMEs in the past (prior to 
Basel II, i. e. prior to 2007/2008) and in the future?  
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
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Usage of fin. 
options: 
SMEs 
past 
SMEs
future
Change Fin. 
past 
Fin. 
future 
Change
Retained 
earnings 
3.19 3.47 8.8% 3.52 3.77 7.1%
Share holder 
(equity/loan) 
2.53 2.54 0.4% 3.35 3.60 7.5%
Bank credit 3.00 2.95 -1.7% 3.84 3.52 -8.3%
SME subsidies 2.38 2.28 -4.2% 3.16 3.27 3.5%
Supplier credit 2.28 2.26 -0.9% 3.43 3.65 6.4%
Leasing 2.81 2.93 4.3% 3.26 3.44 5.5%
Factoring 1.41 1.59 12.8% 2.60 3.13 20.4%
Mezzanine 1.20 1.43 19.2% 2.32 2.63 13.4%
Securities 
(ABS)  
1.13 1.13 0.0% 1.56 1.52 -2.6%
Private equity 1.29 1.49 15.5% 2.29 2.79 21.8%
Strategic 
investor 
1.36 1.72 26.5% 2.21 2.59 17.2%
IPO (e.g. entry 
standard)  
1.05 1.16 10.5% 1.92 1.84 -4.2%
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … SMEs  Financiers  
Basel II on financing preferences: 2.66 3.02 13.5% 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.b) SME & Financier: Rejection Criteria Regarding the Granting of 
Credits  
 
How do you assess the rejection criteria of bank credits regarding SMEs in the 
past (prior to Basel II, i. e. prior to 2007/2008) and in the future (next two 
years)?  
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Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
 
Rejection criteria bank 
credits: 
SMEs 
past 
SMEs
future 
Change Fin. 
past 
Fin. 
future 
Change
To SMEs in general 2.24 3.04 35.7% 2.07 2.54 22.7%
Poor sector outlook 2.68 3.47 29.5% 3.21 3.48 8.4%
Poor market position 
compared to competitors 
2.71 3.33 22.9% 3.33 3.63 9.0%
Profitability in the past 3.00 3.47 15.7% 3.12 3.30 5.8%
Financial situation in the 
past (equity ratio, 
liquidity, …) 
3.12 3.75 20.2% 3.21 3.45 7.5%
Insufficient 
securities/liabilities 
3.32 3.81 14.8% 2.67 2.82 5.6%
Unfavourable outlook 
(revenues, earnings…) 
3.25 3.79 16.6% 3.65 3.82 4.7%
Quality of management 
team 
2.98 3.52 18.1% 3.56 3.77 5.9%
Differences in assess-
ment of comp. strategy 
2.76 3.11 12.7% 2.98 3.28 10.1%
Personal friction betw. 
company management 
and banker 
2.80 2.89 3.2% 2.86 2.91 1.7%
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … Financiers  
Basel II on rejection criteria: 2.78 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.c) SME & Financier: Company Specific Financing/Investment Criteria 
 
How do you assess the importance of the following investment criteria 
regarding your financing/investment decisions in the past (prior to Basel II, i. 
e. prior to 2007/2008) and in the future (next two years)?  
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Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
 
Inv. criteria of SMEs SMEs  Change Fin. Fin. Change
non-bank fin. past future  past future  
Financial stability 
in the past (equity 
ratio, liqu.) 
2.87 3.32 15.7% 3.29 3.49 6.1%
Good market 
position  
3.19 3.47 8.8% 3.58 3.76 5.0%
Leading edge 
prod./technology 
3.33 3.53 6.0% 3.47 3.63 4.6%
Good comparative 
cost pos. in rel. to 
comp. 
3.02 3.21 6.3% 3.16 3.34 5.7%
Ambitious mgmt. 
reg. comp. valuat. 
3.17 3.45 8.8% 3.17 3.26 2.8%
Strong financial 
management  
2.96 3.40 14.9% 3.15 3.46 9.8%
Future growth 
options  
3.35 3.47 3.6% 3.68 3.85 4.6%
Willingness of 
shareholders to 
inc. new inv. with 
respective rights 
2.36 2.52 6.8% 2.75 3.07 11.6%
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = no importance to 4 = very 
high imp.) 
Importance of … SMEs  Financiers Delta 
Basel II on inv. criteria of non-bank fin.: 2.79 2.58 -7.5% 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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6. Financial Performance SME 
 
Findings from the questionnaire-based survey: 
Please comment on the results of the primary study (1 = lower, 2 = equal, 3 = 
higher) 
 
  The value 
in the past was … 
The value in the 
future will probably 
be … 
 Current value lower equal higher lower equal higher 
No. of employees 
finance department 
2.9 Persons 1.94     2.21 
No. of phone calls with 
bank manager per year 
14.8 times p. a. 1.96    2.00  
No. of meetings with 
bank manager per year 
3.2 times p. a. 1.94     2.08 
Rating value _____ rating 1.77     2.30 
EBIT ratio (pre-tax 
profit/revenue) 
6.6 % 1.75     2.29 
Equity ratio 37.9 % 1.94     2.38 
Height overdraft 
(in % of revenue) 
5.8 %   2.11 1.82   
Development of credit rates   2.15   2.27 
No. of credit application 
rejections 
____ times 1.83     2.04 
 
7. Closing 
 
Thank you very much for your support and for taking your time to answer these 
questions. 
Can I finally ask you if there are any aspects regarding the Basel II effect on SMEs 
and investors, relating to your experience as funds manager, that have not yet been 
covered in this interview? 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Close with reference to the informed consent letter, about providing a 
tape/transcript, and an excerpt of the study. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 January 11 Page 455 of 463 
Appendix F INFORMED CONSENT LETTER  
Informed Consent Letter 
 
Note: as informed consent and confidentiality are applied, (and anonymity on 
request and only in the dissemination phase) the process of confidentiality and 
voluntary participation is explained extensively in order to gain a real and full 
consent not only about the research topic but especially concerning the research 
process as well. 
 
“Thank you for participating in this corporate finance research as part of a DBA 
project of the University of Bradford: 
 
The aim of the research is to evaluate the ‘effect of Basel II regulation on SME 
financing in Germany and how SMEs can cope with the effect’. Interviews were 
conducted to gain a deeper understanding.  
 
Prior to the interviews a survey was conducted by means of self-administered 
questionnaires amongst SMEs on the one hand and financiers on the other hand. 
 
In order to acknowledge your effort you will get a dedicated evaluation of the 
findings setting your estimations in relation to the average or respective peer 
groups.  
 
As it is best practice to ensure that a broader audience benefits from the research 
findings, it is planned that the general findings - without any individual details - will 
be published in selected magazines, via a press release and on the internet. 
Complying with state-of-the-art methodologies no tracing back to the individual 
companies will be possible. 
 
Before we start with the interview it is important for you to know that the DBA study 
is sponsored by Global Value Management GmbH (GVM). GVM is a corporate 
finance consultancy advising SMEs on areas such as corporate financing. The 
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researcher who conducted the interviews is the founder and Managing Director of 
that firm. The interviews are for research purposes and not for consulting purposes. 
 
Applying to international standards of ethical best practices in research, the author 
will apply high standards of confidentiality, for example, by using secured files for 
the storage of data. A record of the interview for approval will be provided. After your 
approval, the recording will be destroyed and overwritten after the DBA thesis is 
completed. 
 
In any cases where citations are to be included in the research publication, fictional 
names will be used and no specific descriptions will be provided so that no tracing 
back is possible according to state-of-the-art methodologies. 
 
Furthermore, it is important for you to know that you can leave the interview at 
anytime, or you can skip certain passages from utilisation within the research. If you 
wish to do so just say ‘off-the-record’ and I will pause the recording. Or you can say 
afterwards to skip a passage already recorded. Furthermore, you can even skip or 
alter passages when you get the recording. Or you can even resign from 
participating. In that case the interview would not be included in the research at all. 
 
If major changes occur during the research you will be informed immediately and 
you can change elements of your statements or resign completely as discussed 
above.” 
 
… conduct the interview … 
 
“Thank you very much for your time and your thoughts. I will send the recording to 
you via e-mail. The e-mail will be password secured, this will be provided via 
telephone. Please return your comments via mail using the same password or give 
me a call so that I can collect the transcript from you.  
At the end of the data analysis phase you will get the evaluation discussed upfront. 
All the best and have a good day!” 
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Appendix G SAMPLE SESSION SUMMARY SHEET  
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